*1 evidence, responsibility that court had a to determine presented whether evidence was sufficient jury matter of law to enable the to find that plaintiff negligence, regard had established the elements of recovery improbability less of such evidence. based on ever-present danger court, There is an at- that a trial tempting sufficiency, unintentionally to determine will violate gossamer boundary weight trespass and into the realm of appeal, evidence. On this court is unable trace steps must, instead, mental our the trial court but make way through only own non- evidence favorable moving party. path will be found our Error when leads differing to a result from that of the trial court. bar, having duty exists, the case at we found that a photographs, pictures,

conclude that motion traffic con- manual, trol testimony investigating and devices expert officer and Elliott, witness which were offered therefrom, the reasonable inferences to be drawn are suffi- probative might cient plaintiff value that a find negligence. has Thus, established the elements of the third inquiry is answered in the affirmative.

Therefore, the decision of court reversed proceedings. cause remanded for further Lybrook, JJ., Lowdermilk and concur. Reported N.E. 674.

Note. — Enyart, Michelle friend, Dawn her next William Enyart Blacketor, Frederick Kline Jr. February 27, Rehearing Filed April [No. 3-1273A162. denied September 13, 1976.] 1976. Transfer denied *2 Bangs Rollo, Rollo, Huntington, Herbert D. R. & Charles Tiede, Plummer, Tiede, Magley Wabash, Metz, ap- & for pellants. Bent, Rockhill, Kennedy, Pinnick, Bent,

Herbert H. & Sand Warsaw, Peterson, E. Robert Rochester, appellee. for Enyart Plaintiffs-appellants J. Dawn M. Hoffman, (Dawn) parents, Enyart and her F. William and Patricia M. (the Enyarts) separate court, commenced actions in the trial prior trial, seeking damages which were consolidated for injuries bicycle sustained when Dawn’s collided with a vehicle by defendant-appellee Blacketor, driven Kline Trial Jr. jury, had before a which returned a verdict in favor Judgment thereon, Blacketor. appeal was entered and this perfected. presented appeal The first issue on whether granting by Blacketor, court erred in a motion in limine filed entering during and in proscribing any an order reference *3 per the speed to a hour 20 mile limit which was posted near the accident scene. Blacketor’s motion in limine legal speed asserted the that limit at the collision scene hour, per Enyarts not 20 miles and that the intended to show trial, the prejudice. existence his to ground illegality speed Blacketor’s for the asserted City Rochester, limit the was that of juris- which had scene, diction over the collision had pursuant not acted to speed State statute so as alter the general to limit from the per prescribed by limit 30 miles hour of statute such for Enyarts, however, The urban areas. contended the trial appeal duly court and on that such limit had altered per authority hour 20 miles under the of ordinance of the City Rochester in effect at of the time of the collision here at issue. parties dispute general speed

The do not the applicable the when mishap street this occurred was 30 per provisions the 1971, miles hour under (b) 9-4-1-57 IC recognized IC Ed.). parties also (1) (Burns Both Code Ed.), “local authorities” (Burns enabled 9-4-1-58 Code the “urban districts” limit within decrease such (b) (1), supra, than to not less covered 9-4-1-57 IC general speed had been per 20 miles hour where safe greater than what was reasonable determined to be investigation. The engineering and on the basis of aforementioned dispute centers about the this issue thus City Ordinance, appellants assert author- which Rochester scene. hour limit at the collision ized a mile upon proving facts appellants The the burden had bar, negligence. case at they In the which their claim of base legal speed accident scene at the maximum claim or placed pleadings. Where issue ordinance, municipal portion on a thereof is based asserting estab claim to party such the burden is ordinance, since courts of lish the existence See, judicial ordinances. notice of such do take State Law No. 309 No. 305 and Public Matter Public Law 659, 662, and cases cited Ind. bar, Thus, appellants had therein. in the case city showing ordinance existence of a further burden neg they alleged setting Blacketor had speed limit which burden, appellants ligently response to such violated. City men Ordinance the existence of the Rochester asserted tioned hereinabove. made portions of ordinance have been

The of Police part enable the of the record of this cause Chief City to “determine the installation of Rochester timing devices” proper of traffic-control and maintenance regu- “temporary experimental signs, and to make such as emergencies special Chief cover conditions.” lations to *4 empowered to conduct studies related of Police is also engineering planning. regard ordinance with to this

