Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc. (In Re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp.)Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc. (In Re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp.)
OPINION CONCERNING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The issue presented concerns whether the
FACTS
Commencing on December 2, 2001, and from time to time continuing thereafter, Enron Corporation (“Enron”) and certain of its affiliated entities, (collectively, the “Debtors”) filed voluntary petitions for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”). On July 15, 2004, the Court entered an Order confirming the Debtors’ Supplemental Modified Fifth Amended Joint Plan of Affiliated Debtors (the “Plan”) in these cases. The Plan became effective on November 17, 2004 and the Debtors emerged from chapter 11 as reorganized debtors. Effective March 1, 2007, Enron changed its name to Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. Thereafter, on April 4, 2007, an order was entered authorizing the change of the caption of the reorganized debtors’ cases. 1
In 2003, Enron filed a complaint commencing an adversary proceeding against J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc. (“JP Morgan”) and various other defendants, and filed a separate complaint commencing an adversary proceeding against Mass Mutual Life Insurance Company and various other defendants. In each adversary proceeding, Enron sought to avoid and recover certain transfers made to the defendants that it alleged were preferential or otherwise avoidable. On December 1, 2003, Enron filed amended complaints with respect to each of the adversary proceedings (each individually, as amended, the “Complaint” and together, the “Complaints”).
In the Complaints, Enron sought to recover transfers made by Enron between October 26 and November 6, 2001, totaling in excess of $1.1 billion. Prior to the petition date, Enron issued and sold unsecured commercial paper to various entities. The commercial paper was uncertificated and had maturities of up to 270 days. The significance of certificates not having been issued to monitor its ownership is that the ownership of the commercial paper is then tracked by “bookkeeping” entries in a computer system at The Depository Trust Company (“DTC”), a clearing agency. This tracking method is customary in the industry.
2
The DTC is used to process the
Pursuant to Issuing and Paying Agency Agreements between Enron and J.P. Morgan Chase Bank and its predecessors in interest (collectively, the “Chase IPA”), the Chase IPA served as issuing and paying agent in connection with Enron’s commercial paper. Any issuer of commercial paper needs an issuing and paying agent within the DTC to issue the commercial paper and to pay for the commercial paper at maturity, or prior to maturity if the paper is redeemed early. The DTC does not permit an issuing and paying agent for commercial paper to participate in a “secondary trade” of a security and instead requires the early retirement of commercial paper to be processed as a “prepayment.”
The purchase and sale of Enron’s commercial paper, including each commercial paper note identified in the amended complaints, was made pursuant to terms set forth in an Offering Memorandum, dated September 14, 2001. The Offering Memorandum provided as follows: “The [n]otes are not redeemable or subject to voluntary prepayment by [Enron] prior to maturity.”
JP Morgan acquired the Enron commercial paper for its own account, as a market maker, and on behalf of its respective customers, as a dealer. 3 The source of the notes evidencing the commercial paper that the customers purchased through one of the broker/dealers was either Enron itself or other holders of outstanding Enron commercial paper who sold certain of their holdings before maturity. JP Morgan documented its and its customers’ purchases of Enron commercial paper through trading confirmation records (the “Confirmations”). The payments for the purchases were made through the DTC.
Enron had access to two lines of credit totaling $3 billion that had been made available to it by two bank syndicates. One was a $1.75 billion revolver agreement with a syndicate of various banks, and the other was a $1.25 billion long-term credit agreement with another bank syndicate. Enron could draw funds on these lines of credit to pay off maturing commercial paper and to meet its other daily cash needs. The credit facility agreements authorized Enron to use the proceeds of the lines of credit for any “general corporate purposes.”
In the Complaints, Enron maintains that the transfers it made between October 26 and November 6, 2001 were for the purpose of paying, prior to their maturity date, the notes that had been previously issued by Enron. As Enron paid approximate accrued par value 4 for the commercial paper notes, which was significantly more than their market value, Enron characterized the payments as being made for the early redemption of the commercial paper notes. In the Complaints, Enron delineated the individual transfers that it sought to avoid against the various defendants in each of the actions. 5
In Count I of the each Complaint, Enron seeks avoidance of the transfers as preferential payments under
On June 15, 2005, the Court issued an Opinion concerning motions to dismiss that had been lodged by substantially all of the original defendants.
Enron Corp. v. J.P. Morgan Secs., Inc. (In re Enron Corp.),
Thereafter, certain defendants filed motions in the district court seeking leave to file an interlocutory appeal. They also sought to have the reference of the adversary proceedings to this Court withdrawn. The defendants argued,
inter alia,
that the question of whether short-term paper qualifies as a security within the scope of
After Enron’s submission of its expert reports, which set forth certain securities law issues, former defendant Goldman Sachs & Co. filed a motion in the district court seeking to have the reference withdrawn, arguing that resolution of the adversary proceedings required substantial and material consideration of the federal securities laws. The district court concluded that the theory seeking to hold the broker/dealers liable as beneficiaries of the transfers, based upon the elimination of their liability under certain securities laws, required substantial interpretation of the interplay of various securities laws.
