Bаnco De Seguros Del Estado (“Banco”) was a member of a Lloyd’s, London syndicate that reinsured several insurance policies underwritten by Employers Insurance of Wausau (“Wausau”), a Wisconsin insurance company. In September 1995, an arbitration panel awarded Wausau $7,783,-324 from the syndicate, of which Banco was liable for $181,319. When Wausau filed a petition in the district court to confirm the arbitration award against Ban- *939 co, Banco moved to vacate, claiming that Wausau’s service of notice of arbitration did not comply with the terms of their reinsurance contract or with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611. The district court granted Wausau’s motion to confirm and denied Banco’s motion to vacate. Banco appeals, claiming that the district court made errors of law and fact in determining that notice of arbitration had been served properly on Banco. Finding no error, we affirm.
I. HISTORY
Banco is the state insurance bank and an instrumentality of the Sovereign Republic of Uruguay. Wausau is a mutual insurance company organized under Wisconsin law with its principal place of business in Wausau; Wisconsin. Between 1966 and 1973, Wausau entered into a series of contracts known as excess retrocessional insurance treaties (“Treaties”) with morе than 100 underwriters at Lloyd’s, London and other London market insurance companies, including Banco, commonly referred to as the “retrocessionaires.” Under the Treaties, the retrocessionaires agreed to reinsure Wausau for specified percentages of direct reinsurance losses paid by Wausau, as long as those losses were within the coverage of the Treaties.
The Treaties were identical to one another, except for the specific percentages of coverage allocated to a particular party under each one. Each Treaty contained an arbitration clause, which stated that any arbitration requested by the parties would take place in Wausau, Wisconsin. The arbitration clause did not specify what procedures would be used in the event of an arbitration. Each Treaty also contained a “Service of Suit” clause, which provided that:
It is agreed that in the event of a failure of the [retrocessionaires] hereon to pay any amount claimed to be due hereunder, [retrocessionaire], at the request of the reinsured, will submit to the jurisdiction of any Court of competent jurisdiction within the United States and will comply with all requirements necessary tо give such Court jurisdiction ...
It is further agreed that service of process in such suit may be made upon Messrs. Mendes & Mount ... and that in any suit instituted against [retroces-sionaires], [retrocessionaires] will abide by the final decision of such Court or of any Appellate Court in the event of an appeal.
[Mendes & Mount] are authorized and directed to accept service of process on behalf of [retrocessionaires] in any such suit and/or upon the request of the rein-sured to give a written 'undertaking to the reinsured that they will enter a general appearance upon [retrocessio-naire’s] behalf in the event such suit will be instituted.
Furthеr, pursuant to any statute of any state, territory or district of the United States which makes provision therefor, [retrocessionaires] hereby designate the Superintendent, Commissioner or Director of Insurance or other officer specified for that purpose in the statute, or his successor or successors in office, as their true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served any lawful process in any action, suit or proceeding instituted by or on behalf of the reinsured ... and hereby designate the above-named as the person to whom the said officer is authorized to mail such process or a true copy thereof.
The New York law firm of Mendes & Mount was designated as the party to accept service for Banco. Each Treaty also contained an “intermediary clause,” which designated Pritchard & Baird, Inc., (“Pritchard”) as the “intermediary ... through whom all communications and transactions relating thereto shall be transmitted by the parties.”
Pursuant to the intermediary clause, Wausau and the retrocessionaires originally communicated through Pritchard. *940 However, Pritchard became insolvent in 1975, and the parties to the Treaties thereafter used Leslie & Godwin, a British firm, as an intermediary. The parties never amended their Treaty to reflect this change. Leslie & Godwin contacted Banco through another intermediary, Argenhall, S.A., an Argentine brokerage firm.
In 1984, Wausau began to submit proofs of loss to Leslie & Godwin and to Lord, Bissell & Brook, counsel to the lead underwriter among the retrocessionaires, Mer-rett Syndicate. These proofs of loss showed that policy-holders on policies rein-sured by Wausau suffered extensive injuries related to asbestos contamination. Merrett Syndicate engaged Lord, Bissell & Brook to audit these claims and determine whether they fell within the scope of the Treaties. Despite continued submissions of proofs of loss, the retrocessio-naires refused to reimburse Wausau for its losses.
