*1 DECISION city ordi- no applicable there is park- prohibits statute that
nance or state adjacent to a zone yellow diagonal in a
ing designated physically space
parking was insuffi- the evidence persons,
disabled conviction for support Kortkamp’s
cient to space. designated parking
obstructing a
Reversed. ENGLER, Respondent,
Geralyn S. WEHMAS, Appellant.
Beverly J.
No. C9-01-528. of Minnesota. Appeals
Court of
Sept. *2 Scouton, Streed, stayed the ditch Respondent alongside David E. side Mark D. Ltd., Woodbury, passenger of the rear door. Spence, Meshbesher & (for MN, respondent). appellant Beverly Weh- Subsequently, *3 Gunderson, Magnuson, Eric Jan M. on 221st Ave- approached J. mas westbound Bratvold, Kenney, L. Diane B. Rid- Piper Appellant nue. lost control of her car and er, Bennett, Arundel, Egan Minneapolis, & Jeffrey it veered towards the ditch where (for MN, appellant). emerging area. Re- from the wooded spondent thought appellant’s go- car was and decided Considered ing to hit her and run into Renner’s car. KALITOWSKI, Presiding Judge, Instead, respondent the car and missed STONEBURNER, KLAPHAKE and him Jeffrey, throwing struck ten feet Judges. Jeffrey injuries, air. sustained severe
including permanent scarring disfig- and OPINION accident, respondent urement. Since the depression, posttrau- claims to suffer from KALITOWSKI, Judge disorder, matic stress and other mental Geralyn Respondent Engler brought S. physical and ailments. against Beverly appellant an action J. In July respondent commenced a based on an accident that result- Wehmas against appellant claiming negli- lawsuit injuries respondent’s ed severe son. gent arising infliction of emotional distress negligent Respondent claimed infliction of safety, from her fear for her own her fear emotional distress based on her fear for safety, for her son’s and the distress safety, her the fear she felt for her by witnessing caused her son’s serious in- safety, son’s and the distress she suffered juries. 2000, appellant On December witnessing injuries as a result of to her summary renewed an earlier motion for Appellant partial son. moved for sum- judgment, asking the district court to dis- mary judgment, arguing that Minnesota respondent’s miss claims for emotional dis- damages caselaw does not allow for injuries tress based on fear for or to her infliction of emotional distress alternative, appellant son. asked safety based on either fear for the of a certify question district person third or witnessing to a respondent may whether recover for emo- person. third The district court denied tional distress based on that claim. The question motion and certified the appellant’s district court denied motion for
this court. certified, summary judgment pursuant 103.03(h), Civ.App. to Minn. R. the follow- FACTS ing question: 17, 1997, April respondent Geralyn On Where the has asserted claim Renner, Engler, respondent’s Brent infliction of emotional dis- sons, Jeffrey, driving two Jacob and were tress is found to have: Grove, eastbound on 221st Avenue in Oak danger” 1. been in the “zone Minnesota. four-and-a-half-year-old When physical impact; Jeffrey go stated he needed to experienced 2. a reasonable fear for bathroom, pulled Renner to the side of the safety; her own gravel Jeffrey rural road. walked about along 25 feet to the line tree the ditch so 3. demonstrated manifesta- distress, that he was not from the road. tions of visible emotional may portance placed also recover should be on whether re- distress caused her for emotional fear versal of the will terminate the proceedings.” for the of her son and from wit- nessing her son’s
Here, while our decision on the certified question presented does not ter ISSUES minate the proceedings, it substantially re question important 1. Is the certified appellant’s duces responsibility for dam and doubtful? ages. By answering the certified May recover negative in the respondent may pres for emotional distress from wit- *4 ent relating evidence to her son’s nessing an accident from within the zone This will greatly reduce the of scope danger, by appellant’s caused negli- proceedings and affect the amount and gence, which her caused fear for her son’s type respondent may claim. injuries and resulted severe We thus presented conclude the issue here her son? important. is ANALYSIS “A question is properly certified as doubtful if there is no controlling prece I. (citation omitted). dent.” Id. parties Both assert that the dis question trict court’s certified “impor question is That the is impres- one of first not, however, and agree. tant doubtful.” We This court sion is of itself sufficient to may appeal justify doubtful; hear an from a denial of a certification as summary judgment motion for “if question the trial should be one on which there is question certifies that the presented ground substantial for a difference of important is and doubtful.” opinion. Minn. R. Civ. 108.03(h) Jostens, (2000); P.
