Case Information
*1 Before W OOD Chief Judge , W ILLIAMS H AMILTON , Circuit Judges .
W OOD Chief Judge
Deals stuff legislating. Al though logrolling appear unseemly some time, not, itself, illegal. Bribes are. This case requires us once again decide whether some shenanigans Illinois *2 General Assembly and governor’s office crossed the line the merely unseemly the unlawful. It involves a sub ject we have visited in the past: two industries that compete for gambling dollars. Empress Casino Joliet Corp. Bal moral Racing Club, Inc. F.3d (7th Cir. 2011) (en banc). In and 2008, former Rod signed into law two bills (to we refer and Acts) imposed a tax on certain in state casinos 3% revenue and placed funds into a trust for benefit horseracing industry. Smelling rat, plaintiff casinos brought suit federal Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO), U.S.C. § alleging defendants, all members horseracing industry, bribed governor ensure bills were enact ed. Viewing in light most favorable plaintiffs (and course vouching for anything), we con clude there was enough survive summary judgment on claim agreed sign in exchange for bribe. We therefore reverse part re mand further proceedings on part case.
Illinois legalized riverboat casino gambling Ever since, state’s once thriving horseracing industry has been decline. late early General As sembly considered legislation help horseracers. One bill imposed 3% tax on casinos earning more than $50 million annually deposited proceeds fund benefit horseracing industry. It mod eled similar initiatives three other states. Lobbying all sides intense. On first few votes General Assembly, bill failed garner majority. *3 ‐ bill’s fortunes changed later in spring 2006. For
one thing, it modified so tax applied to ca ‐ sinos earning more than $200 million annually, thereby limit ‐ ing its effect large casinos in northern Illinois near Chicago. For another, Governor Blagojevich began take interest in matter after his senior aide and pay ‐ ‐ play facilitator, Christopher Kelly, met with horseracing executive, John Johnston. On floor General As ‐ sembly, bill’s opponents cried foul. “Why some you called down Governor’s office, then you come back up change your vote?” asked Representative Wil ‐ liam Black. Added Representative Brent Hassert, “The Gov ‐ ernor has weighed [the bill] … heavily in last night so, calling people asking people vote this. It my understanding there’s promises been made support bill.” Soon after, cleared House vote 32; week later, Senate passed Blagojevich signed bill law next day. Johnston other racing executives thanked gov ‐ ernor his support bill personal letter. Using various subsidiaries, they then contributed $125,000 his campaign fund. contained two year sunset provision. In ear
ly General Assembly began consider its renewal. Meanwhile, horseracing executive Johnston met with Gov ernor chief staff Alonzo Monk. Blago jevich gave no indication whether he support re newed bill, telling Johnston, “Appreciate your support past, hope you can continue support me future.” fall, bill stalled General Assembly, Blago jevich called Johnston solicit campaign donations. John ston pledged give $100,000, he send mon *4 ey. Over the next few months, Monk repeatedly needled Johnston about following through pledge. In one con versation recorded by federal authorities, Johnston told Monk: “Look, tell big guy [Blagojevich] I’m good it. I’m just figuring out accounts pull checks from.”
In November, General Assembly voted renew Racing Act a vote 28; Senate likewise did so by a vote Representative Robert Molaro, sponsor original Racing Act legislation, testified later that Governor Blagojevich played no role in passage ’08 Act. But contrast his immediate signing Act, gov ernor initially nothing Johnston com plained Monk recorded conversation gover nor’s delay signing bill was costing him $9,000 per day. “This getting goofier,” Johnston told colleague email, “We going have put stronger bit his mouth!?!” In another recorded conversation, Monk told governor Johnston was breathing down neck about bill. governor replied bill would signed, “timing issue.” Possibly alluding Johnston’s $100,000 commitment, governor explained he “like some separation between signing bill.”
By December, Johnston still had ponied up $100,000 still signed into law. recorded conversations, Monk strategized about “how [Monk] [could] approach John Johnston get donation one hundred thousand dol lars.” Monk made clear Johnston desperate Racing renewal signed law. He told gover nor: “Look, want go [Johnston] without crossing *5 line say, give us fuckin’ money … give us money one has nothing do with other. … But give us fuckin’ money, because they’re losing 9,000 day for eve ry day it’s signed.” Monk then met with Johnston de liver message, he later recalled it, “once [Johnston] made contribution, act would be signed.” Johnston asked Monk: “Do you want me make some pay ment now some payment after beginning year?” Asked whether Johnston ever directly promised deliver money, Monk later testified: “I think he me.” After meeting, Monk called governor report Johnston soon pay up.