Enron Corp. v. J.P. Morgan Secs., Inc. (In re Enron Corp.),
Thereafter, most of the nearly 200 defendants in the adversary proceedings moved for summary judgment in mid-2008. The vast majority of the defendants in both actions reached a settlement with Enron and have been dismissed from the action. The four remaining defendants are ING VP Balanced Portfolio (the “Balanced Fund”), a mutual fund; Aetna Bond VP (the “Bond Fund” and, together with the Balanced Fund, the “ING Funds”), a mutual fund; Aeltus Investment Management, Inc. (“Aeltus”), an investment advis- or; and Alfa S.A.B. de C.V. (“Alfa,” and together with the ING Funds, the “Investors”), a Mexican holding company whose treasury department invests the corporate cash reserves of Alfa’s component businesses.
The Balanced Fund, which invests in equities and fixed-income securities, and the Bond Fund, which invests primarily in fixed-income securities, are both registered with the Securities Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) as investment companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940.
Aeltus, which engages in investment transactions for the accounts of the ING Funds, is registered with the SEC as an investment advisor under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Aeltus, which is a separate legal entity from the ING Funds, is responsible for managing the assets of the ING Funds and making investment decisions for those Funds consistent with their respective investment objectives and policies. Aeltus does not receive a commission or other form of payment in connection with the particular transactions. Rather, the ING Funds each pay Aeltus a management fee based upon the value of the assets that Aeltus manages. At no time does Aeltus obtain legal ownership of any of the ING Funds’ assets.
The Investors engaged in transactions with JP Morgan in mid-September or mid-October 2001 to acquire commercial paper issued by Enron and then transferred the commercial paper to JP Morgan in late October, prior to their respective maturity dates. The transactions were conducted through custodial bank accounts at the DTC. On the same day that the commercial paper was transferred from the Investors to JP Morgan, JP Morgan transferred that same commercial paper to Enron’s Chase IPA account at the DTC and Enron paid JP Morgan, again through the DTC. Immediately upon the payment to JP Morgan, the commercial paper was extinguished. Previously, on October 25, 2001,
The specific transactions involving the ING Funds were orchestrated by Aeltus. On October 16, 2001, Aeltus entered into an agreement for the benefit of the Balanced Fund to buy from JP Morgan certain commercial paper (the “Balanced CP”) issued by Enron in the principal amount of $23,216,000.00, with the purchase price being $23,157,024.91. The stated maturity date of the Balanced CP was November 16, 2001. In addition, on October 16, 2001, Aeltus entered into an agreement, for the benefit of the Bond Fund, to buy from JP Morgan certain commercial paper (the “Bond CP”) issued by Enron in the principal amount of $25,000,000.00, with the purchase price being $24,936,493.06. The stated maturity date of the Bond CP was also November 16, 2001. At the time of both of these transactions, the payments made to JP Morgan were debited from the custodial bank account used for the ING Funds at the DTC. In addition, the commercial paper was credited to that account.
On October 26, 2001, Aeltus entered into an agreement to transfer, for the benefit of the Balanced Fund, the Balanced CP for $23,181,756.40. In addition, on October 26, 2001, Aeltus entered into a similar agreement, for the benefit of the Bond Fund, to transfer the Bond CP for $24,963,125.00. On the morning of October 29, 2001, the commercial paper was transferred to JP Morgan. Certain evidence presented to the Court indicates that Aeltus had been informed that JP Morgan was acting as agent for Enron and that Enron was retiring its commercial paper. The commercial paper for the ING Funds was debited from the custodial bank’s DTC accounts used for the ING Funds and the payments from JP Morgan were credited to those accounts. The payments from JP Morgan were debited from JP Morgan’s account and the commercial paper was credited to its account at DTC. Later that same day, JP Morgan transferred, through the DTC, the same commercial paper that it had received from the ING Funds to Enron’s Chase IPA account where, upon the payment by Enron to JP Morgan’s account at DTC, the commercial paper was immediately extinguished. Assuming that JP Morgan was acting as agent, 7 had the latter transactions not been consummated, the earlier transactions between the ING Funds and JP Morgan would have been unwound and the earlier debits and credits reversed. Prior to the final transfers between JP Morgan and Enron, the ING Funds could have used the credits in their custodial accounts at the DTC to effect certain transfers with other entities with DTC custodial accounts within the DTC system. However, the ING Funds could not withdraw the value from the DTC system to put the funds to their own use until the final transfers were completed.