App.
Inc. v.
omitted).
Id. at
(quotation
886
Federated Mut. Ins.
612 N.W.2d
there is no
controlling
direct
caselaw on
(Minn.2000).
883
Whether a question is
jurisdictions
this issue and
split
other
are
important and
legal ques
doubtful raises a
on
negligent
whether to allow
subject
tion and is
de novo review
infliction of emotional distress
on
based
Jostens,
this court.
In is doubt- determining question if a is ful. important, we balance a number of factors.
Id. at 884. A increasingly is im Because the certified presented portant if impact, it has statewide reversal doubtful, is both important grant we likely, lengthy proceedings is will be termi review. nated, and a district court’s incorrect rul ing will inflict substantial harm on the II. parties. Id. A question is decreasingly affirmed, important if it will be a trial Appellant will contends that the dis issue, moot the reversal will not terminate trict court in denying erred her motion for action, summary judgment reversal would not relieve in concluding parties significant of a burden. Id. can recover for her emotional But each factor does not warrant equal appellant’s distress from great consideration. Id. of im- against respondent’s “[A] deal conduct son. 872 summary But appeal judgment,
On an
from
no Minnesota case has addressed
(1)
whether a
within the zone of dan
questions:
whether there
we ask two
can
ger
recover for emotional distress aris
any genuine
of material fact
are
issues
injury
an
(2)
ing
plain
from
to a
whether the lower courts erred
Although
controlling,
tiffs child.
of the law.
application
their
discussion
infliction of emo
French,
2, 4
by Cooper
State
v.
Cross,
tional distress claims in
Stadler
(Minn.1990) (citation omitted). A review-
(Minn.1980),
552
N.W.2d
instructive.
ing court need not defer to the district
Stadler,
Supreme
In
the Minnesota
Court
application
court’s
the law when the
held that a
bring
could not
an
in dispute.
material facts are not
Hubred
action for intentional infliction of emotional
Corp.,
v. Control Data
N.W.2d
on the
distress
based
(Minn.1989). Here, there are no material
plaintiffs
child
the plaintiff
in dispute,
facts
thus our review is de novo.
not in the zone of
at 553.
necessary
The elements
to maintain a
discussing why
applies
Minnesota
negligence
duty;
claim for
are
test,
zone-of-danger
the court mentioned
duty;
breach of that
that the breach
*5
problems
liability
with limitless
to tortfea
duty
proximate
of
be
cause of plain-
sors.
(4)
injury;
plaintiff
tiffs
and
that [the]
liability
A person’s
consequences
for the
injury.
did in fact suffer
of
her or
actions cannot be unlimited.
(Minn.
State,
40,
Johnson v.
553 N.W.2d
workable,
The limits imposed must be as
1996) (citation omitted). Courts have add-
reasonable, logical,
just
possible.
and
as
ed three
requirements
additional
for the
If
consistently
the limits cannot
and
be
tort of
infliction of emotional dis-
meaningfully
ju-
applied
courts and
plaintiff
tress: a
must show she
ries,
imposition
liability
then the
of
danger
physi-
was within a zone of
of
arbitrary
capricious.
would become
impact;
reasonably
cal
feared for her
Moreover,
Id. at 554.
the court raised
safety;
suffered severe
policy concerns about a rule that would
physi-
emotional distress with attendant
damages
allow
cal manifestations.
infliction
plain-
of emotional distress for a
tiff who witnesses
to an immediate
Benson,
K.A.C. v.
527 N.W.2d
family member:
(Minn.1995). Moreover, “[c]ourts histori
if
cally
person
plain-
what
the third
have been concerned about the relia
was
bility
tiffs beloved niece or nephew, grandpar-
of emotional distress claims and have
ent, flaneé,
friend,
liability
lifelong
or
as dear to
limited
for those claims.” Carlson
as her more immediate fam-
Illinois Farmers Ins.
ily?
