Lead Opinion
FOR THE COURT:
■ ¶1. In December 2011, Lawrence J. Tucker Jr. proposed marriage to Emily F. Cooley, and presented her with a diamond engagement ring. In November 2014, Tucker broke off the engagement. Thereafter, Cooley maintained possession of the ring despite Tucker’s requests to have the ring returned. Tucker filed a replevin action in the Lafayette County Chancery Court in February 2015 seeking return of the ring. After a trial on the merits, the chancery court ruled in favor of Tucker. In August 2015, the chancery court ordered Cooley to return the ring. Aggrieved, Cooley appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶2. Tucker and Cooley began dating in Aprii 2009. In the summer of 2010, Cooley relocated from Hattiesburg, Mississippi, to Oxford, Mississippi, and began cohabiting with Tucker in Tucker’s home. Tucker averred that the relationship was tumultuous. Tucker testified that after consistent requests from Cooley to become engaged, he believed an engagement would improve the relationship. Accordingly, Tucker proposed marriage to Cooley in December 2011.
¶3. Tucker presented Cooley with a ring upon asking her to marry him. The ring appraised at approximately $40,000.. Cooley accepted the proposal, and wore the ring continuously thereafter. Tucker immediately acquired insurance on the ring. He listed himself as the sole insured on the policy. Cooley was not referenced anywhere in the policy.
¶4. Tucker and Cooley could not agree, among other things, on the type of . wedding they desired. A wedding date was never chosen, nor were any wedding plans pursued. Tucker testified that the relationship remained troubled and without improvement following the engagement. Tucker also stated that he attempted to end the relationship numerous times in person, but that Cooley’s adverse reactions and threats to harm herself dissuaded him from pushing the issue. Tucker ultimately ended the relationship through an email in November 2014.
■ ¶5. Cooley moved out 'of Tucker’s house within a few days of receiving the email. Thereafter, Tucker requested that Cooley return the engagement ring. Cooley refused. After numerous failed attempts- to recoup the ring from Cooley, Tucker ultimately filed a replevin action in the chancery court seeking return of the ring.
¶6. A trial took place before the chancellor on May 21, 2015. Tucker and Cooley both testified. Cooley asserted that the ring was an inter vivos gift to her from Tucker. Tucker countered that the ring was a conditional gift, premised on the condition that he and Cooley would marry. On July 29,2015, the chancellor entered an order awarding Tucker possession of the ring. The chancellor determined that the ring was a conditional gift, and since Tucker and Cooley did not fulfill the condition of marriage, Cooley was not entitled to keep it. Cooley now appeals the chancery court’s judgment.
DISCUSSION
¶7. Our standard of review for analyzing chancery-court judgments is lim
¶8. Cooley asserts that the chancery court erred in its determination that the ring was a conditional gift rather than an inter vivos gift. The chancery court properly cited Johnson v. Collins,
¶9. In Johnson, the properties at issue consisted of certificates of deposit that were given on the condition that the recipient obtain a divorce. Id. at 1031. The supreme court determined that because the divorce did not occur, the gift was not a valid inter vivos gift “because the gift was not complete with nothing left to be done.” Id.
¶10. Likewise, the cases relied upon by Cooley, Lomax v. Lomax, 172 So.3d 1258 (Miss.Ct.App.2015), and Neville v. Neville,
¶11. This is not inconsistent with the required elements in Johnson. The engagement ring is to be considered an inter vivos gift conditioned upon the parties getting married — a condition that, obviously, occurred in the cases cited by Cooley. Id. at (1111). Hence, in those cases, the Johnson requirements were met, including the element mandating that the gift be completed with nothing more to be done. Johnson,
¶12. Here, the chancellor ultimately determined that “[t]he engagement ring was a conditional gift presented in contemplation of a marriage that did not occur.” It is from this determination that the chancellor awarded Tucker the ring. This conclusion is supported by Mississippi caselaw and by fact. We cannot find that the chancellor “was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard.” Buford,
¶13. Cooley requests, in an alternative argument, that this Court create new precedents under which trial courts would determine ownership of an engagement ring following a broken engagement. We decline to do so. Existing Mississippi gift law adequately addresses cases such as this, and we will not deviate from the path set before us at this time.
¶14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LAFAYETTE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
Dissenting Opinion
DISSENTING:
¶15. To the extent that the engagement ring was a conditional gift given in contemplation of marriage, as determined by the chancellor, I disagree that Tucker is entitled to the return of the ring under these circumstances. A review of basic contract principles is sufficient to establish that Tucker, who prevented the completion of the condition by breaking off the engagement, excused that condition and is not entitled to benefit from his action.