A few days later, federal authorities arrested Blagojevich. Despite arrest, Blagojevich later signed law. charging documents against Blagojevich had linked signage commitment donate $100,000 discussions an un named representative horseracing industry. Regarding charge, Johnston admitted, “I didn’t know if anybody else given $100,000, knew I did.” (Despite statement, Johnston never actually delivered money.) Johnston signed an immunity agreement represented he “may information relevant [Blagojevich] investigation” acknowledged “that such information tend incriminate [himself].” Later, investigative report General Assembly found trad ed action campaign contributions, including “Race Horse Executive 1,” later revealed Johnston, exchange enactment appellants here Empress Casino Joliet Corpora tion, Des Plaines Development Limited Partnership, Holly *6 6 13 ‐ 2972 wood Casino Aurora, Inc., and Elgin Riverboat Resort Riverboat Casino (the Casinos). They all Illinois casinos taxed under ’06 and ‘08 Acts. Their first move challenge validity Acts state court. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected challenge ’06 under state and federal constitutions. Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Giannoulias , 896 N.E.2d 277 (Ill. 2008), cert. denied 556 1281 ( Empress ). Illinois courts later rejected a similar challenge Act. Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Gian noulias , N.E.2d (Ill. App. Ct. 2011), app. denied 949 N.E.2d (Ill. 2011) ( Empress II ). appellees here— horseracing tracks and executives that benefitted from ‘08 Acts (the Racetracks)—intervened and participat ed both state actions. then filed a federal RICO suit against
Racetracks former Blagojevich seeking dam ages constructive trust over tax money received Racetracks ‘08 Acts. A panel court held that legislative immunity barred suit against Blagojevich Tax Injunction permitted constructive trust. Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. , F.3d (7th Cir. 2011) ( Empress III ). Sitting en banc we rejected position panel had taken regard Tax Injunction Empress Casino Joliet Corp. Balmoral Racing Club F.3d ( Empress IV ). On remand, dis trict court granted summary judgment Racetracks Casinos’ claims conspiracy exchange campaign contributions action violation RICO, U.S.C. § 1962(d). district court found fered reasonable jury could find there pattern racketeering activity. It found jury could find enterprise fact, consisting *7 Blagojevich, his associates, various other par ticipants, existed. The court concluded there was suffi cient evidence support jury finding the defendants bribed secure signature on ‘08 Act, assumed, without deciding, sufficiency of relating ‘06 court went on determine Casinos could not show bribes proxi mately caused their injury. element lost therefore proximate cause. Casinos ap pealed this court.
II
We begin Racetracks’ argument results of two prior state actions foreclose Casinos’ claims under claim preclusion branch of res judicata We apply same preclusive effect state court judgment state court itself apply. U.S.C. § 1738; see Marrese v. Amer. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons (1985).
Under Illinois law, “[f]or doctrine res judicata apply, following three requirements must satisfied: (1) there final judgment merits rendered court competent jurisdiction; (2) there is an identity cause action; there identity parties privies.” River Park, Inc. City Highland Park, N.E.2d (Ill. 1998).
Res judicata does bar Casinos’ claims here because second element met: action does present same claim transactional test Illinois adopted River Park id. first action, asked court “to determine constitutionality [the Act],” Illinois Supreme Court held “[the Act] *8 withst[ood] the constitutional challenges raised” the state and federal constitutions. Empress , N.E.2d at 282. second state action, Casinos “challeng[ed] the con ‐ stitutionality [the ’08 Act],” and Illinois courts upheld new law. Empress II , N.E.2d at 786, Indeed, first time we been asked consider res judi ‐ cata effects earlier litigation. We concluded before “the claims two [state] suits are materially differ ‐ ent” than those involved here, see Empress III F.3d at and we adhere assessment. (This conclusion makes unnecessary for us decide whether cases volve same parties.) two state actions were facial challenges validity Racing Acts. Neither action considered question issue here: whether Racetracks are liable Casinos bribing sign ‘08 Acts.