535 (Minn.App.1994) (citing Restate
(Second)
§
ment
of Torts
cmt.
436A
b
Id. at 555.
(1965))(other
omitted).
citation
Stadler,
In addition to
we are also mind-
parties
Both
that all
agree
required
ful of a recent decision of this court that
elements of a claim for negligent infliction held that a “plaintiff cannot recover for
here,
of emotional
present
distress are
and negligent
infliction of emotional distress
it
disputed
is not
respondent
go arising
that
can
from witnessing the death of a
forward with
her claim for the
friend” even when the
is inside the
Carlson,
she suffered
on her fear
based
for her own zone of
520 N.W.2d at
safety.
In discussing where to draw a line
suggested
distress she suffered as a result
liability,
the Carlson
of either
fearing
safety
witnessing
for her son’s
or
that:
injury.
her son’s
duty
pro-
the tortfeasor had a
to
[w]hile
tect both
and her Mend from
Carlson
Certified
answered
in the
they
pas-
harm
were
negative.
car,
sengers
duty
in his
he had no
to
from
protect Carlson
distress
KLAPHAKE, Judge (dissenting)
from the fate of her Mend.
I respectfully
Although
dissent.
I agree
Id. at 537. The court further concluded
that
important
the certified
otherwise,
that if it
to find
the tort-
were
doubtful, I disagree with
majority’s
liability
out of proportion
feasor’s
would be
conclusion that respondent should not be
culpability.
to the tortfeasor’s
allowed to recover emotional
dam-
distress
holdings
Applying
Sta-
ages based on the fear she experienced for
Carlson,
dler and
we conclude that Minne
her son’s
and based on
anxiety
appellate
sota
courts have been reluctant
upon witnessing
distress she suffered
liability
negli
third
persons
to extend
her son sustain serious
gent infliction
emotional distress cases.
undisputedly
in the “zone
addition,
Minnesota has never held
danger”
and sustained emotional dis-
duty
a
has a
a
protect
person
tortfeasor
tress
based on fear for her own
within
from
the zone of
safety, she should also
to present
be able
Thus,
family
harm
member.
this
evidence on the emotional distress she sus-
creating
court would be
new law Minne
*6
witnessing
tained as a result of
injury to
if
hold
sota we were to
that
her child.
I would therefore answer the
damages
could recover
for the emotional
certified
in the affirmative.
distress she suffered as a result of witness
ing her son’s
See Tobin v. Gross
I
in
ruling,
do not believe that
so
we
man,
609,
554,
24 N.Y.2d
301 N.Y.S.2d
249
“creating
would be
new law in Minnesota.”
419, 421
(stating
N.E.2d
that allow A cause of action for
infliction of
ing
damages
the
of
for emotional
in
emotional distress has existed Minneso-
injury
distress based on an
to a third party
City
ta since 1892. See Purcell v. St. Paul
law).
134,
is the creation of new
it
is Ry.
48 Minn.
N.W.2d 557 DECISION safeguards tations act as to insure Notwithstanding genuineness the fact that of claims based on emotional she (noting id. at courts danger, respondent within the zone of is distress. See 559 in- required objective component not to the emotional have to entitled for stability in predictability disposi- just” sure necessary limits found to be in Sta- claims). dler. tion of emotional distress See id. Carlson, 538, 520 N.W.2d at this Contrary majority’s characteriza- court plaintiff held that a cannot recover here, presented respon- tion of the claims infliction of emotional dis- dent not does seek to recover arising tress from witnessing the death of injuries: based on her son’s she seeks friend, a even when that was in- damages based on the emotional distress side the zone of This rea- not, she has suffered. is This as the ma- tortfeasor, soned that the driver concludes, jority an attempt to create new car in which the plaintiff and her friend Indeed, majori- law. by case cited riding, duty were protect “had no to [the ty easily distinguishable because the plaintiff] from distress from the that case was not the zone of fate of her friend” impose such merely witnessed the accident duty a would render the tortfeasor’s liabili- injured. in which her child was See Tobin ty out proportion to his culpability. Id. Grossman, 609, 24 N.Y.2d 301 N.Y.S.2d at Again, making a tortfeasor liable 554, (refusing N.E.2d mother, the distress suffered her- recognize “entirely new cause of action” danger, self in witnessing injury at to her based on mother’s car striking child, places limits on liability that are child, when mother sustained no proportion workable and in culpability. impact in accident and did not fear for her recognized As by at least one commenta- safety). unique The fact situation tor, allowing respondent fully to recover
presented
may
here
make this a “case of
for the emotional distress she has suffered
impression,”
first
it
but
does not make this
is consistent with
negligence princi-
basic
a case in which we are being asked to
ples, as set out in Minnesota case law and
make new law or create a new cause of
the Restatement of Torts. See Michael K.