Appellants’ exact assertion presumption public officials act is a there is that because law, presumed conformity it must be speed posted here limit at issue was powers in the of his Chief Police exercise regulations foregoing erect and make traffic under the Therefore, they ordinance. because had ordi established such legal contend, sign, appellants nance as a for basis erroneously placed upon trial court them burden of show ing city altering pre speed another ordinance limit as a showing condition admission of evidence the existence sign. assuming arguendo even that such ordinance general properly could have authorized alteration of speed law, appellants limit under State have at no time shown or offered put place to show that this limit by an presumed order Chief Police. While it public conformity law,1 that such a official acts with the there is no basis in presumption law reason for a in the case at bar that place Chief Police acted to cause the sign. ment appellants Because have never shown offered necessary to show the facts to come within the terms ordinance, the aforementioned properly the trial court placed upon showing them burden of that a mile hour limit had been set the accident scene author ity of some other pursuant ordinance enacted to IC 9-4-1-58, supra. Moreover, appellants because the thereafter failed to show the proper existence of authority for a deviation in the limit at the collision scene from general speed statute, any appellants evidence which the tending would have introduced establish such a legal speed as the eyes limit in the would have prejudicial, properly irrelevant and through excludable See, order in limine. Silhavy Burrus (1973), Ind. App. 558, 293 N.E.2d 794. It must concluded that trial proscribing court did not err in any reference 1. Heathco v. State ex rel. Addison 209 Ind. 199 N.E.

219 sign following failure appellants’ disputed speed limit to showing applicable ordinance carry burden of to their validating sign. they if failed that even contention is

Appellants’ next sign, exist- validity evidence of its still of such establish mandate disregard apparent of its ence and the defendant’s consider at for the presented have been should support negligence. Appellants his as some of evidence involving disre- through citation of cases contention notably devices, most gard irregularly posted traffic control of N.W. including Geisking 105 Sheimo Iowa v. 252 599, 2 2d A.L.R.3d brief, succinctly page at their

Appellants, of state their 19 position as follows: limiting order the exist- “The evidence as to Court’s speed signs proving first ence of the without were ordinance, ruling by specific clearly authorized by etc. was sign if un- to the fact that was an Court as sign, negligence per authorized it would se violate not regulation.” illegal that the violation of assertion negligence supported by appellants

is is evidence Geisking following Sheimo, supra, quotation v. at from 41 Iowa, N.W.2d, at of A.L.R. 3d: 2 at 601 105 272-73 weight authority great an unauthor- is that even “[T]he meaningless questions negligence when ized agree with the rule stated under consideration. We are heading ALR, page under the ‘Anno-Traffic It is ‘Further- Intersection’. there said: Street Control more, many take the view if it is shown courts that even authorized, signal properly was not the traffic involved that it question negligence effective to control the is still negligence it, pedestrian contributory driver or vehicle disregard disregards at least the extent that such who consideration the trier of the facts into be taken passed upon in deter- to be circumstances one of the contribu- question mining of a violator’s ” tory negligence.’ Geisking appellants’ supra, Sheimo, reliance on v. therein, misplaced. pointed and the cases cited As out appellee Blacketor, a fundamental difference exists between Geisking Sheimo, supra, cases such as bar. and the case at cases, disregard In the former class a defendant’s of an irregularly gives posted traffic control device which notice of the existence of a hazardous situation is to be considered negligence. However, some evidence of his in the instant case, gave it cannot said that the Blacketor *6 any any hazard, notice of to render so as his asserted dis regard disregard consequences. of it a of known hazardous study Geisking Sheimo, supra,

A careful of v. and the cases therein, warning aspect cited discloses that or notice of irregular

such traffic control considered devices was by dispositive those courts to of the issue disregard negli whether a of them was evidence gence. example, following language For is found in Cook App. 354, v. (1935), Hunter 52 Ohio at 682: always permissible conditions, “It has to show all the facts, surrounding and circumstances col- the location of a character, determining lision of in this re- whether spective parties, conditions, in view of these cir- facts and cumstances, ordinarily prudent persons acted as act would conditions, facts, circumstances, under like and and were guilty negligence therefore contributory or negligence, directly proximately producing and injury, collision and although a criminal conviction could not be based a sign stop light failure to observe a or traffic not erected by authority and maintained warning of law. The effect signal traffic erected at the intersection of the roads occurred, gives where the collision rise to the instant action, way in by no lessened or increased the obtain- ing failing or to obtain the approval consent and highway (Em- director to erect and maintain the same.” phasis supplied.)