By 1991, Wausau determined that the retrocessionaires had not complied with the terms of the Treaties. On May 27, 1991, Wausau sent a demand for arbitration to Lord, Bissell & Brook, as agent for Merrett Syndicate, according to the custom of Lloyd’s, London that the lead underwriter traditionally handles claims on behalf of all underwriters in a syndicate. Lord, Bissell & Brook then forwarded Wausau’s arbitration demand to Leslie & Godwin, who attempted to notify the other retrocessionaires. In June 1991, Leslie & Godwin sent Argenhall a letter informing Banco of Wausau’s arbitration demand and asking for confirmation that Lord, Bissell & Brook would represent them. Banco claims that it never received this communication. In the letter, Leslie & Godwin requested that Banco respond, but Banco did not.
On August 19, 1991, Wausau petitioned the Marathon County Circuit Court in Wisconsin for an order compelling the re-trocessionaires to proceed with arbitration. The Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance was served with two copies of the petition, and Mendes & Mount was served with one copy. In addition, Wausau provided Leslie & Godwin and Lord, Bissell & Brook each with a copy of the petition. The caption of the petition identified the respondents to the petition as including “certain London Market Insurance Companies, including those identified in Appendix A.” Appendix A to the petition lists among the respondents the following two parties: “Banco” and “Banco di Seguros del Estado.” Ban-co clаims that Mendes & Mount did not notify it of the petition.
The trial court granted Wausau’s motion in October 1991, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision in
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Jackson,
On September 18, 1995, the arbitration panel issued an award in favor of Wаusau in the amount of $7,783,324 as a full and final settlement of all its loss claims. The retrocessionaires were each liable for a portion of the award, which varied according to each retrocessionaire’s proportionate share of the coverage allocation. The retrocessionaires were given forty-five days to pay their respective shares. If they did not pay, each would be subject to stiff penalties, including 7.5 percent interest and joint and several liability for attorneys’ fees and costs, and would be required to provide a $9,000,000 letter of credit to Wausau to secure payment оf the retrocessionaires’ ultimate liability. Ban-co’s share of the total award was $181,319, *941 but Banco was not listed on the arbitration award. Banco claims that it was never informed of the arbitration proceedings, and it has not paid either its share of the award or its additional penalties, which now exceed $9,000,000.
In July 1998, Wausau filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award as to Banco in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. Wausau served this petition on both the Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance and on Mendes & Mount. Banco’s name was listed in the caption, and Mendes & Mount caused process to be served on Banco at its principal place of business in Montevideo, Uruguay. Banco responded to the motion with a motion to vacate the arbitration panel’s award. It claimed that it had never received notice of the arbitration and was not properly served in accordance with Wisconsin law or the requirements of the FSIA. On January 5, 1999, the district court denied Banco’s motion to vacate and granted Wausau’s motion to confirm. The court found that service on Mendes & Mount and the Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance of the petition to compel arbitration was sufficient to meet the requirements of the Treaties, Wisconsin law and the constitutional right to due process.
II. Analysis
On appeal, Banco argues that the district court erred by determining that Wausau’s service of process was effective as to Banco, and it argues that the court made clearly erroneous findings of fact in granting Wausau’s motion to confirm its arbitration award. In reviewing the grant of a motion to confirm an arbitration award, we decide questions of law
de novo
and review findings of fact for clear error.
See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kap-lan,
As an instrumentality of the sovereign state of Uruguay, Banco is a “foreign state” within the meaning of §§ 1603(a)-(b) of the FSIA. See § 1603(a) (“A ‘foreign state’ ... includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b).”); § 1603(b)(l)-(3) (defining “instrumentality” as “a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise ... which is an organ of a-foreign state ... or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state ... which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States ... nor created under the laws of any third country”). Foreign states possess immunity from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States, except as specified by the FSIA. See §§ 1604-1607. By agreeing to a Treaty which designated Wausau, Wisconsin, as the site of any arbitration, however, Banco has waived its immunity in any proceeding to confirm the arbitral award. See § 1605(a)(6)(A). Federal courts have original subject matter jurisdiсtion over all suits involving foreign states, see § 1330(a), and Banco admits that Wausau’s motion to confirm satisfied the FSIA service requirements, so there is also personal jurisdiction over Banco in this matter. See §§ 1330(b), 1608(b)(1).
Because the United States and Uruguay are both signatories, the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (“Inter-American Convention”) Article V(l)(b), Jan. 30, 1975, reprinted at 9 U.S.C. § 301, governs the procedure of confirming an arbitral award as well as the procedure of refusal for an award.
1
Section 302 of the Inter-Ameri
*942
can Convention incorporates certain sections of the New York Convention, codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208, into arbitration proceedings where both parties are citizens of signatory states.
See
9 U.S.C. § 302 (incorporating 9 U.S.C. §§ 202-205, 207);
see also Jain v. de Mere,
Under the New York Convention, within three years of any arbitral award any party to the arbitration may apply to any court with jurisdiction for an order confirming the award against any other party to the arbitration.
