*1 ENGBERG, Roy Appellant Lee
(Petitioner), MEYER, Attorney Joseph B. General Wyoming, and Duane Shil the State Wyoming linger, Warden Penitentiary, Appellees (Respondents).
No. 87-15. Supreme Wyoming. Court of 17, 1991.
Oct.
Wyoming Program, Public Defender Munker, Defender, Leonard D. State Public McClain,Deputy and J. Martin State Public Defender, appellant. for Gen., Joseph Meyer, Atty. B. and John Renneisen, Gen., Deputy Atty. ap- W. pellees. C.J.,* BROWN, Ret., and
Before CARDINE, THOMAS, URBIGKIT MACY, JJ.
THOMAS, Justice, writing for the Court innocence, affecting guilt on the issues or Justice, CARDINE, writing for the affecting imposition Court on the issues capital of the sentence.
MACY, J., opinion dissenting filed part concurring in part.
URBIGKIT, J.,- opinion filed an part concurring part.
dissenting THOMAS, J., dissenting opinion filed an capital respect with to the reversal of the Ret., sentence, BROWN, C.J., in which joined. post- appeal this the denial case,
conviction relief murder capital divide, pertinent the issues does statute, that affect between those matters innocence and guilt determination of or imposition those impact capital of a division sentence. Because disposition respect court with case, justices agreeing that this with three (Engberg) lawfully Roy Lee degree murder but one first convicted of agreeing the other two those with justices capital sentence should be set opinion aside, majority of the court guilt affecting to those issues respect with * argument. Chief Justice of oral at time circumstance, ing assigned innocence to Justice the fact that the crimes has been majority opinion of the may and the induced
Thomas
have been
economic
affecting
respect to the issues
family
court
conditions. The
then recom
capital
sentence has
imposition
capital punishment,
mended
im
which was
assigned to Justice Cardine.
been
pursuant
posed by
court
6-2-
to §
102(f),
(June
A
Repl.).
W.S.1977
sen
THOMAS,
(on
question of
Justice
twenty-five
thirty years
tence of
degree murder).
guilt or innocence of first
Eng-
imposed
aggravated robbery.
function
the court in this
The first
berg appealed
judgment
and sentence
procedural
apply
rule of
appeal is to
our
crimes,
for these
court affirmed.
Next, questions that could not be
waiver.
A more
statement of the facts
detailed
*4
presented
appeal
on
or for
direct
which underlying Engberg’s conviction can be
procedural
to
cause exists
avoid
waiver
State,
in
P.2d 541
Engberg
found
examined
error of constitution-
must be
for
(Wyo.1984),
cert. denied 469 U.S.
magnitude.
respect
al
With
to the convic-
murder,
degree
the crime of first
tion of
After
court affirmed his convictions
this
questions
pros-
failure of
these
include:
rehearing,
for
coun-
petition
and denied his
Engberg
hypnotic
to advise
of a
ecution
for
assist
appointed
Engberg
sel was
to
key witness;
a
á claim of
session with
presenting
petition
post-convic-
a
him
for
counsel on direct
ineffective assistance of
Engberg
twenty is-
tion relief.
asserted
(this
requires that we
appeal
issue
afford
support
to
court in
of his
sues
the district
attention to two other conten-
incidental
rehearing.
Wyo-
petition
The State
for
tions);
claim of cumulative error that was
a
ming
pursu-
petition
to dismiss the
moved
Engberg's right
to
to a fair tri-
prejudicial
12(b)(6),
Following
ant to Rule
W.R.C.P.
al;
charge of conflict of interest because
a
argument,
trial
a
oral
court entered
attorney general’s legal
member
findings
fact and con-
memorandum of
for
on
staff had served
counsel
to
explaining
clusions
its decision
of law
appeal;
a claim that
this
his direct
grant
motion. An order was
the State’s
court has structured an unfair and consti-
dismissing
entered in the district court
seeking
tutionally
process
post-
infirm
for
post-conviction
Engberg’s
for
re-
petition
relief. All
five of the claims
conviction
but
taken
order.
appeal
lief. This
from that
fatally affecting
by Engberg as
asserted
of proce-
fall under the rule
his conviction
sake of
all
completeness,
For the
others,
respect
With
to
dural waiver.
by Engberg are set
the issues asserted
ground
as a
that none serve
we conclude
opinion.
I to
Our
Appendix
forth
of first
setting
for
aside the conviction
those issues convinces the
examination of
degree
We affirm the dismissal
murder.
could, or
court
six of them
that all but
by
Engberg’s petition for
the trial court of
should,
appeal,
raised on direct
have been
post-conviction
insofar
as that
relief
good
appeal
in this
and no
cause is shown
propriety of his
dismissal relates to the
include
in the direct
for the
to
them
failure
conviction.
appeal.
said:
haveWe
convicted,
Engberg was
after
“ * * *
disciplined
court has
This
taken
felony
jury, of the
murder
crimes of
relief, point-
approach
post-conviction
to
W.S.1977,
6-4-101(a),
violation
§
ing
is not a
for the
out that it
substitute
6-4-402,
robbery in
armed
violation
§
upon
a con-
appeal from
of review
findings of
Following
W.S.1977.
these
ap-
to be
as an
viction nor is it
treated
re-
guilty, the
received
with
evidence
raised
peal. Questions
which
be
spect
capital punishment
to whether
should
are
post-conviction relief
a motion for
and, in
imposed
accordance
with
6-2-
§
magni-
limited
those of constitutional
(June
Repl.),
W.S.1977
found five
miscarriage of
manifest a
tude which
statutory aggravating circumstances and
have
Those issues
could
mitigating
justice.
statutory
circumstances,
no
but
appeal
open determine,
are not
non-statutory
presented
mitigat-
been
did
fairness,
process, fundamental
and a reli-
post-conviction
a motion for
challenge
that the death
by the
able determination
they are foreclosed
relief because
imposed.
should be
judicata.”
res
Cutbirth
doctrine of
(Wyo.1988)
P.2d
appellant was afforded
“18. Whether
omitted).
(citations
during his
of counsel
effective assistance
tion,
to,
Engberg are:
This rule
dix.
This
Wyoming.”
enhancing Kay Otto’s
close its use
the task
present it. This
presenting ining issues raised
tion
the issue on
prejudice
courts will facilitate
ing any claim of
“2. Whether
lel to the rule
from
sought
he demonstrates
should
« *
and forecloses
fifteenth issues set forth
is a rule of
applied
the first issue and
* *
remaining issues as articulated
raising
proceedings
of a conviction
of the federal courts
procedural
arising
convicte(j
in a
presented on
Cutbirth,
jury’s punishment? that the murder was committed stances Engberg Did effective “XIV. receive gain and the defen- pecuniary while appeal? on assistance counsel engaged in the commission of a dant was already robbery had nature robbery when the “XV. Does the cumulative capital warrant relief? any elevate the crime to case been used to errors murder. Attorney entire General’s “XVI. Is the post-conviction disqualified staff the cumulative nature “17. Whether Engberg’s one of that, regardless proceedings because error is such appeal on direct has since error, attorneys together one four harmlessness Attorney Assistant General?” appellant’s rights to due become they prejudiced raised, question Engberg urges respect per- with district court and, interrogatories error was committed dur mitted these issues that be filed ing appeal after his direct or that he has response, hypnotic the State admitted the present good cause for not demonstrated By Kay session. the affidavits of Otto agree ing the issues at that time. We police hyp- officer who conducted the 18,19 quoted Issues and 20 above could not session, suggests notic the State that the appeal. have been raised on direct We hypnosis was unsuccessful. con- good conclude that cause has been demon evidentiary hearing tends that an must be procedural strated to avoid the rule of question. conducted in order to resolve 2 and 16. As respect waiver with to Issues are hearing required We satisfied that no former, dis prosecutor did not because, law, under our case any attempt Engberg, and hypnotic session to close hypnotize a witness must be disclosed. until after his direct it was not discovered respect Issue it is appeal. upon language With The State relies upon decisions premised recent federal from Haselhuhn v. Eng- require
which would
a conclusion that
(Wyo.1986),
cert. denied 479 U.S.
berg’s
imposed
sentence was
in violation of
of the United States of
Constitution
court stated:
“ * * *
America,
accept
principles
if
should
we
State must advise the de-
[T]he
change
in those cases. The
found
fendant of the fact that a witness has
demonstrates sufficient cause to avoid
law
previously hypnotized
been
and make
procedural
Finally,
rule
waiver.
our
request
available
the defendant
all
of cumulative error will be con
claim
proceedings relating
statements and
sidered,
respect to those is
but
hypnosis.”
*6
ap
properly before the court in this
sues
State,
(Wyo.
also
v.
victim when however, man, proposi we articulated the Engberg. good are satisfied that We degree hypnosis tion that the fact or demonstrated for not cause has been are that difficult evaluate. We satisfied presenting appeal, this issue on and error upon depend a defendant need not the con stan- must be found for violation of the respect with to that clusion of the State precedents. in Even dards set forth our suggested fact. We never have that the though state standards were some our dependent requirement of disclosure is subsequent Engberg’s con- articulated hypnosis. the effort at upon the success of viction, entitled to in- he would have been Haselhuhn; State, 695 P.2d Pote v. voke them because his case had not been (Wyo.1985); Chapman. 617 rules finally decided at the time those were however, conclude, that promulgated. We Engberg satisfied that We also are require post-convic- that this error does not claim the of this was entitled to benefit granted Engberg relief because has tion be requirement. disclosure He was convicted prejudice. not demonstrated substantial 20,1982. in on Our decision Gee December 28, April 1983. While was announced hypnotic that a The record now discloses in that the rule suggested we that decision in effort to en- session was conducted an implicit Chapman, articulated Kay Otto’s recollection of events hance conviction, Engberg’s which did antedate This the time her was killed. at brother rely upon proposition we do not Engberg disclosed to information was not Chap on notice virtue of the State was prior or his counsel to the return fact, Engberg was entitled to the benefit and, man. jury’s verdict was not discover- of the rule announced Gee because preparation Engberg’s peti- ed until the applied retroactively. relief. When the must be post-conviction tion for 76 (rule (Wyo. State, State, (Wyo.1989) 1298 P.2d 558 enun- In v. 538 Ostwald 610, Ohio, forth Doyle set in ciated in v. 426 U.S. 96 1975), adopted principles we 293, 2240, (1976), Denno, applied S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 91 388 U.S. S.Ct. v.
Stovall
retroactively
appeal).
direct
order to
cases on
L.Ed.2d
Engberg’s appeal
re
had
a defendant should
Because
not been
determine whether
Gee,
application
retroactive
decided at
time
decided
ceive the benefit
we
applied
this court.1
should receive the bene-
We
P.2d
decision
they
applied
the rule
in Gee.
should be
fit of
announced
principles,
those
case, when we said in Flores
this
light
principles,
Even in
these
our
(Wyo.1977):
P.2d
persuades
examination
the record
us
purpose
ruling
served
“Where
beyond a
doubt that this error
reasonable
‘substantially improve
would
prejudicial. There is no
was not
reasonable
finding process
accuracy of the fact
jury’s
probability
verdict would
application
a retroactive
of such
trial’
use of hypnosis
have been different had the
mandated,
decision
United States
respect to Kay
with
Otto been disclosed.
Currency, 401
United States Coin &
an
she
This is not
instance which
was the
1041, 1046,
91 S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
U.S.
Engberg;
only witness who identified
sev
**
other
testified that he was
eral
witnesses
Essentially,
is the rule advanced in
addition, the
the murderer.
In
record con
Stumes,
104 S.Ct.
Solem v.
tains an abundance of circumstantial evi
(1984);
United States
linking Engberg
robbery
dence
537, 102
Johnson,
457 U.S.
murder,
day
On
he
the murder.
(1982);
Hankerson v. North
departed
Casper
inexplicably
where
Carolina,
97 S.Ct.
occurred;
acquired
the murder
he had
mon
L.Ed.2d 306
Williams
United
day,
source of
ey on that
but the
those
States, 401 U.S.
unexplained;
paid
he
his
funds
overdue
instance,
L.Ed.2d 388
such
and rent for
rent
a week
advance even
good faith
on the old
neither
reliance
law though
premises
he abandoned the rented
impact on the administration of
nor the
day;
same
he used aliases to
conceal
only pro
justice
require
sufficient
are
identity;
deceptive
respect
he
his
*7
prod
spective application.
Williams.
purpose
purchased
to the
he
which
concerning hypnosis
uct of our decisions
is
car in
after the car
used
Rawlins
driven
finding
rule does enhance the fact
that the
failed;
Casper
material evidence was
testing
process
utility
of its
because
along the
found
road between Rawlins and
credibility of the witness.
Utah;
times,
City,
Lake
Salt
various
Furthermore,
wife,
application
Engberg,
pawned
or his
had
a .38
retroactive
is
revolver;
Engberg’s
grounds
on
caliber
a round of ammunition
not foreclosed
“finally
Flores,
would fit
was discover
E.g.,
decided.”
which
that revolver
case was
746; Ostwald,
pocket
in the
538 P.2d
ed in the
vest
abandoned
1298.
of a
home;
“finally
rounds
respect
decided” mobile
additional
were locat
Our rule with
to
availability
appeal
Engberg’s
ed in
room when he was
relates to
motel
cases
arrested; and,
purchased
judgment of
has been
in the automobile
after the
conviction
Rawlins,
appeal
orange-toned,
exhaust
multicolored
has been
rendered. When
ed,
“finally
lightweight
jacket
cap
ski
and a
hold the case to have been
brown
we
Flores;
those worn
the killer were
Ostwald.
also Cle
similar to
decided.”
See
State,
Engberg’s claim that he
de
counsel
resolved
appellate
objective
coun
criteria. We held that ineffective
nied effective assistance
issue,
sel,
appellate
is demon
as advanced in his 18th stated
assistance of
counsel
first,
by showing:
particular
subject
not
to the rule of waiver because it
strated
facts,
appeal.
in the
record
could not be raised in his
His
found
without
equivocal
interfer
argument
speculation
ineffective assistance
resort
ence, upon
inadequate
failure of counsel
which the claim
found because
rests;
representation by
his
every
argued
appellate
issue
motion
counsel
to raise
and, second,
post-conviction
persuasive.
that those record facts serve
relief
not
unequivocal
clear
rule
appeal,
an
to invoke a
failure to raise
issue
meritorious,
transgressed in a
law
clear and
even if
does not demonstrate
which was
obvious,
arguable, way.
appellate
merely
counsel.
ad
ineffective assistance
Cutbirth,
dition,
W.R.E.,
elimination
the
and the
appellate
to re
courts
tive
of
counsel.
has caused some
assistance
issue rule
accepted
viability
previously
the
view
Engberg’s
shall consider
We also
admissibility of
to
holdings
respect
the
error,
appen
sixth claim of
set forth
the
eye witness
expert testimony relating to
dix,
Moore,
of ineffective assist
under the claim
786
v.
identification. United States
arguing
that
appellate
ance of
counsel.
791
(5th Cir.1986), reh’g denied
F.2d 1308
in permitting
the
erred
his wife
Down
trial court
v.
(1986);
F.2d 928
United States
immunity
Cir.1985).
privilege
spousal
to
(3rd
There
invoke the
1224
ing, 753 F.2d
despite
waiver, Engberg contends that
trend more
his
a modern
appear
does
to be
spouse.
testi
expert
privilege
party
the
is
that
admission
favorable to the
identification.
also
exclusion of
He
asserts error
relating
eye witness
mony
to
however,
Garner,
testi
testimony
that such
who
is,
hearsay,
of Janet
still
rule
of the
subject
the discretion
would have testified as to earlier state
to
mony is
wife,
Eng-
instance. United States
any given
Engberg.
ments
Donna
court
462;
amended,
Poole,
opinion
berg’s
that
to
position
794 F.2d
Donna’s refusal
v.
(9th Cir.1986);
F.2d 853
testify
806
made
reh’g. denied
her
unavailable witness
Smith, 736 F.2d
Moore;
justified
v.
United States
admission
circumstance
Cir.1984),
804,
(6th
denied 469 U.S.
hearsay
1103
cert.
pursuant
to Rule
213,
(1984);
143
trial,
105 S.Ct.
At
its resolution
W.R.E.
McDonald; People
Chapple;
relief,
v.
Downing;
post-conviction
Engberg’s motion for
(Colo. App.1986);
Beaver,
Thereafter,
conducted
this discussion was
or,
feelings
her
are.”
she voiced what
but
at the bench:
reference
judge’s
the trial
We understand
Guetz,
doesn’t
“THE
Mr.
she
COURT:
misappre-
rule to reflect a
to the modern
testify.
want
part
his decision was
on his
hension
her to.
“MR.
can’t force
GUETZ: We
authority from the Su-
controlled
recent
No,
her
you can’t force
“THE COURT:
United States. The
preme
of the
Court
to.
in the conclusions
position is reflected
same
opportunity
I want the
“MR. SKAGGS:
denial of
filed in connection with the
of law
the im-
cross-examine her and assert
relief.
post-conviction
Engberg’s motion
every question.
munity on
States, 445 U.S.
Trammel
United
You want what?
“THE COURT:
40, 100
L.Ed.2d 186
S.Ct.
opportunity
“MR.
I want the
SKAGGS:
held
States
Supreme
of the United
Court
the im-
to cross-examine her and assert
privi
may invoke the
spouse
that a witness
munity
every question.
That was said
immunity.
lege
spousal
I don’t think if she
“THE COURT:
re-
law
federal common
to be the rule
you,
testify
that —I would ask
fused
pro
had been
contrary to what
and was
Guetz,
explain
clearly
to her
Mr.