Similarly, see, Devine Grace Construction Supply Co. 98, 181 short, 243 Ind. N.E.2d has rule disregard developed irregularly the violation or of an of a driver’s evidence is some posted control device in contributory negligence device where the negligence or warning specific hazard such as gives a question notice or known defect, upcoming area of or of an or road a curve A.L.R. Annot. hazard, or intersection. a school such as Cf: ; (1965) Annot. A.L.R. 3d 275 Annot. 2 (1965); 3d 557 (1946). A.L.R., IVc., at 212 § irregularly posted speed does a that such foregoing rule for reason

come within the warning gives ordinarily or no notice con danger which should or hazard immediate due care. by exercise of a driver in the sidered opinion of no than is more speed limit set speed limit appropriate as to individual some undisclosed such, posted. highway it is As evi- street where for the determining in probative value is of little dence of its violation negligence, contributory what a defendant’s outweighed preju- far evidence is there is value undoubtedly placing result from before would dice which by a defend- apparent speeding violation of an evidence one at bar. case such as the in a ant stated, passing, the view which

It should be preclude plaintiff taken of this issue does not court has *7 introducing any from such a case evidence speed. cases, plain in other defendant’s As all may introduce evidence that was tiff defendant greater operating at a than that his vehicle which was prudent existing under the then circum- reasonable and See, (Bums (a) IC road conditions. 9-4-1-57 stances and correctly Ed.). court held The trial that Code evidence regarding irregularly posted by appellants offered upon admitted the facts in should this case.2 opinion dissenting states in Note 8 that without the rationale of this 2. The statutory “signs compliance opinion legal that erected have no is any required pay whatever, no one attention to and is such effect correctly being signs.” position be more summarized can as that Our effect, legal except they may signs be used to without that such are The next issue which must be considered herein whether is limiting appellants’ the trial court erred in cross-examina- Defendant-appellee tion of witness. introduced Blacketor diagram into evidence a which wit- had drawn such ness, depicting physical objects topography and in the vicinity subsequent of the accident scene on a date diagram approximately accident. Such feet two feet six point legend mph” size and at one bears the in mini- “20 printing. objection scule hand It admitted without and displayed jury. at some distance from the

Although examination, it was never mentioned on direct appellants sought prepared to cross-examine the witness who meaning such mph” symbol. exhibit as to the of such “20 The trial court refused to allow such cross-examination and, presence jury, out symbol ordered such upon appellants. covered motion of The facts relevant to this issue reveal that the trial court’s refusal of mph” symbol cross-examination as to the “20 symbol immediately its deletion of such presence after its rulings was made known were no more than in furtherance limine, of the trial court’s order in which heretofore we have proper. Furthermore, symbol held to be subject dispute during of this was never mentioned direct examination, appellants established, have not nor we do believe, jury that the was ever aware of its existence. More- over, if even one or more members of the did become symbol, light appellants aware of such consistent efforts to have the existence of such jury, revealed such could have been revelation beneficial to their cause. allegedly negligent reasonably that specific show notice driver had some hazard, which he should have considered the exercise of Further, stated, reasonable care. not excessive; for the reasons herein should utilized basis for an inference a driver’s legis- an inference should be based either a valid enactment, proof lative such driver’s under was excessive existing the then road conditions.

223 following question Appellants contend that next erro- during of Blacketor the direct examination answer objection: neously their admitted evidence over anything “Q. Blacketor, there your opinion, Mr. In that accident? you to have avoided could done have Honor, that, going object Your am TIEDE: I “MR. which is called for conclusion for the reason it Jury evidence. province draw from all the proper. prefectly This “MR. Bent: objection overruled. “THE COURT: “A. was not.” There pointed by appellee, the of such out substance testimony ob- previously without had been admitted

opinion during jection examination of Blacketor: such direct “Q. you your before collision? horn Did honk did not have time. “A. I right

“Q. you your car from either —either to Did veer or left?

“A. No. Why

“Q. not?

“A. There was time.” appellants Furthermore, relied rule of law making objection recently been re-examined has their Reith-Riley Company, Construction court. App. Ind. 325 v. McCarrell Inc. court, 844, Judge Lybrook, speaking for this N.E.2d lay opinion requiring a se exclusion of rule held the former by the questions decided testimony to be upon the ultimate N.E.2d, and, unduly 852-53 to be restrictive App., stated: Ind. at 626 of 163 shortcomings “Through recognition of the strict of these majority exclusionary approach, courts have state philosophy provided admissi- adopted all other now met, opinion upon ultimate

bility requirements are given. general cases cited discussion and See fact McCormick, Evidence Evidence 32 C.J.S. *9 § (2d 1972). Exemplifying approaches to Ed. the new § problem of the for United this States Courts is Rule Rules of Evidence Magistrates: “ ‘Rule 704.