See
9 U.S.C. § 207;
Generica Ltd. v. Pharmaceutical Basics, Inc.,
Although arbitration “is simply a matter of contract between the parties,”
First Options,
A. Waiver
The Treaties between Banco and Wau-sau contain a “Service of Suit” clause which designates that, in any suit filed to recover any amount of money due under the Treaties, Mendes & Mount and the Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance may *943 be served as Banco’s agents for service of process. Wausau argues that by designating special agents for the service of process Banco has waived its right to notice reasonably calculated to apprise it of the pending arbitration.
For an American court to assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, the court must generally determine that the company has “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.”
Hanson v. Denckla,
B. Notice Reasonably Calculated
Banco admits that a copy of the motion to compel arbitration was served by a proper person on its designated agents. It argues that the motion itself was insufficient to provide notice to either Banco or its agents that Banco was a party to the arbitration. Banco relies on three contentions to assert that Wausau’s motion is insufficient to provide notice reasonably calculated to Banco or its agents: (1) Wau-sau did not follow proper Wisconsin procedures in its service of process on Banco’s agents; (2) Wausau failed to follow the special service of process procedure required by the FSIA for foreign sovereigns; (3) even if Wausau followed the proper Wisconsin procedures, these procedures do not provide “notice reasonably calculated” as required by the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution.
Banco contends that Wausau failed to meet Wisconsin’s notice requirement because it failed to list Banco in the caption of its motion to compel arbitration and it failed to serve a formal summons with its motion on Banco’s agents. Banco argues that thе parties did not specify by contract the rules under which arbitration would be conducted. Therefore, because Article V(l)(b) requires that, absent a waiver, arbitration proceedings must meet the due process rights of the forum state,
see Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp.,
We disagree with Banco’s contention that Article V(l)(b) of the Inter-American Convention requires that service of process be made in accordance with the forum state’s service of process statute. Service of process according to statute raises a presumption that due process has been met.
See Mid-America Tablewares, Inc. v. Mogi Trading Co.,
Under Wisconsin law, a principal is “bound and affected by such knowledge and notice as its agents received.”
Lakeshore Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Bradford Arms Corp.,
*945
Banco rests its contention that Wausau did not serve its agents with adequate notice that Banco was a party on two facts: (1) the motion to compel arbitration fails to list Banco correctly in either the official caption or Appendix A; (2) each agent was provided with only one copy of process, despite the large number of retrocessionaires. Banco argues that Wausau instead should have sent a copy of proсess to Banco’s (and every other retrocessionaire’s) principal place of business. However, “notice reasonably calculated” requires only that the notice provided “be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information.”
Mullane,
No reasonable person could be expected to serve more than 100 copies (that is, one copy for each retrocessionaire) of the same motion on Mendes & Mount and the Commissioner of Insurance. As the district court noted, the purpose of the Service of Suit clause is, in part, to anticipate the burden of personally serving the numerous members of each Lloyd’s syndicate individually and avoid it by designating a uniform agent for all. Moreover, knowing that the same person would be agent to each of the retrocessionaires, no reasonable person would expect each retrocessionaire to be listed in the caption. If the agent must index the Appendix to find the names of some retrocessionaires, it would not be unrеasonable to expect the agent to do so for all of them. Had Wausau not erroneously listed Banco in the Appendix as either “Banco” or “Banco di Seguros del Estado,” there would be no reason to question that it provided Banco’s agents with “notice reasonably calculated” to apprise them of Banco’s involvement in the pending arbitration.
Wausau misspelled Banco’s name in the Appendix, so we must consider whether this error is one of sufficient magnitude to compromise Wausau’s attempt to provide Banco with notice. We will not allow a technical error such as a spelling mistakе to implicate Banco’s right to due process, because both Mendes & Mount and the Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance had the duty as agents of Banco to make a reasonable inquiry into who “Banco di Se-guros del Estado” might be.
See, e.g., Dombeck v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St Paul & Pac. R. Co.,
In the alternative, Banco argues that, as the instrumentality of a foreign sovereign, it has general immunity from suit in the United States, subject only to the exceptions of the FSIA. Pursuant to the FSIA, certain formalities must be followed in the proper service of a complaint. Section 1608 of the FSIA requires that service be made “(1) by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance with any special arrangement for service between the plaintiff and the agency or instrumentality ...or “(2) if no special arrangement exists, by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance with an applicable international convention on service of judicial documents.” Id. at § 1608(b)(l)-(2).