¶16. The Mississippi Supreme Court has explained: “Where a contract is performable on the occurrence of a future event, there is an implied agreement that neither party will place any obstacle in the. way of the happening of such event, and where a party is himself the cause of the failure he cannot rely on such condition to defeat his liability.” Garner v. Hickman,
¶17. Here, Tucker’s unilateral decision to terminate the engagement to Cooley prevented the condition from being fulfilled, thereby excusing the condition. As argued by Cooley’s counsel at the hearing:
[I]f the agreement is not performed because of a breach by the donor, which in this case is [Tucker], the donor should not benefit from that breach by regaining the ring.
If they’re taking the position that the marriage was a condition precedent but yet they break the condition precedent, how can the law condone that[?] There’s nothing Ms. Cooley can do. Will you marry me, yes. He gives her the ring. They live together three years, as we*478 would say as husband and wife. And then he breaks off the engagement. He cuts off the condition precedent that he’s now trying to rely on to get the ring back.- How is that equitable? It’s not.
¶18. I further find Johnson v. Collins,
¶19. The chancery court observed that “neither party was at fault for [the relationship’s] demise.” And while I sympathize with the chancery court’s public-poli'cy reasoning — that Tucker should not be “penalized” for realizing that marriage to Co'oley would be imprudent — and with Tucker’s testimony that he felt that Cooley pressured him into proposing, a $40,000 promise to enter into marriage should have been regarded by Tucker with gravity and with due consideration given to the potential outcome, especially in light of his testimony that the relationship was “rocky.” Since Tucker broke off the engagement, making it impossible for the condition (marriage) to be fulfilled, I would reverse and render the chancery court’s judgment on this issue, awarding the engagement ring to Cooley.
GRIFFIS, P.J., AND JAMES, J., JOIN THIS OPINION; CARLTON, J„ JOINS IN PART WITH OPINION.
DISSENTING:
¶20. I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
¶21. In this replevin action, the chancellor erroneously held that the ring constituted a conditional gift, and that since Tucker and Cooley failed to fulfill the condition of marriage, Cooley was not entitled to keep the ring. Mississippi precedent reflects that in actions for wrongful breach of the promise to marry, our courts apply contract principles, not the law of conditional gifts. See Carney v. McGilvray,
¶23. Additionally, the chancellor must apply the appropriate legal standards and Mississippi precedent in determining if Tucker met his burden of proof to show that he is entitled to possession and return of the engagement ring under Mississippi precedent of contract-law principles applicable to wrongful breach of the promise to marry.
¶24. Based upon the foregoing, I would reverse and remand because the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard. Tucker must prove his right to immediate possession of the ring in accordance with the law of breach of the promise to marry, not the law of conditional gifts.
BARNES AND JAMES, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION IN PART.
Notes
. Mississippi appellate courts have not addressed this precise factual situation until now. Furthermore, as the parties observe, there is a split of authority in other jurisdictions on how to resolve these cases. I find it unnecessary, however, to delve into the holdings of the various other jurisdictions, except to note that the traditional, common-law approach is to determine who was at fault for breaking off the engagement, but the modem trend in some jurisdictions is to apply a non-fault-based approach. See 23 Williston on Contracts § 62:28 (4th ed. 2002). This modem approach was employed by the chancellor here — concluding that the ring is a conditional gift, and the donor is entitled to ownership of the gift once the condition (marriage) is not satisfied, with no consideration of who was at fault in ending the relationship. In my view, the case can, and should, be determined under basic contract principles.
. See Carney v. McGilvray,
. The damages consider the loss of the opportunity to marry and damage to reputation. See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Rules of Engagement, 107 Yale L.J. 2583, 2593 (1998) (discussing various treatments by different states of return, of gifts given in contemplation of
. In her law-journal article Rules of Engage"ment, Rebecca Tushnet explained:
In early American law, women could recover damages when men promised marriage and then reneged; the action was known simply as "breach of promise,” Early breach-of-promise cases were mainly about responding to the financial harms of a broken engagement, but the action was recon-ceptualized over time as one centering around emotional wounds. By the beginning of the twentieth century, recoverable damages included the loss of the benefits a woman would have received from marriage, her loss of a chance to marry someone else, and the emotional harm she suffered from the broken engagement, giving rise to the popular name for the resultant lawsuits — heartbalm suits.
See Tushnet, at 2586. Tushnet’s article also provides:
Breach of promise was not just about love, but also about lost economic chances, and often the damages included compensation for loss of virginity or for pregnancy from premarital sex. These consequential and expectation damages were based on the effect of the broken engagement on the plaintiff’s social standing or her chances to marry another[.]
Id. at 2592. The facts in the case before us show that Cooley moved into Tucker’s home prior to marriage and the two engaged in premarital relations and cohabitation before breaking off the engagement.
. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-37-125 (Rev. 2012) (replevin trial and hearing to determine rights of parties to possession). Compare Hung Kwong Leung v. Law,
. Note, the replevin statutes may be "supplemented only by so much of the [Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure] as are not inconsistent with those statutes.” Hall v. Corbin,