“ ‘Opinion on Ultimate Issue “ ‘Testimony opinion in the form an or inference other- objectionable em- wise braces an ultimate issue fact.’ not because it admissible by to be decided the trier of abrogated, and “Thus the se exclusion rule has judge discretion, appropriate the in trial at his permit discretion, case, exercising such evidence. In his judge the trial should consider the nature of the issue light opinion the offered in all circumstances attendant particular case. will This court review such judicial only exercise in discretion for an abuse thereof.” (Footnote omitted.) (1950), Similarly, Bragdon Bruce see App. 497, 501, 120 Ind. bar, by the case at the facts observed the wit- several fully the nesses to collision were jury, revealed to the were the facts observed Blacketor. A factual basis opinion was thus expressed established for the surrounding Blacketor as to the circumstances opinion accident. Such jury thus served to inform the perception totality Blacketor’s of the circumstances surrounding Furthermore, the collision. unlikely it is that opinion was weight by misused or accorded undue jury light in of the trial court’s jury instruction to consider the interest litigation witness in weigh- in ing testimony. say his This court cannot that court the trial allowing its opinion abused discretion evidence, or appellants that they have shown prejudiced were thereby. presented by next appeal

The issue this is whether instructing court erred that Dawn under statutory bicycle duty stop her proceeding before from alley upon which she traveling into where the street Enyarts Dawn was assert occurred. The the collision “Stop” duty, to the absence not under such due However, even to the street. “Yield” at the entrance assuming, deciding, statute without that the scene, applicable the accident instruction was based was emerging duty stop from Dawn was under a before alley (Burns Code provisions 9-4-1-111 under the of IC Ed.). (Bums Ed.), Code and IC 9-4-1-94 alley, proceeded across a she left As Dawn conduct violates and into the street. Such sidewalk following provisions statutes: 1971, 9-4-1-111, supra. IC driveway.— alley private “Stop emerging from before dis- residence within business or of a vehicle driver driveway, building alley, shall emerging *10 from an

trict stop driving immediately side- prior to a onto such vehicle any alley- extending across the sidewalk area walk or into way driveway.” private 9-4-1-94, supra. IC bicycles. Every riding apply persons “Traffic laws to — bicycle roadway subject applicable riding upon person a shall be a provisions of this act the [9-4-1-1 9-4-1-138] — special regulations vehicle, except to and of of as to the driver a except 9-4-1-101], to those

this as article [9-4-1-93— by no provisions of act which their nature can have this application.” applicable unquestionably factual the These statutes are bar, exactly by place the presented case situation bicycle duty legal operator a did the same upon by applicable court. relied the trial questionably statutes preju- circumstances, appellants could not have been these properly by giving inasmuch instruction as it this diced jury legal duty plaintiff. a Because to the described jury there has been no discernible misled and was not giving by any appellants, occasioned prejudice error harmless, was result reached was of this instruction justice. must be The trial court consistent with substantial Procedure, Appellate as to this issue. Ind. Rules of affirmed Procedure, 15(D) ; Ind. Rule 61. Rule Rules of by appeal presented is whether issue final failing trial court erred in to include a statement part applicable a standard of care to children as negligence. contributory pertaining an instruction record that such standard discloses subsequent correctly instruc care related to the in a Any incompleteness dealing of such tion with the same issue. by in non-mandatory another a be cured instruction Wining Coffey er struction not therewith. inconsistent denied). App. (transfer 156 Ind. ques bar, any deficiency In the in the instruction case subsequent instruction. appellant tioned cured shown, judgment having No reversible error must affirmed. trial court Affirmed. Staton, P.J.,

Garrard, J., dissents opinion; concurs with opinion. Opinion Concurring Judge concur with Hoffman but believe Garrard, J. I explanation may necessary regarding word of further our review of the exclusion from evidence of reference to sign posted indicating near the scene of the collision m.p.h. limit of 20 *11 sign pursuant

The was not established erected to have been exceeding City Thus, to a ordinance valid of the of Rochester. sign expressed the on the would not constitute through the violation of a statute or ordinance. Devine Supply v. Grace Const. & Co. Ind. 243 862. hand, Judge out, negligence points