W.R.E.,
which would
posed as Rule
immunity
spousal
and she
has
she
spousal immu
privilege
have limited the
testify.
have to
doesn’t
was not
but
nity
party spouse
vein,
similar
oppose
adopted
I
that. She does
In a
by Congress.
"MR. SKAGGS:
decision of
Roy
priv-
rejected
has the
the court
the earlier
privilege.
not have
States,
Hawkins v.
ilege.
United
in
privilege
(Wyo.1981),
court
voked,
cert. denied 455
aware that the
P.2d 79
632
922,
the matter in
approach
it is
far better to
recently
a conviction in
have reversed
we
should be
Certainly,
proceeding
More
a case in
chambers.
permitted
court
which the trial
possibili
adjourned
chambers as soon
presence of
witnesses in the
prosecution to call
Otherwise,
is a
ty
apparent.
there
becomes
prosecution
jury
court and the
who the
deplore
We
clear risk of a reversal
Jones.
as in
privi
Amendment
invoke the Fifth
knew would
unnecessary presentation
such an issue
testify.
P.2d 54
Jones v.
lege
potential
front
because of
this,
as in
(Wyo.1989).
instance such
In an
prejudice.
Hopkinson, if counsel or the
Haselhuhn
*12
in
has
(1958),
prior
in
In the
cases which
court
which the
3 L.Ed.2d
statute,
it
had
the
never has
spousal
considered
privilege
the
court held that
like
In
to address a situation
this.
occasion
the
immunity
by
claimed
both
could
State,
(Wyo.
officers in order press prior appel- to manipulation fleeing. him prevent right deprived appellant his lant’s trial State’s 4. Whether the introduction fair trial. to a showing that fre- appellant evidence right (b) effective right appellant’s Whether quently used aliases him his him was denied fundamentally fair assistance counsel to a trial. robbery already used had been when capital elevate the crime to murder. attorney’s fail- court-appointed his initial 17. Whether the cumulative nature misuse prosecution’s ure to combat that, regardless error such of the media. error, together harmlessness of one failure 11. the trial court’s Whether rights they prejudiced appellant’s to due de- cause venireman Alberts for excuse fairness, reli- process, and a fundamental fair trial prived appellant right his to a penalty determination that the death able impartial jury. an imposed. should used procedure 12. the voir dire Whether effec- appellant was afforded 18. Whether right his him appellant’s trial denied ap- during his tive assistance counsel impartial jury. fair Supreme peal Wyoming Court. of evi- (a) 13. Whether the introduction of- improper 19. Whether it was appellant phase in the penalty dence Attorney represent fice of the General Mis- escaped from the authorities had proceedings post-conviction the State process right to due souri denied him his Attorney urge that an Assistant Gen- finding that the fundamentally fair and a proper representation proce- was a eral’s imposed. penalty death should be appel- dural bar to the issues raised in closing ar- (b) prosecutor’s Whether the petition post-conviction relief. lant’s gument phase of the trial Court’s discussion and Whether this to due appellant of his deprived *16 holding regard to prior cases with fair process fundamentally and petitions post-conviction ignore relief for prosecutor appellant argued when plain statutory language and obvious to in order to re- needed be executed procedure establish a which is viola- and Wyoming him strain and when the Su- process tive fundamental fairness due previously recognized preme Court has equal it has procedure and and whether argument proper kind of confusing a and established unworkable heinous, atrocious, or cruel where the simply process wherein courts dismiss is involved. aggravating circumstance get petitions post-conviction relief to for to permit 14. the court’s refusal Whether rid of them.” opportunity to evi- appellant the Justice, CARDINE, concurring in the circumstance, mitigating dence of THOMAS, Justice, opinion except execution, de- cruelty of manner of sentencing respect relating to issues to the right process of appellant his to due nied phase of the trial. finding fundamentally fair law penalty. impose the death I appellant’s right pro- due 15. Whether ap- a death verdict returned cruel un- and to free from cess be pellant’s sentencing This is be- trial. case punishment violated usual upon post-conviction petition us for fore statutory presumption in favor of death penalty cases are different relief. Death requires Wyoming law which under punishment is other cases. The from all to bear burden demon- defendant corrected; wrong, it be If it is cannot final. strating mitigating cir- that sufficient undone; made it cannot cannot be be outweigh aggravating cumstances so, case with right. And we review leniency. as to warrant circumstances so purpose of care detail for the utmost right to free appellant’s Whether impose do assuring ourselves that we punishment and cruel and unusual arbitrarily, or penalty unlawfully, the death jury’s process was violated to due unjustly by adherence doubtful slavish aggravating circumstances finding as application of technical doctrine. pecu- committed that the murder was error, presenting the Appellant claims the defendant was niary gain and while following our robbery issue for review: engaged the commission degree to be appellant’s only require- free of first murder. The “Whether punishment unusual during from cruel and ment is that the murder occur process were violated to due perpetration, attempt defendant’s circum- finding aggravating jury’s perpetrate, one of the felonies listed the murder was committed stances that Thus, statute. consider we whether the the defen- pecuniary gain and while penalty properly death invoked follow- of a engaged in the commission dant was ing appellant’s degree conviction of first already had robbery robbery when murder, (felony) felony being robbery. capital to elevate the crime been used Supreme The United States murder.” Eighth has Court stated that the Amend part on direct This issue was raised prohibition against ment’s cruel and un part by Justice appeal and addressed in punishment, applicable usual made Rose, dissenting, in through Amendment, states the Fourteenth (Wyo.1984), P.2d 558-62 cert. prohibits imposing a state from the death 1077, 105 S.Ct. 469 U.S. penalty arbitrary capricious in an man I). develop (1984) Subsequent (Engberg Instead, sentencing body ner. must be our stat ments in case law and revision of provided genu with standards will require penalty death utes that we review inely narrow the class of crimes and the pro sentencing post-conviction in this relief persons against the death whom ceeding. imposed by allowing it to make an individu here address The issues we are whether alized determination on the basis of the robbery sup- underlying the use of the character of the individual and the circum port independent aggravating circum- two Stephens, stances of the crime. Zant v. stances, robbery an and the use of the 862, 878-80, 2743- aggravating circumstance when it had al- ready to elevate the crime to been used [unconstitutional, arbitrary “To avoid permissible. capital murder were We con- capricious sentencing], aggravat- *17 robbery clude that both uses of the were * * * ing reasonably circumstance must impermissible; jury instructions relat- justify imposition the of a more severe ing aggravating mitigating to the cir- compared sentence on the defendant incorrect; that, cumstances were ac- Id., guilty of others found murder.” cordingly, appellant’s sentence must va- be 877, 103 at 2742. U.S. at S.Ct. cated and this case remanded for resen- tencing. Gregg Georgia, See also U.S. 2940-41, 206-07, S.Ct. 49 L.Ed.2d Appellant felony was convicted of mur- S.Ct. reh. (Dec.1977 Repl.)
der under W.S. 6-4-101 Furman v. Geor- 50 L.Ed.2d 6-2-101): (now W.S. * * * 238, 294, 92 2754- gia, 408 U.S. “(a) perpetration Whoever * * * (Brennan, J., concur- L.Ed.2d 346 of, attempt perpetrate, any or * * * ring), denied 409 U.S. reh. robbery any being kills human * * * guilty of murder in the first degree. has chosen to meet this re- Wyoming “(b) creating separate statutory person quirement by A of murder in the convicted punished by jury degree sentencing procedure first shall be death under which imprisonment according aggravating mitigating life to law.” or considers pen- deciding whether the death factors Wyoming allows assessment of the death first imposed case of alty should be each upon degree of first penalty only conviction part Wy- degree pertinent murder. The murder, premeditated is murder with which fol- read as oming’s death statute Felony felony malice or murder. murder lows: jurispru- occupies unique place our evidence, “(d)(i) hearing After all the dence. It a defendant who commits allows a recom- unpremeditated convicted shall and render jury an murder be deliberate the defendant to jury, death is defendant ommends ed defendant it found by the foremen of dict, imposed, sentence. whether posed unless ing tenced to able death, gravating circumstances section * * * “(f) cumstances tion ist; and “(C) aggravating circumstances aggravating circumstances forth in subsection “(e) mendation based “(B) “(A) circumstance Unless (j) The death time, # # Based Whether Whether if If the law. upon the shall its verdict is a recommendation (h) *18 made, the defendant should this section judge the death sentence to death to life agree death or life beyond of this section is found. [*] [*] Where a recommendation exist as upon these designate judge one sufficient jury trying sentence penalty shall the court following: least one imprisonment shall not sentence cannot, or circumstances which [*] [*] death. but (1) or a reasonable shall set (h) jury shall sentence punishment [*] [*] imprisonment. set forth in sub- within reason- forth more mitigating cir- writing signed considerations, shall sentence impose a life the case outweigh found to exist [*] [*] in subsec- aggravat- sufficient be sen- its ver- section; provid- be doubt. judge, to be # rec- [*] ag- im- set ex- tion of another bance; defendant’s conduct the defendant was a murder and his duress or under the substantial extreme act; tory “(vi) purpose of “(v) the unlawful ful arrest “(iv) cause of “(in) “(i) cuniary gain; former former district charging of a destructive device custody; atrocious "(viii) mitting “(ii) The murder was committed while “(j) Mitigating circumstances shall robbery, glary, kidnapping “(vii) “(vi) “(v) following: prosecuting- The defendant acted under The relatively The The victim was The The The judicial participation prior defendant has or the exercise rape, murder defendant was an murder mental or emotional distur- or murder capacity of committed or murder of avoiding or attempting cruel; criminal effecting throwing, sexual attorney or former minor; officer, person; attorney, was was under the influence or aircraft assault, arson, committed for especially committed for activity; a judicial no participant preventing district consented his another placing or significant during defendant homicidal act accomplice in commit, official escape from piracy attorney, or extreme heinous, domina- officer, person county or a law- bomb; in the duty, bur- his- dis- be- pe- or criminality his conduct appreciate “(h) are lim- Aggravating circumstances require- his conduct to or conform following: ited to the im- substantially ments of the law was “(i) per- a committed The murder was paired; imprisonment; son under sentence “(vii) age of the defendant at “(ii) con- previously The defendant was (Dec. of the crime.” W.S. 6-4-102 time de- in the first victed of another murder Cum.Supp.). Repl. & 1982 gree or or felony involving use person; statutory provi- threat of violence to the jury, applying following above, detailed found “(in) sions defendant knowingly created aggravating circumstances: (2) great risk death to or more two was committed persons; “1. That the murder imprison- sentence person under “(iv) The murder was committed while ment. engaged, or the defendant was an previously of,
accomplice, in
the Defendant
the commission
an
That
or
“2.
first
murder
commit,
of another
attempt
flight
or
after
com-
convicted
available,
legally
felony involving the use or
which it
the conclu-
degree
aor
person.
virtually inescapable
threat of violence
sion is
it is
knowingly
Indeed,
cre-
being
arbitrarily.
the Defendant
inflicted
“3. That
(2) or
great risk of death to two
ated a
lottery sys-
more than
smacks of little
persons.
more
tem.”
The constitutional
with W.S. 6-4-
case,
Engberg’s
enhancing
102 as it existed at the time of
In this
effect of the
sentencing
Engberg’s
it allowed
was that
underlying felony (robbery) provided two
and,
him
felony murder to
convict
both
aggravating
circumstances
led
more,
him death
without
sentence
(1)
Engberg’s
death sentence:
murder
allowing imposition
of the death
(2)
during
felony,
commission of a
and mur-
upon
jury finding: “at least one
result,
gain.
pecuniary
der for
As a
* * * aggravating circumstance”—that be- underlying robbery was used not once but
* * *
* * *
“(h)(iv)
ing
committed
murder
three times to convict and then enhance the
*
**
any robbery.”
in the commission of
Engberg’s
crime to a death
seriousness
provided
requirements
no
be-
This statute
felony
involving
murders
sentence. All
felony
itself to
yond the crime of
murder
definition,
robbery, by
contain at least the
appropriately
select those to be
narrow
aggravating circumstances detailed
two
therefore,
on its
sentenced to death
places
felony
This
murder de-
above.
face,
arbitrary imposition of the
permitted
position
in a
than the defen-
fendant
worse
statutory
penalty.
death
This
scheme
murder,
premeditated
dant convicted
felony
sentencing preserved
death
mur-
simply
his crime was committed in
because
very
der the
evil condemned and held un-
Georgia,
felony.
This is an
conjunction
constitutional
Furman v.
with another
permitted in
Another
reason for
portion of our
quires
we overrule a
versing appellant’s
sentence is that
death
I,
opinion
Engberg
I.
we
sentenced,
legislature
since
has
he was
that submission
the contention
addressed
modified the death
statute mak
gain”
pecuniary
of “murder for
aggra
ing
changes
three
which affect the
* * *
while the
and “murder
committed
vating
circumstances used
his case.
* * *
engaged
in the com
defendant was
First,
legislature
most of
removed
* * * any robbery”
improp
mission of
felonies,
previous
including
list of
rob-
aggravating circumstances
er because both
bery,
the list of crimes which consti-
aspect
the defen
same
referred to the
aggravating circumstances in W.S. 6-
tute
reasoning
We found the
dant’s crime.
2-102(h)(iv).
reads as fol-
The new version
persuasive:
court
Carolina
North
lows:
Oliver, 302 N.C.
“In
committed while
“The murder was
(1981),that court held that the
S.E.2d 183
engaged, or was an ac-
defendant was
circumstance identified as
aggravating
of, or an
complice, in the commission
gain
pecuniary
examines
murder
commit,
attempt
flight
com-
or
after
conduct,
motive, not his
defendant’s
commit, any
mitting
attempting
or
air-
not an element of the offense
while
throwing,
piracy
craft
or the unlawful
may consider his motive
jury properly
discharging of
placing or
a destructive
capital
respect
to the issue of a
6-2-102(h)(iv)
W.S.
device
bomb.”
that the
Later that court held
sentence.
(1991 Cum.Supp.).
of murder for
aggravating circumstance
appropri-
Second,
pecuniary gain
always
almost
legislature
qualified
has
jury where
ately will be submitted to the
question of what kinds of crimes are
during the
gain:
murder
is committed
by pecuniary
deemed motivated
*21
death,
is
shall
robbery.
a sentence
of an armed
State v.
verdict
course
of
Irwin,
writing
by
life death instructions on or bringing in prosecution means wit- “[i]f and, appropriate, impose if the law out-of-state, nesses from cost penalty. death a plea the deterrent that fosters bar- Barron, $, gain.” prose- needs Defense majority The dissent criticizes its Star-Tribune, deal, Casper cutor can alleged dissenting opinion and citation of 22, 1991, A8, Sept. at col. 4. However, Op. at reliance on dictum. “ Unfounded, lack unsupported con- blame for proposition that ‘matters which placed deci- to con- death executions require unanimity, penalty and failure vict juror vote one sions this court is neither constructive vict result from the can helpful. effect, is to mitigating always, cir- nor aggravating ‘I’m oversimplify dealt with the cumstances should be with debate ” tough-on-crime, accu- you’re way,’ Hopkinson same soft-on-crime’ J., demagoguery that (Wyo.1990)(Cardine, sations. It is the sort of dissent- upon unfairly political seize ing), merely hypothetical or candidates dictum a exploit. simplistic these argument Rather, problem is the a dissent. slogans they often premise statutory for the current scheme buzz words Wyo- specific real and issues and do obscure the required instruction under pressing prob- 6-2- not aid in the solution of ming death statute. W.S. example, (iii). populous state 102(e)(i)through lems. For changes recently a milestone in mitigating country passed rel- statutory factor are scheme that, capi- history, first in its for the time not an “effort to evant and eliminate * * * 100,000 persons incar- counted more than punishment Wyoming, by artic- tal dictum,” Eng- prisons. That is a milestone op. cerated in its ulating dis. because persons prison it is more than berg resentenced amend- because will be under that Therefore, any anywhere in the Wyo- industrialized nation ed scheme. revised delay. sentencing jury ag- world, Presenting of America. to a States except the United is not gravating mitigating look at that state’s factors re- begin to Should we ‘tough- Surely if ally ask ourselves burdensome difficult. milestone and really working? We approach suggestion on-crime’ will prosecutor eschew than crime difficulty job have more violent honestly, such and do his industrialized nations. We other western reasonably, by law. required and as *24 drug problem than oth- a greater have affirmed. Sentence vacated Conviction one murders. We are ers. We have more proceedings case remanded for consist- and developed countries minority of of small opinion. ent with this All penalty. of this that retains the death thoughtful study. serious and deserves MACY, Justice, dissenting part and pun: that crime must recognizing While concurring in part. incarcerated, ished we and offenders doing that in so we should understand also portion I dissent to of Justice Thom- and not the cause. The treat the disease question opinion pertaining to the as’ many, they causes and deserve serious are Engberg’s guilt It is or innocence. unrea- debate, study, and consideration. that, require sonable for this Court to nature, law, by very its business of default, procedural order to avoid defense conflict, controversy, disagree- involves Engberg’s counsel should have called wife healthy ment. A discussion different already second had time after she re- very essence points of is the of law— view type very fused to is the testify. This grow, each way it is we live better with secondguessing of defense counsel’s trial other, improve system our of law to strategy which have said we will do we society. spirit It was this better serve reviewing are when we a claim ineffec- important questions discussion Seeley tive assistance of counsel. See presented in this case was undertaken. Also, (Wyo.1986). P.2d at trial while the record shows that both by It is the dissent we said ignored Wyo.Stat. counsel the court penalty. claim is abolished the death Thomas’ 1-12-104 Justice con- § exists pursuant absurd. The death Engberg’s struction the statute violates by legislation adopted Wyo- in 1989 constitutionally protected to obtain ming legislature. Because we are a Const, in his amend. witnesses favor. men, government laws and not we Const, VI; Wyo. art. See also § sentencing phase must reverse Urbigkit’s Justice Section V.B. of Chief case. concurring dissenting part opinion prosecutor, a member of the Whether part. government, cap- seeks executive branch that it imprisonment I concur with Justice Cardine punishment or life is a ital underlying rob- impermissible deci- to use placed decision with his office. The honest, when bery aggravating as an circumstance result from an fair ought sion already had used to elevate the and circumstances been assessment of the facts It is also first-degree I crime to murder. particular case. am confi- present in each support robbery to duty impermissible use the not shirk the prosecutor dent the will independent circum- whining aggravating two in this about court case difficulty stances. complaining about the caused
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page AND THE PROCEEDINGS ISSUES PRESENTED I. HISTORY OF II. FACTS III. OF REVIEW SCOPE Introduction Outline A. B. Scope Penalty Review Death Cases Right by Procedural Default C. Forfeiture Constitutional OF COUNSEL INEFFECTIVENESS IV. ISSUES PHASE V. GUILT rH Contended Errors A. B. H T—I «O his Engberg Right to Call to Allow Refusal the Trial Court as a Witness Wife Established Totality the Record of Procedures What Use of C. Witness” Secondary From an “Unavailable Evidence D. E. F. Open Court of the Prejudice in Presentation Witness Trial to Allow Court Eyewitness Identification Witness—Refusal Testify the Potential for Expert Witness Call Error in Identification i—I<N OO Attorney Engberg and His That to Inform of the Prosecutor G. The Failure Her Mem- Hypnotized to Enhance Principal Eyewitness They Had the *25 Hearing a Post-Trial ory Subsequent Denial of CO Engberg by Raised Phase Issues H. Additional Guilt lO DEATH PENALTY ISSUE VI. 1C CO in “Modern” America Penalty The Death A. B. Capital Punishment a Predicate for Felony Murder as IO Wyoming Present Statute C. n © by Ameliorated Conflicts Now Weighing and Burden of Persuasion D. Present Law rH CO Penalty Issues Death E. Other rH CO CONCLUSION
VII.
t-H COCD
(1984)
(Engberg
Justice, dissenting in
URBIGKIT,
S.Ct.
