¶ 1 Plaintiff, Aaron Engler, appeals the summary judgment entered in favor of Defendant, Gulf Interstate Engineering, Inc. (“Gulf’). Engler was injured when the motorcycle he was riding collided with a vehicle driven by Ian Gray, a Gulf employee. En-gler filed suit against Gray and Gulf, alleging in part that at the time of the accident, Gray was acting within the course and scope of his employment with Gulf, and therefore Gulf was vicariously liable for Gray’s alleged negligence based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Gulf and denied Engler’s motions for new trial and reconsideration. Engler maintains that we must reverse the court’s final judgment because the reasoning of a recent Arizona Court of Appeals opinion,
McCloud v. Kimbro (“McCloud II”),
¶ 2 As the parties have previously recognized, the material facts related to whether Gray was acting in the course and scope of his employment with Gulf at the time of the accident are essentially undisputed. To the extent that any dispute exists, we view the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Engler because we are reviewing a decision granting summary judgment in favor of Gulf.
See Orme Sch. v. Reeves,
¶ 3 Gulf is an energy consulting company, and its main office is located in Houston, Texas. Gray is employed by Gulf as a full-time, salai’ied, senior principal engineer. 1 Gray’s engineexing position is based in Houston, where he x’esides. In 2007 and 2008, however, Gx’ay was extensively involved in the design and construction of a natural gas compressor station located in Los Algodones, Mexico. While they worked on this project, Gx’ay and other Gulf employees stayed in hotels in Yuma, Arizona, and commuted approximately ten to fifteen miles to Mexico each day.
¶ 4 Late in 2007, Gray flew from Houston to San Diego where, using his personal credit card, he rented a car to di’ive to Yuma. Gray utilized the vehicle for both business and pex’sonal use while in Yuma, and he was entitled to reimbursement from Gulf for the vehicle’s rental cost, as well as for the fuel expended for business purposes. Gulf also x’eimbui’sed Gray for his hotel lodging and three meals per day while wox’king on the project. Gray would sometimes buy food and eat either at the job site in Mexico or in his hotel room rather than at a restaurant.
¶ 5 Although Gulf provided a common vehicle to transport its employees from the hotel to the wox’k site in Mexico, Gray generally used his x’ental car to tx’avel to and from work. Gray’s work day would begin at approximately 7:00 a.m. each day, when he and other Gulf employees would arrive at the project’s job site. The trip into Mexico flora the United States took only a few minutes, but the xoturn trip at the end of the day could take several hours due to border delays. Although Gulf did not usually pay its employees for travel to or from a job site, given the unusual circumstance of having to cross an international border to get to and from wox’k, and given the often significant delays in returning to Yuma, Gulf generally considered Gray’s wox’k day to have concluded when he arrived back at his hotel rather than when he left the job site.
¶ 6 After Gray and the other Gulf employees returned to their hotels in Yuma, they wei’e free to do whatever they wanted until they arrived at work the next day. During this time, Gulf did not attempt to supervise its employees or direct or control their activities in any way.
¶ 7 On December 11, 2007, Gx’ay and another Gulf employee, a younger engineer named Jason Shing, x’ode together in Gray’s rental car and arrived at the work site in Mexico at approximately 7:00 a.m. Gi’ay billed 12.5 hours that day, and returned to the hotel at approximately 7:30 p.m. Gi’ay changed from his work attii’e and did no fui'ther woi’k after x’eturning to his hotel room.
¶ 8 Later that evening, Gray and Shing went to dinner at a restaurant in Yuma. Gray drove the rental car to the restaurant. Neither Gray nor Shing conducted any woi’k during this time. After finishing their meal, Gi’ay and Shing left the restaurant and headed back toward the hotel in the rental vehicle. On the trip back, the vehicle di’iven by Gi’ay was involved in a collision with a motorcycle driven by Engler.
