105 Minn. 74 | Minn. | 1908
Appellant was operating a ditching machine, known as a “Jacobs Steel Excavator,” and respondent, while employed in making repairs on it, was seriously injured by the falling of the buckets. A detailed description of the machine may be found in the record, but for the purposes of this appeal we shall not attempt any more than a general
Respondent commenced work for appellant on Tuesday, June 5., 1906, and the accident occurred the following Friday, the 8th. He testified that for two days he worked at repairing a small engine, which had no connection with the machine which operated the buckets; that on Thursday, the third day, he, with others, worked with the traction part of the machine until about two o’clock p. m., when the machine stuck, on account of a defective rail, and they worked all •the rest of the day getting the machine off the defective rail; that on Friday morning, after getting the machinery in shape, they moved the machine back to the point where the rail was defective, and it stuck again, and in the attempt to back the machine the sprocket chain slipped out of the sprocket and became taut; that respondent
Upon an examination, which took place immediately after the accident, it was discovered that the cable which connected the lever with the brake and was concealed underneath the floor of the deck, had become worn to such an extent that two or three of the strands were cut in two. It was conclusively shown that the buckets were held in place at the top of the steel arm by means of the brake apparatus described; that the engine was originally manufactured with a brake attachment of an entirely different pattern, which was declared by experts to be the safest appliance made for the purpose. The iron dog and cable already described was a makeshift arrangement, made and put on the machine by the persons who bought it from the mánu-facturers and,who sold it secondhand ,to appellant. There was a dispute between the experts'as to whether it was a safe appliance for such purpose, and as to whether the other brake attachment originally manufactured to be sold with it, could have been attached to a machine and engine of that character.
1. Appellant had owned the machine only a short time, and had not inspected it with a view to discovering whether the brake attachment was suitable and safe. The court submitted to the jury the question whether under all the circumstances appellant had violated' its duty in furnishing a suitable and safe appliance. Appellant cannot be excused by the mere fact that it bought the machine secondhand, supposing it to be of the standard type, complete in all its parts, and suitable for the purpose for which it was sold. Conceding that appellant had no knowledge of the fact that the original brake attach-mént had been omitted, and that another had been made and put on,
It is not necessarily fatal to respondent’s case that it does not definitely appear for what particular reason the buckets fell. They were held in place by the brake only, did not fall of their own accord, and could not have fallen, had the brake not become released. The machine was not in operation at the time, and there was no evidence that the engine or brake were being manipulated. If the brake gave way by reason of the straightening of the worn-out cable, then the evidence was sufficient to sustain negligence on the part of appellant. On the other hand, if the dog attachment slipped off the hook, and the brake was released as a result, then the evidence, was sufficient to prove appellant was negligent in using such an appliance. In this connection attention is called to the case of King v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 104 Minn. 397, 116 N. W. 918, where the facts are quite similar.
2. We do not think it conclusively appears that respondent was guilty of contributory negligence simply because he might have taken some other method of releasing the sprocket chain, and thus avoided placing himself in a position where the buckets would strike him if they fell. There was some evidence tending to show that he might have gone down under the machine, that he might have opened the chain by unscrewing a nut, or that the engineer might have been required to let the buckets down before commencing the work. But whether respondent should, under all of the circumstances, have pursued one or the other of these courses, was for the consideration of the jury, in determining whether he did what an ordinarily prudent man would have done under the same circumstances. Respondent testified that he had no knowledge of the character of the brake attachment, and that his attention was not called to its nature; that he had not inspected it, and had no reason to believe the brake was unsafe. If this was true, it was not clearfy an act of negligence on his part in going under the buckets for the temporary purpose of releasing the sprocket chain.
3. Whether respondent assumed the risk of his employment depends upon what the contract was. If, as contended by appellant, he was employed as an expert for the express purpose of inspecting, putting in repair, and operating the machine, then it would follow that he
Affirmed.