JOSEPH M. ENGELHART, GAYLE O. LUNKEN, and KB PARTNERS, INC., Appellants, vs. HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, and WAYNE COATS, Appellees.
APPEAL NO. C-150639
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
July 13, 2016
[Cite as Engelhart v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2016-Ohio-4935.]
MOCK, Judge.
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas; Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed; TRIAL NO. A-1405101
The Law Firm of Curt
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, David T. Stevenson and Jeremiah Seebоhm, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for Appellees.
O P I N I
MOCK, Judge.
{¶1} Appellants Joseph M. Englehart, Gayle O. Lunken, and KB Partners, Inc., (collectively “the landowners“) are registered landowners in Hamilton County. They sought to appeal a decision of appellee Hamilton County Board of Commissioners abolishing registered land. Thеy also named Wayne Coats, Hamilton County Recorder, as an appellee. (We refer to the appellees collectively as “the board.“) The Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas granted the board‘s motion to dismiss the appeal. The landowners have filed a timely appeal from thаt dismissal. We find no merit in their sole assignment of error, and we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
{¶2} In 1991, the Ohio legislature enacted
{¶3} Following a public hearing, the board adopted Resolution 25, in which it stated that because the costs of the registered-land system exceeded the benefits, “the Board hereby abolishes land registration in Hamilton County, Ohio[.]” The landowners filed a “Notice of Appeal from Administrative Proceedings,” in which they сontended that the board‘s decision to abolish registered land “was not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and was not made in accordance with law.” They contended that the board did not follow the procedures set forth in
{¶4} The board filed a motion to dismiss the appеal, in which it argued that the common pleas court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear any appeal from Resolution 25. The court found that the board‘s adoption of the resolution was a legislative action, and therefore, no statutory provision allowed for an appeal оf the resolution. This appeal followed.
{¶5} In their sole assignment of error, the landowners contend that the trial court erred in granting the board‘s motion to dismiss their appeal. They argue that the board‘s adoption of the resolution was the result of a quasi-judicial proceeding, and therefore, it was subjеct to review under
{¶6} Subject-matter jurisdiction denotes the power of a court to hear and decide a case on its merits and to render an enforceable judgment in the action. Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87, 290 N.E.2d 841 (1972); In re T.J.B., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130725, 2014-Ohio-2028, ¶ 6. A defect in subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or forfeited and may, thеrefore, be raised at any time. State v. Mbodji, 129 Ohio St.3d 325, 2011-Ohio-2880, 951 N.E.2d 1925, ¶ 10; T.J.B. at ¶ 6. A trial court‘s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo. T.J.B. at ¶ 7.
{¶7} The landowners argue that the board‘s decision was reviewable under
{¶8} Despite this broad language, the jurisdiction granted by the statute does not include jurisdiction to review actions of a legislative body that оccur as a result of the exercise of legislative authority. Berg v. Struthers, 176 Ohio St. 146, 146-147, 198 N.E.2d 48 (1964); Osburn Towing v. Akron, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26633, 2013-Ohio-5409, ¶ 6. But a public body that is essentially legislative in character may act in an administrative capacity. Donnelly v. Fairview Park, 13 Ohio St.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 500 (1968), paragraph one of the syllabus; Osburn Towing at ¶ 6. The question of whether an action by a legislative body is appealable under
{¶9} A legislative body acts administratively when it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. Id. at ¶ 17. Thus, an administrative decision rendered in a quasi-judicial proceeding is appealable under
{¶10} The earmarks of a quasi-judicial proceeding include requirements of notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to introduce evidence. M.J. Kelly Co. at paragraph two of the syllabus; State ex rel. Fern at ¶ 51.
Whether there is an adjudication depends not on what the administrative agency actually did, but rather upon what the administrative agеncy should have done. Where the administrative agency should have given notice, conducted a hearing and afforded the parties an opportunity to be heard and to introduce evidence, the order is a result of an adjudication even if the administration fails to afford such notice and heаring.
{¶11} The landowners argue that the abolishment of registered land by a board of county commissioners constitutes a quasi-judicial proceeding because
{¶12} A legislative body acts in a legislative capacity when it enacts a new law. “The test for determining whether the action of a legislative body is legislative or administrative is whether the action is one enacting a law, ordinance or regulation, or executing or administering a law, ordinance or regulation already in existence.” Donnelly, 13 Ohio St.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 500, at paragraph two of the syllabus; Shaheen, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24472, 2010-Ohio-640, at ¶ 16. The facts considered in a quasi-judicial
{¶13} Legislative facts, on the other hand, do not concern the immediate parties. They are general facts that help the tribunal decide questions of “law, policy, and discretion.” Id. at ¶ 23. They are “normally generalizations concerning a policy or state of affairs.” Id. Legislative action “results in the formulation of a general rule or policy,” while quasi-judicial action “results in the application of a general rule or policy.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. Accord Ohio Multi-Use Trails Assn. v. Vinton Cty. Commrs., 182 Ohio App.3d 32, 2009-Ohio-2061, 911 N.E.2d 350, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.).