On the other as Staton reasonably normally is to be determined the actions similar circum- acting person under the same prudent implicit warning Furthermore, agree some I stances. Why advising then of a low limit. sign in a motorists sign not be admitted location of existence and should the circumstances relevant simply of the factual one in evidence exercised Blaeketor determination whether ultimate care? reasonable with discretion answer lies in the sound

The marginally admissibility determining court is vested confusing prejudice, the risk of relevant evidence where misleading outweighs probative value issues, Ed.) See, (Second on Evidence of the evidence. McCormick Aylor (1974), Ev.; cf., Spears Rule F.R. §185; v. App. Ind. N.E.2d great dealing

A number cases control traffic stop proper authority devices erected without either involve signs regular appearance lights. See, or traffic control Geisking Sheimo, opin principal other in the citations disregard signals ion. has Not a driver’s been admissible, it is referred often “control courts as ling.” exercising apparent. reason A reasonable man ordinary stop prudence deliberately through run does not opposing in the face of if he even carries certified proof no statute or ordinance was enacted to authorize question.

Furthermore, signs posted seen, actually which are inor seen, care should have warn- the exercise reasonable ing things construction, play, as road children etc. of such determining particular would relevant in whether a driver reasonable care. not be exercised would They merely determinative issue. would constitute one fact or circumstance to be in as- additional considered sessing care. reasonable us,

Thus, posted advising in the case before of a 20 imply m.p.h. speed limit would there was for some reason *12 such, traveling statutory would have limit. As it below the question value, on the probative but broad some greater driving than was Blacketor was “at whether having prudent re- under the conditions and reasonable or existing,” i.e., potential gard hazards then actual and to the exercising See, care. 1971 9-4-1-57. reasonable IC fashion, opportunity prejudicing in this

When stated misleading jury apparent. How one does Blacketor warning implied unspecified of some hazard consider sign’s yet presence, exclude from implicit in consideration legal significance best, m.p.h. which has no At dictate ? the 20 problem undully emphasize attempting cope with would importance and would tend to confuse speed was to the real issue of whether Blacketor’s problems, under the circumstances. view of these excessive excluding the court did not abuse its discretion the evidence. Dissenting Opinion purpose dissent. The P.J. I of the motion in Staton, by limine has been exceeded the trial court’s order which granted motion in limine.1 Blacketor’s fairA trial has been to¡ granted denied. A motion in limine should be exclude prejudicial bearing matter which has no on the issues or rights parties. Silhavy (1973), Burrus v. Ind. granted 1. The court defendant’s “Motion for Protective Order” 1973, its order entered June that: adjudged “It is now ordered and the defendant’s motion be granted the trial of this cause as to whether or not adjacent plaintiffs and the are now directed to offer no evidence signs place on or were City Rochester, Indiana, to 46th in the Street between Streets, proximity July 11, 1968, Indiana and Ohio or in on thereto signs removed, or whether after said date such were which said designated 4th at said location as an maximum Street area where the permissive speed per was 20 miles hour for on vehicular traffic said . proving July 11, 1968, Street, first 4th of the without on ordinance valid City Indiana, Rochester, effect, was in which ordinance engineer investigation based and which ordinance prima permitted facie limit from a reduced the statute per to a miximum of 30 miles hour maximum of 20 miles [sic] location.” hour at said twenty-mile App. hour A 794.2 sign near the scene of collision between a motorist and a year girl bicycle twelve old on a on the issue Blacke bears posted speed. when he exceeded the See Mazon tor’s v. Druxman 2d 68 Wash. 415 P.2d 86. Evidence regarding presence have should not *13 by Legal placement been a in the excluded motion limine. negligence sign at a the scene and se is different matter may properly by reached in The motion limine.3 which a purpose succinctly City expressed Bridges “. . . 2. Its has been in (1962), 292, Tex. of Richardson 163 354 S.W.2d 367: purpose filing suppress in to ‘The a motion limine evidence to or opposing prevent asking not to offer it instruct prejudicial counsel is to questions making prejudicial and statements in presence respect proper of the with to no matters which have bearing rights parties on the issues in case or on the to the prejudicial questions It is the effect of the asked or statements suit. prejudicial evidence, in connection with offer of made not the itself, of the effect evidence which the motion limine is intended . to . .’ reach. trial, simplify effect has to shorten the “Its the issues and reduce possibilities (footnote of a mistrial.” 293 omitted). N.E.2d at 796-97 majority’s The trial court’s and the posi order rationale take the statutory compliance legal tion that erected without no have effect whatever, required pay any and no signs. one is attention to such (1935), App. 354, 357, But see Cook v. Hunter 52 Ohio 3 N.E.2d (1949), Hoover v. Blackmore (Mun. 682. In Ct. of 1949), Dayton, Ohio the Court stated: ‘courtesy’ clearly controls, visible, “Unauthorized traffic require if operators of vehicles to take such factor into consideration in exer- cising ordinary stop care under the Mere circumstances. failure to negligence not, be, ‘per se’, however, cannot sign is visible if the is approaching vehicle, from an that fact considered judge jury just involving other case the exercise of ordinary care.” Geisking 37, 41, v. Sheimo 599, 601, Iowa 105 N.W.2d stated: the Court great weight authority “But the is that even unauthorized meaningless sign sideration. We questions negligence is not when are under con- agree A.L.R., page 216, the rule with stated in 164 heading ‘Anno —Traffic under Control at Street Intersection’. It is said: there ‘Furthermore, many take courts that if it view even is shown signal property authorized, the traffic involved was not it is question effective to control the still tory negligence or contribu- pedestrian disregards it, of a who vehicle driver disregard may least to the that such extent be taken into con- by the sideration trier facts as one of the circumstances to judgment reversed and a new should be trial court’s granted. sign majority’s must warn rationale that a traffic

