The opinion of tide court was delivered by
The plaintiff, who is a carpenter, was engaged with other carpenters and with laborers in constructing center panels within the spaces made by the iron cross beams of a large refrigerator building in Jersey City, then in course of erection, which were for the temporary support of a concrete floor then being- laid in the several stories of the building. The work had progressed until the fourth floor had been reached, and the plaintiff, while engaged in nailing
The gravamen of the action was negligence in failing to provide proper support to the floor or sheathing upon which the plaintiff was working, and in failing to provide competent and skillful employes to lay and construct such flooring and in failing to properly inspect and maintain the same in a reasonably safe and sound condition while the plaintiff was working thereon in discharge of his duties.
At the close of the plaintiff’s evidence at the trial motion was made for a nonsuit, upon the ground, among others, that the accident was the result of the negligence of a fellow-servant. The learned trial judge ordered a nonsuit, observing that the case was either within the principle of Curley v. Hough, 33 Vroom 759, or within that of Saunders v. Eastern Hydraulic Co., 34 Id. 554. We have not stopped to determine as to the applicancy of these cases, for we can more appropriately, we think, invoke in support of the nonsuit the doctrine of fellow-servant. It is contended for the plaintiff that the defendant failed in his duty to use reasonable care to provide for him a reasonably safe place in which to work. But this duty of the master does not apply where the place of work is one that the servants themselves undertake to erect and provide as one of the duties and undertakings of their common employment. In such a case, if any injury occurs to an employe by reason of negligent construction, caused by the carelessness of a co-employe, the master is not liable. This principle is clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in Maher v. McGrath, 29 Id. 469, and in this court in Olsen v. Nixon, 32 Id. 671. The only liability that could fall upon the master in such case would be for negligence in the selection of the workmen. And the general rule is also well established that employes of a common master, who are engaged in the common employment of erecting the same structure,
These putlogs were selected by one or more of the carpenters, of whom there were at least six at work at the time of the accident, and they were carried by the laborers, as were the boards and other materials used, and- placed alongside the panel for which they were intended. Now, regarding- the putlog as an appliance which it was the duty of the master to furnish that would be reasonably safe for the purpose designed—a duty that could not be delegated—still it is well settled-that, where the master has furnished a sufficiency of safe appliances to select from, the master is not liable for an injury to an employe arising from the selection by a co-servant of an imperfect appliance not furnished by the master for the purpose. This principle was laid down by- this court in Maher v. Thropp, 30 Vroom 186, and in Guggenheim Smelting Co. v. Flanigan, 33 Id. 354. As before shown, the corporation had, by its president, plainly con
But, upon another principle, the master cannot be-held to be negligent because there were imperfect putlogs upon the premises that might be brought into use.' This was an appliance which the carpenters were to prepare, and did prepare, out of materials furnished by the master, in the course of their general work. It is not disputed but that the material furnished for the putlogs was of the proper quality and was sufficient in quantity. It therefore follows, upon the principle already stated, that any injury to a co-employe, by reason of faulty construction, does not fall upon the master. Maher v. McGrath, ubi supra. The fact that they acted under the direction of the foreman in charge of the men in doing what they did does not affect the question of liability. The foreman was, under the circumstances, a fellow-servant with the other employes engaged in the common employment.
The 'rule upon this subject is correctly laid down by the Supreme Court in O'Brien v. American Dredging Co., 24 Vroom 291. The decision has been approved by this court in Maher v. Thropp and Olsen v. Nixon, ubi supra. This rule was again very fully discussed and approved by the Court of Errors and Appeals in the recent case of Knutter v. New York and New Jersey Telephone Co. But, perhaps, the better and more complete answer to the alleged ground of liability on the part of the defendant, by reason of its alleged negligence in connection with the cutting, making and use of the imperfect putlog, may be found in this: That it plainly appears that such negligence, if any, was not the proximate cause of the injury. It was' proven by one of the carpenters, who.was the plaintiff’s witness, that he had been a carpenter for fifty years; that he was employed upon this work, and, under instructions from the foreman, he cut and prepared putlogs and was so engaged when stopped b3r the president; that they were pieced in a proper way; that this was often done, but they did it for the prevention of
This being the situation, the only question remaining is, was the faulty arrangement of the putlogs a breach of any duty that belonged to the master, or was it the fault of- a fellow-servant or. of the plaintiff himself. The evidence does not show that the master was present or participating in any way in the construction and sheathing of the panels. Under the principles already stated, he had furnished the proper and necessary materials for this work that was in charge of the carpenters and laborers, under the direction of the foreman. He owed them no duty thereafter in-the conduct of this work. The only liability that could attach to him for an injury to an employe so engaged would be where it arose from his failure to exercise reasonable care in the employment of a co-servant, whose negligence caused the injury. And this is the chief, if not the only, point of attack by the plaintiff in this part of -the case. His contention is that the ordinary laborers were directed or permitted to, not only carry the putlogs to the panel in question, but to lay them down in the clips—a duty which belonged to the carpenters, and for which the laborers were incompetent; that, if they had known, how to do their work and had been properly instructed, the accident, in all probability, would not have happened. It will be perceived that it is not claimed that- the master employed incompetent men, having regard to the particular work required of them, but rather that the ordi
But even conceding that the conditions of danger which precipitated the plaintiff’s injury grew out of negligence of the co-servant, as the result of his incompetency, since it plainly appears that these conditions were known to the plaintiff, or should have been known to him bjr the exercise of ordinary care before exposing himself to the danger complained of, and yet that, without notice thereof to the master or seeking in any way to remedy these conditions, he continued in the employment which resulted in the injury, -he must be held to have assumed the risk as an obvious one, and cannot recover. The principle involved in the proposition is so well established that the citation of authorities will.be unnecessary.
An effort has been made by the plaintiff to escape this result of his own negligence and that of his co-servants upon