Chief
I),
concurring
part.
in
this court observed
part and
“[t]he
the trial of this case was
factual issue at
appeal pro-
post-conviction-relief
This
In deci
identity
perpetrator.”
consideration of
this court’s second
vides
sion,
desideration
court found
this
“[t]he
death
Roy
Engberg’s
Lee
conviction and
methodology of voir dire examination
Fargo
the murder of a Wells
sentence for
discretionary.
Id. at
jurors”
was
delivering money
grocery
to a
store
guard
issue,
perempto
second
use of
547. On the
in
sec-
Wyoming. I dissent
this
Casper,
going beyond Witherspoon
challenges
ry
appellate advo-
of trial and
ond absolution
Illinois, 391
Witherspoon v.
expendables,
and con-
cacy
involved
conviction
errors
1770, 20 L.Ed.2d
88 S.Ct.
U.S.
opinion of Justice Cardine
cur with the
reh’g
393 U.S.
89 S.Ct.
denied
penalty
death
reversal.
we said:
L.Ed.2d
I.
imposed by
the limits
Swain
Within
Alabama, supra
[380
THE
HISTORY OF
PROCEEDINGS
759, reh’g de-
AND ISSUES PRESENTED
1528, 14
381 U.S.
nied
sen-
Following jury verdict
death
(1965)], peremptory
chal-
tence,
five
appeal was taken with
initial
recognized
partisan
as
lenges must be
(1)
voir
right
stated:
to individual
issues
application.
idiosyncratic
nature
(2)
challenges
jurors;
peremptory
dire of
part of the tools of interested
They are
(3)
qualified jury;
death
to create a
used
they
such
al-
advocates. As
and able
kill to
of intent
insufficient evidence
wholly discre-
ways
been viewed as
(4)
use
penalty;
duplicate
justify the death
respect
beyond inquiry with
tionary and
robbery and an offense committed
to motivation and intention.
factors;
gain
aggravating
pecuniary
as
penalty.
proportionality of
death
I,
P.2d at 549. The intent
Engberg
by this court
kill issue was addressed
Engberg
In
would
intentional homicide
105 decision that
(Wyo.),
cert.
felony murder
ISSUE 2
for the
requirement
not be
* * *
penalty sentence.
death
failure to disclose its
the State’s
hypnosis
enhancing
use of
as means
significant issue addressed in
The most
Kay
memory violated its ethical
Otto’s
of murder for
I
dual use
his
obligations
appellant
right
and denied
ag-
robbery
distinct
pecuniary gain and
law,
right
process
to due
his
of con-
validating
gravating circumstances.
frontation,
and his
to effective as-
instruction,
concluded that “the
court
sistance of counsel.
sep-
[permitting submission of both
rule
premised upon
arate circumstances]
ISSUE 3
aggravat-
assumption that the number of
* * *
(a)
appellant
pro-
was denied due
independent
some
ing
has
circumstances
procedure
cess of law the extradition
Id. at 553. This was the
significance.”
bring
Wyoming
him to
such that
used
aggra-
numerically
aggregating
thesis of
proceedings
here must be declared
Finally, Engberg I
vating circumstances.
null and void.
nei-
that the death
determined
*
**
(b)
appellant
pro-
due
was denied
disproportionate
nor
when
ther excessive
cess
of evidence that
introduction
Wyo-
capital
compared
other
cases
police
he
to be
officers
had
beaten
Id.
ming.
at 555.
*26
prevent him
who arrested him in order to
briefing
apparently
appellate
Initial
fleeing.
from
students
prepared by law school
Program
University of
at the
Defender Aid
ISSUE
appellate attorney in the
Wyoming. The
* * *
of evidence
the State’s introduction
position
left
public defender’s office
showing
appellant frequently
used
petition
filed
rehear
and new counsel
a
for
right
denied him his
funda-
aliases
presenting
is
ing first
what
now the Lock
mentally fair trial.
issue, Collins v. Lock
hart-Lowenfield
(8th Cir.),
hart, 754
cert. denied
F.2d
ISSUE
1013, 106S.Ct.
ISSUE opportunity lant the evidence circumstance, * mitigating cruelty * * of a the testimony of the ballistics ex- execution, appel- of manner of denied pert incompetent was and should have right process lant his to due law and a disregarded, and dis- been should be fundamentally finding impose fair now, regarded and thus whether there is penalty. death to support evidence the con- insufficient viction. ISSUE 15 * * * right to due appellant’s process ISSUE and to free from cruel and be unusual * * * punishment by violated the statu- (a) prosecution’s ma- use and tory presumption in favor death under press prior appel- nipulation of the Wyoming requires law which defen- deprived appellant right his lant’s trial demonstrating dant to bear the burden of to a trial. fair * * * mitigating circumstances sufficient (b) right appellant’s to effective outweigh aggravating circumstances by counsel was him assistance of denied leniency. so as to warrant court-appointed attorney’s fail- initial his prosecution’s misuse ure to combat ISSUE media. * * * right to be free from appellant’s punishment and to due cruel and unusual ISSUE by jury’s find- process violated were * * * circumstances that ing aggravating the trial court’s failure to excuse pecuniary committed for deprived ap- for cause venireman Alberts the murder the defendant pellant right to a while was en- gain of his fair trial robbery commission of a jury. gaged in the impartial Argument IV already used robbery had been when the murder. capital the crime Eng-
to elevate impropriety illegality Did Wyoming affect the
berg’s extradition to courts? Wyoming jurisdiction of ISSUE * * * Argument V of the error cumulative nature trial due to Engberg denied fair Was that, harmless- regardless of the
is such Engberg denied publicity; was pretrial error, they prej- together any one ness of pretrial due to effective trial counsel process, due rights to appellant’s udiced publicity? fairness, de- and a reliable fundamental penalty should that the death Argument
termination VI * * * imposed. process selection Was the
proper? ISSUE 18 Argument VII * * * expert afforded or exclusion of appellant was Was the admission [ineffec- ap- during his testimony discretionary of counsel and did the exer- tive assistance Supreme Court. peal Wyoming affect a constitu- cise of that discretion
tional in this case? ISSUE Argument VIII * * * trial, due Engberg deprived of a fair Was office of improper for the it was failure of process or confrontation represent attorney general Kay contact to disclose Otto’s State proceedings to post-conviction hypnotist? with a general’s attorney urge that an assistant procedural Argument IX representation was a proper appellant’s the issues raised bar to process due Was relief. petition post-conviction spouse had a ruling that his trial court’s testify?
privilege not to ISSUE Argument X * * * as an Engberg’s status Was evidence holding discussion and this court’s in the escapee properly admitted regard petitions for prior cases with closing prosecution’s ar- phase; was the *28 plain ignore relief post-conviction proper? penalty phase gument at the language statutory and establish obvious of funda- procedure which is violative a Argument XI equal fairness[,] process due mental in Engberg’s proffer of evidence Was it has estab- and whether procedure [sic] lethal the effects of “mitigation” to show pro- confusing and unworkable lished a excluded; etc., is this issue gas, properly peti- simply dismiss cess wherein courts moot? get post-conviction relief to rid tions for Argument XII of them. presumption in Is there a favor as: frames these issues
The State Wyoming under statutes penalty death Argument I cruel and un- process of due or violation punishment? procedures fol- usual error in the Was there Engberg’s on in the court lowed lower XIII Argument * * * relief? petition post-conviction properly instructed Was the II Argument circum- statutory aggravating to pro- stances; due Engberg denied was of con- it error to admit evidence Was unusual to cruel and subjected cess guilt trial? sciousness of at punishment? Argument III Argument XIV suppress evi- Engberg’s motion
Was assistance receive effective Engberg Did properly de- trailer dence seized appeal? on of counsel nied? testimony on expert witness to introduce XV
Argument
identi-
potential
eyewitness
for error
errors
nature
the cumulative
Does
Furthermore, Engberg
his
fication.
relief?
warrant
this case
kept
police
attorney
unaware that the
were
Argument XVI
principal eyewitness
attempted to have the
attorney general’s entire staff dis-
Is the
Eng-
memory.
her
hypnotized to enhance
post-conviction proceed-
qualified
berg
felony
murder and
was convicted
one of Engberg’s four at-
ings because
robbery
aggravated
and sentenced to death
appeal
torneys
direct
has since be-
on
and a consecutive
on the murder conviction
M
attorney general?
an assistant
come
years on
twenty-five
thirty
term of
II.
robbery conviction.2
FACTS
III.
Otto,
sister, Kay
Rogers
Vernon
and his
Fargo,
employed by
making
were
Wells
SCOPE OF REVIEW
delivery
grocery
a
money
van
armored
A. Introduction and Outline
left the store to
Casper.
store in
two
to face
man
find themselves face
with
penalty ap
death
Consideration
Rogers
gun. Vernon
was
armed with a
limited issues raised on
peal within the
instantly
killed in front
almost
shot and
appeal
broad based attack
initial
and the
escaped
his
the robber
with
sister and
requires
post-conviction
relief
now made
later, Eng-
bag money.
week
About a
concepts.
different
application of three
berg
while drunk
Las Ve-
was arrested
First,
scrutiny
heightened
standard
following
gas,
Day
Nevada
New Years
requires
for death
cases
review
complaint
his
family
wife.
violence
recognition.
is the limitation that
Second
po-
injury Engberg
from the
received
addresses a constitu
post-conviction relief
during
required
hospital-
lice
arrest
both
in this
tional issue which is found
case
surgical operation.
ization
appellate
primarily ineffectiveness
the issues
brought Wyo-
counsel
failure
raise
Engberg
eventually
forfei
appeal. Finally,
mur-
initial
constitutional
ming
charged
premeditated
trial,
presented in
procedural
During
ture
default
felony
der
murder.
appel
his
contended waiver
the omission of
denied the
to call
Cut
appeal
initial
since
judge
late counsel in the
witness when
trial
wife
his
(Wyo.1988)
rather than con- birth v.
U.S.
902,
90,
greater degree of scruti
correspondingly
34 L.Ed.2d
409
93 S.Ct.
denied
U.S.
Reid v.
Stewart,
(1972),
J., concurring;
capital sentencing
determina
ny
164
Covert,
1,
1222, 1262,
Mississippi,
65,
v.
354
77 S.Ct.
472 U.S.
Caldwell
U.S.
tion.”
Harlan, J.,
(1957),
2633, 2639,
concur
320, 329, 105
86 L.Ed.2d
S.Ct.
State
N.E.2d
L.Ed.2d 343
policy.” approach
Kirkpatrick,
ments
L.Ed.2d
Bay,
holds
ty is
preme
443 So.2d
1040, 109
denied
ring;
Kirkpatrick, (Fla.1988),
tion,
propositions of
legal arguments which were not briefed
care
Because
lant. lant, we
been
tence
Our
Supreme
534 N.E.2d
argued by
103
Right
By
like
C.
abstract, capital cases are
Constitutional
In the
Forfeiture
Procedural
require
They
litigation.
forms of
other
Default
legal principles
apply
appellate courts to
Although my disagreement is well stated
Yet
trial level.
found at the
to facts
therein,
by proce-
forfeiture
constitutional
cases,
hangs in the bal
life
where
these
Cutbirth,
dural
751
default
defined
de
cases
ance,
“great”
are akin to the
morally
P.2d 1257
or constitu-
cannot be
“imme
Holmes, where
by Justice
tionally ignored
scribed
Murray
here.
also
v.
See
hydrau State,
kind of
exercise a
(Wyo.1989);
diate interests
105
why,
Burr,
single analysis:
happened,
what
one
Representing
chiropractor.
also
wrong,
and what was its effect.
was
Politics
Death Row: The
on
the Client
1
L.Rev.
Advocacy, 59 UMKC
mistakes, ne
packaging into which
counseling
last stuffed
glect,
sloppy
prin-
portrays an inextricable
Engberg II
ignore
practical harm is the
to avoid and
its
right
enfolding constitutional
ciple
logic
appel
unreality
ignore ineffectiveness of
to
and inef-
by procedural default
forfeiture
counsel.
It is obvious that
Cut-
late
By definition,
of counsel.
fectiveness
if
Amin,
birth,
attach
Murray,
Kallas7
subjected
right
which was
there was
Strickland,
466 U.S.
ment
by procedural
constitutional
forfeiture
self-produced justifi
in a
2052 is embodied
was sub-
represented
accused
default,
conviction should be affirmed
cation that
Con-
counsel.
jected to ineffectiveness of
regard
process,
for the due
fair
without
of constitutional
any contention
sequently,
ness,
reasonably
pro
and even
error-free
inef-
always
equivalent
raises an
forfeiture
ceeding
the conviction is
from which
obligated to
jurist
fectiveness issue.
con
To revisit the record is to
grasped.
right
analyze
scope of the
substantively
enormity
capacity
template the
disposses-
weigh the
in order to
defaulted
fact,
ma
ignore.
guilt phase
In
actual
to avoid
of the failure of counsel
sive effect
substantively ad
jority simply does not
competent
error
the default
invoked
issue, except as
dress the ineffectiveness
reason,
justice
serve
For this
we
practice.
by the
pre-staged
this case was
Cutbirth
addressing
by
claimed
quicker and better
Amin,
Murray,
opinion and followed
delivery system opera-
justice
mistakes in
post-
jurisdictions,
In most
and Kallas.8
raising
first
directly
tion
instead of
preferable process
conviction relief is the
constitutional
forfeiture
specter of
and inevi
ineffectiveness issues
to consider
centering
then
on
procedural default and
is obtained
tably required where evidence
required
phase
second
for consideration
appeal
challenge the conduct of first
pro-
permitted the
why
the trial counsel
Pelle
appellate counsel. United States v.
Cir.1988);
I
(1st
to occur. would eliminate
tier,
cedural default
1126
845 F.2d
(8th
proce-
Lockhart,
right forfeiture
presented including eye- post-conviction, (1984) judiciary the federal challenge, identification undis- affirming Shillinger, witness Osborn (not hypnosis ap- first F.Supp. closed available to 861 F.2d (D.Wyo.1986), aff'd extradition, peal), beating/bad per- (10th Cir.1988), hardly arrest can afford com evidence, evidence, person alias bad conclusions and son fort to this court hospital as ineffectiveness of counsel photographed reasoning refusal to be an succeeding in this guilt, presented cross-exami- consciousness issue now nation, immunity, death case. spousal admissible sub- bristling arguable appellate at- case claims of failure of
The obvious
error, petitioner’s
open-
counsel filed an
in this case is not dissimilar
torneys
consisting
ing
20-page
brief
of a
reflected in the Nebraska
recita-
performance
Broomhall,
and a one-page argu-
221 Neb.
tion
facts
of State v.
case
* * *
(Broomhall
I)
ment.
N.W.2d 845
where,
appeal,
the conviction was
direct
course,
appellate
Of
an
counsel is not
discretionary
trial court
deci-
affirmed on a
responsible
to be held
for an actual friv
deny
sion to
a continuance to obtain
client,
appeal by
olous
his
and we do not
diligence by
important witness after due
California,
hold that Anders
[v.
not shown.
the defendant’s counsel was
*35
738,
1396, 18
(1967)
87 S.Ct.
]
raising the same lack of
post-conviction,
On
Feggans require
and
the advocate to con
counsel,
diligence of
the conviction was
due
arguable
trive
issues. But in the instant
Broomhall, 227
reversed.
v.
Neb.
action,
peti
each
counts on which
II).
