Enmanuel v. People

7 P.R. 216 | Supreme Court of Puerto Rico | 1904

Lead Opinion

Mb. Justice Figuebas,

after making the above statement of facts, delivered the opinion of the court:

G-ood practice requires that before entering upon the fundamental question of ownership, we should first analyze such issues incidental to the main action to determine the question of ownership, as have been raised by the defendant, both in the answer to the complaint and in the appeal taken to this Supreme Court.

The first question to be considered is the one referring to the want of legal capacity which, by way of dilatory exception, was pleaded by the Fiscal on behalf of the people of Porto Eico, in answering the complaint, on the ground that the plaintiff should prove beyond doubt the character and representative capacity under which he sues, because if he does so by reason of a settlement in tail, there is wanting, according to him, evidence as to the existence of the entailed estate, which must be proven by the instrument instituting the same; and if he sues as an heir, it should have been established, by means of documents and other proper evidence, that the property claimed has, by strict and legal succesion or by a duly executed will, come to the possession of the plaintiff.

In this case there is nothing which refers to entailed estates, nor is such issue raised between persons contesting the benefit thereof; but even granting this, for the sake of argument, it would still appear that the deficiencies pointed out by the fiscal refer to the absence of those documents upon which the plaintiff bases his right, and this, which is known as sine actiones agis, would affect the fundamental question (article 503 of the Law of Civil Procedure), whence it follows that the defendant ha,s confused such a lack of right of action with the want of legal capacity mentioned in paragraph 2 of article 502, and article 532 of aforesaid Law of Procedure.

The plaintiff has complied with the last two precepts above enunciated, inasmuch as in claiming his rights as legatee of the Duchess de Mahon Crillon, he has proved his character as such by the will of said lady and by her certificate of death, whence his capacity is perfectly defined, a capacity which, on the other hand, has already been recognized by the Administration, and cannot now be ignored by its representative.

The second issue raised is that set forth by the fiscal in the following terms: ‘1 That only the President of the United States or, in a proper case, the G-ovemor of Porto Rico, can pronounce the decision left pending by the Queen of Spain;” but an important point is here lost sight of, namely, that it is not a question of giving or withholding a decision of an administrative character, by which lands belonging to either political entity mentioned above, are granted or refused, for which it is evident that this court has no powers; but one of a right to protection in the possession of lands, which constitutes a title of ownership, dating as far back as March 10, 1830, and confirmed by the decree of April 7, T859; hence the point discussed in this case is whether said ownership has subsisted up to this day, in the succession of time, or whether by acts and occurrences contrary to law the plaintiff has been deprived of each and every one of the rights pertaining to said ownership.

If such is the case, it undoubtedly devolves upon the judicial authority to extend to private property that protection wherewith it has been exclusively entrusted by the law, and in that sense it is evident that it acts within the scope of its powers in taking cognizance of the matter and deciding as to whether or not a violation has been committed against said ownership, such questions having at all times appertained exclusively to the ordinary courts.

These principles are embodied in the wise Constitution of the United States which declares, under article V (of Amendments thereto), that no person shall be deprived of his property without dne process of law, and this right, as is natural, must be determined by the proper judicial authority, whose power must be recognized and respected whenever, as in the present case, questions of ownership are dealt with.

And now, entering upon the real and only fundamental issue involved, it is necessary to determine whether each and every one of the proofs required in all actions instituted for the recovery of possession have been produced, these proofs being, in the first place, that of ownership, and, in the second place, the identification of the property sought to be recovered.

In examining the evidence submitted, due regard must be had, as is proper, to such public documents issued by competent authority as have been brought to the record, within the prescribed period of time, and which have not been challenged as spurious, either civilly or criminally, and to such evidence as has been taken, after citation of the adverse party, setting aside all antecedents which can be used only as means of illustration but do not constitute evidence having all the requirements prescribed by law.

It is a fact admitted by the fiscal, representing the defendant, that lands were granted in this Island to Duke de Crillon, afterwards Duke de Mahon, by virtue of Royal Cédulas of July 4 and September 25, 1776, which grant was ratified by ’Rojal-Cédula of July 19, 1792.