¶ 9 Engler bi’ought suit for personal injui’y against Gi’ay and Gulf, alleging Gray’s negligence and Gulfs vicarious liability. Gulf moved for summary judgment with regard to Engler’s claim against it. Gulf argued that it could not be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior because Gray was not acting in the course and scope of his employment with Gulf at the time of the accident and “no reasonable juror could conclude that Gulf should be held vicariously liable for the
¶ 10 The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Gulf. Thirteen days later, however, a panel of the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its opinion in
McCloud II,
which held “that an employee on out-of-town travel status is within the course and scope of his employment and subjects his employer to vicarious liability while traveling to and from a restaurant for a regular meal.”
¶ 11 The judgment included language from Rule 54(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P., and Engler filed a timely notice of appeal from that judgment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) (West2011). 4
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 12 We review
de novo
the superior court’s grant of summary judgment and application of the law.
Andrews v. Blake,
ANALYSIS
¶ 13 In
McCloud II,
Officer Kimbro was a DPS officer who normally worked in Phoenix, where he lived, but who had been temporarily assigned to Douglas, Arizona, and the surrounding areas, including Sierra Vista.
¶ 14 McCloud timely filed a notice of claim against the State of Arizona, DPS, and Officer Kimbro,
see
A.R.S. § 12-821.01 (2003), but did not file her lawsuit against them until more than one year after the accident.
Id.
The trial court granted a motion to dismiss all of the defendants pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ariz. R. Civ. P., because the action had been filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations period applicable to claims against a public entity or employee as set forth in A.R.S. § 12-821 (2003).
Id.
at n. 3. The court of appeals affirmed as to the state and DPS, but reversed and remanded as to Officer Kimbro personally because a material fact question existed whether he was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
Id.; see also McCloud v. State (“McCloud I"),
¶ 15 On remand, the trial court again granted summary judgment in favor of Officer Kimbro based on the one-year statute of limitations applicable to actions against state employees.
See McCloud II,
¶ 16 In this ease, the legal question that we must decide is whether Gray was acting within the course and scope of his employment with Gulf when the accident involving Engler occurred. Engler argues the superior court erred in granting Gulfs motion for summary judgment because the reasoning in McCloud II requires finding that Gray was acting within the course and scope of his employ-merit with Gulf at the time of the accident. Engler maintains that Gray, like Officer Kimbro, was on out-of-town assignment when he was involved in an accident while on his way to or from a restaurant for dinner and, because eating a meal was “necessarily incidental” to Gray’s multiple-day assignment, Gray was within the course and scope of his employment at the time. Gulf argues that McCloud II is factually distinguishable and should be limited in its scope or, in the alternative, was wrongly decided. 6
¶ 17 In Arizona, an employer may be held vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the negligent acts of its employee acting within the course and scope of employment.
Baker ex rel. Hall Brake Supply, Inc. v. Stewart Title & Trust of Phoenix, Inc.,
¶ 18 As the court in
McCloud II
implicitly recognized, no previous Arizona opinion had “artieulat[ed] an employer’s tort liability for the conduct of an off-duty employee assigned to out-of-town work.”
[F]or workers!’] compensation purposes, the rule for overnight traveling workers is that “such workers remain within the course of employment continuously during their travel, even when eating and sleeping, except when a ‘distinct departure on a personal errand’ has occurred.”
¶ 19 We recognize that principles arising from workers’ compensation cases may be instructive when addressing potential liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
See Ortiz v. Clinton,
¶ 20 “Nevertheless, the rules adopted for workers’] compensation cases should not be mechanically applied in negligence cases.”
¶ 21 In Robarge, this court rejected the argument that the rules adopted for workers’ compensation cases should necessarily apply in determining whether an employee was acting in the “course and scope of employment” in a negligence action:
While workmen’s compensation law and respondeat superior doctrine both involve allocations of costs regarding industrial accidents, they differ in scope. Workmen’s compensation benefits turn solely upon whether the employee was injured while performing an activity related to his job— and “relatedness” is usually a function of benefit to the employer. In contrast, re-spondeat superior subjects employers to liability for injuries suffered by an indefinite number of third persons. To limit this burden of liability, the narrower concept, “scope of employment,” has long been tied to the employer’s right to control the employee’s activity at the time of his tor-tious conduct____We therefore reject the (appellant’s) argument that workmen’s compensation law be applied in this tort case.