Banco contends that the only clause in the treaty that could constitute a “special arrangement” for the purposes of the act was the intermediary clause, but neither it nor the procedures of any applicable international convention were followed. In ad *946 dition, Banco notes that Wausau never served the summons required in both § 1608(b)(1) and § 1608(b)(2). Therefore, Banco contends that it was never properly served with notice of the pending arbitration.
Banco’s attempts to shield itself beneath the procedural requirements of the FSIA merely obfuscate the real issue of notice. Banco seem's to believe that any improprieties in Wausau’s service of the motion to compel arbitration relieve Banco of notice of the arbitration. Instead, such an impropriety would render Banco immune to the action compelling parties to arbitrate. Wausau admittedly did not serve Banco with a summons, so might not have been able to compel Banco into arbitration.
Other retrocessionaires were compelled to enter arbitration with Wausau, and arbitration occurred. By agreeing to the arbitration provision in its Treaty, Banco agreed to submit itself to the decision made by any arbitrators empaneled pursuant to the arbitration clause. Banco is bound to the arbitral award not by the motion to compel arbitration, but by the language of the Treaty that it made with Wausau.
Banco, of course, could have retained immunity from any proceedings to confirm the award had Wausau not served notice of the motion to confirm an arbitration award. However, Wausau properly served notice of the motion to confirm, and we must confirm the award regardless whether Banco could have been forced to participate in the arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 207 (“The court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the [Inter-American] Convention.” (emphasis added)). We have already determined that Banco had notice as required by Article V(l)(b) of the Inter-American Convention, and any fault in Banco’s inability to appear at the arbitration rests with Ban-co’s designated agents, not with Wausau. Absent any grounds for refusal of recognition of the award, we are compelled by the Inter-American Convention to confirm it.
Banco also obfuscates the issue of notice by claiming that the arbitration award was, in effect, a default judgment, so the requirements of § 1608(e) of the FSIA must be met. Section 1608 requires that any claimant of a default judgment establish his right to relief “by evidence satisfactory to the court.” § 1608(e). However, § 1608(e), like the rest of the FSIA, refers to judicial proceedings. Wausau never sought a default judgment against Banco; instead it seeks to confirm an arbitral award in the manner provided by the FSIA. Section 1608(e) does not apply.
C. Findings of Fact
Banco also argues that the district court made сlearly erroneous findings of fact which led it incorrectly to grant Wau-sau’s motion to confirm. Banco disputes three “undisputed facts” found by the district court: (1) Wausau notified all retro-cessionaires of its filing of suit by service on Mendes & Mount; (2) a custom exists at Lloyd’s, London that the petitioner need only inform the lead retrocessionaire of matters relating to the operation of the Treaties; (3) Leslie
&
Godwin had not communicated directly with Banco, but instead sent information in care of Argen-hall. We review findings of fact made in motions to confirm arbitration for clear error,
see First Options,
We are unconvinced' that any of the district court’s findings of undisputed fact are clearly in error. Banco contends that, because it disputes receiving notice of the arbitration after Wausau served Mendes & Mount, all the retrocessionaires did not *947 receive notice of the pending arbitration. We have found that each retrocessionaire listed in the caption of the motion to compel arbitration must be imputed to have received actual notice by service on Mendes & Mount. Because Banco does not provide us with evidence that any other retrocessionaire wаs omitted from the motion to compel arbitration, we see no error in the district court’s finding.
In holding that Banco received notice of arbitration by Wausau’s service of the motion to compel, we do not rely on any of the other findings of fact that Banco urges us to review. As such, these findings do not prejudice Banco, and “[a]n error that is not prejudicial is still an error, but it is unlikely to be a clear error.”
Chaulk v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
III. ConclusioN
Because we find that Wausau’s motion to compel arbitration effectively gave Ban-co notice of arbitration proceedings and because we find that the district court made no clearly erroneous findings of fact in confirming the arbitration award in favor of Wausau or in denying Banco’s motion to vacate the arbitration award, the decisions of the district court are Affirmed.
Notes
. As the district court noted, since both the United States and Uruguay are also signatories of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcеment of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention”), Dec. 29, 1970, reprinted at 9 U.S.C.A. § 201, codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208, unless a majority of the other retrocessionaires are also signatories of the Inter-American Convention, the New York Convention would actually apply to this dispute. See 9 U.S.C. § 305. However, as we discuss below, the provisions of both conventions are interpreted to reach the same result in each case, and, lacking knowledge of *942 the signatory status of the home states of the remaining retrocessionaires, the parties have stipulated that the Inter-American Convention shall apply. Since the outcome would not be affected if we instead applied the New York Convention, we agree with the district court that “the point appears to be technical.”