III circumstances surrounding enactment two
Acts differ significantly, so we analyze them separately. We conclude failed present sufficient evi dence respect allegations about another matter. For it, presented suffi cient proximate cause withstand summary judgment. As we noted earlier, we naturally are vouch ing any facts we rely here; instead, re quired, we reviewing district court’s grant sum mary judgment de novo viewing all facts reasonable inferences light most favorable nonmoving par ty. Shaffer Amer. Med. Ass’n F.3d (7th Cir. 2011). *9 9 13 2972 Act. —We begin allegation Race
tracks bribed Governor Blagojevich push ‘06 through state legislature. Even if a RICO suit could based such allegation (a questionable proposition), presented sufficient permit a trier of fact find caused leg islature pass
RICO’s private civil remedy provision states: Any person injured his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter sue therefor … shall recover threefold damages he sustains cost suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Prohibited activities under RICO include “conduct [an] enterprise’s affairs through pattern racketeering activity,” U.S.C. § 1962(c), as well as con spiracy do same, id. § 1962(d). To claim provision, plaintiff must allege “an injury [his] business or property result[ed] from underlying acts racketeering.” Haroco, Inc. v. Amer. Nat’l B&T Co. Chi. , F.2d 384, (7th Cir. 1984). Under RICO, plain tiff “can recover extent [] he has been injured business property conduct constituting violation.” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc. , U.S. 479, (1985). Bribery government officials one offense can serve predicate RICO violation. U.S.C. § 1961(1); see Salinas v. United States U.S. 62–66 (1997).
RICO borrows doctrine proximate cause anti trust law. Holmes Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. 267–68 *10 10 13 2972 (1992). both antitrust and RICO contexts, “the focus directness relationship between [defend ant’s alleged] conduct harm.” Hemi Grp., LLC v. City New York, N.Y. , U.S. 1, (2010); see Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. , U.S. (“[T]he central question [to] ask whether alleged violation led directly to plaintiff’s injuries.”); Holmes , U.S. (RICO re quires “some direct relation between injury asserted injurious conduct alleged”). As Supreme Court has explained:
‘[P]roximate cause’ [serves] label generically judicial tools used limit person’s re sponsibility for consequences per son’s own acts, with particular emphasis demand some direct relation between injury asserted injurious conduct alleged. direct relation requirement avoids difficulties associated attempting ascertain amount plaintiff’s damages attributable violation, distinct other, independent factors Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co. (2008). Casinos have pointed evidence al low factfinder conclude Racetracks’ bribery scheme caused legislature pass To begin with, make no allegation no evi dence Racetracks ever bribed attempted bribe state legislators. Nor do point agreed exert improper influence over legislators order win support ex change bribe. McCutcheon Fed. Election Comm’n *11 11 S. Ct. (“[W]hile preventing corruption or its appearance is legitimate objective, Congress tar ‐ get specific type of corruption—’ quid pro quo ’ corrup tion.”). fact, every legislator who was deposed testified that governor had attempted induce his vote on
A careful look record reveals that Casinos’ suggestion that governor threatened withhold funding various legislators’ districts unsubstantiated, but extent this was more simple logrolling, it falls short evi dence that could support RICO claim. refer us several exhibits purportedly show “Blagojevich or staff link[ed] changed votes on [‘06] capital expenditures like highway spending representatives’ districts.” But this an exaggeration record. Repre sentative Phelps, example, when asked whether it was possible called him discuss 3% fee, claimed remember. At same time, when asked if possible topic came up he just recall, he answered “no” said he remembered something like that. Representative D’Amico flatly denied raised issue 3% fee phone call about different bill. Representa tive Giles’s testimony same. Other exhibits refer enced contain nothing inadmissible hear say point. Ex. (declaration Maddox); Ex. (email from Maddox) (“Brandon Phelps said …”); Ex. (email from Satz based reports he heard); Ex. (emails from James Morphew) (“Hassert told me morning “). Finally, admissible email one defendants says nothing about governor’s linkage high way spending any other improper exertion influence. *12 ‐ See Ex. (email Tim Carey, president Hawthorne Race Course) (“[T]he fact Gov was working phones us was great sign this could make it his desk.”). fact bill failed garner majority on
first few votes does not suffice raise genuine issue material fact. See Anderson Liberty Lobby, Inc. 250–52 (1986). Numerous reasons, including change bill restricting its application highest ‐ earning casi nos or just usual give ‐ ‐ take legislative lawmaking, might explain change outcome. point statements floor
General Assembly various media reports, these statements not admissible prove matters asserted therein. See F ED . R. E VID . 801(c), 802. Even if they were ad missible, they show very little; fact met with unnamed legislators during months ‐ long period when bill was consideration does show any thing untoward. We do know legislators met governor, nor what was discussed. worst comment identify is Rep. Hassert’s obviously inadmissible statement “understanding [that] promises [were] made support bill.” Not comment out court statement offered prove truth matter asserted; underlying sentiment based personal knowledge. F ED R. E VID . Worse, we no idea what promises he talking about. If promise referred support re election, commitment co sponsor bill, without any taint bribery, nothing wrong.