¶ 22 In Carnes, this court expanded on the Robarge analysis in recognizing the differing purposes of workers’ compensation statutes and the doctrine of respondeat superior:
The purpose of workers’ compensation statutes is to shift the burden of loss attributed to work-related accidents from the individual employee and “place the burden of injury upon the industry and the community as a whole.” Hannon v. Indus. Comm’n,9 Ariz.App. 231 , 232,451 P.2d 44 , 45 (1969). In workers’ compensation cases, the employer’s responsibility is limited to the employees, and workers’ compensation benefits turn on whether the employee was injured while performing a work-related activity. See Robarge,131 Ariz. at 28 [2],640 P.2d at 213 . The test of work-relatedness in workers’ compensation cases focuses on whether the accident arose out of and in the course of employment. See Keovorabouth v. Indus. Comm’n,222 Ariz. 378 , 381, ¶ 8,214 P.3d 1019 , 1022 (App.2009).
On the other hand, the doctrine of re-spondeat superior encourages employers to supervise their employees to discourage tortious conduct by requiring employers to compensate victims injured by the tortious acts of employees within the scope of employment. An employer’s vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superi- or extends to an indeterminate number of people and is not limited to employees and their dependents as is worker’s compensation. To impose respondeat superior liability requires the narrower scope-of-employment test instead of the broader work-related test from workers’ compensation. See Robarge,131 Ariz. at 28 [2]-8[3],640 P.2d at 213-14 .
¶ 23 A case relied on in
McCloud II
for its statement in dicta that an employee required to eat and sleep away from home in order to carry on the employer’s business is “within the scope of employment while traveling to and from such necessary lodging and meals,”
Pham v. OSP Consultants, Inc.,
[Wjhile perhaps ninety percent of the decisions on the course of employment in routine cases are interchangeable between the two fields [of workers’ compensation and respondeat superior liability], the analogy breaks down in certain close cases because of a fundamental difference between the two types of liability. In the law of re-spondeat superior, the harmful force is always an act of the servant, or at least the omission which is the equivalent of an act. The inquiry is whether performance of the act was in furtherance of the master’s business. But in many workers’ compensation situations, the harmful force is not the employee’s act, but something acting upon the employee. 1 Larson, [Workers’ Compensation Law ] § 14.00 at 4-1 [ (1998) ] (emphasis in original).
Put another way, the scope of employment may be treated differently because the policy considerations for imposing liability on employers, as a matter of social duty, differ. As a result, “there may be situations where it may be proper to hold an employer liable for compensation benefits to the employee and yet not hold the employer responsible for that employee’s conduct in causing injury to a third person arising out of the same situation.” See Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Electronic Systems, Inc., [ ] 813 F.Supp. [802,] 806 [ (S.D.Fla.1993) ].
Id. (concluding that, for the purposes of determining respondeat superior liability, an out-of-town employee permitted to use a company truck for purposes related to his work was not acting within the scope of his employment when he used the truck to drive to a bar, where he danced, drank beer, and ate tacos from a food truck in the bar’s parking lot).
¶ 24 The
McCloud I
court also recognized that reliance on workers’ compensation cases may be “misplaced” in a negligence action because “[w]orkers’ compensation statutes are interpreted liberally to protect the injured worker.”
¶ 25 The liberal construction afforded workers’ compensation legislation exists because Arizona’s Workers’ Compensation Act is remedial legislation enacted to protect employees injured in the course of their employment. Hopkins,
¶ 26 Further, in workers’ compensation cases, the damages available to an injured employee are much more circumscribed than the damages available under tort law.