The warning qualify motorists is specific as a hazard to authority. speed supported A reason or warning a previously speed is a a authorized reduces posted speed hazard. exceed is a motorist im- specific. condition is A hazardous hazard need not be traffic, condition, heavy pedestrial plicit congested traffic — dangerous district, inter- intersections or numerous business near, play- area, park section, a a residential a recreational near, emergency ground, hospital a school a with heavy ahead, oversized a construction area is area greater ahead, unsafe at condition of the road is trucks is many a A which reduces speeds, and more. the motorist that he must previously authorized warns will sufficient time so that he have reaction reduce his sign listing variety separate of hazards. A each to avoid greater unnecessary at a is both possible hazard yellow light, caution is a unreasonable. Whether *14 upon, determining passed question negligence in be violator’s contributory negligence.’ or support.” in authorities are cited “Numerous (1966), 701, 86, v. Druxman 68 Wash.2d In Mazon court had 415 P.2d speed instructed the the maximum lawful limit m.p.h., though of the accident was 15 at the scene evidence even was no there speed m.p.h. by proper that the limit had been from reduced 25 municipal presence Defendant action. admitted that he knew of the Washington m.p.h. sign. Supreme approved The Court of struction 15 in- noted: and many fact, courts take the view that “In even if it is shown that properly signal authorized, not it is traffic the still effective to control negligence contributory negligence question of the or a vehicle of disregards 88, citing Annot., it.” 415 P.2d at who 3 driver 180,290 A.L.R.3d (1965). further noted: The court highways upon public expected are are “Travelers not to first ascertai n compliance whether such in determine established strict respecting 88, quoting them.” 415 law before P.2d from (1932), 177, 166 Wash. 6 v. Penner P.2d 604. Comfort (1937), e.g., King 890, also, 774; 224 v. Gold Iowa 276 N.W. Mathias See Eichelberger (1935), 185, 619; 182 Wash. 45 P.2d Ambrose v. Warner v. 231, (1958), 332 P.2d 941. 53 Wash.2d

231 speed sign, implicitly all warn fixed slow reduce a may require some of a hazardous condition which motorist “yield” operation in Even the alteration of his vehicle. 37, sign Geisking Iowa N.W.2d v. Sheimo Indeed, 268, specific hazard. did not warn of a A.L.R.3d converging The may all. there not of be hazard warning “yield” sign merely on the a down be to slow traveling the road. It traffic which across lookout for intersecting roads, type specify does not the number warning specific require density a a of traffic. To unsupported unreasonable but hazard is weight authority. negligence cause. The issue

Blacketor’s previously authorized which reduced the he exceeded on issue of Blacketor’s when bears Enyart year Dawn who was and struck twelve old riding bicycle. was at evidence that The by the trial court. Its the scene not have been excluded should a fair trial all the by a limine denied exclusion motion judgment Enyart. court the trial issues to Dawn reversed, should remanded for and this cause should be trial. new Reported at 342 N.E.2d 654.

Note. — Wayne Indiana. Broeker State Dennis Rehearing April March 1976. Filed denied 1-775A117. [No. September 13, denied 1976.] Transfer