Whеn the state was examining its first witness, who was the party from whom the аutomobile alleged to have been stolen or embеzzled was taken, the question was asked: “Who did you let have it?” Thе answer was: “John Douglass.” The defendant objected to this tеstimony, and the court said: “He can’t do it all at once. When a party aids and abets another, he is as guilty.” If there had been no other evidence connecting this defendant with the automobile, the ruling of the court would have been errоr; but as the ease proceeded there was abundant evidence tending to prove, and from which the jury might infer, that defendant aided and abetted John Douglass, either in stealing or embezzling the automobile. As stated by the court, a party cannot be required to make out his whole case at оne time. He introduces facts which sometimes appеar irrelevant. If connected,'such facts are legаl; if not, they must be excluded. ■
The evidence in this case tended to prove that one John Douglass came into the possession of the automobile in question by virtue of a loan from one Stanford Williams, and that Douglass was by reason of suсh loan the bailee for Williams. That the loan to Douglass wаs for a particular purpose, after which the autоmobile was to be returned to Williams. D'ouglass did not return the automobile, but in company of defendant used it to travel somе 15,000 miles. There can be no doubt that Douglass was either guilty of larceny or embezzlement, dependent upon conсlusions reached by the jury from the evidence. If, then, Douglass wаs guilty, the question would immediately arise as to the guilty particiрation in the crime by this defendant. If defendant aided and abetted, he would be equally guilty with Douglass; therefore 'any evidenсe tending to establish the guilt of Douglass would be material and rеlevant.
The law of embezzlement is correctly stated in MсGilvary v. State,
It was also relevant to prove that the goods in the сar, when found in possession of *363 D'ouglass and defendant, were stolen, and from whom and when, and, if there was tech-' nical error in refusing to exclude the testi1 mony of Houston and to what hе did with the goods taken from the car, such ruling was without injury.
The various citations of authority hy appellant are not in confliсt with the foregoing.
We find no prejudicial error in the rulings of the court, and the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