No. We accept present purposes that, an appropriate case, a “finding that bribery of a [government official] prox imately caused plaintiff’s injury can [] rest on evidence of that individual’s influence over proceedings.” Bieter Co. v. Blomquist F.2d (8th Cir. 1993). But that prin ciple does apply Act. record contains no admissible evidence that unduly pres sured members of legislature support Nor is there competent evidence that would permit an inference any identifiable group of legislators “voted as bloc” at governor’s behest. No legislator bribed. It takes more than have shown here support proposed conclusion workings of entire state leg islature were coopted by bribery of one official. work of state legislatures lies heart of “Re publican Form Government” Constitution man dates. U.S. C ONST art. IV, § 4; see T HE F EDERALIST (James Madison) (“In republican government, legislative authority necessarily predominates.”). evidence extraordinary conclude one corrupt offi cial, whether governor anyone else, hijacked this foundational institution sovereignty. And even if evidence were strong, cure lie civil litigation courts. Fletcher Peck (“[A] court, sitting as court law, cannot sustain suit brought one individual against another founded allegation act nullity, consequence impure motives influenced certain members legislature which passed law.”). We do need explore outer boundaries Fletcher holding here, because record devoid admissible exerted undue influence legislators they considered *14 Act. The Casinos’ case must fail insofar as it rests that epi sode.
Evidence similarly lacking support a finding that Racetracks bribed Governor Blagojevich sign ’06 Act law. The point meeting between Johnston Blagojevich’s aide Chris Kelly in while Act stalled in legislature. But they provide no evidence that Johnston offered Kelly bribe exchange for Blagojevich’s signature during meeting. letter from Racetracks after ’06 Act passed merely thanked him for support; suggest Blago jevich agreed sign bill exchange for bribe. fact Racetracks later made campaign contributions cannot, without more, support liability acts political corruption. To hold illegal official’s support legislation furthering interests some constituents shortly before or after campaign contributions are solicited received “would open prosecution conduct has long been thought well within law conduct very real sense unavoidable so long as election cam paigns are financed private contributions expendi tures, they been beginning Nation.” McCormick United States
Because evidence presented opposition summary judgment with respect ’06 permit trier fact rule favor, district court properly granted summary judgment Racetracks these claims. —The circumstances surrounding another matter. As Act, record contains
little show Governor’s influence caused *15 legislature to pass ’08 But that not all that alleged. They asserted that Racetracks and agreed to quid pro quo : in exchange governor’s signature Act, Racetracks promised to give $100,000 to his campaign fund. summary judgment record contains considerable ev
idence that, if credited, would support allegation quid pro quo between Racetracks and Blago jevich. When Blagojevich immediately sign law, Racetracks executive Johnston stated to col league in an email: “We going put stronger bit his mouth!?!” Johnston complained Blagojevich’s chief staff Monk that delays signing bill were costing Johnston $9,000 per day. A factfinder could conclude that Blagojevich talking about Johnston’s commitment pay $100,000 when he informed Monk that he would “like some separation between signing bill.” After FBI recorded Monk Blagojevich scheming about getting Johnston pay, Monk met with Johnston and, according Monk, delivered message bill would signed until he paid. According Monk, Johnston coun tered with an offer pay half money once half later. Monk called Blagojevich immediately after meeting Johnston report belief Johnston soon pay. After learning criminal allegation threatened sign bill unless he paid $100,000 someone horseracing industry, Johnston admitted, “I didn’t know if anybody else had given 100,000, knew I did.” Finally, Johnston signed immunity agreement he acknowledged he infor mation “may tend incriminate” him. From other record, reasonable juror could con *16 ‐ clude that the Racetracks agreed pay $100,000 Blago ‐ jevich’s campaign fund return for his signature the ’08
Blagojevich’s signature the bill caused the Act become law. Under Illinois law, bills passed by the General Assembly must be presented the governor within days. I LL . C ONST ., art. IV, § 9(a). “If the Governor approves the bill, he shall sign it and it shall become law.” Id. “If the does not approve the bill, he shall veto it by returning it with objections house it originated.” Id. § 9(b). If factfinder believes supporting Casi nos’ allegations, it could conclude bill was presented governor he signed exchange lucrative campaign contribution. Unlike allegation Race tracks bribed persuade member leg islature enact bill, became law direct result agreement trade money one per son’s action—the governor’s signature. A jury could find causal chain between Racetracks’ bribe gov ernor’s signing bill broken by any intervening acts third parties. Cf. Hemi Group at (“[T]he City’s harm directly caused by customers, Hemi.”); id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (taking issue majority’s suggestion “the intervening voluntary acts third parties cut[] causal chain”). Only gov ernor authority sign bill law, he so.