In 2001, Alfa’s treasurer was responsible for investing approximately $200 million of Alfa’s cash reserves in various commercial paper obligations. The criteria utilized for such investments were the commercial paper’s credit rating, expiration, and yield. On September 17, 2001, Alfa purchased approximately $5.6 million of Enron commercial paper from JP Morgan, as the commercial paper met the required ratings guidelines. Alfa’s usual policy was to purchase commercial paper only on the secondary market from broker/dealers and not directly from the issuer.
Parties’ Arguments
The Investors contend that the payments from JP Morgan for the commercial paper were made to complete securities transactions and that, as such, they were settlement payments protected from avoidance by
Enron argues that it redeemed its commercial paper and that JP Morgan merely acted as an agent in these transactions. Enron maintains that the transfers were payments for the early redemption of the notes. Enron further maintains that it
Pursuant to section 1109(a), which allows the SEC to raise an issue or appear and be heard on an issue in a case under chapter 11, the SEC appeared in support of the motions for summary judgment. The SEC argued that as long as commercial paper is processed through the normal securities clearance settlement processes for commercial paper, the safe harbor protections apply regardless of whether commercial paper is retired prior to maturity.
10
While not taking a position on whether the redemption or retirement of commercial paper at maturity would qualify for protection under the
Since the Court’s ruling concerning the motions to dismiss, the parties have engaged in extensive discovery and, as previously stated, the motions for summary judgment were filed. A hearing (the “Hearing”) concerning the summary judgment motions for the four remaining defendants was conducted on April 7, 2009. At the Hearing, the remaining defendants continue to argue that the
Enron opposes the motions for summary judgments and again argues that the transfers at issue were not settlement payments protected by
DISCUSSION
Summary Judgment Standard
After the non-moving party to the summary judgment motion has been afforded a sufficient time for discovery, summary judgment must be entered against it where it fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which it has the burden of proof at trial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
The summary judgment standard is interpreted in a way to support its primary goal of “disposing] of factually unsupported claims or defenses.”
Id.
at 323-24,
Avoidance Powers
The Bankruptcy Code provides a trustee or debtor-in-possession with the power to avoid certain transfers “of an interest of the debtor in property” and to bring that value back into the bankruptcy estate for ratable distribution to all allowed creditors.
Safe Harbor Provisions
Notwithstanding sections 544, 545, 547, 548(a)(1)(B), and 548(b) of this title, the trustee may not avoid a transfer that is a margin payment, as defined in section 101, 741, or 761 of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 101 or 741 of this title, made by or to a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, or securities clearing agency, that is made before the commencement of the case, except under section 548(a)(1)(A) of this title.
Section 548(d)(2)(B) provides, in relevant part, that
a ... stockbroker, financial institution, or securities clearing agency that receives a ... settlement payment, as defined in section ... 741 of this title, takes for value to the extent of such payment.
Thus,
The routine purchase and sale of a security includes two opportunities for settlement, “street-side settlement” between the brokers and the clearing agencies, and “customer-side settlement” between the broker and its customer.
See Kaiser II,
In enacting the
When first enacted,
“settlement payment” means a preliminary settlement payment, a partial settlement payment, an interim settlement payment, a settlement payment on account, a final settlement payment, or any other similar payment commonly used in the securities trade.
This Court previously considered the arguments concerning the breadth of the term “settlement payment” and concluded that because the definition merely lists types of settlement payments, the reference in
Even where a broad interpretation has been ascribed to the term “settlement payment,” it has been observed that the term must be interpreted as it is “plainly understood within the securities industry.”
See Kaiser II,
In the Opinion concerning the previous motions to dismiss filed in these adversary proceedings, the Court concluded that because the
evidence must be presented as to whether payments made with respect to short-term commercial paper prior to the maturity date, at significantly above market prices and contrary to the offering documents in the midst of coercion by the holders of the commercial paper resulting from public announcements that make clear that the company is in a severe financial crisis constitute settlement payments commonly used in the securities trade. 13 Thus, evidence must be presented as to whether this particular transaction could be normally regarded as part of the settlement process.
Enron Corp.,
An Interest of the Debtor in Property
If JP Morgan acted as principal, then JP Morgan would have been the party that acquired an interest in Enron’s property.
15
This argument, however, fails to recognize that when a transfer of an interest of the debtor in property is avoided, the trustee, or debtor-in-possession, may recover such avoided transfer either from the initial transferee or from the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made.
As previously stated, pursuant to
Pursuant to the structure of
In the guarantor situation, it is the initial transfer that relieves the guarantor of its obligation. In another context, the court in
In re B.S. Livingston & Co.,
The benefit must be “direct, ascertainable and quantifiable” and must correspond to, or be commensurate with, the value of the property that was transferred.