The plaintiff, Pierre Enmanuel, Baron de Laurens d’Oise-lay, has fully proven that the lands under discussion had been held, since April 22, 1829, not only in the name of the Duke, but also in that of the Duchess, from whom the plaintiff derives his right, said possession, moreover, being recognized by the board itself in the minutes of their session of April 3, 1854, when the lands in question were declared by them to be waste lands; and, besides, .the plaintiff’s right of ownership is fully borne out by the title of protection of March 10, 1830, maintaining the Duke de Mahon Crillon in the possession of said lands, issued, with authority therefor, by Captain-General Don Miguel de la Torre.

The action taken by the board of apportionment of waste lands, at their session of April 3, 1854, declaring escheated to the Crown the lands claimed in this controversy, on the ground that they had been abandoned, cannot have the scope and importance attached to it in this suit, namely, that of wiping out the rights springing from the titles and acts mentioned herein, because said action was taken without prejudice to submitting the same to the approval of the' Queen, which requisite does not appear to have been complied with, and because said action should be understood as having been rendered ineffective by Royal Order of April 8, 1857, issued at the instance of the legal representative of the Duchess de Mahon, by which sovereign decision the effects of the notice given to the heirs of the Duke, through the French Consul, in consequence thereof, was directed to be left in suspense. And aforesaid royal decision went still further, inasmuch as it was also ordained therein that the lands not yet put under cultivation should in no ivise be awarded to new grantees; all this with the express reservation of the Queen’s final decision in the matter, which means that the decision of the board of apportionment of waste lands was not final, and Captain-General Cotoner, so understanding it, referred the royal order to aforesaid board, on July 21, 1857, that is, to the very body that had declared the escheat, as may be seen at folios 27 to 31, inclusive, of the record, in which appears the aforesaid petition and a transcript of the royal order mentioned above, which documents must be accepted as authentic, inasmuch as they have not in any manner been contested by the defendant.

To further strengthen the belief that aforesaid decision had produced no legal effect whatsoever, we have the order of the Governor-General of this Island, dated April 7, 3859, directing that Count de Sambuy, as representative of the Estate of Duke de Mahon, be again put in possession, and it cannot be maintained that said order was not carried'out, on the ground that the papers connected with the proceedings thereof were not joined to the record, since on folio 37 a certificate appears, issued by Carlos Budet y Texidor, secretary of the municipal council of Lares, wherein the letter-book of 1859, existing in the archives of said corporation, is referred to, and a transcript therefrom given of the draft of the official communication of June 4, 1859, transmitting the record of proceedings instituted by the alcalde of Lares for the purpose of giving possession of the 20% caballerías of land in barrio Cibao of that municipality, to Count de Sambuy, in the representative capacity under which he then sued.

If the papers connected with the possession proceedings which are shown to have been transmitted to the Governor-General were mislaid or lost in his office, and it has therefore been impossible to bring them to the record, such an accident, for which the plaintiff was not responsible, cannot impair his rights, when, as in the -present case, the fact of the possession given as a result of the Governor’s order has been proven by the draft of said communication of a remote date the authenticity whereof cannot be questioned, because it refers to what is found in the archives of 1859, and because that certificate, issued by the secretary, wherein is inserted the draft of the letter of transmittal of the record of proceedings dealing with the possession given, no doubt with all the established formalities, is viséed by the acting alcalde of Lares and stamped with the seal of his office, which formalities preclude all idea of falsification, because the secretary issuing the certificate, who is the custodian of the draft of the letter, knew that he was doing so under his official liability, according to rule 4 of article 596 of the Law of Civil Procedure.

Said certificate, containing the draft of the letter of transmittal of the record of proceedings for the purpose of giving possession, lias the character of a formal public document, according to paragraph 4 of article 595 of aforesaid Law of Civil Procedure, because it is a copy made and authenticated by the secretary in charge of the archives, by order of a competent authority, such as the alcalde.