(1988)(Broomhall
It is
responsive
manifest to an alert
attor
highly
the failure to call a
stand how
ney.
qualified
apparently credible witness
Cordero,
also In re
Broomhall “failpng] egre- by as described the court as pursue the leads and evidence giously to this
Similarly, Justice Mosk addressed
made
to him.”
available
Smith,
subject in
re
3 Cal.3d
In
(quoting
(1967)):
Cal.Rptr.
the court
priate
that are
petitioner before
ment can be made
serves both
must set forth a
advocating changes
resentation
“Counsel must
*
Judged by the
* * legal
legal
citations to the
from
Cal.Rptr.
authority,
* * *
issues with citations
issues
arguable.
People
understanding
the court and his client
prepare a
foregoing
statement of the facts
the Court of
appointed
the case.
supporting
Moreover,
Feggans,
transcript,
argue
the law
brief
971-72
the facts and
P.2d
criteria,
counsel
all issues
The brief
67 Cal.2d thoughtful theory
to assist
if
change.
counsel
discuss
Appeal
appro-
(1970)
argu-
rep-
in the
dovsky,
tack,
ing that should trouble
fense
by the failure
mined to be within the realm of
meaningful standards to test
tiveness of trial counsel.
As illuminated
tent assistance.
science of the
decisions.
competent and indefensible
This
* * * I
[*]
critique
counsel are rationalized as
problem
U.Pa.L.Rev.1965,
Right
find it somewhat
In all too
[*]
of David
of the courts to establish
courts and bar is deter-
[*]
to Counsel Under
seriously aggravated
powerful persuasion
many
Rudovsky in Ru
[*]
1971-72
cases,
case,
collective
The most in-
actions of de-
ironic that
[*]
the effec-
lawyer-
tactical
I
compe-
(1988):
find
con-
[*]
At
Indeed,
increasing
ethical de-
are
our
inadequate.
while we
demonstrably
counsel,
denigrate
we
had
mands on defense
fared better
petitioner would have
the sixth amend-
pro
purpose
the central
attorney
in favor of a
his
withdrawn
effective assist-
meaningful and
despite petition-
ment:
petitioner,
se brief
In a
ance
counsel.
acknowledged legal ineptitude.
er’s
claim of
However, compare
analysis Hayes
cally,
ineffective assistance
Lockhart,
reh’g
appeal
F.2d
on
counsel cannot be raised
direct
(8th Cir.),
grant
cert.
denied 869 F.2d
evi-
requires
its resolution often
because
judgment
ed and
vacated
contained in
record
dence which
not
Harris,
F.2d
appeal.”
on
at 686. See
White,
(quoting
from Blackmon
Osborn,
comprehensive
consideration
Cir.1987)):
(8th
F.2d
at 626
861 F.2d
n.
See also United
rep-
holding
(8th Cir.1988)
counsel’s
defense
Long,
857 F.2d
States
constitutionally
defi-
resentation was
Dubray,
F.2d 771
States v.
United
cient,
mindful that our function is
are
(8th Cir.1984).
we
perform-
counsel’s
not to
trial
insulate
problem
forth out of this
Another
strains
criticism,
review and
post-trial
ance from
any justi
This record is barren of
morass.
cases,
in death
for a
especially
why
attorney
fication of
who worked
lawyer’s professional reputation
not to
appeal
disregard
initial
chose
preserved
expense
at the
of a defen-
objections originally
error
established
rights. At
same
dant’s constitutional
Engberg’s attorney. Lacking
evidentia-
*36
time, however,
resist
we must
ry
explanation
provid
for
be
foundation
second-guess
temptation
“the
a law-
hearing
require
ed
which most courts
lawyer
yer’s
makes
strategy;
trial
consideration, procedur
for ineffectiveness
it appears
on the law as
choices based
anticipates
nei
apparently
al default
time, the
as
at the
facts
disclosed
adequate testimony
ther
of the client
point,
proceedings
to that
and his
particularly
testimony
nor
of trial
more
judgment
best
to the attitudes and
preserved
counsel should be
for review.
judge
jury.’’
of
sympathies
810,
Hatch, 144
N.W.2d
State v.
Wis.2d
425
probably
No
not much
counsel
worse
(1988).
Hay
27
See also
v.
United States
incompetent
McCoy
than
counsel.
v.
Cf.
man,
205,
263,
72
96 L.Ed.
342 U.S.
S.Ct.
Wisconsin,
1,
Appeals
Court
Dist.
of
(1952). This
this
232
is not
state of
1895,
429,
100
486 U.S.
108 S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d appeal
actually
since
record
shows
Murray,
440
847
Giarratano
which,
specific procedural
defaults
defi
Cir.),
(4th
granted
F.2d 1118
cert.
488 U.S. nition,
malpractice
constitute
and ineffec
303,
923,
(1988),
322
109
S.Ct.
had
tiveness whenever the omitted issue
1,
2765,
rev’d 492 U.S.
109 S.Ct.
106 any arguable validity in a case
as this
such
—
(1989),
L.Ed.2d 1
cert. denied
U.S.
penalty
we
appeal.
death
On this record
83,
—,
(1990).
1H
avail,”
be “of little
the con
trial itself would
began
foreclosed issue of
with the
recognized repeatedly.
Court has
I
viability
penalty.
of the death
stitutional
person
rights
that an accused
“Of all
always reject proce
uniformly and
would
has,
coun-
right
represented by
to be
legal malprac
dural default absolution
pervasive for it
sel is
far the most
of counsel—unless
tice—ineffectiveness
ability
his
assert
other
affects
face that neither
is clear on its
the record
rights
he
have.”
existed, or
malpractice
nor
ineffectiveness
compre
special
right
alternatively,
record is
value of
unless
why
pro
explains
counsel
assistance of
hensively developed
post-conviction
“[i]t
recognized
right
long been
that the
Wainwright, 777 F.2d
has
ceedings. Smith v.
right
to counsel is the
to the effective
vestigation
Strickland,
668,
similarly held that a claim of ineffective
104
2052
delineation. This is not to
appellate
assistance of
prior
counsel or
tally different from the
partic
“failure to
postconviction
provides
counsel
sufficient
* * *
* *
ipate
deliberate trial tactic
permit
reason to
newly
allega-
asserted
Rose,
1245,
Martin v.
(6th
744 F.2d
tions to be
subsequent post-
raised
Cir.1984).
accord,
In
I,
like
see Broomhall
proceeding.
conviction
See Sims v.
374 N.W.2d
II,
845 and Broomhall
State,
(Iowa 1980);
through
prior court-appointed
comprehensive research,
attor-
although con-
*40
ney,
provide
and would therefore
suffi-
fined to trial
I
recognize
as would
to be
permitting
cient reason
newly
for
applicable
appeal,
the author considered
allegations
asserted
raised in
be
and
part
concluded in
in Goodpaster, su-
State,
247,
(Mo.App.1988).
865,
12. Lint v.
H3 (footnotes lot I to be desired. realize he was hired N.Y.U.L.Rev. at 360 pra, 58 probably a omitted): job the state to do and not I paid didn’t mention it at the much.... the conclusion discussion leads to This jury room but I think he was not deter- that, case capital some kind of absent try enough He enough. mined didn’t and is no attorney system, certification there compe- jury. They that affected the had less way attorney to insure feasible mean, guess. clearly I he sympathy, Direct and I in of trial. tence advance that, review, guilty, ineffi- were postconviction as but there times collateral be, they may lawyer, I know even I inadequate cient and as and I’m a but vindicating know, a times he should have been remain the best means when right capital defendant's to the effective on his feet and he wasn’t. That’s sad competent attorney. (defendant) sorry The if assistance a because even was a regarding one, review are its issues such he a deserved trial and someone specific competency nature and what for him and look out him.” care apply. it is to standards Tabak, conclusion, see Of similar The duties and functions from counsel in In [******] capital case, ordinary criminal cases. defense counsel definably different has Death alty Change Capricious Imposition in Fairness: 1980s, 14 (1986), N.Y.U.Rev.L. & Soc. an Arbitrary the Death Pen- item verse in and recite description, and then to as ineffec- requires great reliabili- Constitution tiveness: ty capital in sen- and individualization
tencing gives capital many attorneys and defendant the capital Too defen- dants, inexperi- his sentencer with due to a combination of presentation resources, mitigating [expert evidence ence and lack of time and fail defenses, might save his appeal] adequate particularly on life. to mount sentencing require- particular sentencing proceedings. These shape capital duties and functions ments Tabak then in effect concludes provide defining basis for “rea- and working penalty system not and death capital sonably competent counsel” arbitrary should be abolished for the and cases/13! operates. capricious in which it way Mello, Facing Sevilla, Death Alone: The Investigating Preparing See also and also Attorney Post-Conviction Crisis Counsel Assistance of Ineffective Row, (1986) Am.U.L.Rev. 513 Claim, Death 37 Mercer L.Rev. Like- particularly footnote three thereof. Amsterdam, analysis by Geimer and Ruthenbeck, wise informative You Don’t Opera- Death: Why Jurors Vote Life Lose on Death Have to Your Shirt Penal- in Ten Florida Death Penal- tive Factors Cases, Justice, Spring ty ABA Criminal Cases, 15 Am.J.Crim.L. ty 1988, at 10. source), we (quoting from an undisclosed performance is defense counsel learn that Of even more concern effectiveness in the outcome as related significant indeed particular and the need for consideration juror in a case where execution Amsterdam, death expertise Supreme Punishment, resulted: 14 Hu- Capital Court it, Rights man where the author say my I feel it “I but shouldn’t have, death-proneness his left discerns always lawyer heart and Only through capital Additionally, guidelines cases. such anee the author’s standards, guidelines judicial preparation, applicability re- close standards communication, them, search, inge- scrutiny enforcing coordination and will death who, lawyer’s product nuity work those few be- in result as reserved for *41 truly nothing mitigate responsibility: there is their cause mercy, may standards, death-qualifying crimes or elicit infused as rules of conduct These unworthy life. This is the true expressed deemed and with the attitudes orientations purpose of trial for life. by guidelines, state elements constitut- Goodpaster, supra, at 362. competent attorney perform- 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev. ing reasonably 114 system protec- States means that the client.
United
Since
criminal defendant
cases,
tion is less—not more—than in other
facing
penalty
a death
or dies
lives
with the
consequently,
higher
and
that a
level
legal representation,
character of
he is
Catz,
expertise
required.
counsel
is
See
question
justice
called to
delivery sys
Penalty
Habeas
The Death
and Federal
tem if
attorney
substantial mistake of his
Corpus:
Legislative Proposal,
A Modest
beyond
Although differing only
review.
Ledewitz,
(1988)
20 Conn.L.Rev. 895
and
counsel,
array
trial
the factual
of failure of
supra, 24 Crim.L.Bull. 379.
representation found in United States ex
Thieret,
rel.
F.Supp.
Kubat v.
679
788
ignorance
The level of our state’s
or inat-
(N.D.Ill.1988) disturbingly
similar to the
starkly
tention is more
reflected in the
Engberg
service afforded
appeal.
on his
where,
footnote,
Goodpaster article
he
mercy
Reliance on
is not sufficient.
Wyoming
grown
relates to the
home
varie-
ty:
Although
by
post-
conviction review
experienced
Some
criminal trial counsel
proceeding
conviction-relief
searches for
simply do not understand the nature or
right
constitutional
violations which ordi
significance
penalty
capi-
of the
trial
narily
law, questions
considers errors of
State,
Hopkinson
tal case.
v.
632 ineffective assistance of counsel address
“
(Wyo.1981),
example,
P.2d 79
defense
proceed
‘fundamental fairness of the
”
competently
guilt
counsel
conducted the
ing whose
being challenged.’
result
phase
complex
lengthy
trial of a
Risdal,
130,
(Iowa
v.
404 N.W.2d
131
trial,
capital
case.
Before
1987) (quoting Strickland,
696,
466
atU.S.
however,
judge
when asked
2069).
Ruiz,
104 S.Ct. at
People
See
how much time he
need for
would
1,
201,
Ill.2d
138 Ill.Dec.
H5
analysis
capi-
It can be found
case
necessarily equate with
efforts do not
corpus
expect capital
reversals
federal courts
defense
habeas
competence. We
tal
for
of counsel
in state
(or
expertise
to have an
ineffectiveness
appellate) counsel
equal
normally
an
specific
considerations
courts demonstrate
regarding
Davis,
greater
appellate
com
capital
failure of
counsel
cases.
561 A.2d
if
pared to trial counsel can be found
at 1089.
proper appeal
originally
ever
taken.
from
present proceeding
This
comes
440,
Dugger,
reh’g
v.
F.2d
Johnson
911
Engberg’s appellate counsel to
failure of
granted
opinion
vacated
lief Vegas arrest and Don- berg’s claimed Las
Cursory given fingered consideration will then be her husband for the na being badly for bad acts evidence of opening beaten Casper statement murder. police arrest, attorney officers at the time of Engberg’s that claim is contended produce to be evidence flee- defense evi- would indicated ing constituting guilt, evidence prosecution show the dence at acts evidence of the of an alias. wrong. proof bad use That intended was circum- included will be the introduction of successfully Further the State invited vented when *44 up let’s first. take an easier one We privilege to her not Engberg’s wife assert suppress issue to the testi- envi- have filed motion testify. complied.15 She to understanding Engberg had just been one Donna who mony of ronment Roy Eng- evidence and Lee prejudicially happens created without to be the wife of opportunity to Engberg then denied was this berg. I am at that time—at time contest or defend. going that We have to withdraw motion. hearsay given been of state- notice 25, 1982, Engberg’s counsel On October Engberg, appar- ments so it’s Donna testimony by sup[p]ress his moved “to Wyoming ent that if the of cannot State completely in- testimony spouse as such they simply testify, just force her to will Wyo.Stat.Ann. reason admiss[i]ble * * rely they hearsay on this statement hearing subsequent on No- At a already her which obtained 17, 1982, subject again vember admissible; may may I or not be don’t addressed: into it far I haven’t looked know. Honor, Okay, Your [Defense Counsel]: going I enough, but am to withdraw think this motion for disclo- we want—I suppress testimony her and at motion to one. The sure informer is the easiest I give notice that will con- time will pretrial Wyoming in its memo- State of being sent to her allowed to be called they have informer randum stated in chief. case State’s the informer is. and I don’t know who 8(k), respectfully give time I use At this would paragraph It would be to going object I There was an informer in- notice that am informer. hearsay upon my I assume from the use of statements with- and would volved suppress her giggle counsel table over here it motion to drawal was, Engberg, testimony. but I probably, Donna to make sure.
want Okay. THE COURT: assumption His Counsel]: [Prosecution part my So that [Defense Counsel]: correct, Your Honor. I pretrial memorandum where said we correct, That’s Mr. THE COURT: that, going drop I’m rely on would of that. Skaggs; that takes care issue, interesting It’s an what that. ruling We have a up forced into the Counsel]: come if we were [Defense would that, it disclosed as Donna spousal testimony, or whether issue Engberg? hearsay not statements would be ad- her Yes, missible; interesting.
