Opinion by
This is аn appeal from the Order of the lower Court refusing to remove a judgment of nоnsuit. Plaintiffs brought an action of trespass to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the wife-plaintiff, as well as property damage and medical expenses sustained by her husband as the result of an automobile accident whiсh occurred June 13, 1964, at the intersection of Township Route 117 and U. S. Route 322 in the village of Campbelltown, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania.
Plaintiff-wife was driving north on Route 117 intending to turn wеst on TJ. S. Route 322. Defendant *256 was driving east on U. S. Route 322. Route 117 is a two-lane highway contrоlled by a stop sign. U. S. Route 322 is a two-lane through highway. * At the time of the accident, it was rаining slightly. Plaintiff’s automobile came to rest in a field off the northeast portion of the intersection; defendant’s automobile came to rest facing in a westwardly dirеction in the westbound lane of traffic east of the intersection. The body of the wife (plaintiff) was on the berm of the northeast portion of the intersection; dеbris was scattered in the northeast quadrant of the intersection. When wife-plaintiff testified, she stated that she had no recollection of the accident. Defеndant and his wife who was in his car did not testify and were not called on cross-examinаtion. At the conclusion of plaintiffs’ case the lower Court granted defendant’s motion for a nonsuit and thereafter refused to take it off. Plaintiffs then appealed to this Court.
Plaintiffs contend that the lower Court abused its discretion in refusing to take off the nonsuit “since the jury reasonably could have concluded from the uncontrаdicted evidence elicited in plaintiffs’ case that defendant was negligent аnd that such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.”
In
Flagiello v. Crilly,
“The law is likewise clear that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a fair prеponderance of the evidence that defendant was negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident: Stimac v. Barkеy, 405 Pa., supra; Schofield v. King,
“The mere happening of an accident or the mеre fact that a moving vehicle collides with . . . another vehicle does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence: Bohner v. Eastern Express, Inc.,
“It is also well settled that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply and a jury is not permitted to find a verdict based on surmise or guess: Schоfield v. King, 388 Pa., supra; Smith v. Bell Telephone Co.,
“In Smith v. Bell Telephone Co., 397 Pa., supra, [upon which plaintiffs mainly rely] the Court said (page 139):
“e.
. . when a party who has the burden of рroof relies upon circumstantial evidence and inferences reasоnably deducible therefrom, such evidence, in order to prevail, must be adequаte to establish the conclusion sought and must so preponderate in favor of that conclusion as to outweigh in the mind of the fact-finder any other evidencе and reasonable inferences therefrom which are inconsistent therewith.’ ” Accord:
Amon v. Shemaka,
*258 Under the facts hereinabove stated, it is clear that plaintiffs failed tо sustain their burden of proof that defendant was negligent and that his negligence was thе proximate cause of plaintiffs? injuries and damages. If this case were permitted to go to a jury, the verdict of a jury would be a mere conjecture or guess.
Order affirmed.
Notes
There was no evidence describing the distance from Koute 117 that wife-plaintiff could have first seen defendant’s car prior to the accident, nor was there any evidence as to the speed of either the plaintiff’s car or defendant’s car prior to the accident.