Lastly, it is a custom admitted for the proper conduct of offices, and especially to avoid responsibilities for the loss of official documents transmitted, to preserve the drafts thereof, and in the present case this precaution has saved the evidence of an important fact in the suit, such as the possession consummated, which cannot now be denied without first proving the falsity of the draft of the official communication, a thing which has not been attempted, nor has there even been a doubt as to the existence of the original draft; and such being the case, the possession given must be admitted, because the said draft is effective herein, and because to deny the possession given, while accepting the truthfulness of the draft, would be really inconsistent.

The fact of possession is likewise strengthened by the further fact, also proven and admitted by the fiscal, that the Duke de Mahon, or his successors, or the' Duchess de Mahon Crillon, had paid the taxes assessed on said lands, from the year 1862 to the year 1899, that is, thirty-seven years; from which circumstance it must be inferred that said lands were under cultivation, for, until the change of sovereignty, and the approval on March 1, 1902, .of the revenue law in force, taxes were imposed on the basis of profits, and if there were none, owing to the absence of cultivation, said taxes could not have been assessed or collected.

These proceedings, in which an action for the recovery of possession has been exercised, are directed against the entity which, according to the plaintiff, has committed a real spoliation, that is, the People of Porto Rico, Which is the one appearing at the public office of the registry of property as the detainer of his rights of ownership, and the success of the action exercised cannot be hindered by the fact that it has not been likewise directed against others who are merely alleged ’ by innuendo to be possessors of the lands in question, because the title by which they possess does not appear, and because it is possible that they are colonos of the plaintiff’s; but in any event, as they have not been parties to this suit, the decision that may be rendered herein can in no way prejudice them, their rights being left unimpaired, to be asserted in the proper proceeding, when the validity of their titles, if they have any, and such other evidence as they may submit can be considered and determined.

By Boyal Decree of April 17, 1884, the Begulations for the adjustment of waste lands in this Island were approved, and articles 2 and 3 of said Begulations read as follows:

“Art. 2. For the legal effects of these regulations, persons shall be considered as owners who show that they have acquired the lands by means of a royal cédula, a grant from the Superior Board of Allotment of Waste Lands, or a title issued by competent authority, and that they have complied with the conditions imposed upon them by the concession, irrespective of the time during which they may have been in possession.

“Persons shall also be considered as owners who, though lacking a dominion title, show that they have possessed the aforesaid lands, without interruption, for a period of twenty years, if under cultivation, and of thirty years, if not.

“To be understood as cultivated land it is necessary to prove that the same has been under cultivation during the last three years.

“Art. 3. All grants of lands in general, and especially those made from the year 1850 to the date hereof, with respect to which the conditions imposed have not been fulfilled,, are declared forfeited, the lands reverting to the State.”

By Royal Order of August 20, 1888, published in the Gazette of this Island of October 11, following, it is resolved “That article 3 of the Begulations be amended to read as follows:

“Grants of lands, in general, and especially those made from the year 1850 to the year 1884, with respect to the conditions imposed have not been fulfilled, are declared forfeited, the lands reverting to the State, unless the grantees have been in possession thereof for more than thirty years, which is the term fixed by the foregoing article for prescription as to uncultivated lands, held, without title. ’ ’

Even presuming possession without title, and that the lands in question are uncultivated, it must be declared, pursuant to the royal order and regulations cited above, that the plaintiff is the owner of the lands claimed by him, inasmuch' as the grant subsists, and said lands cannot now be considered as having escheated.

The conditions required for the prosecution of an action to recover possession have been proven,'such as the ownership and identification of the thing claimed, which latter evidently is that portion of lands described and recorded in the registry of property, the entry whereof must likewise be declared null and void, if the effects of the ownership existing in favor of the plaintiff are to be respected and the principle laid down in section 4 of the revised Civil Code is to prevail, namely, that acts executed contrary to the provisions of law are void, and said entry is therefore void which was ordered illegally and without complying with the requirements established by law, said errors being afterwards recognized by the Treasurer of Porto Rico, as shown by his official communication of June 4, 1901, wherein he tells the representative of' the plaintiff that if he had had before him the documents, which are those filed with the record, he would not have acted in the premises as he did, — an unequivocal and honest declaration which also confirms the plaintiff’s right.