Reily v. Kapila (In re Int’l. Mgmt. Assoc.),
While it is sometimes observed that the entity must be the
intended
beneficiary,
Secs. Inv. Prot. v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc.,
where the benefit to the defendant is clear, the debtor’s intent ought not to matter; the defendant should be required to disgorge the benefit from an avoided fraudulent or preferential transfer. On the other hand, unless courts are prepared to extend liability underSection 550(a)(1) to the remotest frontiers of benefit-in-fact, there must be some principle to confine liability to an immediate class of beneficiaries. A requirement of intent to benefit effectively restricts the circle of liability to those who directly and foreseeably benefitted from the transfer. Furthermore, an intent element insulates defendants whose receipt of benefit was remote and incidental.
Id. at 159. Nevertheless, the authors conclude that the estate can more effectively be made whole
without burdening remote, incidental beneficiaries by requiring a showing not of intent, but rather a quantifiable, monetary benefit to the defendant. By this means no defendant is placed in the difficult position of disgorging the value of a theoretical or potential benefit, while the trustee avoids litigating the thorny issue of intent when the court has already found the relevant transfer to be fraudulent or preferential as well as a direct benefit to the defendant.
Id. at 160. The Court agrees with this latter approach. Thus, showing a direct, ascertainable and quantifiable monetary benefit to the defendant would obviate the need to show intent.
Applying
A trustee, or debtor-in-possession, pursuant to
Aeltus as Advisor
In addition to adopting the arguments raised by the ING Funds, Aeltus argues that it did not receive any payment and, therefore, it was not a beneficiary of the transfer. Aeltus maintains that it had neither ownership of the commercial paper transferred to the ING Funds nor the right to use the commercial paper. Aeltus also asserts that it did not receive a commission, payment, credit, or any other direct benefit as a result of the transfer of the commercial paper. Aeltus contends that it was neither a transferee nor a beneficiary of the transfers of the commercial paper from which a
Enron argues that Aeltus benefitted because as the entity that made the investment decisions for the ING Funds, Aeltus would have been sued by the ING Funds had they not received their payments from Enron for the underlying debt obligations. Enron maintains that because Enron made those payments, the ING Funds had no cause of action against Aeltus and Aeltus was relieved of the liability to the ING Funds for its investment decisions.
Aeltus counters that the alleged benefit is too uncertain and unquantifiable and, therefore, cannot be the basis upon which to avoid the transfer. Aeltus also argues that because Enron drew down on the bank lines of credit, it would have been able to pay the ING Funds when the commercial paper matured even if the ING Funds had not been paid prior to the maturity date. As a result, Aeltus argues that the ING Funds would not have had causes of action against Aeltus in any event.
In response, Enron asserts that Aeltus, as advisor to the ING Funds, made the investment decisions for the ING Funds. Therefore, even if there is a requirement of an intent to benefit-which Enron does not concede-Enron’s desire for future reentry into the commercial paper market would necessitate that it take actions to please and benefit Aeltus. Thus, Enron contends that it intended to benefit Aeltus in order to facilitate Enron’s future reentry into the commercial paper market. The alleged benefit Aeltus received was that because the ING Funds got paid, they had no cause of action against Aeltus. En
Whether the benefit to Aeltus was sufficient to qualify as a
The benefit alleged is that if Enron had defaulted on paying the underlying obligations owed on the commercial paper notes, the ING Funds would have had causes of action against Aeltus for not acting prudently in advising them to invest in Enron. Those actions would entail interpretation of various securities laws. Thus, similar to a guarantor, the claim is that the payment relieved Aeltus from exposure to liability that would have resulted from the nonpayment of the underlying obligation. The benefit flows directly from the initial transfer, as receipt of the payment eliminates any cause of action the ING Funds would have had against Aeltus for Enron’s default on the underlying commercial paper obligations. Further, the value attributable to the relief from exposure corresponds to the amount of the transfer. This is because if the transfer had not been made, the relief sought in any action against Aeltus would have been equal to the amount of the payment on the underlying obligation for the commercial paper.