See, e.g., Stout v. State Comp. Fund,
¶27 Given the differing policy considerations between workers’ compensation and the tort system, we decline to follow the reasoning set forth in McCloud II. Engraft-ing the broad work-related test and principles from workers’ compensation onto the Arizona tort system would in this case run counter to the policy considerations underlying these areas of the law and only serve to blur the distinctions between them.
¶ 28 Applying the narrower seope-ofemployment test applicable to the Arizona tort system, we agree with the superior court that Gulf is entitled to summary judgment on Engler’s claim that Gulf is vicariously liable for Gray’s alleged negligence based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. At the time of the accident, Gray was not subject to Gulfs control or right of control. Instead, once he returned to his hotel in Yuma, Gray was free to do what he wished until the next day when he arrived at work, and during that time, Gulf did not control or attempt to control his actions in any way, including directing him where or when to eat, and whether, how, or when to leave or return to his hotel room. Additionally, at the time of his allegedly negligent conduct, Gray was not acting in furtherance of his employer’s business by engaging in the kind of work he was employed to perform, and his need to eat dinner, whether at the hotel or at a restaurant, was no more incidental to his employment than his need to eat dinner while not on an out-of-town assignment. Gray’s conduct did not occur within the authorized time and space limits of his work (it occurred after his work day had ended), and other than reimbursement of expenses, Gulf did not pay Gray for any post-work activity.
See generally Schraft,
CONCLUSION
¶ 29 For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the superior court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Gulf. Because Gulf is the successful party, we grant Gulf its costs on appeal, contingent on its compliance with Rule 21 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure.
Notes
. Gray is nonetheless eligible for "overtime” pay at a regular hourly rate in specified instances if he works more than forty billable hours per week.
. Subsection (A)(1) of A.A.C. R2-10-107 provides for liability coverage within specified limitations “for an officer, agent, or employee while driving a state-owned or other vehicle in the course and scope of employment.” For the purpose of determining eligibility for liability coverage, subsection (A)(2) further provides as follows:
An officer, agent, or employee operates a state-owned vehicle within the course and scope of employment if driving:
a. On authorized state business,
b. To and from work,
c. To and from lunch on a working day,
d. To and from meals while on out-of-town travel.
. The court in
McCloud II,
however, appears to have rejected any reliance on A.A.C. R2-10-107 for its holding when it recognized that "the state’s provision of liability coverage does not, by itself, impose liability on the state.”
. The Arizona Legislature recently renumbered A.R.S. § 12-2101. See 2011 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 304, § 1 (1st Reg. Sess.) (effective July 20, 2011).
. Although the parties disputed whether Officer Kimbro's work time had ended, the
McCloud II
court concluded that "[t]he exact time his shift ended is not [ ] material to determining whether Kimbro was within the scope of his employment” under the court’s analysis.
. As an initial matter, we reject Gulf’s argument that this case may be factually differentiated from
McCloud II
on the basis that, by virtue of his status as a law enforcement officer, Officer Kimbro could be determined to be acting within the scope of his employment even when off-duty because the state had a right to control his private, off-duty conduct and he was authorized, if not duty-bound, to intervene if he witnessed a crime or other incident likely to invoke police action on his way to or from his meal. The court in
McCloud I
rejected the reasoning when it found "unavailing” the state’s argument that Officer Kimbro was necessarily acting within the scope of his employment on this basis.
. In
Carnes,
this court applied the "going and coming rule” and declined to adopt the "employee’s own conveyance rule” in finding that a newspaper delivery person was not acting within the course and scope of her employment as she drove her vehicle home after completing her deliveries for the day.
. Although the court in
McCloud II
"found no case directly on point” in extending an employer's tort liability for the conduct of an off-duty employee assigned to out-of-town work, it did find a few cases "instructive,” including
Davis v. Vumore Cable Co.,
. The
McCloud II
court also found
Anderson
"instructive.”
See