In view of rule 63 of General Orders No. 118, series of 1899,, of the provisions cited and the pertinent ones cited in the judgment appealed from, as also the act of the Legislative Assembly, approved March 12, 1903, and articles 358, 364 and 371 of the Law of Civil Procedure, we adjudge that we should affirm and dQ affirm the judgment rendered by the District Court of San Juan, August 3, 1902, without special imposition .of the costs of this appeal. This judgment is ordered to be communicated, and the record returned to the trial court.

Chief Justice Quiñones and Justice Sulzbacher concurred. Justices Hernández and MacLeary dissented.

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Dissenting Opinion

Dissenting Opinion -of

Justices Hernández and MacLeary.

The undersigned associate justices do not concur in the foregoing opinion, rendered by a majority of their colleagues, and in lieu thereof submit their opinion as follows:

The findings of fact of aforesaid opinion are accepted, and supplemented with the following:

According to a report a copy of which was filed with the record, prepared on March 8, 1869, in pursuance to instructions from the board of allotment of waste lands by their fellow-member Lucas Garcia Ruiz, Count de Sambuy, representing the interests of the Estate of Duke de Mahon, addressed a petition to the Governor-General of this Island, under date of July 25, 1865, including two public documents executed in Avignon, Prance, on the 10th of July aforesaid, to wit: a general power of attorney conferred by the Duchess de Mahon upon Count de Sambuy, and a public instrument wherein, among other particulars, the ducal title of Mahon, together with the Grandeeship of Spain, of the first class, and the fee-tail instituted in connection with said ranks, by deed executed in Madrid on August 27, 1794, assigning to said fee-tail the lands granted to the Duke de Mahon, according to the title issued by Captain-General Don Miguel de la Torre, on March 10, 1830, are recognized in favor of Maria Antonia Gabriela Balbo Berthone de Crillon, the remaining lands that had belonged to the Duke de Mahon in this Island being awarded to the other heirs. These documents were presented by the Count de Sambuy, according to his statement, for the purpose of their preservation by the Government, together with other documents referring to the Duke de Ma'hon, after registering the same at the Contaduría General, Audiencia Territorial, alcaldía of Lares and Anotación de Hipotecas, to the end that the proper authorities might safeguard the grant made by King Carlos III and the estate-tail founded on behalf of the Duké de Mahon, Conqueror of Minorca. Aforesaid documents, together with the petition, were referred by the Governor-General to the hoard of allotment of waste lands, which commisisoned their fellow-member Lucas Garcia Ruiz to prepare the report called for.

Said member of the board, after examining the necessary antecedents, was of opinion that a report should be submitted to “His Excellency the Superior Civil Governor” to the effect that “inasmuch as said Estate (that of the Duke de Mahon) could not he considered as owner of the lands referred to in such an indefinite manner in the claim presented, if the aforesaid Estate, or its representative, should deem it advisable to assert or vindicate its right of ownership over said lands, the same must be specifically determined; and in case said lands should appear to he under cultivation or held in usufruct created by said Estate or by the representatives of the dukes, their rights therein must be respected; but should such rights be disputed by other private persons who under a different title are cultivating said lands, the representative of the Duke must resort to the courts of justice, which are the only ones having jurisdiction over matters relating to ownership; and, finally, should the lands prove to be unoccupied waste lands, then it devolves upon the hoard to decide as to the validity or invalidity of the grant, as it may deem proper. At the same time, Iiis Excellency the Superior Civil Governor may he apprised that according to provisions of law in force, the_ public instruments forwarded by Count de Sambuy with his letter of July 25, 1865, cannot be registered in the Audiencia Territorial, and the Contaduría General, nor can they be administratively ordered to be registered at the respective Ano-taci-ones de Hipotecas. Another matter is presented in the letter and deeds forwarded by Connt de Sambuy, namely, the one referring to the institution of a fee-tail in connection with the Duchy of Mahon and Grandeeship of Spain annexed thereto, by entailing for this purpose one of the four leagues of land awarded in this Island to the first duke. Whether because a royal license was formerly required for the purpose of creating an'estate-tail, or because the creation of fee-tails are now prohibited, it would seem that the incumbrances and impediments instituted by the deed executed-in Avignon over aforesaid league of land, being contrary to our existing laws, can have no legal effect in this Island. The report called for by His Excellency the Superior Civil Governor might be drawn up in the terms above set forth, or in such others as the board should deem more appropriate. San Juan, Porto Rico, March 8, 1869. Garcia Ruiz.”

