64 Vt. 502 | Vt. | 1892
The opinion, of the court was delivered by
The plaintiff claims title to the colt in question under a chattel mortgage of its mother, in which the colt is in no way referred to, and its mother is described as “ one brown
If the plaintiff had title to the colt by reason of this mortgage upon its mother, such title was in-operative as against a purchaser or attaching creditor, and the defendant acquired good title by his purchase of the mortgagor. R. L. 1966; Parker v. Chase and Buck, 62 Vt. 206; Longey v. Leach, 57 Vt. 377; Darling v. Wilson, 60 N. H. 59 (49 Am. Rept. 305); Funk v. Pond, 64 Wis. 35 (54 Am. Rept. 576); Rogers v. Highland, 69 Iowa 504 (58 Am. Rep. 230); Morrill v. Hoyes, 56 Maine 458 (96 Am. Dec. 486).
R. L. 1966 provides that a mortgage of such personal property shall not be valid against any person except the mortgagor,his executors and administrators, unless the possession of the property is delivered to, and retained by, the mortgagee, or the mortgage is recorded in the office of the clerk of the town in which the mortgagor resides at the time of making the same, or if he resides out of the State, in the town in which the property is situated.
Before the enactment of this statute, a mortgage of personal property was void as against subsequent purchasers and attaching creditors, unless the mortgagee took and retained possession of the property. Woodward v. Gates, 9 Vt. 358; Tobias v. Francis, 3 Vt. 425; Kendall v. Samson, 12 Vt. 515. The only change made by this statute is to authorize the recording of the mortgage in lieu of possession of the mortgaged property by the mortgagee, and as equivalent to it. Such recording is constructive notice to third parties subsequently dealing with the prop
By the construction given to this statute in the case of Parker v. Chase and Buck, supra, every distinct chattel must be so described in the mortgage itself that a third person, aided by inquiry which the instrument itself suggests, will be able to identify it; nothing short of this will impart notice to a purchaser. The plaintiff’s mortgage contained nothing to suggest inquiry in regard to the colt, therefore it was not constructive notice that the colt was mortgaged. At the time the defendant bought the colt, the period of nurture had passed. It was no longer connected with .its mother for any purpose. It was a chattel, distinct from its mother. Being a distinct chattel, it was not included within the description of the mother nor an incident of the mortgage.' There was nothing in its then relation to its mother to suggest that it was incumbered by the mortgage upon her. There is nothing in the description, “ one brown mare twelve or thirteen years old,” to suggest that a colt four months old, and no longer following its mother for nurture, is mortgaged. The colt would not have been a chattel more distinct and separate from its mother if it had been five years old. It was such a chattel as the law requires the mortgagee to have in his possession or described in a recorded mortgage.
But it is claimed that the notice given to the defendant at
Judgment affirmed.