THE COURT: counsel. would ****** the State had On November Engberg Now, Honor, subpoena served on Donna Your [Defense Counsel]: Gothenburg, Nebraska.16 a motion—let’s see— you have made Morrison, (4)_The privilege will claim of non- F.2d 223 15. See United States v. Cir.1976), (1), (2), (3rd prose- the activities of the as No. where disclosure 8K— subject witness defendant’s cution "convinced” the the same in Sec- referenced girlfriend take fifth amendment rather pretrial filed October tion of his submission K testify of defendant as a denial of than favor as follows: oppor- right which affords the the constitutional (1) Any about use K. X information tunity witness. See abo United to call a defense case. in this an informer or lookout Hammond, reh’g F.2d States v. (2) intention of X State’s A statement (5th Cir.1979) States v. and United F.2d 862 calling or lookout as witness. informer Cir.1973). Thomas, (6th F.2d ****** suppress: Motion to C. motions X Other pretrial October conference form filed on spouse testimony Defen- 14, 1982, suppress the State stated: grounds and for the reasons that dant on K. Use of informer: immunity. _ spousal absolute there is (1) informer There x was not an Thereafter, suppress was filed motion involved. _ _ 25, 1982, request for disclo- well as a October (2) not be informer will will informer: sure of at the trial. as a witness called Defendant, NOW, name, address, supplied COMES has ItX through attorney the Court for and moves his phone of the informer. number developed extremely panorama then rule. Those statements are The trial damaging in rea- themselves. We have mid-trial: change son to believe that she her As the Court is Counsel]: [Prosecution testimony degree to some from those aware, the next we intend to call witness Roy. Secondly, statements of benefit to Engberg, is Donna the wife of the Defen- Roy Wyoming we have advised Su- dant, here in chambers and we are now *45 preme if Court decisions that indicate his and the Defendant is spousal Defendant were to claim immuni- attorneys and we want to make it abso- ty prosecution could comment in clos- they lutely clear on the record that are ing on the failure call his Defendant’s to willing any privilege immuni- to waive wife as a witness. Those factors miti- ty testify agree for the wife gated against claiming any spousal im- testify. allow her to time, munity. Roy, you at this do wish Skaggs? THE Mr. COURT: privilege spousal to assert the immuni- Honor, Okay, Your [Defense Counsel]: ty? particular point, at this we have advised No, go you THE DEFENDANT: respect par- our to this Defendant —with suggested, Wyatt. get Let her on the problem, ticular advised him we have stand. is to claim his absolute saying, Eng- THE COURT: You’re Mr. spousal immunity prevent her from berg, you waiving spousal are im- testifying. We have further advised our munity? spousal if client that he elects to claim really THE DEFENDANT: That is immunity, there is a chance of the hear- alternative, isn’t it? say Vegas statements from Las to Offi- Well, THE I am not— COURT: becoming cer Cooper Jim available for Yeah, prosecution use under the witness THE I DEFENDANT: will exception hearsay unavailable waive. Engberg agreed appear Douglas, Wyo- the disclosure of the Informer stated in Para- 8(k) graph ming day of the State’s Pretrial on the 6th of December 1982 but Conference Form, appear and whether the Informer will be has now failed to and has asserted that Petitioner, therefore, appear. called at trial. she will not re- (Emphasis original.) spectfully requests that the court recommend By prospective a list witnesses filed Octo- in its Certificate that said witness be taken 29, 1982, Engberg custody
ber Donna was included as an into immediate and be delivered to Deputy County, anticipated witness for the State. Sheriff of Converse Wyoming, Wyo- Engberg, in defense witness list filed Novem- an officer of the State of 22, 1982, ming, ber included: to assure attendance in this state [her] proceeding. 1. criminal All witnesses and addresses listed on as witness in said day, Supplementary State’s Witness List and State’s On the same Certificate for Attendance court, prepared by the Witness List. was issued the trial Application county attorney, part An for Certificate for Attendance and in stated: Out Of State that Donna Witness was filed the State on 3. That believes [the State] 7, 1982, Gothenburg, Engberg residing December Nebraska included: petitioner Eng- necessary 3. That and material witness to be believes that Donna is a Nebraska, berg residing Gothenburg, prosecution of said criminal trial is a called in the necessary following reasons: material witness to be called in prosecution Engberg of said was with defendant on De- action for Donna the follow- ing reasons: 1982 and thereafter traveled with cember Vegas, they stayed Engberg Donna was with Las Nevada where De- him to defendant on January defendant was arrested on cember thereafter until traveled with Vegas, Engberg given they stayed him to Las Nevada where 1982. Donna has statements to agents implicating January until defendant was arrested on law enforcement the defen- given charged. Donna has in the crimes for which he is dant statements to ****** agents implicating law enforcement the defen- charged. the crimes for which he dant in 7. That the court recommends that said ****** custody witness be taken into immediate Deputy Sheriff of Converse Petitioner believes that unless said be delivered witness Wyoming, custody County, is taken into immediate she State of to assure her at- fail though Wyoming, appear in the State of as a wit- even so ordered. Such tendance be- proceeding. lief is based on the fact that the said ness in said criminal Donna
H9 force We can’t Okay, Counsel]: will convene we [Prosecution COURT: THE to. minutes, her five folks. in about No, Honor, you can’t force her THE Your COURT: Counsel]:
[Defense her request that after to. we time would direct, recess have a testimony on we all oppor- I want the Counsel]: [Defense testimony. go her can over so we her and assert tunity cross-examine problems with I have no every question. THE immunity COURT: that. want THE You what? COURT: calls [Prosecution [*] Donna [*] Engberg. Counsel]: [*] [*] * * * [*] The State [*] tunity to cross-examine [Defense immunity on Counsel]: every question. I want the her and oppor- assert if she re- I think
THE
don’t
COURT:
you,
ask
testify
would
*46
that —I
ENGBERG
fused to
DONNA
Guetz,
clearly that
explain to her
Mr.
by the
as a witness
having
called
been
and she
spousal
immunity
has
she
State,
duly
testified
first
sworn
testify.
have
doesn’t
follows, to wit:
oppose
I
that. She
Counsel]:
[Defense
Roy has the
the privilege.
have
does not
EXAMINATION
DIRECT
privilege.
BY
Counsel]:
[Prosecution
privi-
THE
She can assert
COURT:
record,
please tell
you
could
Q.
For
lege.
your name?
the Court and
Honor, under
Your
Counsel]:
[Defense
Engberg.
A. Donna
assert,
law,
privilege to
Roy’s
case
it’s
Q.
you reside?
do
Where
not hers.
Gothenb[u]rg, Nebraska.
A.
the more recent
THE
Under
COURT:
you
the wife
Q.
Engberg,
are
Mrs.
immunity
rule,
her-
can assert
she
Defendant,
you
Roy Engberg, are
that im-
Absolutely,
can assert
she
self.
not?
her
munity on
own.
A. Yes.
when it
misadvised
court was
testify
this
in
Q.
your
wish to
Is
rule on testi-
federal Trammel
applied the
case?
says “the witness-
privilege which
monial
A. No.
refuse to
privilege
has a
alone
spouse
willing
testify in this
Q.
you
Are
may be nei-
adversely; the witness
testify
case?
testify
foreclosed
nor
compelled
ther
if I
have to.
A. Not
don’t
United
testifying.”
Trammel v.
from
know,
you
Q.
Engberg,
Mrs.
906, 914,
40, 53,
States,
100 S.Ct.
asking
are
make and we
your choice to
privi-
(1980). “Testimonial
L.Ed.2d 186
you
make
choice
want to
you now what
testifying
prevents
spouse
lege”
testify
case,
you want to
in
whether
this
commu-
A “confidential
the other.
against
or not?
testimony
prevents
privilege”
nication
No, I
A.
don’t.
in
said mari-
reveal what was
would
which
May
ap-
we
tal confidence.17
Counsel]:
[Prosecution
bench,
Honor?
Your
proach the
Wyo-
applied
court should
The trial
may.
You
COURT:
THE
1-12-104:
ming law found W.S.
[******]
No
husband
or
wife
shall be
a witness
pro-
except
criminal
other
Guetz,
against the
she doesn’t
Mr.
COURT:
THE
committed
one
ceedings
a crime
testify.
want
Note, Spouse’s Testimony
Comment,
found in
statute
also
Rules
Symposium on the Federal
Cases,
Wyo.L.J.
Criminal
Wyoming
Practice
Their
Evidence:
Effect
privileged
disqualification and
witness
discusses
L.Rev.
Adopted, XII Land & Water
if
(1977).
communication.
as a confidential
analysis
Wyoming
evidence
A detailed
other,
against
problem
or in a civil
action
noting
coerced result
first
proceeding by
against
one
the other.
privilege
presented
was not
objec-
They may in all civil and criminal cases
joinder
tion to trial
concluding
then
be witnesses for each other the same as
not,
that the
testimony
wife’s
though the marital relation did not exist.
present
court’s
conception, exculpatory, al-
though actually placing her husband at the
Wyoming
This
statute has remained sub
scene with an
stantively unchanged
availability
gun
of a
since enacted in 1899.
(1899); Note,
armed
Spouse’s
robbery charge.
W.S.
simply
Testi
§
Amin
can-
Cases,
mony
Wyo.LJ.
in Criminal
support
decision on the
Direct consideration or at least
application
Wyoming privilege
stat-
implication
spousal
of the issue of
testimo
ute as affording
to the witness-
ny Wyoming
cases is found in Biggs v.
spouse to
testify
refuse to
approved
when
State,
(1904);
Wyo.
process under both compel- It is said eral constitutions. separate Kentucky recognizes two statu- *48 2241 at Wigmore, supra, ling logic in 8 § testimony. on husband-wife tory limitations 254: of communi- disclosure confidential One is suggested reason taking But the other privilege refuse second is to and the cation namely, immunity from privilege, for the in from testify. Although different text to being of con- situation repugnant the con- statutory system is the Wyoming, becoming spouse or of demned one’s Com., 744 S.W.2d Estes trolled. of a condemna- spouse’s the instrument State, 430 Williams (Ky.1987). Cf. ** to be *, privilege seems the tion (Ind.), appeal dismissed N.E.2d and of party witness. equally that 103 S.Ct. 459 U.S. 1059, 103 S.Ct. 459 U.S. reh’g denied adoption of the Trammel The trial court’s (1982), only “privi- where L.Ed.2d 626 Wyoming statute mean- renders the rule recognized. communication” is leged testify can not to if wife elect ingless the prosecuto- when corrosive her husband in recognizing that the error After first explicit the applied. is With pressure rial unquestioned, it be- and substance form inap- adoption place, in statute state trial recreation bizarre comes re- rule becomes Trammel plicable federal improper decision to events absolve error. versible trial by charging defendant’s court the trial to only jurisdiction Any not the such Wyoming procedural default. counsel court suggesting The Texas that misplaced rule. in reject argument the Trammel in against disregarded Trammel record distinguished Engberg protect Young in called on state statute when the State relying their error committed (Tex.Cr.App.1980). jury, State, in front 603 S.W.2d to the stand his wife had Jones, in Montana: he thereafter Similarly said re-empha- case to again his recall her may possess merit this view Whatever prejudicial effect only in federal size applies ], it [:Trammel testify. No fac- second election not statutory her contrary to and is courts charging timating terms, tual basis for trial counsel with his involvement. In basic by procedural this constitutional forfeiture the denial Engberg any testimony default is found trial events unless we from his posture wife contravenes the ignore Engberg’s continued effort to obtain Washington Texas, v. State 388 U.S. testimony Engberg. of Donna Obvi- 1920, 18 (1967), 87 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 1019 defin ously, to reach that answer to excuse the ing of the accused defendant to error, necessary it is to attach the compulsory process to obtain witness Const, procedural default failure and mistake to es in his Wyo. behalf. art. trial counsel. That would be novel both § factually briefing and in for this case. approach federal which misdirected adopt Even if we the convoluted construc- the trial court started with Hawkins v. argued by tion of these facts States, United 358 U.S. 79 S.Ct. appellate duty then either counsel had a (1958), L.Ed.2d 125 holding sub modified raise the failure as an ineffectiveness con- States, nom. Trammel v. United appeal tention on initial or that status is 40, properly now before us as ineffectiveness where conviction was reversed after the counsel, suggested which has never been government used defendant’s wife as a wit- by any writer, prior Engberg, brief privilege ness objection over his based on a appeal. State or this court on initial Actu- premise common law and construction. ally, objection there was no notice of fail- Stewart, concurrence, Justice contended any significance by ure of trial counsel and privilege should be that of the suggest otherwise now decision is witness and not of the accused and said highly inappropriate. “[ujnder such a rule the defendant in a criminal case prevent could not his wife C. Totality What the Record and testifying him, against but she could Procedures Established compelled not be to do so.” Id. U.S. at decision, majority, con- 82, 79 141. The Tenth Circuit verts what was confused and confessed Appeals, Court of which did apparently not error non-argued into a and non-briefed Hawkins, like its reversal sent Trammel First, disregard conclusion to error. Supreme to the United States Court specific ruling the face of the of the trial co-conspirator denial of error in a spouse court that Donna would testi- immunity granted case where fy, again the defense thereafter had to call *49 elected, pursuant wife and she then to her protected her to the stand to be from some- immunity, testify to over the husband’s thing in the nature of “waived error” so privilege objection. claimed Substantively, that the trial court would make the same pursued. the common law evaluation was ruling. recognition This contention belies judicial The various utterances on the succeeding that the federal rules Wyo- and matter privilege exercise of the ming rules in effect for more now than a privilege belongs establish that the quarter century of a were intended to elimi- party spouse against whom the other is regurgitation nate this of needless in kind witness; however, offered as a firm- it is pointless process procedure. and See ly established that privilege also be- Additionally, W.R.C.P. trial counsel longs to the spouse. witness rely should have been to on the trial able Trammel, 1166, United States v. 583 F.2d court’s Engberg statement “Donna (10th Cir.1978), 1169 granted cert. 440 U.S. has used her privilege” that the and believe 934, 1277, L.Ed.2d 59 492 said; trial court meant that the what was 445 U.S. 100 63 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d issue was decided aff'd repeated as by the (1980) (emphasis original). 186 in court answer to the to objection State’s proof Supreme offer of hearsay United States Court introduction. au- Engberg to Denial of his testimony thenticates its decision for federal wife’s law was disastrous as the case perspective, developed changed from within historical opening mores, statement into other in- testimony review the common law as
123
been,
testimony
testimony might
Engberg
non-
to
for the
es the
limited
adverse
preferable
clearly expected it to be
to what-
federal
of evi-
statutory purposes of
rules
police
Vegas
from
ever the
officer
Las
“Accordingly, we conclude that
dence.
say
Engberg
Donna
said when she
would
so that the
existing rule should be modified
complaint against her
January
filed the
privilege
to re-
witness-spouse
has
alone
husband.
adversely; the
testify
to
witness
fuse
testify
compelled
neither
nor foreclos-
contrary directly
To conclude
vio
Trammel,
445 U.S.
testifying.”
ed from
rights
the constitutional
of the defen
lates
53,
Morrison, Cir.1976), 535 F.2d nature, majori created stitutional the prosecution where activities justification ty’s decision denial to “convinced” the witness defendant’s testimony of his the accused desired girlfriend take the fifth amendment Engberg’s The denial of access to wife. testify than in favor defendant rather testimony right to adequately denies a right a denial the constitutional protected an interest defend forecloses opportunity affords the to call a defense by both state and federal constitutions witness. See likewise United States Amendment). (Sixth Exculpatory testimo Hammond, F.2d reh’g 598 F.2d rejected ny desired for use (5th Cir.1979) and United States right to defend in by this decision. Thomas, (6th Cir.1973). F.2d cluding introduction of available material case, apply In this consider we testimony has addressed the Unit been explicit Wyoming statute and not an ab- Rock, Supreme further ed States Court stract and attacked “sentimental relic” Taylor and is con considered Olden principle.” “reasoned historical Since trolling Clearly, on this sim and decisive. Wyoming privilege provence is not the basis, Eng- ple yet direct constitutional it the judicial system, the federal neither is resulted his denial berg’s conviction ignore Wyoming rights courts to Re Amendment defend. of Sixth is, result, provided constitutionally has as an as a re legislature what the versal quired. existed established which has now standard VerMeulen, century. most of Secondary From D. Use Evidence N.W.2d 36. crucible of this case *50 an “Unavailable Witness” opinion appearance from statement to Engberg
this witness before the State’s testimony as the of Donna Since denied, witness, last communicated from examination had been prejudice by direct subject again: availability Engberg’s counsel raised denied Whatev- undeniable. Light Trammel, troubling Privilege: Balancing Interests “In nature of albeit as al non-statutory through adaptation Experiencé', 19 Ind.L.Rev. 645 common law and Reason courts, Note, for the federal Privileges construction is demon a (1986); Marital Federal question, strated engendered. conflict and confusion Need Further Context: The Criminal Modifi the conflict Consider found in the Trammel, & 43 Wash. Lee L.Rev. Since cation case, Parker, joint United involvement States v. Note, (1986); in Crime: The Joint Partners Cir.1987), (4th cert. F.2d 408 834 938, Against Privilege Participants Exception to the with Spousal Testimony, 53 Fordham L.Rev. Adverse Evidence, Right Every Lempert, A to Woman's Note, (1985); Spousal Adverse Privi Note, Iowa L.Rev. 725 The Joint Alive?, Wash.U.L.Q. lege: or Dead Participation Exception to the Marital Testimoni now, proponent procure through Okay, can reason- Your Counsel]: [Defense Honor, I this time proof offer able effort and would state at we have an would procure Engberg. we made other efforts to to would have related Donna We testimony particular her and on I have these particular offer at this time—and facts, way procure is no we can put I will her on there Janet Garner here and testimony. that any believe respect hearsay stand evi- other We (c), 804(b)(6)(c), pur- general Engberg that has told her. under dence Donna pose justice rules the interest of okay? that After that I would Would will be served the admission hearsay move to admit it under the ex- best her to Janet into evi- ception. statement Garner dence. Counsel], THE COURT: [Prosecution on you you
do comment that? Thank you. have THE Would COURT: that, respond Counsel], Well, far as [Prosecution as Counsel]: [Prosecution please? that, they preserve want the record on way proper I don’t if that is know briefly, Just [Prosecution Counsel]: not, going but— about this this Your Honor. We have discussed Well, what, previously. respect I’ll tell you THE matter With COURT: Engberg perception, there no evi- has used recent has been Gentlemen. Donna percep- privilege. spouse. a It is her dence that this matter is a recent her She is items, going regard tion. other we privilege I’m not allow the With she hearsay have discussed this matter evidence. spousal privilege, her has exercised supported by effort an offer privilege holds. She desires not to she chambers, outlining proof proposed authority testify and there is abundant which, investigator testimony from an privilege, one exercises that when Engberg’s presenting statements hearsay inadmissible even would be wife, factually would attacked request motion be would that the we specifically case and controverted State’s denied. opening contentions of the statement my THE That is also under- COURT: prosecution. standing. going deny I’m the motion. Following proof defining the offer testimony Eng- prospective direct Donna justification for admission obvious berg, pursued defense counsel admissabili- Simms, provided by P.2d 804 evidence ty text substance as W.R.E. prior where defense counsel was faced with interviewing in- through testimony of an preliminary testimony of a witness vestigator: hearing parties not married. when were Honor, testimony in Your at The actual court after which
[Defense Counsel]:
his
to have his
particular point,
I will make a motion defendant waived
against him
testimony
testify
wife
was available
to admit the
of Janet Garner
introduction, including
804(b)(6)
her
testi-
pursuant
804. Under
both
live
to Rule
(b)(5),
mony
hostile witness examination from
I would state at this time that
Simms,
prior transcript. This
court
Mrs.
unavailable witness.