The board of waste lands approved the report of their fellow-member, and it was also accepted by the Council of Administration, which recommended a decision to the same effect on June 14, 1869, there being no record of the Governor’s determination in the premises.

■The holders of the lands claimed by the plaintiff as his property having been summoned to show the right by which they held, in compliance with the resolution of the Treasurer of Porto Rico, of September 4,1900, as appear from the record presented in the trial, none of them presented a title of ownership, while many declared that the title of the grant made to them in 1854 was on file at the alcaldía of Lares.

In compliance with the Treasurer’s decree, the holders of the lands in question were entered on the assessment-roll of land-taxes for the fiscal year 1900-1901, .with the number of cuerdas possessed by each, aggregating 3,826.50 cuerdas.

Besides the findings of fact of the judgment rendered, the dissenting justices accept the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth conclusions of law thereof, and add thereto the following:

An action to recover the ownership of a thing can prosper only when, besides'proving the ownership and identity thereof, it is exercised against the holder or possessor of the thing sought to be recovered, as was declared by this Supreme Court in a judgment delivered October 24, 1900, in conformity with the jurisprudence established by the Supreme Court of Justice of Spain, prior to the extinction of the latter’s sovereignty over this Island.

Although it was shown at the trial that the Duke de Mahon Crillon had been in the possession of the lands in question, on April 22, 1829, and a writ protecting him in said possession was issued on March 10 of the following year, he thereby securing a true title of ownership, not absolute and irrevocable, but subject to the conditions governing grants of waste lands, said title remained without effect the moment the board of waste lands by their resolution of April 3, 1854, after instituting the proper proceedings, declared.that said lands had reverted to the Crown of Spain, in view of the state of abandonment in which they had been left.

The aforesaid resolution of April 3, 1854, complied with Royal Order of September 15, 1852, declaring that it was necessary to proceed without delay to the reversion of the 27 caballerías that had been abandoned and left without cultivation by the grantee in Rio Grande and Lares, and therefore the provision of the resolution “without prejudice to reporting-such action to the Queen,” cannot mean that it would have no immediate legal effect or that it was to remain in suspense nntil approved by the Queen, but that it would be effective until amended or repealed by the Spanish Sovereign. That such was the case is shown by the fact that the board of waste lands, at the request of the municipal board of Lares, which suggested the advisability of giving to seventy-four residents the portion of lands occupied by them that had belonged to the Duke de Mahon Crillon, decided, by a subsequent resolution, to make the award to said possessors, provided that the portion allotted to each should not exceed one hundred cuerdas, the proper authorization for the measurement thereof to be taken out within the period of two months.

The Eoyal Order of April 8, 1857, did not leave without effect the decision of the board of waste lands, of April 3,1854, nor the award subsequently made to seventy-four holders of lands formerly belonging to the Duke de Mahon Crillon, but •directed, in view of the Duchess de Mahon Crillon’s petition to the Queen of Spain, requesting an extension of time for the reversion to the State of the lands granted to the first Duke de Mahon Crillon, that Her Majesty be informed as to the antecedents and state of the matter, and that recommendations' be made as to the manner of reconciling the interests of the Duke’s family with the agricultural interests of the Island, the effects of the notice given through the Consul of Trance to the heirs of the duke being left in suspense, no awards whatsoever of the lands not yet cultivated to be made to new grantees, in the meantime; and inasmuch as the object of the notice to the heirs of the Dulce, through the French Consul, was to inform them that if they still desired to preserve some of the lands awarded him in Fajardo, Naguabo or elsewhere (no mention is made of Lares), he should appoint an attorney to produce the measurement and survey thereof and put them under cultivation within one year, and pay the royal dues, in which case his rights would be respected, as otherwise they would revert to the Crown, pursuant to the circular of which a copy was joined to the notice, it is evident that said notice the minutes whereof are filed with the record and bear date of June 7,1856, does not refer to the decision of the board of waste lands, of April 3, 1854; and therefore the Eoyal Order of April 8, 1857, was not intended to repeal said decision, nor did it suspend the effects thereof; the more so, as the notice refers to lands not reverted to the Crown of Spain, as had been those forming the subject-matter of the controversy,, and the royal order only forbids the awarding of new grants, without cancelling those that had been made, such as the ones awarded to the seventy-four residents of Lares.

