Case Information
*1
[Cite as
Entech, Ltd. v. Geauga Cty. Court of Common Pleas
,
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GEAUGA COUNTY, OHIO
ENTECH LTD., : PER CURIAM OPINION
Relator, :
CASE NO. 2016-G-0092 - vs - :
THE GEAUGA COUNTY COURT :
OF COMMON PLEAS, et al.,
:
Respondents.
:
Original Action for Writ of Prohibition.
Judgment: Petition dismissed
Jaredd J. Flynn , Thrasher, Dinsmore, & Dоlan, 100 Seventh Avenue, #150, Chardon, OH 44024 (For Relator).
James R. Flaiz, Geauga County Prosecutor, and Katherine A. Jacob, Assistant Prosecutor, Courthouse Annex, 231 Main Street, Suite 3A, Chardon, OH 44024 (For Respondents, the Geauga Cоunty Court of Common Pleas and The Honorable David L. Fuhry).
Joseph G. Stafford, Stafford Law Co., L.P.A., 55 Erieview Plaza, 5th Floor, Cleveland, OH 44115 (For Marcia Speece).
PER CURIAM Before this court is relator, EnTech Ltd.’s, Petition for Writ of Prohibition.
Respondents, the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas and Judge David L. Fuhry, have filed a Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), claiming that EnTech has *2 failed to demonstrate the elements necessary for granting a writ of prohibition. For the following reasons, EnTech’s Petition is dismissed. On October 3, 2016, EnTech filed its Petition for Writ of Prohibition.
EnTech requests that this court order that Bryan Speece, the owner of EnTech, “not be compelled,” in proceedings before the lower court, “to produce certain documents or testify regarding the confidential trade secrets of his employer EnTech.” This includes matters designаted confidential pursuant to nondisclosure agreements. According to EnTech’s Petition, Speece and his wife, Marcia Speece,
became involved in divorce proceedings before Judge Fuhry in the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. 15DC000460. In those proceedings, following the filing of discovery motions, the magistrate ordered discovery to be provided by Speece, whiсh EnTech alleges includes information subject to nondisclosure agreements. Judge Fuhry ordered Speece to provide copies of confidential documents/nondisclosure agreements for in camera review. According to EnTech, in discovery, it “produced certain redacted nondisclosure agreements.” On September 15, 2016, Marcia filed a notice of deposition, which,
аccording to EnTech, shows she intended to depose Speece on confidential and trade secret information. At the deposition, Speece refused to discuss information in relatiоn to the nondisclosure agreements. A special master was subsequently appointed “to facilitate discovery,” turned over nondisclosure agreements to Marcia’s counsel, and requested that Speece attend another deposition to testify regarding “protected” information. Speece refused to do so.
{¶5} EnTech argues that the threat of sanctions against Speece may cause him to disclose confidential trade secret information and requiring Speece to do so “will cause EnTech to violate a contract,” resulting in irreparable harm. It сontends that Judge Fuhry “does not have jurisdiction to force an entity to breach a contract without due process,” which amounts to intentional interference with a contract. On November 9, 2016, resрondents filed a Motion to Dismiss. [1] Therein,
they contend that the trial court had jurisdiction to issue discovery orders, this is not properly challenged through seeking a writ of prohibition, and there is an adequate remedy at law. EnTech filed a brief in Opposition to Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss on
November 29, 2016. “The conditions which must exist to support the issuance of a writ of
prohibition are: (1) The court or officer against whоm it is sought must be about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power; (2) the exercise of such power must be unauthorized by law; and (3) it must appear that the refusal of the writ would result in injury for which there is no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.” State ex rel. McKee v. Cooper , 40 Ohio St.2d 65, 320 N.E.2d 286 (1974), paragraph one of the syllabus. However, “the absence of an adequate legal rеmedy is not necessary when the lack of judicial authority to act is patent and unambiguous; i.e., if the lack of jurisdiction is clear, the writ will lie upon proof of the first two elements only.” 1. On October 19, 2016, Marcia filed a Brief in Opposition to Relator’s Petition for Writ of Prohibition. Relator and respondents filed Motions to Strike on the ground that she is not a party to the present matter. As such, her Brief has been strickеn in a separate Judgment Entry of this court and will not be considered.