(footnote
citing
804(a)(1). 492
because of
P.2d at 521
omitted
She
unavailable
Evidence,
(Chadbourn
Wigmore,
grounds
privi-
exempted
She is
§
or,
804(b)(5) rev.1974))
lege
secondly,
disqualification
fits under
said “that a
she
being
privilege
exercise of
makes
admissible because
is a state- witness
*51
Also,
present testimony
fits
the
unavailable
perception.
ment of recent
she
witness’s
804(b)(6)
to his
excep-
accordingly
the
and
should allow resort
under
under
other
tions,
testimony,
to
former
a doctrine
was not
phrase
the
804. It is a
which
catch-all
accepted
early English
law
by
mate-
common
statement offered as evidence of a
chancery
courts
well established in
proba-
fact.
is a statement more
but was
rial
It
practice
generally
being
probably
to
and would
be
point
tive on the
which it is
in our courts.”
any other evidence which a
followed
offered than
spouse
poena by
is
the defense
was
evidence
not
Why in this case similar
through
she
Engberg
the testimo-
ever obtained and
“never became
available
investigator
validity
response
is
re-
of the
ny of the witness
witness.”
defined,
context of
except in the
fined or
the facts of the trial are so self-
within
prosecution is fre-
good for the
what
is
evident that further comment is unneeded
in
The State
quently not available
defense.
dispose
this
contention. Simmons v.
ignore
phraseology
us to
would ask
(1988).
Md.
uncharged coconspirators were called
71,
(1942);
1086
testify
and
as
126 P.2d
State v.
the witness stand
refused
Wash.2d
93,
Winnett,
(1907).
described in Jones.
48
ple v.
(D.C.Cir.1971),
Judge
re-
Chief
Bazelon
842,
tion; *57 charged capital people innocent scientifically judicially The and rec- 2. Radelet, 40 supra, Bedau & crimes. See ognized that there are serious fact (Appendix at A: Cat- Stan.L.Rev. 91-172 reliability eye- of on the limitations Defendants). problem The of alogue of defendants; identification of witness faulty has eyewitness identification been scientifically judicially The rec- 3. and books, comprehensively addressed scien- employed ognized frequently that fact publications legal journals. For tific and police prosecution procedures of- and fundamentally fair Wyoming law to be as (and frequently unintentionally) it, ten we make a defendant should be can misidentifi- eyewitnesses mislead into evidence which can shake able defendant; cation of the eyewitness the confidence identifica- prosecution is use just as the free to legal and fact 4. historical that tion— is a of eyewitness identification. It matter people significant number of innocent analyzing After they fairness.24 of crimes did fundamental have been convicted Ordover, Porraro, in 6 Crim- See also an excellent review also 121 R.I. 404 23. See (1988). Advocacy (1979); With those standard trilogy, inal the Wade United States Law A.2d 465 Wade, Yarmey, Psycholo- included A. texts must be (1979) (1967); California, gy Testimony and E. Loftus Eyewitness Gilbert v. State of S.Ct.1951, (1967); Testimony: Doyle, Eyewitness Civil and & J. U.S. 87 Denno, (1987). merely of a As illustrative Stovall v. Criminal societal, (1967) psy- subsequent portion and cases. scientific and small reviews, monograms see M. chology and article Note, analysis provided in Interesting An McCloskey, Treadway Cite Unseen: Distor- & M. Twenty-Years Diminishing A Protection: Pro Study Allport and Postman Rumor tions Standards, Trilogy’s posal to Wade Return to the Literature, Testimony 11 Law Eyewitness (1987). See also Com 15 Hofstra L.Rev. 583 Bersoff, (1987); Behavior 19 D. Human ment, Eyewitness at Erroneous Identification System: Psychologists and the Broader Judicial Cure, Lineups Its Problem and —The Perspectives, 10 Law Behavior and Human compare the U.S.F.L.Rev. 85 earlier (1986); Bregman, Un- Juror H. McAllister & N. article, Quinn, In the The Di Wake Wade: Eyewitness derutilization Cases, Nonidentifications: Eyewitness mensions of Identification Ap- Implications, J.71 and Practical Theoretical addition, 42 U.Colo.L.Rev. 135 In see (1986); & K. Deffenbacher plied Psychology 168 1987) (Wyo. Charpentier P.2d 724 Loftus, a Common Under- Share E. Do Jurors J., (Urbigkit, dissenting). Behavior?, Concerning Eyewitness standing (1982); R. Chris- Behavior 15 Representative easily as more Law and Human tiaansen, available Sweeney, & J. Individual Munsterberg, Ochalek are K. sources H. On the Witness Borchard, Eyewitness Memory and (1908); Convicting E. Stand Inno- Confi- Differences Psychology Frankfurter, Wall, (1932); Judgments, 110 J. General supra; cent F. P. dence Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony (1984); G. Eye-Witness in Criminal Cases Identification Arnolds, Sobel, System and Estimator Vari- supra; Variables supra. N. Research: E. Supreme major attempt first Court’s eyewitness reliance on unquestioning “dangers eye- inherent legal system, two confront identification suggestibil- and the rules witness identification argue for uniform prominent scholars pretrial ity in the context of the inherent such identification: govern primary identification.” Court’s con- inadequa- light of the unenumerated legal cern was to evolve standards and and tes- eye-witness identification cies of substantially that would reduce remedies safeguards are timony, procedural new identification. erroneous pro- following proposed required. The suggested alterna- are not Reid, Testimony tections on Expert Katz & evidence, such eyewitness Identification, tives Fallibility Eyewitness very vital role in play can evidence describes: CrimJustJ. proceedings. investigative the testi- Many psychologists believe Rather, safeguards suggested are these eyewitness crime mony of an to a might eyewitness evidence in order This article address- often be unreliable. jury proper in its presented to a scien- question es whether behavioral prejudicial perspective. least testify permitted to tists should be jury explain criminal trials to Eyewitness & Cunningham Tyrrell, Credi eyewitness danger relying Sights inherent Adjusting the the Judi bility: identifications. Lawyer ciary, 37 Alabama police These scholars recommend legal admissi- After a discussion of the lineups using suggestive analysis avoid testimony, an bility of this instructions, re provide special problem courts scope of the the nature and evidence, corroborating employ pro quire presented, followed a discussion of procedures for in-court identifica expert tective specific upon topics *58 tion, require procedures pretrial identification testify. and eyewitness identification (St Denno, 388 87 conclusion, presents this some article ovall (1967) (Denno 18 1199 L.Ed.2d in guidelines judge assist his the hearing)). this matter. of discretion on exercise rep-A nearly O’Connor, literature is endless. Sobering
The A “That’s Man”: found in & analysis is Levine Eyewitness resentative and Study Identification of Identi- L.Rev. 1-2 Tapp, Psychology The Criminal 49 St.John’s Polygraph, of Kirby, (1974) (footnote omitted) Gap The From Wade to states: fication: (1973)(quoting 121 1079 U.Pa.L.Rev. four in the morn- It is almost o’clock 218, 235, Wade, 388 U.S. States v. lighted United and, he in the ing, stands 1926, 1936, (1967) 18 1149 squad at the 110th doorway of the room omitted), which stated: but, and footnotes precinct, Manny is Balestrero tired — scared, still, more 12, 1967, Supreme he scared Court worse June On cases, Things life. trilogy he has ever been in his in a than United States closing him. Wade, His seem to be around Gilbert v. Cali- States v. United Denno, evening interrogation since earlier and dealt Stovall fornia not, standard, brutal; by any been police practices has constitutionality persistent, just no has been obtaining force procedures eyewitness and used— relentless, questioning by ceaseless two marked These decisions identifications. 1974); (Dec. ables, Today Psychology 116 and G. All- Psychology Personality 36 J. & Social Postman, Psychology (1978); Buckhout, Eye- port Rumor & L. The Psychology R. 1546 Monahan, Identification, also & Social Psychology Walker witness 1 Law and (1975); Luce, New Use Social Science in Di- Frameworks: A Law, Neglected 75 T. Review The Did Eyewitness 559 and How The Identification, 73 VaX.Rev. mension 4 Criminal Snared?, (1977); Portman, Wrong National Law Eye- Man Get The S. Defense Mistaken 7, 1988). (March more One of the vali- Remedy, A Journal witness Criminal Identification: 4 Buckhout, (1976); teaching to be Eyewitness orientation R. dated sources Defense Iden- Williams, Loftus, Courtroom, B. Bell & K. Pow- Psychology is E. in the found tification (April Loftus, Testimony, Trial 64 Eyewitness E. Criminal Defense 5 Recon- erful Eyewitness, 1988). structing Memory: The Incredible determination, one for skeptically polite, and often the sole who are so detectives adamantly unbelieving! Yet, every trial. commenta- so criminal
[*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] tors extensively have documented wrongful result- frequency of convictions swiftly to its bitter The drama moves ing from mistaken identifications senses, again rather Manny than end. long recognized the threat darkened sees, in the room. movement poses the ideals such misidentification words: whispered “That’s Then come As Felix justice. of criminal Justice collaps- world Manny’s man!” whole noted, Frankfurter once “The identifica- es. strangers proverbially untrust- tion of interim, and, (After a mistrial worthy. testimony The hazards such perpetrator apprehended.) real by a number are formidable established legal within is an article of faith “It English in the records of instances testimony eyewitness profession and American trials.” Biggers: Neil Pulaski, unreliable.” Eyes Did Deceive You? Ex- Note, Your Supreme Court Dismantles Wade pert Psychological Testimony on Protection, Trilogy’s Due Process Stan. Unreliability Eyewitness L.Rev. Identifica- tion, (1977) (quot- 29 Stan.L.Rev. unreliability eyewitness identifi- supra, Frankfurter, ing 30) (footnotes F. poses one of the most cation evidence omitted). variety just detail of problems in the administration of serious subject articles on are few other justice. Identifying the defen- criminal issue, presents astounding.25 wrongdoer as the dant
25. The
of
719
regarded
McGowan,
Quinn,
Grano,
tutional
(footnotes
inaccuracy
Guilt 89
Criminal
greatest
believe, the use
"Although eyewitness
suspecting
lized
to correct
ished.
our
tration
tion.
of criminal
experts to
dence have
“All
of the
ones. Yet
taken
eyewitness identifications.
cern to those involved
Convicting the
Until
(1974) (quoting G.
peril
testimony,
ideal that
legal systems
society
Kirby,
supra n.
Safeguards
evidence.”
prosecution;
major
vagaries
(3d
Identification, Wm. &
form of evidence in criminal
recently,
of the criminal law is
[******]
single
omitted).
has not
Constitutional
ed.
conviction
law.
Biggers,
traditionally
cause of
rather than
abuses
no
Innocent?,
watching
1963)).
threat to the achievement of
comparatively
of confessions
an innocent
of visual
gone
It has been
innocent
Remain
what
and Ash: Do
judiciary had done little
identification is
injustice
Williams,
unnoticed.”
in the
real
U.Colo.L.Rev.
eyewitness
made
for
72 Mich.L.Rev.
been of
for the
Interpretation and
Against
is
man shall
identification
danger
thought many
voluntary
person
conceivably
lying testimony
in the adminis-
administration
rare
but the use of
not,
Mary
involuntary
Any
mistake of
great
Comment,
identifica-
is mis-
trials,
by
Proof of
be
Danger
Consti-
at 135
L.Rev.
a civi-
highly
errors
many
pun-
con-
evi-
put
its
Need
Expert Testimony
Eyewitness
many
Dick.L.Rev.
nal
(quoting
the
waite?,
Munsterberg, supra n.
Comment,
Testimony:
12 AmJ.Crim.L.
justice
ble human
the American
“Justice would less often
many
are to
the
and
may
are
tirely
clarity
“'[I]nnocent
form evidence. This inherent
in
ingness
human
cation
chologists
fair and efficient
have
permitted
astrous
Throughout
Eyewitness
Supreme
Cases,
combination
treachery
decided
testimony
recall,
not be as accurate
52 U.Colo.L.Rev.
suggested
on the
weigh
psychologists
Jonakait,
that,
testimony
Cautionary Jury
memory process,
effects, poses
Helping the
The Need for
America.
Identification
have demonstrated with
effectively
there is
guilty
due to normal deficiencies in
Court Tell Manson v. Brath
testimony systems
testify
evidence
daily
Wash.U.L.Q.
people
testimony plays
of human
this
judicial
with the
Reliable Identification:
produced
is an
administration of criminal
will
based
century,
Eyewitness Perception,
(1978).
Jury
will be
psychologists
24).
safeguard
constant concern
experts
were
a serious threat
Additional
remain free.”’
as it seems.
Instructions in
system. Many
inherently
legal system's unwill-
perception,
Testimony
memory."
Evaluate
eyewitnesses.
legal
substantially
*59
miscarry
(1984) (quoting H.
eyewitness
by inherently
more
experimental
imprisoned,
to inform
a critical role
commentators
against its dis-
unreliability,
(1981)).
conscious of
Safeguards,
Eyewitness
increasing
should be
unreliable
if
Recently
memory
identifi-
all who
jurors
Crimi
(1983)
that it
to the
Could
Since
Note,
cases
falli-
psy-
en-
continue to face
Fassett,
identifications shall
literature,
The Third
able
In current
Expert
needlessly
judi-
shut
Response to
Tes-
doors
Unique
closed
Circuit’s
Perception:
Eyewitness
scope
Is
timony
ciary
limiting
intent on
Get?, 19 Seton
dismantling
You See
You
What
What
of trials. Given
duration
(1989) provides a
Hall L.Rev.
protections devel-
of the constitutional
ex-
thoughtfully detailed and documented
ago
oped twenty-two years
to ensure
concludes:
position and then
unreliable identification evi-
exclusion of
unreliability
eye-
The inherent
arising
unduly suggestive
dence
evidence,
identification
combined
witness
those closed doors
pretrial procedures,
protec-
the dilution of constitutional
with
certainly
tragically
facili-
will almost
iden-
designed
tions
to exclude unreliable
innocent defen-
tate the conviction of
tifications,
adoption of
necessitates
dants.
safeguards where such
judicial
additional
reliability
ex-
invoking the
When
disputed.
critical and
evidence
both
analysis
eyewitness
identifi-
pert witness
safeguard, ex-
such
The most effective
cation,
found in review of
four concerns are
testimony,
pert identification
should be
many
expansive
cases and
literature:
pres-
frequently
far more
than
admitted
ently
majority
Amaral
allowed
admissibility
expert
The test for
standard. Enunciated
F.2d
[488
1148]
application of
testimony is F.R.E.
with
years ago by the Ninth Cir-
fifteen
over
test,
States,
Frye
Frye
v. United
either
cuit,
inconsistent with
that standard is
135
eyewitness testimony might
much
jury
will
reliance
justified hope that either
Telfaire,
given.
United States v.
enough
adequately
discount iden- be
469
smart
Eye
second,
(D.C.Cir.1972).
Note,
testimony,
that the
F.2d 552
or
oth-
tification
Testimony
is sufficient so that the invalid witness
and the
er evidence
Identification
Cautionary
Jury
Alterna- Need
Instructions
really
not
testimony does
matter.
Cases,
in Criminal
power
U.L.Q.
60
1387
on
of cross-exam-
Wash.
tively, reliance
State,
Hampton
v.
justifi-
frequently given
as a
In
92 Wis.2d
is also
ination
(citing Chap
(1979)
procedure
868
for the uncontrolled
as an
285 N.W.2d
cation
State,
identifi- man v.
eyewitness
69 Wis.2d
230 N.W.2d
adequate validation
Williamson,
v.
State
testimony.
824
84
cation
Since none
these ex-
(1978)),
testi
planations
reliability
assure
of result for Wis.2d
decisional
used
v.
United States
(4th Cir.1986);
advisability
cluding
propriety
and
both
1052
Amaral,
of a Denno
(9th Cir.1973);
limine
hearing
motion in
1148
and
488 F.2d
State,
v.
(Del.Super.),
Fensterer
trial.
in advance of
A.2d
resolution
granted
judgment
and
vacated
rt.
ce
expert
general principles
As
for
witness
292,
15,
88 L.Ed.2d
474 U.S.
106 S.Ct.
consid
testimony,
separately
definable
(a)
include
com
trial court
erations
witness,
qualification of the
petency and
expert
tes
admissibility
The
standard for
Vineyard,
137 1224, Supreme v. 753 F.2d 1230-31 Jersey Downing, New States in statements Cir.1985): Windmere, (3rd regard in to the in Inc. Court
particular
recognized:
ultimately
which
scientific
reliability
There
proponent
topic
found inadmissible.
are
results can
in terms of
generally
voice
expert testimony
prove
its
prints
three
general accept-
which was
That court
ways
required
in
testimony
in which courts have found
test
certain
[W]e
of Rule
[******]
find
circumstances,
persuasive
can
702.
satisfy
* * *
more
type
recent
that,
helpfulness
expert
under
cases
community:
professional
agree
ance within the
in Chappie,
We
with the courts
(1)
knowledgeable
Smith,
ex-
testimony
and
McDonald
under certain
(2)
scientific litera-
perts;
expert
authoritative
testimony
circumstances
on
(3)
ture;
judicial
persuasive
reliability
decisions
eyewitness
identifications
general accept-
acknowledge
reaching
such
in
can assist
a correct
expert testimony.
ance of
decision and therefore
meet
702.[30]
helpfulness
requirement
Rule
Windmere, Inc.,
That
522 A.2d
408.28
applied
approach by
factu-
case
reasoned
making
jurisdiction in
Retained discretional
analysis
acceptability
criteria.
al
each
probative
prejudicial
evaluation
versus
is further
reflected
v.
super-
United States
Frye
generally
test has been
1308,
Moore,
702,
reh’g
786 F.2d
denied 791
current
seded
F.R.E.
more
(5th Cir.1986)
Via,
F.2d 928
State v.
recognition
relationship
science’s
108,
(1985),
P.2d 238
in- 146 Ariz.
704
cert.
fact-finding
for truth in trial
search
1268,
1048,
U.S.
106
89
denied 475
S.Ct.
quiry.29
psychological principles as
(1986).
L.Ed.2d 577
The more recent real
are
psycho-legal fundamentals
enumerated
responsible analyses
general
in istic and
have
derived
four factors
to be
involved
ly
issue
to re
quoted
concluded that the
whether
eyewitness identification
earlier
ject
Anderson,
(with
requires an affirmative conclusion of
468
205 N.W.2d at
exhaus-
Hamm,
prejudice.
v.