Aeltus argues that prior to its receiving the benefit from the elimination of any cause of action, there would be too many intervening circumstances to consider that make the benefit too remote. These potential intervening circumstances include (i) the ING Funds actually bringing a lawsuit, (ii) Aeltus being deemed to have violated the standard of care applicable thereto, under relevant securities laws and contractual arrangements, as advisor to the ING Funds, or (iii) Enron actually defaulting on the commercial paper. Some of those issues, however, would apply equally to a guarantor who, notwithstanding those issues, is considered to benefit pursuant to
Repayment of Loan
Commercial paper is a loan, with a corporation borrowing the money in the marketplace instead of from a bank. Enron maintains that all of the parties knew that Enron was paying off the commercial paper loans. 19 Ordinarily, short-term commercial paper is held until maturity. The purchaser seeks an investment for excess cash for a short period and calculates when it will require the return of its principal. The issuer of commercial paper needs funds for a particular length of time and it sets the maturity date for a time when it expects to have funds to pay off the commercial paper. Occasionally, however, the issuer may want to adjust its balance sheet to have less debt outstanding and may offer to pay off the commercial paper. Alternatively, a holder of commercial paper may have a liquidity issue and may seek to sell its commercial paper holdings prior to maturity to obtain the cash. Usually, when this situation occurs, the broker/dealer involved attempts to make a market for the commercial paper, and it will acquire the commercial paper for its own account and either hold it until maturity or sell it in the secondary market to another holder. In the secondary market, the commercial paper is sold at the prevailing market price, with the broker/dealer anticipating making a profit equal to the amount of the spread between the price at which it acquires the commercial paper and the price at which it sells it in the secondary market.
The transactions at issue, however, were not conducted in the usual manner.
20
Instead of acting as principal and making a market for the commercial paper, evidence was presented indicating that the broker/dealers, including JP Morgan, all sought to distance themselves from the transactions, often citing the risk of preference liability as their rationale. The broker/dealers allege that, initially, they
Commercial paper is a note evidencing a debt, which entails the attendant credit risk. Enron argues that when the Investors acquired Enron’s commercial paper, they also acquired Enron’s credit risk, as that risk was inherent in the very nature of the instrument. Enron further argues that the
The Second Circuit has recognized that “a maker’s paying a note prior to maturity in accordance with its terms would not be regarded as a ‘purchase.’ ”
SEC v. Sterling Precision Corp.,
The safe harbor is not intended to protect an investor from the credit risk
The SEC contends that the
Sterling Precision
court’s interpretation of whether a redemption is a “sale” is limited to application under the Investment Company Act. Further, the SEC notes that the Second Circuit recognized that the term “sale” may have a broader definition in certain contexts. In addition, the SEC directs the Court’s attention to
Drachman v. Harvey,
In Drachman, however, the redemption of the convertible debentures allowed the issuer of the debt to acquire its stock. Given the nature of the security at issue there, it was a simultaneous transaction, as convertible debentures are by definition convertible into stock. Therefore, the court may have “collapsed” the transaction and considered it a “purchase” because it viewed the redemption of the convertible debentures as the equivalent of buying the stock. Collapsing the transaction reflected its essence — a purchase of the issuer’s stock. Here, the essence of the transaction is that Enron paid the underlying obligation on the note. Enron’s ability to pay the obligation for the commercial paper note was precisely the risk assumed by the holder of that instrument.
The SEC also argues that Enron’s prepayment on the notes is distinguishable from payment at maturity. The SEC notes that Enron made an offer to purchase its notes because it had no legal right to compel the holders to surrender them, and that it was only because the holders agreed to the offer that Enron was able to retire them. The SEC contends that the case is distinguishable from a redemption at maturity or a contractual right to redeem prior to maturity. The SEC, therefore, argues that it is not inconsistent to view the transactions as both a repurchase of a debt and a repayment.
In effect, the SEC’s view is that each of the overall relevant transactions at issue is a two-step process similar to that applied to the purchase of stock in a leveraged buyout, where the stock is purchased and then immediately cancelled. In such transactions, the purchase of the stock has been held to be protected by the
There is, however, a fundamental difference between a stock transaction and a commercial paper transaction. Stock cannot be extinguished by its own terms. Rather, the corporation has to reacquire its stock in order to cancel it. Thus, because the stock is “purchased” by the issuer, it is a securities transaction. On the other hand, commercial paper is extinguished automatically upon payment of the underlying debt obligation. The commercial paper is swept into the issuing and paying agent’s account and immediately after payment, it is removed from the DTC system. This occurs whether the commercial paper debt obligation is paid at maturity or prior to maturity. As long as the issuer pays the monetary equivalent of the amount that would be received at maturity, pro rated to the date of payment, there is no reason to treat the retirement of the debt obligation differently whether the commercial paper is redeemed at maturity or prior to maturity. Early retirement of the commercial paper still entails payment on the underlying debt obligation and, as such, the holder assumes the credit risk of the issuer’s ability to pay off the obligation. Further, the entity receiving payment assumes the related preference risk associated with the payment of a loan.