It does matter passed legislature veto proof majorities. LL C ONST ., art. IV, § 9(c). It cannot assumed veto proof majority will hold face executive veto. See, e.g. McGrath, Rogowski, & Ryan, Gubernatorial Veto Powers Size Legislative Coa *17 ‐ litions (Dec. 11, 2013) (S. Pol. Sci. Ass’n), https://pages.wustl.edu/files/pages/imce/rogowski/mrr ‐ coalitions ‐ nov13.pdf (demonstrating how threat a veto affects legislative coalitions and influences policymaking); Steven Dennis & Emma Dumain, R OLL C ALL , “The House Democrats Who Defied Obama’s Veto Threat,” (Nov. 15, 2013), http://blogs.rollcall.com/218/the ‐ ‐ house ‐ democrats who ‐ defied ‐ obamas ‐ veto ‐ threat/ (last visited August 2014). Many legislators, especially those governor’s party, may hesitate override veto even if they originally voted bill. That ‘08 cleared General As sembly by veto proof majority does erase signifi cance governor’s signature. If it did, it would be un necessary obtain governor’s signature bill passed by veto proof majorities.
Nor does it matter bill become law even if Governor neither signed nor vetoed it. See LL C ONST ., art. IV, § 9(b) (“Any bill so returned by within calendar days after it presented him shall become law.”). RICO claims sound tort. Beck Prupis U.S. 501–06 (2000) (discussing historical relationship between tort RICO claims and explaining “Congress meant incorporate common law principles when adopted RICO”); Anza 466–67 (Thomas, J., concurring part dissenting part) (applying cau sation damages principles R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND ) OF T ORTS analysis RICO claims). bribery here intentional tort. Like an arsonist who burns down cabin day before natural forest fire, Racetracks “jointly severally liable any indi visible injury legally caused [their] tortious conduct,” re *18 ‐ gardless of innocent alternative causes. R ESTATEMENT (T HIRD ) OF T ORTS : A PPORTIONMENT L IABILITY § (2000).
That brings us to the heart of the matter: Was the Race ‐ tracks’ alleged agreement bribe sign the sufficiently immediate serve legal cause of Casinos’ injuries purposes of RICO? The focus of quiry directness of injury resulting from de fendants’ conduct. The Supreme Court has spoken RICO’s proximate cause requirement several occasions, so we begin look at its guidance. Anza , plaintiff alleged defendant, its busi
ness competitor, defrauded State of New York by failing charge certain sales taxes. U.S. at 454–55. As result, defendant was able offer lower prices than plain tiff; those prices foreseeable effect of hurting plaintiff’s business. The Court held, however, “direct victim of [the defendant’s] conduct [was] State of New York,” plaintiff. Id. at The cause of plaintiff’s harm “a set actions (offering lower prices) entirely distinct from RICO violation (defrauding State).” Id. The plaintiff’s theory Anza failed because re quired multi step analysis: defendants’ payment taxes, reduced prices, plaintiff’s loss sales. defendants’ misconduct—underpayment taxes—did by itself harm plaintiffs. That fact, light “the general tendency law, regard damages …, go beyond first step,” Hemi Grp. U.S. quoting S. Pac. Co. Darnell Taenzer Lumber Co. (Holmes, J.), doomed plaintiff’s case. case before us, contrast, exemplifies direct effect. object conspiracy bring effect ex *19 change for cash bribe; harmed the tune of 3% of their revenue. thus sat cen ‐ ter of target of conspiracy.