yet
recognized
action
in Minnesota.
Steenson, The Anatomy
Emotional Dis-
Minnesota,
tress Claims in
19 William
contrary,
To the
presents
this case
(1993).
Mitchell L.Rev.
11-15
Professor
logical extension of the two
cases cited
*7
Steenson offers the following analysis:
Cross,
majority,
the
Stadler v.
(Minn.1980),
552
The plaintiff
was in the
Carlson v. Illinois
zone of
(Minn.
reasonably
Farmers Ins.
520
She
N.W.2d 534
feared for her own safe-
Stadler,
ty.
App.1994).
She suffered
295 N.W.2d at
severe emotional dis-
tress that was
supreme
product
the
the
of fear
held that a
mother
herself or the
bring
safety
family
could not
an
of a
action for
member.
intentional
The
physical
distress resulted in
infliction of emotional
harm
distress for damages
within the
meaning of [existing
based on
Minneso-
to her child because the
ta cases discussing proximate cause].
mother was not in the zone of danger.
Because emotional harm and
The
resultant
court was concerned
prob-
with the
physical injury were foreseeable under
lems that such
liability
limitless
would im-
circumstances,
the
it is irrelevant if the
pose
Here,
on tortfeasors.
defendant was unable to foresee the ex-
should be allowed
act manner of occurrence.
in the
zone of
and feared for her
safety
own
as well as her son’s. This case
Id. at 13. Section 436 of the Restatement
thus draws a bright-line rule
provides
further supports recovery
types
for these
“workable, reasonable,
logical,
damages:
within
as
and consistent results”: she was
If the actor’s conduct
designed
pro-
to
duty
danger,
safety,
of care
zone of
feared
her own
violating a
fright
from a
or other emo-
tect another
and has exhibited
manifestations
which the
actor
disturbance
tional
her
caused
emotional distress. See
involving an unrea-
recognize
K.A.C.,
as
should
the harm results the affirmative and allow re- or other operation fright ternal spondent present evidence on her emo- protect emotional disturbance does distress, tional caused fear for whether liability. the actor from safety safety, her own or for her son’s or conduct is as If the actor’s by or she anxiety experienced distress causing creating an unreasonable risk of being severely her upon son otherwise than bodily harm to another injured by negligence. another’s shock, fright, him or by subjecting and immediate emotional other similar
disturbance, re- the fact that such harm solely operation from the internal
sults fright or other emotional disturbance liability. actor from protect
does not 2 ap- The rule stated Subsection
plies bodily where the harm to the other The YEAR APPEAL fright from his shock or at harm 2001 BUDGET OF
results Lyle LANDGREN, County Pipestone or of his immediate peril to member Sheriff, Petitioner, Appellant, family occurring presence. in his (Second) § of Torts Restatement (1965). One of the comments subsection PIPESTONE COUNTY BOARD explains: COMMISSIONERS, OF exception The reason for this Respondent. general rule that there cannot be recov- disturbance, ery for emotional or its con- No. CX-01-618. peril from the of a sequences, arising Appeals Court of Minnesota. person
third lies in the fact that defendant, by negligence, endan- has Sept.
gered plaintiffs harm, bodily
threatened him with so *8 the defendant is in breach of an
original duty to exercise protection.
care
Id., cmt. f.
Thus, voiced Minnesota the concerns in prior limiting
courts cases simply are ab-
emotional distress
sent There is no that re- here.
spondent’s genu- claims are not reliable or
ine has met the limits set out because she courts to “lead to reasonable Minnesota