194 Pa. Super. 53 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1960
Opinion by
We are here concerned with the interpretation and application of several sections of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
On May 14,1956, while Paul E. Enos, claimant, was engaged in cleaning over-head lights in Somerset Township, Somerset County, pursuant to his usual duties with his employer, Terrance L. Walter, the ladder on which claimant was standing slipped, causing him to fall. As a result, claimant’s right arm and wrist were sprained, his right shoulder dislocated, and he was hospitalized. Claimant returned to work on May 21, 1956, but was compelled to cease work on June 1, 1956, because of the condition of his arm. After further treatment, he again returned to work on August 10, 1956, and continued until the employer went out of business. Claimant then secured work at the Beacon Service Station, where he is presently employed at a weekly wage equal to that he was formerly receiving. However, he still has limitation of extension and flexion in the arm, allegedly a permanent condition. A compensation agreement, No. B-565,437, was prepared by the insurance carrier under date of July 2, 1956. This agreement was signed by the employer, but not by the claimant. Nevertheless, compensation was paid to claimant at the rate of $28.56 per week beginning May 14, 1956, and ending August 10, 1956. Claimant thereafter refused to sign a final receipt.
The petition presently under consideration is captioned as follows: “Petition for review of compensation agreement and for allowance of compensation because of continued disability”. Counsel for appellants moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that, not
Section 315 of the statute (77 P.S. 602) reads in pertinent part as follows: “In cases of personal injury all claims for compensation shall be forever barred, unless, within sixteen months after the accident, the parties shall have agreed upon the compensation payable under this article; or unless within sixteen months after the accident, one of the parties shall have filed a. petition as provided in article four hereof . . . Where, however, payments of compensation have been made in any case, said limitations shall not take effect until the expiration of sixteen months from the time of the making of the most recent payment prior to date of filing such petition”.
Section 413 of the statute (77 P.S. 772) reads in pertinent part as follows: “The board, or referee designated by the board, may, at any .time, modify, reinstate, suspend, .or terminate an original or supplemental agreement or an award, upon petition filed by either party with such board, upon proof that the disa
Appellants’ contention is thus stated: “There is no agreement subject to suspension under the provisions of Section 413 and the petition is barred by the applicable limitation as set forth in Section 315”. They rely upon the wording of Section 407 of the statute (77 P.S. 731) which reads, inter alia: “All agreements made in accordance with the provisions of this section shall be in writing, and signed by all parties in interest”. The purpose of this section was to protect claimants from imposition and improvidence: Wahs v. Wolf, 157 Pa. Superior Ct. 181, 42 A. 2d 166. Appellants also cite Blair v. Laughead, 108 Pa. Superior Ct. Pa. Superior Ct. 407, 165 A. 58, and Busch v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Borg., 150 Pa. Superior Ct. 48, 27 A. 2d 656, but these cases do not control the present factual situation. The Blair case involved an action in trespass wherein the plaintiff averred an oral contract under which he was to be paid specified weekly wages in lieu of compensation. It was held that (1) being oral, (2) having been made prior to the tenth day after the alleged accident, and (3) payments thereunder being contrary to the schedule set forth in the statute, the contract was null and void. In the Busch case, we said (italics supplied) : “The term ‘agreement’, as used in the Act, means a complete agreement voluntarily entered into and ordinarily, to come within the terms of the Act, it must be in writing and signed by all parties in interest”.
A somewhat comparable situation is found in Pooler v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 150 Pa. Superior Ct. 595, 29 A. 2d 212. In that case the employer attempted to have an agreement set aside because it was executed eight days after the accident, whereas the statute then provided that an agreement entered into prior to the tenth day after the accident was null and void. Emphasizing that the purpose of this provision was to benefit the employe, not the employer, we refused to set aside the agreement. The following language in the opinion is particularly applicable in the case at bar: “It would be absurd to hold that an employer could make an agreement which in every respect complies with the provisions of the Act and then, after paying under it for a period of six months, repudiate it on the ground that it was null and void”.
In summary, the agreement which had been prepared was signed by the employer and proceeded upon
Order affirmed.
Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 736, 77 P.S. 1 et seq.