The argument seeking to treat each of the overall relevant transactions at issue as a two-step process is further undermined because the prices paid for the commercial paper were substantially above market price. To be considered a sale followed by a redemption, one would assume that the amount paid for the “sale” of the commercial paper would reflect the prevailing market price. Instead, the amounts paid here were equal to the principal plus accrued interest to the date of payment, thereby reflecting payments on the underlying loans. 23
Finally, the Investors and the SEC argue that a ruling that
Further, the fear that sellers of commercial paper in the secondary market will be reluctant to sell commercial paper because they will not know if the broker/dealer is acting as principal or agent for an issuer redeeming commercial paper can be readily remedied by the DTC. The DTC system could put in place a mechanism that places the burden upon the broker/dealer to indicate clearly to the trans-feror of commercial paper whether the broker/dealer was acting as principal or as agent for an issuer redeeming its commercial paper. The broker/dealers were primary players in taking the transactions at issue outside of the realm of what was common in the trade, by their efforts to depart from their usual role of principal. Thus, it would not be inequitable, unjust, or unfair to hold the broker/dealers accountable if commercial paper holders in the secondary market are not apprised that the transaction actually involves a redemption by the issuer. Such a procedure would provide clarity and avoid any uncertainty in the secondary market.
Earmarking
Pursuant to
Initially, the earmarking doctrine was applied in cases where a guarantor secured a debtor’s obligations because it was the guarantor’s property that was transferred, resulting in no diminution to the debtor’s estate.
McCuskey v. Nat’l Bank of Waterloo (In re Bohlen Enters., Ltd.),
Subsequently, the earmarking doctrine was expanded to cover instances where a third party provides the debtor with funds “for the express purpose of enabling the debtor to pay a specific creditor.”
Cadle,
In
Cadle,
the Second Circuit noted that various approaches had developed to determine whether it is appropriate to apply the earmarking doctrine to a particular case.
Cadle,
(1)the existence of an agreement between the new lender and the debtor that the new funds will be used to pay a specified antecedent debt,
(2) performance of that agreement according to its terms, and
(3) the transaction viewed as a whole (including the transfer in of the new funds and the transfer out to the old creditor) does not result in any diminution of the estate.
Id.
at 184-85. The Second Circuit then categorized the other formulations developed by various courts as “focusfing] primarily on whether the debtor lacked control over the funds supplied by the new creditor.”
Id.
at 185 (citing
Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas-London,
The Second Circuit proceeded to set forth its own history of having applied the general principles behind the earmarking doctrine without necessarily having applied the term “earmarking.”
Cadle,
where a debtor receives funds subject to a clear obligation to use that money to pay off a preexisting debt, and the funds are in fact used for that purpose, those funds do not become part of the estate and the transfer cannot be avoided in bankruptcy.
Id.
(citing
Grubb v. Gen. Contract Purchase Corp.,
[Wjhere a new creditor provides funds to the debtor with no specific requirement as to their use, the funds do become part of the estate and any transfer of the funds out of the estate is potentially subject to trustee’s avoidance powers.
Id.
at 185 (citing
Smyth v. Kaufman (In re J.B. Koplik & Co.),
The defendants argue that the requisite obligation to pay off the preexisting debt does not have to emanate from the new lender. Rather, they argue that the obligation can flow from another source, and that it is sufficient that a debt- or recognizes some obligation compelling it to use the new funds to pay off the preexisting debt. The Investors note that Enron was legally required to use the bank-facility funds to replace the commercial paper debt. The Investors point to a directive from Enron’s board requiring Enron not to issue commercial paper in an amount greater than the balance available on the commercial paper backup credit lines. According to the Investors, once Enron drew down the lines of credit, Enron could no longer have commercial paper outstanding. Thus, the Investors maintain that Enron was compelled to use the bank-facility funds to eliminate its outstanding commercial paper. 26
However, anyone who has a pre-existing debt has some manner of obligation and compulsion to pay it pff-even if it is simply the obligation under the underlying contract with the lender, and the compulsion of a potential action for breach of contract. In
Schubert v. Lucent Techs. Inc. (In re Winstar Commc’ns., Inc.),
Reviewing the facts before it, the Wins-tar court noted that, “at most,” the new lender was aware that the credit agreement between the debtor and the old creditor required the debtor to pay the proceeds of the new lender’s loan to the old creditor and that the debtor intended to make such payment. Id. at 402. The Winstar court concluded that while the debtor’s failure to so pay the funds
would have ultimately led to an event of default under the Bank Facility, that merely implies that the Bank Facility lenders (including [the new lender]) could have brought breach of contract claims against [the debtor]-not that [the new lender] conditioned its loan on [the debtor’s] payment to [the old lender].
Id. at 402. Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that earmarking was inapplicable, absent a requirement in the new lender’s agreement conditioning the loan on payment to the creditor seeking the benefit of the earmarking doctrine.