146
See State
bibliography).
tive
130,
584,
(1988).
430
591
Wis.2d
N.W.2d
authority
line of
where trial denial
Perhaps
viably addressing
the case most
appeal began
on
reversal
resulted
eyewitness
invalidity
identification
and the
Chapple,
Ariz.
P.2d
v.
135
660
State
justification
expert testimony
for relevant
McDonald,
People v.
37
1208
Ap
the Fifth
comes from
Circuit Court of
Cal.Rptr.
208
tive
subject
for ex-
appropriateness
discretionary
in the
nized these
constraints
pert
testimony
jury trial con-
in a
witness
Poland,
case of
Ariz.
State
the testi-
conformity
text. Third is the
Utah has followed a sim-
P.2d
mony
explanatory theory, and fourth
Bruce,
path
ilar
admissibility of
resolution in
the eternal
1989).
(Utah
prejudicial
weighing probative value versus
ad-
The evidence reaches relevance and
effect.
highly
missability
identification is
where
clearly quali
Loftus
Dr. Elizabeth
and,
ques-
significant
perhaps, reasonably
exposure
experience
fied
national
case,
exclusion of
tionable.
such
testified
particularly
so since she had
factually
constitute a
expert witness
(Wyo.
P.2d 898
Alberts
against
of conviction
directed verdict
1987).
Doyle, Eye
Loftus
E.
& J.
If
define discretion
real
defendant.
we
Testimony:
and Criminal
the witness
Civil
judgmental
apply
decision and
terms of
step
con
properly
next
principles emplaced in W.R.E.
answers
expert
expert
analysis
testi-
is assessment
in modern
witness
sidered
terms
*64
139
335,
(Ala.Cr.
State,
validity.
ker v.
568 So.2d
339
admissibility
Clear
testimony for
Hall,
161,
proposed App.1990);
v.
244 Mont.
and the
State
ly,
criteria was met
this
(1990); Melson,
proof
offer of
P.2d
L.Ed.2d
L.Ed.2d
Note, Hypnosis
see
and the Defendant’s
investigation, the suc
post-conviction
In
Case,
Right
Testify in
1989
to
a Criminal
appellate
discovered that
counsel
cessor
(1989).
Utah L.Rev. 545
eyewitness had
principal
hypnotism the
to
“attempted” and undisclosed
both been
thoughtful analysis
provided by
A
is
during
trial.
Engberg either before or
Comment, Hypnotically Enhanced Testi-
Eng-
proceeding,
post-conviction-relief
Charm?,
mony:
it Lost
15
Has
its
S.I11.
an
opportunity to have
berg asked for an
289,
(footnotes
U.L.J.
293-95
omit-
had
evidentiary hearing to establish what
ted):
attempted hypnotism
why
and
occurred
hypno-
The scientific
is that
consensus
activity
hidden from his counsel.
does enhance recall. If this were the
sis
discovery,
court,
post-
the trial
After
considered,
to
only factor
be
there would
any evidentiary
decision denied
conviction
argument
no
its use.
be
about
But
any prop
hearing. The
eliminated
decision
problems
hypnosis
associated with
create
by
inquiry, leaving
er examination
oral
problems lie in
the conflict. These
four
denial
affidavit
the decedent’s sister’s
major
suggestibility,
areas:
confabula-
actually
hyp
had
that she
succumbed when
tion,
fabrication,
deliberate
and increased
attempted
police
on her
notism was
confidence.
Iwakiri,
representative.
v.
106 Ida
State
in the
Suggestibility
hyp-
inherent
618,
(1984).
People v.
ho
based on the fact
she had been
111. This
information was obtained
Dugger, 850
Bundy
tized.”
also
investigative
done on
a result
work
(11th Cir.1988),
cert. denied
Mr. McClain’s behalf and not because
F.2d
prosecution
comply
a decision
Brady request,
Petitioner’s
or Disci-
Johnston,
n.
N.E.2d at 903
7-103(B),
Wyoming
plinary Rule
or the
Supreme
ruling
Court’s
v.Gee
*68
post-conviction process
arrive
We
(Wyo.1983).
never However, indicating. information so Gee, suspicion between it and there exists a Ms. Miller did indicate that she hypnosis may been used here. that recalled in other cases in Casper hypnosis Police had used to enhance a wit- memory. ness's part defend, I of his to under Far- the trial court’s discretion. within etta vs. dispute that at all. don’t California. that,
However,
my
I—it’s
concern
response,
stated:
its discre-
the trial court abuses
where
Concerning
case,
hypnosis in this
I still
ability
Defendant his
and denies the
tion
that
don’t feel
the Petitioner has come
witness,
then the constitutional
to call
anywhere
showing
near making a factual
Amendment,
right under the Sixth
require
that would
this Court
conduct
defend,
implicated.
right to
evidentiary
question.
hearing on this
an
my
that there was an
It’s
contention
regard,
four affidavits in that
We have
and, first,
this case
abuse
discretion
the same affidavits we had the last time
occurred
just on the basis of what
at
hearing
this
we had a
before
Court. The
trial,
rely
I
on
cases cited in
would
defense has not come forward —or the
Arizona, California, and, I
my brief from
Petitioner has
come forward with
believe,
Third Circuit. More recent-
that,
anything in addition
and I think
years,
ly, in the last two
those courts
enough
time the Court has
before
eyewitness identification
have ruled that
it to decide that
issue on
merits.
help
jury
field
needs
is a
proof
As
on
concerns
burden
eyewitness
expert
an
on
identifica-
and
hypnosis,
we have cited to
Court U.S.
provide
help
tion can
that is
we
also call
Bagley,
vs.
and
would
necessary
possibilities
all the
to consider
Hopkinson
attention
Court
properly,
the evidence
view
newly
which talks about this kind
dis-
that,
basis
my
it’s
contention
on the
covered evidence in a Post-Conviction
cases,
those
there was an abuse
dis-
context,
Hopkinson
Court
cretion here.
newly
said
evidence
discovered
However,
complicated
more
it’s
than
as a
treated the same
motion
should be
complicated by
it’s
Issue
that because
trial,
talking
for new
and if we’re
about
VII,
hypnosis
issue. We have
situ-
evidence,
impeachment
that’s for the de-
partic-
ation where the witness—and
likely
fense
result
to show would
focusing
Kay
one
ular
we were
acquittal,
I
think the burden
hypno-
attempt
Otto. There was
it’s
concerns this issue and whether
hypnotize
her.
wanted to
tize
The State
prejudicial is set
harmful or
forth
they were concerned about
her because
Hopkinson
Bagley
cases like
4-
place.
her in
first
That adds more
hearing as to what
any evidentiary
Without
why
expert,
help
needed the
reason
we
exactly happened
why,
the trial court’s
*70
then,
that,
this,
and
added
is
unravel
phraseology
and
as
decision in form
exact
hypnotized
inability to be
the witness’
by
provided:
filed
the State
what effect—how did that —how
and
¶
At L
Petition Amend-
Consolidated
trauma
might that
affected the
that
have
ed
asserts that the State’s fail-
it
experiencing,
was
would
have
she
hypnosis
ure to
denied
disclose
use
it,
made
heightened
would
have
her
him a
he
that
fair trial. At
asserts
11P
police
helping
about
more concerned
up
leading questions
used
cover
were
somebody, etc.
capture
he
hypnosis.
repeats
such
Under IW
of Issue
and because
And because
VII
of due
but
includes an invocation
11L
hypnosis
the failure to disclose the
process.
case,
affects Issue
aspect
that
Fact:
Findings of
XII,
with
XII
viewed
Issue
should be
provided
41. The State
the Court
light
mind. In
of the new
has
Issue VII in
personal
made on
with three affidavits
information that we
under Issue
Otto,
knowledge
Kay
oath
VII,
and under
if
an
discre-
there wasn’t
abuse
E. “Bill” Clax-
Cooper
James
and William
before,
certainly
XII
tion on Issue
there
Otto, Cooper and
now,
ton.
The affidavits
as a result Petitioner was
is
witness,
Kay Otto met with
Claxton
that
right
his
to call
reveal
a
witness
oming.
P.2d 1280
were
P.2d 103
believable,
for that
leading questions
cution’s
cross-examination
purported variances between
testimony
three
Kay Otto met with
enced
about
Yet, Kay
before
nary
liminary hearing
hypnotically
hypnotized.
Conclusions of
Bill
44. Petitioner’s claim
Hypnotically
43. Petitioner claims
trial were
hypnosis,
preliminary
Claxton,
testimony
hearing testimony
unobjected
her,
months earlier.
questions
December
Kay
who
reason
redirect of
Chapman
Otto met with
at the
that influence
preliminary
is
enhanced.
Otto’s
all
enhanced
alone
unconvincing..
hypnotist, but
varied
hearing testimony.
Law:
adequately explored
de
preliminary
as well as
And the
to at
Gee
and recross.
have been
minimis,
cover
Kay
testimony
inadmissible in
Bill Claxton on or
on March
hearing.
State,
from her
trial.
If
Bill Claxton
due to
testimony is
would
Otto
testimony
up
Claxton
hearing and
natural
more than
Kay
Kay
hypnotized
Wyo., 638
was
Wyo.,
The form
employed
appear
hypnosis.
answers,
was
18, 1982.
prelimi-
subject
prose-
Otto’s
Otto’s
never
influ-
long
Wy-
of a
pre-
not
pra,
trolled United
hypnotist is to be considered
States,
ment
S.Ct. 763
terial in the
ror is harmless. See
under Pote v.
plied
dented
I).
(a
tively only. See Lemieux v.
Ariz.,
hypnotist.
limited role
case
closed to the
notized
can take
149
provided
are
a
denied
is the direct We
now
claim of
That case
at trial.
available
prepare
necessary
access
the defense.
information
this case where
opposite of
Ritchie,
knowledge
Lacking
For
professional
facts,”
discharges
and
obli-
Haber
official
to “establish the trial
see
v.
(11th Cir.1985).
possibility
is
gations.
F.2d
That test
reasonable
Wainwright, 756
1520
People
facts
hearing
applied
materiality.
to determine
to define
The
to a
to be
67,
518,
Dugger,
Vilardi,
similarly recognized
v.
556
Stano
v.
76 N.Y.2d
N.Y.S.2d
(11th Cir.1990).
(1990).
F.2d
al
York
901
898
Stano
N.E.2d
New
915
leged prosecutorial suppression of collusion
the broad con-
court declined to abandon
resulting in
involving
a
attorney
his own
of the lesser
cept Brady-Agurs
favor
Brady
confession. A
issue was found
protection
Bagley
and stated:
*
* *
hearing.
a remand for
required
which
showing
agree
of a
that a
We
(10th
Saffle,
v.
F.2d
Coleman
the failure
possibility”
“reasonable
—
Cir.),
U.S.—,
cert. denied
exculpatory report con-
to disclose the
22,
(1990),
the court held
appro-
tributed to the verdict remains the
must be con
that withheld information
materiality,
priate
standard
measure
picture.
sidered in the context
the whole
prosecutor was made aware
where the
picture
Engberg in
Surely the whole
discovery
de-
specific
request
conjunction
hypnosis
cludes
with the
impor-
the material
fendant considered
* * *
questions
princi
cross-examination
tant
the defense.
pal
witness and the fact that
identification
Further,
backward-looking, outcome-
expert
denied his
witness on
defendant was
gives
oriented
of review that
standard
identification.
dispositive weight
strength
issues
not confined to
Brady-Bagley
are
People’s
clearly provides
case
diminished
Johnston,
the federal courts. See
prosecutor, in first re-
incentive for the
hypnosis
N.E.2d
also was a
case
898 which
discovery
thor-
sponding
requests,
a differ-
documentation about
involved
exculpatory
oughly
files
to review
place
homicide had
ent
where
actual
material,
of disclo-
or to err on the side
participant
occurred and a different
exculpatory
sure where
value is debata-
from
killer for information withheld
provid-
defense itself has
ble. Where the
in the tri-
accused. The court’s confidence
specific
partic-
its
ed
notice of
interest
al’s
had been
Pre-
outcome
undermined.
material, heightened
than
ular
rather
trial withheld information about misidenti-
appropri-
prosecutorial
lessened
care is
principal
fication
witness would also
ate.
require a
trial as a
of state
new
matter
law.
Vilardi,
523,
The trial court has broad discretion
I would reverse for retrial
Consequently,
relevancy issues
ing materiality
and
and
guilt
penalty.
well
ruling
upon
will
be reversed
abuse
its
Martin,
894;
P.2d
of discretion.
VI.
Homes,
Agency,
Wigwam
Inc.
Hursh
Inc.,
(Wyo.1983);
Dec.
the death
provides:
decision to reverse
some
further
belief that
penalty, I write
evidence”
evidence
“Relevant
means
subjects require address
having any tendency to
different
make
exist-
amplification.
consequence
that is of
some conclusion
ence
fact
“Modem”
un
Penalty in
Wyoming Supreme Court
A. The Death
dered
Hopkin
Wyoming Constitution
der the
America
cert. de
son v.
(Wyo.),
umbrella
cognitive
Defined within
nied
908, 104
in Gregg
Supreme Court
the United States
I. The volume
Furman, may not be
provence of
overwhelming38 with
literature
critical
question the
court
appellate
the state
action
litigative
justification
converse
the death
pragmatic wisdom
opinion as almost com
upon public
based
Greenberg,
society.
modern
so-called
our
democracy to this
pletely
in modern
limited
System, as a
Punishment
Yale
Capital
Repres
Expediting Death:
Levit,
nation.
Due
Furthermore,
sive Tolerance and Post-Conviction
under
L.J.
Cases,
Capital
Jurisprudence
Process
Constitution
States
United
Wil-
Bigel,
ren
59 UMKC L.Rev.
case,
previously
has
been
that decision
Cf.
Crimes,
(1987);
Creighton
Let-
L.Rev. 359
no
tal
has been
prior system
Furman]
But the outcome [of
win, Impeaching
Their Prior
With
than that of the
more successful
Defendants
Reconsidering
Dangerous Pro-
Convictions:
capital punishment. This failure has
People v.
pensities
Character Evidence
but rather from
from lack of effort
resulted
After
Bedau,
Castro,
(1985);
fashioning
acceptable
U.C. Davis L.Rev. 681
impossibility of
Penalty
Thinking
as a Cruel
administering capital punishment
the Death
method of
Punishment,
L.Rev. 873
rights
U.C. Davis
maintaining
system
Unusual
while
Smith,
Deathly Errors: Juror
&
Paduano
mandates.
our Constitution
*78
Imposi-
Concerning
the
Misperceptions
Parole in
Greenberg, supra,
B.
“pure” felony
homicide
mur
felony, while
Capital Punishment
der
penalty
only
reaches a death
Felony
felony
Rosen,
intent.
and not the
system,
justice
consti
American
Murder
Eighth
and the
Amendment Ju
capital
adapta
tuting
disparate
criminal
risprudence
Death, B.C.L.Rev.
tion,
paths
pen
to the death
there are two
(1990).
typical
alty.
first
is the
intent-driven
Note,
Should Courts
killing.
premeditated
Actually,
majority
reported
the vast
Principles
and Ex
Use
penalty
death
cases whether characterized
of Justification
Felony-Murder Liability?,
Impose
cuse to
felony
intentional,
murder or
the homi
(1988).
Rutgers
The second
L.J.
factually
cide
established
intentional.
Myers,
category
felony mur
Com. ex rel. Smith
dysfunctional
C
f.
kill is
der
the malice
intent
where
Pa.
American
not
&
The Model
criticism,
analysis
Code,
comment.
Agendas
Re
Multiple
without
and the
Commentaries,
(1988),
1
Penal
&
Rutgers
773,
Model
Code
19
783
form,
L.J.
(1980),
felony
providing
29
210.2 at
model
the authors believe that the
§
where
pen
constitute death
homicide should
very feature
code mens rea doctrine is “the
purposely,
if
alty
committed
know
murder
rule attrac
felony-murder
that makes
* *
recklessly under circumstances
ingly or
prosecutors
Elimination of
tive to
manifesting indifference to the value of
improves
requirement
prove intent
life;
Note,
A
human
Reasoned Moral
simplifies
proof for murder
homicide
Capital
Response: Rethinking Texas’s
People Land,
Ill.App.3d
status.
v.
169
Cf.
Sentencing
Lynaugh, 69
Penry v.
342,
955,
After
119 Ill.Dec.
N.E.2d 711
523
ques
Tex.L.Rev. 407
The further
(intent
underlying felony);
in the
and Jones
tion,
majority
as earlier
discussed
State,
(Ind.1988).
v.
159
sively
policy
virtually
only
documented the rule’s weak
remains
States thus
country
recognizing
still
a rule
This
has
justifications.
Article
demon-
western
possible “that the most
makes it
the rule’s infirmities have
strated that
might
to law
serious sanctions known
finally
constitutional
reached
stature.
imposed
homicide.”
for accidental
Sundby, supra,
&
70 Cornell L. Rev.
Roth
constitutional
That article examines two
at 492.43
concepts
challenging
Eighth
Amend
philosophy engendered
The confusion
presumptive
Process: a
de
ment
Due
relatively
few death cases of
(Sandstrom),
criminal conviction
vice
engi-
felony
where the
nature
(Enmund
liability
a form of criminal strict
felony
aggra-
and then
neers
murder
Florida,
782,
3368,
S.Ct.
73
v.
458 U.S.
102
status,
capital
pro-
to a
vates
offense
L.Ed.2d 1140
States v.
United
question
whether the homicide
vides
Co.,
422,
438
Gypsum
United States
U.S.
intentional, inopportune or accidental.