Hemi Group offers another example an effect too indirect. There, plaintiff City defendant fraudulently avoided filing certain tax reports State regarding cigarette sales. U.S. at 4. City used re ports assess back sales taxes against cigarette buyers, so defendant’s fraud against State ultimately allowed some buyers avoid paying taxes they owed City. “[T]he conduct directly responsible City’s harm was customer’s failure pay taxes,” defendant’s failure file reports. Id. at 11. Thus, Anza “the conduct directly causing harm distinct conduct giv ing rise fraud.” Id. Both Anza Hemi Group stand same general proposition: persons injured di rectly defendant’s misconduct may recover under RICO.
Until Supreme Court’s decision Lexmark Interna tional, Inc. Static Control Components, Inc., S. Ct. (2014), parties usually discussed kind limitation un der rubric statutory standing. Lexmark, however, Supreme Court disapproved idea “prudential” standing. Properly understood, Court said, whether plaintiff sue “is issue requires us determine, using traditional tools statutory interpretation, whether legislatively conferred cause action encompasses partic ular plaintiff’s claim.” S. Ct. at 1387. Court al ready held Holmes Congress mean “to allow all factually injured plaintiffs recover” RICO. But Bridge, Court equally clear *20 extra statutory restrictions the right sue no place. at 648. It therefore rejected rule of first party reli ance could be found nowhere in statute.
We see nothing in RICO, as Supreme Court has inter preted it, would bar Casinos from pursuing their claim respect There no more directly injured party standing between Casinos alleged wrongdoer, thus no one else whom they could look for relief; their injuries were not derivative. money they paid pursuant not compensate State Illinois for any losses state. Rather, Casinos them selves suffered only injury resulting from Racetracks’ conspiracy enact statute. do not occupy role disgruntled tax payer here. That, too, pose problem them, as Ill. ex rel. Ryan v. Brown F.3d (7th Cir. 2000), demon strates. There we rejected plaintiffs’ allegation defendant bribed state treasurer exchange large deposits state money. Plaintiffs, acting only their capac ity ordinary Illinois taxpayers, sued recover state’s losses. But they “suffered general way all taxpayers suffer when victimized by dishones ty.” Id. at 1045. Only “the State Illinois itself directly injured by misdirection its funds pockets miscreants.” Id. Therefore, we held, “State [was] proper party suing, not plaintiffs.” Id.
Here, general limitation taxpayer standing found Article III does apply. do “challenge laws general application where own injur[ies] [are] distinct from suffered general other taxpayers citizens.” Hein Freedom Religion Found., Inc. *21 21 13 2972 U.S. 587, 598 (2007), quoting ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish , 490 U.S. 605, 613 (1989) (Kennedy, J.). taxed only five enti ‐ ties entire state. Other taxpayers citizens were un ‐ affected. Moreover, are challenging tax itself this litigation, having lost earlier efforts pursuing theory. Rather, they seek damages from private party an alleged conspiracy use power of govern ‐ ment take money them. Their injury is easily meas ‐ ured, directly traceable Racetracks’ conduct (bribing sign Act) reme diable court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 555, 560–61 (1992). They thus face no standing barrier their lawsuit Article III. closing, we stress RICO element we are
deciding issue of proximate cause. To sustain their sec tion 1962(d) conspiracy claim, must ultimately show “that (1) defendant[s] agreed maintain an inter est or control an enterprise or participate af fairs an enterprise through pattern racketeering activ ity, defendant[s] further agreed someone commit at least two predicate acts accomplish these goals.” DeGuelle v. Camilli , F.3d 192, (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Roger Whitmore’s Auto. Servs., Inc. v. Lake Cnty., Ill. , F.3d 659, (7th Cir. 2005); Brouwer Raffensperger, Hughes & Co. F.3d (7th Cir. 2000). We recognize our rejection Casinos’ claims based an im pact ability show defendants agreed commission two predicate acts, see Brouwer F.3d at defendants “knowingly agreed perform services kind [to] facilitate activities those op erating enterprise illegal manner,” id. We *22 reluctant delve those issues without proper adver sary presentation. Instead, because evaluation case as whole affected our decision on proximate cause, we confirm district court free on remand revisit its decisions other RICO elements should parties choose revisit them light this opinion.
IV
If correct, Racetracks agreed pay $100,000 exchange signature direct immediate consequence illegal agreement deprive 3% annual revenue. There “a direct relation between inju ry asserted injurious conduct alleged.” Bridge 654–55. Accordingly, we REVERSE district court’s grant summary judgment insofar relates signing REMAND further proceedings consistent opinion.