Here, the relevant loan documents permitted Enron to apply the loan funds for general corporate purposes, with no other limitations or conditions imposed by the lender. While Enron may have faced compulsion from other sources to comply with certain obligations, such compliance was not a condition of the loan. Moreover, any failure to comply with those other obligations would have only subjected Enron to whatever consequences would flow from such failure. Enron, however, received the loan funds from the bank facility with no “specific requirement” to pay off the commercial paper. Unlike credit-backed commercial paper, where a letter of credit, or other funding, is set up to provide a back-up for payments for commercial paper, there was no enforceable obligation in the back-up bank facility to strictly apply any loan proceeds to the payment of the commercial paper. Instead, as noted previously, the funds could be used for any corporate purpose. As such, upon their receipt, the funds became part of Enron’s estate. Accordingly, any transfer of those estate funds subjects such transfer to the avoidance powers.
Moreover, even following the analysis of those courts that focus on the “control” element leads to the same result. Certain of these courts analyze the doctrine as not requiring proof of third-party lender intent because the restriction placed on the use of the proceeds can emanate from any source.
See e.g., Coral,
Here, as long as the funds were used for general corporate purposes, once Enron received the funds, the banks did not dictate how those funds should be applied.
The Investors further argue that paying off the commercial paper with the funds from the bank facility did not diminish Enron’s estate. This is because Enron substituted the unsecured commercial paper creditors for the unsecured back-up facility lenders, who were owed an equal amount. The Investors maintain that avoiding the transfer would result in Enron receiving a windfall which was not the intent of the avoidance section.
The absence of a diminution to the estate is not, by itself, sufficient to call for application of the earmarking doctrine. In fact, it may be argued that any time the proceeds of a new loan are used to pay off an antecedent debt, there is no diminution in the estate. However, the net value of the estate is considered only after the other elements for the application of the earmarking doctrine are met. It is only after a determination is made either (i) that the debtor complied with the new lender’s specific directive that the funds be applied to the debt of the previous creditor or (ü) that the debtor lacked control over the funds supplied by the new creditor, that a court considers whether the estate has been diminished. Further, in preventing application of the earmarking doctrine when the criteria for application are not met, there is no windfall to the debtor because, as is always the case with a preference, the funds are taken from a party entitled to payment strictly for the purpose of achieving a fairer distribution to all creditors.
Therefore, because there were no restrictions on Enron’s use of the credit lines, other than for general corporate purposes, Enron could use the funds for any corporate purpose. Thus, under either of the two main approaches for application of the earmarking principle, it would not apply under these circumstances because there was neither an agreement between Enron and the lenders under the lines of credit to limit use of the proceeds of the loans to payment of the commercial paper nor did Enron lack control over those funds.
CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that there are factual issues concerning whether the
The Court concludes that the benefit received by Aeltus is too remote and unas-certainable, under the facts of this case, to qualify it as a party that benefitted under
Further, the Court concludes that, under the circumstances of the case, the earmarking principle would not apply to protect the payments from avoidance.
Therefore, the motions for summary judgment filed by the ING Funds and Alfa are denied. However, the motion for summary judgment filed by Aeltus is granted.
Counsel for Enron is to settle an order consistent with this Opinion and include in
Notes
. For convenience, hereinafter, all references to Enron signify either Enron, the Debtors, the reorganized debtors, or Enron Creditors Recovery Corp., as the context requires.
. [The DTC] ... was created to reduce costs and provide clearing and settlement efficiencies by immobilizing securities and making ‘'book-entry” changes to ownership of securities. DTC provides securities movements for [the National Securities Clearing Corporation’s (NSCC’s)] net settlements, and settlement for institutional trades (which typically involve money and securities transfers between custodian banks and broker/dealers), as well as money market instruments.
The Depository Trust Company (DTC), http:// www.dtcc.com/about/subs/dtc.php (last visited June 23, 2009).
.With respect to certain defendants that have reached settlements and been dismissed from these actions, Goldman, Sachs & Co. and Lehman Commercial Paper Inc. played a role similar to that of JP Morgan.
. The approximate accrued par value paid was the price originally paid for the commercial paper plus accrued interest.
. Enron did not seek to avoid those payments that were made at maturity, during the preference period, because it determined that al
. Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, all references to sections are to the Bankruptcy Code.
. If JP Morgan were acting as Enron's agent, a transfer from JP Morgan to an investor would have required a commensurate payment to JP Morgan from Enron, as principal.
. Enron does not challenge the contention that had the parties waited until the maturity date, the payment would have been protected from avoidance. This protection, however, would have been afforded by the
. There is no indication that the commercial paper in these seven other companies was redeemed by the respective issuers, as opposed to being held by the broker/dealer until maturity or sold in the secondary market.