854,
2864,
98
57 L.Ed.2d
438
S.Ct.
aff'd
type normally
The
reflected
intended
422,
2864,
854
U.S.
98 S.Ct.
57 L.Ed.2d
is
homicide
evidenced
numerous cases.44
884,
(1978), cert. denied 444 U.S.
100 S.Ct.
persuasion
adopted
The same
was once
175,
(1979)),
clude the
except
thereafter
in Section
determination
[*]
[*****]
3: “This act is effective
immediately
upon
completion
necessary for a bill to
of all acts
(vii)
age
of the defendant at the
4,
provided by Article
Sec-
become law as
crime;
time of the
Wyoming
tion 8 of the
Constitution.”
(viii) Any other
or circum-
fact
171,
3
Wyo.Sess.Laws ch.
Conse-
§
character or
stance
the defendant’s
6, 1989,
quently,
approval March
surrounding
prior
matter
record or
passage.
I con-
effective
law became
mitigate
his
which serves
offense
present law determines
clude that the
culpability.
his
procedure
penalty assessment
future death
(1991
(1989
6-2-102
stat-
include a
retrial for
Cum.Supp.)
W.S.
which would
State,
ute).
P.2d 368
Engberg.47
v.
771
Jones
47. There are no ex
(1977)).
procedure
between
post
prohibitions
While the line
in-
facto
times,
Byrd
see
Blue
application
wavers at
vaded
substance
the current enactment
Const,
525,
I,
Cooperative,
Ridge
Wyo.
Rural Electric
356 U.S.
under either U.S.
art.
10 or
§
Const,
reh’g
U.S.
2 L.Ed.2d
denied 357
art.
35. This
S.Ct.
§
court has addressed
78
933,
(1958),
State,
in Loomer
those concerns
P.2d
1989).
(Wyo.
sentence
post
There
the new statute indicates the
we stated
review of
the ex
impose than under
prohibitions
procedur-
on the
is more difficult to
facto
turn
issue
of death
"
instance,
6-2-102.
the new
‘Any
detriment.
old W.S.
For
al or substantive
statute
* * *
juror
spells
con-
pun-
makes more
out
individual
burdensome the
statute
* * *
commission,
any mitigating
found
crime after its
circumstance
ishment for a
sider
Also,
post
juror
makes clear
prohibited
to exist.
the new statute
as ex
facto.”’
Id.
at 1049
Florida,
282, 292,
mitigating
is illus-
the list of
circumstances
(quoting Dobbert v.
432 U.S.
2290, 2298,
only.
reh’g
W.S. 6-2-102 inures to
trative
Because
S.Ct.
prohibí-
Engberg,
post
ex
facto
S.Ct.
the benefit of
U.S.
L.Ed.2d 166
State,
granted
part
cert.
Reynoldson
737 P.2d
(Wyo.1989);
judg
Miller
S.Ct.
(Wyo.1987);
Attletweedt,
684 P.2d ment rev’d
(Wyo.1987);
(1987). Demonstrating
L.Ed.2d 934
*86
jurisprudence,
of
in its
Cali
problems
dash
Weighing and Burden
Persua-
D.
fornia,
major
of
participants
one of the
sion
Now Ameliorated
Conflicts
litigation,
illustrat
present
penalty
death
Present Law
majority
dissenting opinions
ed
and
People
Lang,
991,
v.
49
264 Cal.
Cal.3d
shifting
assessing the
The
standards
for
de
cert.
(1989),
Rptr. 386,
P.2d 627
782
penalty
jurispru
American
death
modern
—
nied
—,
224,
111
112
U.S.
S.Ct.
explained by
dence can be
the deviousness
(1990)
compared
L.Ed.2d
when
178
philosophic
great
of
differences within
published
the same
unanimous
decision
of
case
and the narrowness
volumes
Hunter,
of People
957,
v.
date
49 Cal.3d
precepts by is determined that
cert.
367,
(1989),
782
Cal.Rptr.
264
P.2d 608
By
is or is
executed.
defendant
not
—
denied
—,
222,
111
112
U.S.
S.Ct.
statutory changes,
Wyoming
current
there
v. De
See also State
(1990).
L.Ed.2d 190
problems
removed
have been contentious
boue,
de
cert.
(La.1989),
Only a brief mention will now be made of
Death
Penalty
Other
Issues
those issues to avoid further extension of
E.
overlong writing.
presently
this
Engberg’s
some deference to
212-
With
brief,
major
The constitutionality
some
and not so minor
under
page
post-
concept
unanimity
penalty issues
case law of the
death
remain
ing
predecessor
Bird
with the succes-
court
court,
(1987);
Biegenwald, 110 N.J.
Lucas
State v.
sor
Professor Uelmen stated:
Biegenwald,
126 N.J.
A.2d
that,
emerge
The thesis that will
at least
A.2d
reviewing
penalty judgments,
very
death
two
Clark, 108 N.M.
New Mexico: State v.
appellate
different models of
function are
U.S.
cert. denied 493
work.
reh'g
approaches the
The Lucas court
review
overruled
L.Ed.2d 551
very
like
death
cases
much
interme-
*88
655,
Henderson, 109
789
sub nom. State v.
N.M.
appellate
approach
courts
the review of
diate
ordinary
(1990).
603
P.2d
process closely
criminal cases. The
278,
Artis,
N.C.
North Carolina: State v.
325
process
in
matches the
described
a classic
(1989),
granted
S.E.2d
cert.
and vacated
384
470
study
appeals
of
in the
criminal
California
1466,
1023,
U.S.
110
108
604
494
S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
Appeal
Appellate
Court of
for the First
District
1,
(1990);
Huff,
381
635
State v.
325 N.C.
S.E.2d
operated in the
"The court
as it
mid-1970s:
— U.S.—,
(1989),
granted and vacated
cert.
approaches
perspective
its work from a
that
3266,
(1990).
S.Ct.
111
777
110
L.Ed.2d
noninterventionist, nonsupervisory, and con-
206,
Dickerson,
Ohio
Ohio: State v.
45
St.3d
avoiding.
process
Its
flict
decision
accentu-
1250,
706,
reh’g denied 46 Ohio St.3d
543 N.E.2d
strongly
finality
in-
ates the value of
and
—
(1989), cert.
U.S.
mandatory weighing
pure
in
McKoy,
Evi-
Comment,
generally
prior
tation. statute.
particularity
McCormick,
1227;
Death,
(1990).
Smith v.
914
dence for
110 S.Ct.
Calif.L.Rev.
Smith,
(9th Cir.1990);
State v.
F.2d
VII.
(1991);
400 S.E.2d
State
328 N.C.
Jones,
(1990);
N.C.
396 S.E.2d
CONCLUSION
Landrum,
107, 559
St.3d
State
53 Ohio
the death
serious nature of
Given
reh’g
denied Ohio St.3d
N.E.2d
heightened reliability
most
penalty and
—
cert. denied
U.S.
N.E.2d 945
consistently required in death
courts have
—,
111 S.Ct.
Davis,
sentencing procedures, People v.
Stevens,
311 Or.
cert. de
(Colo.1990),
P.2d
—
Dugger,
(1991).
Parker v.
P.2d 92
Cf.
—
-,
nied
U.S.
111 S.Ct.
—,
S.Ct.
(1991), Lohr, J., dissenting,
I
L.Ed.2d 656
in n.
See also the cases cited
significant
guilt
find
error
both
would
supra The Lockett Paradox:
Sundby,
“sufficiently
penalty assessment
which
Reconciling
Discretion and Un
Guided
certainty
undermines
fairness and
Sentencing,
Mitigation
Capital
guided
case to
the death sentence returned
L.Rev. 1147
38 UCLA
re
require
Although
reversal.”
I would
Improper
mitigation
instruction of
guilt
the clear
the conviction of
verse
light
aggravation
were
defined
this record and
trial errors
within
relating
specifically
given
conflict as
regard,
dissent
I concur
reversal
persuasion. McKoy,
the burden
agree that
of the death
1227; Mills,
for another trial
case should
remanded
*89
Landrum,
1860;
Com
“Because W.S.
relating
retrial
the sen
issue
instructions
govern
will
of the
Supp.)
case,
need not
phase
this
we
has
tencing
mitigating circumstances
been be
extend the Mills deci
State,
decide whether to
court, Hopkinson
fore this
v.
man
Engberg in a retroactive
sion to
(Wyo.1983),
664
P.2d 43
cert.
—
Smith,
U.S.
Sawyer
ner. See
78
104 S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
U.S.
—,
Dis
and the United States
Lane,
288, 109
(1990);
Teague
Court, Hopkinson
Shillinger,
trict
1060,
subject unwilling to take us write, senting. seriously?” Jones v. how judicial can we (Wyo.1990), expect others to revision. seriously Cardine, J., State, 798 P.2d If we what take dis- are we or will ever walk on the face of this earth ly our focus “ * * * itself. [*] To arrive ought Every [*] to be on the person [*] a rational who ever walked [*] death [*] decision, penal [*] unique. There will be another is never sentence in this respect to the death With person. precious. that Life It is a thing like case, very that was we done have .the unique that gift that is so and wonderful vigorously protested Jones. so cheapen it by no mortal man should tak Furthermore, majority has reached ing it from another. It has been said way particularly result in a that that begets killing. The killing more we applying settled troublesome. Instead of kill, the more conditioned we become doctrine, in the case either law same under killing are so conditioned that no until we decisis, majority judicata res or stare Someday anymore. every one cares adopted judges has a rule selected recognize punish will court our land places other who have no commitment unusual, by killing as ment cruel and but serving people Wyoming the State today prepared accept we are not what one preferred has that rule over the someday pass.” Hopkin will come to adopted by Wyoming justices on previously 1192, Cardine, son, 798 P.2d at despite This is the fact this Court. done added). J., dissenting (emphasis that the decision the Court was scruti- Supreme Court nized the United States they are had These noble words. Would error under the Constitution vic- uttered to memorialize torture been subjected United States then tim, literally apart, an family blown have then is an federal review. What we robbery of an armed rather innocent victim adaptation of a rule under another state convicted, cold-blooded support of than constitution, dif- adopted by judges in the lose fact court should not killers. The state, imported has ferent been to be Rogers, Eng- killed Vernon that when he Wyoming Is substituted for solid law. berg escapee from Missouri protest question there that I must minimum secur- Department of Corrections by dissenting majority opin- result serving facility, he life ity where validity of the death sentence? ion on the degree murder in first sentence for justification ma- Perhaps real for the killing night watchman after fol- position captured in the jority best robbery. I an armed sub- connection with lowing: justify words do not mit noble and, seizing upon here instead of directly faced the awe- result
“Few of us *92 jurisdictions, other the justification fellow from deciding whether a some task control, hence, should, judicata of res should and the being days three rule human I re- capital imme- sentence should affirmed. I face that be by killed execution. be time, opin- decision, majority of the gret as that the drafter alone for the first diate sentencing phase by the feels that there sobering experiences ion on of life’s another personal in unfair and criticism out about who we has been find more which we do, indeed, death, dissenting opinion. I en- life feel this are and how we about feelings others, my power, relationships jus- deavor be attentive our hand, on court. the other tice, legislative the On law. The branch brothers and the in candor is es- the are situations which policy that there has decided as a matter as well as what we those tention to what we do as one of perceive I sential. say. situations. acceptance reflection demands the drafter Mature justification for is no There instances, that, many ac- proposition accept criticism majority opinion speak voluminously and more opinion is tions more majority A personal.
as used and, eloquently than words that can be when collegiate court product of a Consequently, opted I other them. by the describe consideration circulated least, Hopkin- court, or, complete quotation when omit the members of the last sentence son because the next to filed, longer any proprietary retains no light ring a hollow seems to me to have the drafter is concerned. aspect so far as upon the impact is of the of this decision product that an institutional It becomes penalty Wyoming. Lip is death service to opinion only by the court. The owned death constitutionality no the of the that has product of an institution meaning long has so as this court will corporate iden- no instead is a personality, but justifica- identity reach and to find technical stretch Certainly, this institutional tity. avoiding implementation. tion in serv- its the difficulties encompasses one of view, stretching my reaching and is collegiate that court. ing appellate on an and, that the present here to the extent committee deci- effort to articulate a case, it Hopkinson court acceptable to all now redecides way that sion there. is difficult and of the committee members stressful. proposi- I add to has said the what been mem- that it is clear that at least one omitted tion
Turning then to the reference to has read majority of the court’s now Hopkinson ber from the dissent material dissenting opinion. There can be no material reads: full text of that revisiting Hopkinson question that the directly the awe of us faced “Few have way is indeed to decide it in different deciding whether a fellow some task of I would like intentional and not accidental. hence, should, days being three human abrogation of the solution to the to offer a by I face that imme killed execution. but, Wyoming sentencing statute capital decision, time, the first alone for diate you have the saying goes, “When as the sobering experiences by of life’s another votes; votes, majority have the vote!” find out more about who we which we voted; capital punishment is they death, feel life and are and how we about Wyoming. That State of in the abolished others, power, jus relationships with our law, by in- required but result is not tice, legislative and the law. The branch policy, choice of reached as a stead it is policy that the has decided as a matter contrary to the one chosen policy that degree murder penalty for first legislature. Wyoming should be death. Stat State of specifying death been enacted utes have capital of the sentence An affirmance I injection punishment. am by lethal reasoning by proper justified clearly be can this is an unwise convinced now situations, Eng- In most authority. that, at this policy. I am convinced also issue, impropriety of sixteenth berg’s are history, in our these statutes time aggravating circumstances invoking as and, therefore, I the law. constitutional Engberg for murder commission obey support, an oath to have taken engaged in gain and while pecuniary and will honor defend the constitution relying robbery, after on commission So, Hopkin to the law.” oath. degree the first mur- robbery to invoke son, 798 P.2d at statute, controlled would be der concept of and the judicata of res the full text when this I aware of doctrine argument his sen- Engberg’s initially. I dissenting opinion prepared waiver. *93 in a manner which that, determined becoming attuned to aware tence also am Amend- line,” Eighth and Fourteenth colloquially call the “bottom violates what we of the United indeed, the Constitution pay at- ments to society, in our the citizens
171
(5th Cir.1986),
cert. denied 481
argument
is a combination of an
672
States
U.S.
1042,
1985,
825,
reh’g
appeal,
107 S.Ct.
95 L.Ed.2d
by
this court on his direct
rejected
denied
1012,
3245,
483
U.S.
107 S.Ct.
97
he
together with an issue which
did not
(1987).
addition,
L.Ed.2d 750
several
raise,
was addressed
a dis-
but which
highest
decisions in the
courts of the
Engberg,
senting justice
L.Ed.2d 158
criminality
petition-
from
remove the
the
P.2d 79.
“ * * *
But, as
er’s acts.
was said Gardner
jury’s
impose
discretion to
[A]
349, 358,
1197,
Florida, 430 U.S.
97 S.Ct.
‘suitably
must
di-
sentence
be
the death
1204,
[(1977)],
393
it ‘is of
51 L.Ed.2d
minimize
limited so as to
the
rected and
the
to
importance
vital
defendant and
wholly, arbitrary
capricious
risk of
v,
im-
community that
decision to
the
153,
Georgia, 428 U.S.
action.’ Gregg
be,
pose
appear
sentence
the death
2909, 2932,
S.Ct.
49 L.Ed.2d
[96
859]
be,
reason, rather than ca-
on
based
Stewart,
opinion
(joint
of
Powell
* *
price or emotion.’
Stevens, JJ.);
Booth,
502,
“That
There is no
U.S.
at 2532.
cannot be said here.
at
S.Ct.
case, in
principled way
distinguish
this
provisions
of the Constitution
penalty
imposed,
which
death
prohibit a
from
United
do not
state
States
many
it was
cases
which
punishment on
individ-
imposing capital
an
420,
Godfrey Georgia,
not.”
446 U.S.
single ag-
of
on the basis
ual defendant
1759,
432-33, 100 S.Ct.
the conviction petition for a writ in 1984. A by this court Supreme was denied of certiorari capi- While the United States. Court appli- affirmed under tal sentence was rules, it now is set aside because cable place decid- interim someone in another is the modify Wyoming’s rules. How ed to understand, degree prosecutor confidence, capital sen- that if another will somewhere imposed, tence is someone change the rules while the not decide to subject review? new sentence effort be frustrated prosecutive would *98 For me it is doubtful it is now. again, as capital sen- again will face tence, philosophy of and the humanitarian majority be vindicated. will the conviction of
I affirm both would imposition degree murder and first sentence to death. death the sentence at in lawful and rational arrived manner, affirmed. it should be Bostwick, Helling Murane
Steven R. & Casper, appellant. for Mullikin, Larson R. Michael Mullikin of Jackson, Swift, appellee. & THOMAS, C.J., URBIGKIT, Before BERGER, Plumbing, Statt’s Statt d/b/a GOLDEN, CARDINE, JJ. MACY and (Defendant/Cross- Appellant Claimant), OPINION MACY, Justice. INCORPORATED,
TETON SHADOWS Wyoming corporation, Appellee Berger appeals from the Appellant Statt (Defendant/Cross-Claimant). awarding dam- judgment court’s district Incorpo- Appellee ages Teton Shadows No. 90-31. resulting from a fire a condomin- rated Supreme Wyoming. Court of project County. Berger in Teton ium stipulated that Teton Shad- Teton Shadows 5, 1991. Nov. $120,000. At the damages totaled ows’ trial, two-day conclusion of a bench found, alia, Ber- district court inter fire, and it ger’s negligence caused of Teton Shad- granted judgment favor $120,000.1 Berger does full ows Com- Mutual Insurance company, tain West Farm Bureau Moun- Teton Shadows’ insurance