That the Eoyal Order of April 8, 1857, did not leave without effect the decision of the board of waste lands, of April 3, 1854, which agreed with the Eoyal Order of September 15, 1852, is corroborated by the other Eoyal Order of January 20, 1859, in which the Queen of Spain directs the Governor-General of this Island to extend to Count Manfredo Bertone de Sambuy all such protection and assistance as he was entitled to by his rank, in order that he might take proper steps to recover the lands inherited by his daughter-in-law and ward, Madame María Berton de Crillon, Duchess de Mahon and Grandee of Spain of the first class, without ordering the restitution of any particular lands to said young lady; whence it is evident that the decree of the Governor-General of this Island, of April 7, 1859, directing that the representative of the Duke de Mahon be reinstated in the possession of the lands whereof he had been expropriated, according to the bounderies shown on the charts and documents he might produce, leaving unimpaired the rights of those who possessed them, wholly or in part, to be discussed at the place and in the manner prescribed by law, far from conforming to said royal order which was one of mere protection or recommendation, is in open contradiction therewith; for the Governor, instead of rendering assistance and protection to aforesaid count for the recovery of the lands claimed by him, placed him in possession thereof, — a function devolving upon the board of waste lands, which had ordered the reversion of said lands to the Crown of Spain.

The copy of the official communication of June 4, 1859, addressed to the Governor-General of this Island, in which the alcalde of Lares states that he has the honor of transmitting to said high authority the papers connected with the proceedings liad for the purpose of giving to Count de Sambuy, as the representative of the heirs of Duke de Mahon Crillon, possession of 20% caballerías of lands, in barrio Cibao, within said municipality, agreeably to the communication from said Governor, dated April 7, 1859, which was placed at the head of aforesaid papers, offered only an initial portion of written evidence, but not full and complete proof that Count de Sam-buy, as the representative of aforesaid heirs, had been placed in possession of the above-mentioned 20% caballerías of lands, for such evidence can be furnished only by the record of the proper possessory proceedings; and the absence of said record should have been supplied by some other evidence showing to the satisfaction of the court that the decree of April 7, 1859, had been complied with, notwithstanding the- award made by the board of waste lands to seventy-four residents of Lares, subsequently to said board’s decision of April 3, 1854, declaring the lands of the Duke escheated to the Crown of Spain. Said evidence was rendered the more necessary in view of the fact that by public deed executed July 5, 1900, divers persons, claiming by title derived from aforesaid grant, to be owners and possessors of the same lands the ownership whereof is claimed by the plaintiff, had sold them for 8,000 provincial pesos to Virgilio Acevedo Hernández. The plaintiff, moreover, having alleged that the holders by grant from the board of waste lands in 1854 had been dispossessed of the rights acquired, and that if they did remain on the property it was only as colonos, paying lease-rent to the Estate of the Duke de Mahon, he was bound to file with the record proof of the existence of the lease alleged, wherewith he would have shown that the vendors held the lands as lessees, and that the right of ownership belonged to the Estate of the Duke.

The certificates of taxes paid by the Duke de Mahon Crillon, by the Estate of said Duke, or by the Duchess de Mahon Crillon, from the year 1862 to the year 1889, cannot supply the absence of proof of possesison, for aside from the fact that said certificates do not clearly specify the lands to which they refer, they would fill only one of the requisites demanded by articles 391 of the Mortgage Law and 436 of the Regulations for the execution thereof, to prove the possession of real estate.

The wording of the official communication from the alcalde of Lares, of June 4, 1859, affords no light as to what were the formalities observed in giving the possession ordered by the G-overnor-G-eneral, nor can it be inferred therefrom whether it was effected in accordance with the demarcation specified in the writ of protection of March 10, 1830; or whether or not there had been any claims set up by those already in possession ; or whether said claims, if any, had been passed upon by the alcalde of Lares, or referred by him to the G-overnor-G-en-eral for decision; or whether the holders were dispossessed, or permitted to continue in possession; which data are necessary in order to ascertain the nature, extent and scope of the possession given to Count de Sambuy, and to be able to determine whether the lands which were the object therof are the same that the plaintiff claims as his property.