{¶14} In Osburn Towing, the city of Akron divided the city into seven towing districts, each with a designated towing company and impound lot. Osburn Towing was the designated company for district six, and it owned and operated the designated impound lot in that district. Eventually, it sold the proрerty where it had been operating the impound lot, but it continued to tow vehicles and took them to the impound lot in another district. Consequently, the Akron City Council amended the city code to remove Osburn Towing as the designated towing company and designate a new company and a new impound lot for distriсt six.
{¶15} Osburn Towing filed an appeal of the ordinance to the court of common pleas. The city filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the amendment of the ordinance was a legislative act, and therefore, was not subject to review under
{¶16} The Ninth Appellate District reversed the trial court‘s decision, finding that the city had acted legislatively. It noted that city council‘s Public Safety Committee held hearings at which Osburn Towing was represented. The committee had recоmmended that the city adopt the amended ordinance removing Osburn Towing as the designated towing operator for district six.
{¶17} The court also noted that the city had established the Police Towing Review Board to review the performance and operation of the designated towing companies. The board was required to give notice and hold a public hearing to determine if a towing company had violated any of the city ordinances applicable to the towing and impounding of vehicles. {¶18} The court further stated that even though the city council had created an administrative body to ovеrsee the operation of towing companies, it had reserved the right to revoke a license for serious violations affecting public safety, and it did not delegate authority over the designation of a towing location or operator. Osburn Towing, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26633, 2013-Ohio-5409, at ¶ 12-13. Once Osburn Towing had sold the property thе city had originally designated as the impound lot for district six, towing operations were not available in that district. The city was “essentially in the same position as it was at the inception of the adoption of the ordinance—it needed to identify a location and operator for District Six.” Id. at ¶ 13.
{¶19} The court went on to state, “What is critical here is that the focus of the legislative process undertaken in this case was not to sanction or review Osburn Towing‘s performance as a tow operator.” Id. at ¶ 15. Had the “focus of Council‘s efforts been to examine Osburn Towing‘s
{¶20} In Ohio Multi-Use Trails, a township board of trustees petitioned the Vinton County Board of Commissioners to vacate a township road. After the commissioners failed to vote on the issue within 60 days, the township trustees adopted a resolution vacating the road. The Ohio Multi-Use Trails Association, a nonprofit cоrporation that used various roads and trails in Ohio for recreational events and fundraisers, filed an appeal with the court of common pleas challenging the vacation of the road. The common pleas court dismissed the appeal after it found the trustees’ resolution and the cоmmissioners’ failure to act were the result of legislative action, not quasi-judicial action.
{¶21} The Fourth Appellate District affirmed the decision of the common pleas court. It noted that R.C. Chapter 5553 governed the vacation of county roads. In particular,
{¶22} The association contended that the commissioners’ fаilure to act on the trustees’ petition and the trustees’ subsequent resolution were quasi-judicial because they did not enact a law, but simply administered the laws set forth in R.C. Chapter 5553. Specifically, it contended that because
{¶23} The appellate court stated that the Ohio Supreme Court and lower appellate courts had held that the act of vacating a street is a legislative act. Id. at ¶ 12. It went on to state that well after those cases had been decided, the General Assembly had modified R.C. Chapter 5553 and enacted
{¶24} In a similar vein, courts have held that the amendment and enactment of zoning regulations constitutes legislative action. See Moraine v. Bd. of Cty. Commrs., 67 Ohio St.2d 139, 143-144, 423 N.E.2d 184 (1981); Shaheen, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24472, 2010-Ohio-640, at ¶ 27. Thus, in Shaheen, the Ninth Appellate District held that a city council‘s decision approving a “Regulating/Final Development Special Overlay Plan” for a particular neighborhood that included a “Conservation Residential Overlay,” which changed the zoning on рroperty in the district, was legislative. The court held that even though the process used in council‘s decision had the hallmarks of a quasi-judicial action, the adoption
{¶25}
{¶26} In this case, the board did an extensive cost-benefit analysis of registered land and ultimately decided tо abolish it. It did not execute or administer any existing law relating to the facts of any specific case or individual, it enacted a new law abolishing registered land after considering the overall costs and benefits. We hold that the board‘s actions were legislative, and therefore, no appeal lies from its decision. See Moraine at 144.
{¶27} We note that former
{¶28} Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting the board‘s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We overrule the landowners’ sole assignment of error and affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
CUNNINGHAM, P.J., and DEWINE, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.