Johnson v. Geauga Cty. Court of Common Pleas , 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2014-G-3206,
{¶9}
“[T]he function of a writ of prohibition is very limited; i.e., the sole purpose
of such а writ is to stop an inferior court or judicial officer from engaging in any action
which exceeds the general scope of its jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Feathers v.
Gansheimer , 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2006-A-0038,
all material factual allegations of [relator’s] petition and making all reasonable inferences
in their favor, it appеar[s] beyond doubt that they could prove no set of facts entitling
them to the requested extraordinary relief.” State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland , 112 Ohio
St.3d 324,
dismissed as to the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas since it is not sui juris and
cannot sue or be sued absent statutory authority. State ex rel. Cleveland Mun. Court v.
Cleveland City Council ,
a “court or officer” is about to exercise judicial power and the purpose of a writ of
prohibition is to stop a court or judicial officеr from engaging in improper actions. This
court has considered the merits of requests for prohibition when filed against a lower
court as a respondent. State ex rel. Invesco Mgmt Co. LLC v. Geauga Cty. Court оf
Common Pleas , 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2012-G-3085,
dismissed against both respondents, since relаtor fails to raise a jurisdictional issue. EnTech seeks to prevent the lower court from enforcing existing discovery orders or ordering additional discovery, from Speece, of documents relаting to EnTech’s business. It does not, however, demonstrate how the court acted without jurisdiction in ordering these documents be produced. There is no question that the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas has
subject matter jurisdiction over the Speece divorce proceedings. R.C. 3105.011 (“[t]he
court of common pleas including divisions of courts of domestic relations, has full
equitable powers and jurisdictiоn appropriate to the determination of all domestic
relations matters”). “In the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a
court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a
party contesting that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.” State ex rel.
Plant v. Cosgrove ,
or regulate discovery, it has been held that “аn extraordinary writ will not issue to control
[the judge’s] judicial discretion, even if that discretion is abused.” Berthelot v. Dezso , 86
Ohio St.3d 257, 259,
permitted to exercise jurisdiction over the parties or that it is not permitted to generally order discovery. Rather, EnTech essentially argues that the court acted improperly by requiring discovery of certain types of materials, including those subject to nondisclosure agreеments. This is not a jurisdictional issue but instead the type of argument that the Ohio Supreme Court has found does not justify a grant of an extraordinary writ. This exercise of judicial discretion is more properly challеnged on appeal. Berthelot at 259. EnTech, which is not a party to the divorce proceedings, argues that it is
impacted by the trial court’s action since the court is interfering with its contracts/nondisclosure agreements and essentially compelling Speece to breach these agreements. This does not alter the foregoing analysis or change the conditions under which a writ of рrohibition may be granted. EnTech fails to cite even one case to support a contrary holding. Even if the trial court was requiring Speece to breach certain agreements, he, as the person subject to the order, has potential remedies to prevent requiring disclosure, such as seeking a protective order or, if held in contempt *7 for failure to disclose, seeking an аppeal from that holding, as well as appealing discovery issues. The fact that EnTech cannot control Speece’s actions to prevent him from allegedly breaching the agreеments does not warrant it relief through a writ prohibiting the trial court to take action which it is permitted to take. Further, while documents containing trade secrets can be subject to a
protectivе order if one is sought in the lower court, this would be a matter within the trial
court’s discretion. Courts have determined that the issuance of a writ to prevent the
court from exercising its discretion in such matters is not рroper. See State ex rel.
Records Deposition Serv. v. Aurelius , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 78456,
EnTech’s Petition for a Writ of Prohibition is dismissed.
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., concur.