The attorney for the plaintiff has presented as evidence of the ownership alleged such documents as seemed to him pertinent for the purpose, and for the reasons above set forth this is not sufficient to establish said ownership; but he has not alleged prescription as a means of acquiring the same, and therefore he cannot invoke in support of his right articles 2 and 3 of the Regulations for the adjustment of waste lands in this Island, approved by Royal Decree of April 27,1884, nor Royal Order of August 20, 1888, amending article 3 of said Regulations; but even in the supposition that he had in due time alleged prescription, this should be overruled inasmuch as the plaintiff has failed to show, as he was called upon to do, an uninterrupted' possession of the lands in question for more than thirty years.

According to articles 348 and 430 of the old Civil Code, which are sections 3,54 and 433 of the one in force, the owner has a right of action against the holder and the possessor of the thing to recover the same, while natural possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right by a person, and civil possession the same holding or enjoyment, together with the intention of acquiring ownership of the thing or right; and, therefore, The People of Porto Eico not being the possessor of the lands the ownership whereof is at issue herein, the action to recover possession conld not be exercised against it, but should have been directed against those who had possession and enjoyed said lands and still possess and enjoy them alleging rights of ownership over them, as is to be gathered from the deed of sale executed July 5, 1900, in favor of Virgilio Acevedo, and from the fact that said possessors appear to-day upon the assessment-roll pursuant to an order of the Treasurer of Porto Eico, dated September 4, 1900; while the record of possession entered at the Eegistry of Property of Aguadilla in favor of The People of Porto Eico is not sufficient to invest the latter with the character of possessor, which it had not, for such a record cannot convert into real and true a fact which is not so.

The certificate issued by the Treasurer of Porto Eico on September 14, 1900, for the purpose of entering at the Eegis-try of Property of Aguadilla, in favor of The People of Porto Eico, the record of possession of the lands sold by public instrument of July 5, of aforesaid year, to Virgilio Acevedo y Hernández, did not fulfill the requisites prescribed by article 36 of the Eegulations for the execution of the Mortgage Law, nor could it do so, inasmuch as the most essential of these requisites, namely, the possession of the lands in question, was lacking'in the present case, for the simple and manifest reason that The People of Porto Eico did not possess said lands, and therefore the record of possession made in aforesaid registry of property was null and void.

According to section 1 of the Act of the Legislative Assembly Establishing the Supreme Court of Porto Eico as a Court of Appeals, approved March 12,1903, this court in its deliberations and decisions shall not be confined to the errors in procedure or of law only, as they are pointed out, alleged, or saved by the respective parties to the suit, or as set forth in their briefs and exceptions; but in furtherance of justice it may also take cognizance of all the facts and proceedings in the case as they appear in the record and likewise .consider the merits thereof, so as to promote justice and right and to prevent injustice and delay.

In view of the reasons above set forth, of the legal texts already cited, and judgments of the Supreme Court of Spain, of April 10, 1872, December 4, 1888, and October 5, 1892 — the first in an action to recover an estate and payment of dues, the second in a suit for the annulment of a survey and recovery of lands, and the third in an action to recover possession— as also the judgment of this Supreme Court rendered October 24, 1900, the undersigned justices are of opinion that -the exception of want of legal capacity on the part of the plaintiff, pleaded by the defendant, should be overruled; that the complaint, so far as a declaration of ownership of the lands referred to therein is sought in behalf of Pierre Enmanuel Baron de Laurens d’Oiselay, be dismissed and that it be sustained as to the cancellation of the record of possession of said lands entered at the Registry of Property of Aguadilla in the name of The People of Porto Eico, both plaintiff and defendant being left at liberty to assert their respective rights in due form and manner, and against the proper party, as to the title of ownership claimed by them over aforesaid lands; the costs of the trial and of the appeal to be understood as without special imposition.