. The SEC also viewed
. If the transfer were made to an insider, this period would extend to one year.
.
. The Defendants argue that even assuming that the "commonly used in the securities trade” phrase modifies all of the entries in
. The Court recognizes that a transaction that might be considered rare, nevertheless, could be common in the industry. Moreover, not every transaction would have to establish its "commonness,” as that would undermine the purpose of the safe harbor. However, as set forth in this Court's June 15, 2005 Opinion, there were sufficient indicia of extremely unique circumstances presented in this case that set it apart and called into question whether, indeed, a "settlement payment” as contemplated by
.If a broker/dealer acted as principal and acquired the commercial paper from an investor, it would then have had three options with respect to the commercial paper: (i) it could keep the commercial paper until maturity; (ii) it could sell it on the secondary market to a third-party investor; or (iii) it could seek to redeem the commercial paper with the issuer, prior to maturity. If it redeemed the commercial paper at maturity with an issuer who subsequently filed for bankruptcy, the broker/dealer would have the
Thus, the party redeeming the commercial paper is subject to an avoidance action.
. Ordinarily, an agent that makes a payment using property transferred to it by the principal is considered a conduit. If an agent advances its own property to make a payment and is subsequently reimbursed by the principal, the agent, generally, is not considered a conduit.
. Inasmuch as a transfer could be recovered from the Investors if JP Morgan were an agent, whether or not it acted as a conduit in that capacity, the Court does not reach the issue of whether the debit and credit processing within the DTC system would support a finding that JP Morgan, in its role as agent, functioned as a conduit.
. The Investors argue that by redeeming the commercial paper, Enron only sought to
. During this period, Enron had been under close scrutiny by financial analysts and the press. An October 26, 2001 Wall Street Journal article addressed Enron's decision to redeem its commercial paper prior to maturity. In addition, JP Morgan recorded certain telephone conversations, including one where a JP Morgan sales representative advised Ael-tus, who made the ING Funds' investments, that JP Morgan was acting as agent for Enron to retire the commercial paper. Also, Bloom-berg tickets related to the transfers list JP Morgan as agent to retire the commercial paper.
Although the Alfa representative claims not to have seen the Wall Street Journal article, the representative indicates that he was informed of certain rumors circulating about Enron but claims not to have inquired as to their substance. There is contradictory evidence concerning the timing of Alfa's entry into the agreement to transfer its commercial paper, and an e-mail from JP Morgan to Enron suggests that, prior to that agreement, Alfa had knowledge that Enron was involved in the transaction. The e-mail was sent before JP Morgan agreed to act as agent, during the period when JP Morgan was merely connecting commercial paper holders and Enron. In the e-mail, JP Morgan notified Enron that Alfa was a commercial paper holder interested in participating in the transactions.
. In the earlier transactions, pursuant to which the ING Funds and Alfa purchased Enron's commercial paper, JP Morgan acted in its customary role as principal.
. At the Hearing, Alfa's counsel conceded that, as a legal matter, if JP Morgan, indeed, acted as an agent, it did not matter whether Alfa was aware of its role for purposes of determining whether the transfer was subject to a preference.
. As previously noted, had those commercial paper holders waited until maturity, the transfers would have been protected from avoidance. The protection, however, would have been provided by the
. The Investors also argue that the legislative history of the 1982 and 1984 amendments to
There is some merit to both arguments. The Investors are correct to the extent that
. This double payment would result because the guarantor had an obligation to make the old creditor whole by insuring he received payment on the debt owed to him. After the guarantor paid the old creditor, if the payment to the old creditor were deemed a preference, the old creditor would be required to return the payment it had received to the bankruptcy estate. Thereafter, the old creditor, who was the beneficiary of a guaranty, would turn to the guarantor again to make him whole and the guarantor would be obliged to make another payment.
. The
McCuskey
court questioned the wisdom of extending the earmarking doctrine outside of the context of guarantors because the court noted that it would not help a debt- or and actually would harm a new creditor, to the extent that the new creditor is a general creditor.
McCuskey,
. The Investors also contend that shortly before drawing down funds from the bank facilities, Enron made oral representations to the banks that it intended to use the proceeds to pay for the commercial paper. The Investors argue that Enron therefore was compelled to make those payments, otherwise it would have been subject to criminal law penalties for misrepresentations made to the banks for the purpose of obtaining a loan. The Court does not agree. Even if Enron made these statements, the statements were not material under the facts of this case. These bank lines were already committed. Therefore, the banks could not have relied upon the statements to make the loans as the banks were already obligated to make them. Further, the bank-facility agreements, which provided that the proceeds could be used for general corporate purposes, also provided that those agreements could be amended only by a writing.