92 Wis. 146 | Wis. | 1896
There was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict, and the trial seems to have been in most respects fair and just, but there were two rulings made which, we think, were erroneous, and which necessitate reversal of the judgment.
1. The circuit judge charged the jury on the subject of reasonable doubt as follows: “ All men are presumed to be innocent of crime. No man can rightfully be convicted of crime until the legal presumption of innocence just mentioned shall have been overcome, and his guilt affirmatively proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Such proof of guilt can be made only by the evidence given or received on the trial of the case, and must be, in the judgment of the jury, the just and reasonable logic and effect of the whole evidence. The ‘reasonable doubt ’ mentioned beyond which guilt must be affirmatively proven in order to justify a verdict of guilty means, as its name implies, a doubt resting in reason; and it must arise from the whole evidence fairly and rationally considered. When, after a full and impartial consideration of the whole evidence considered within the rules already stated, the judgment is convinced to a moral certainty that the accused is guilty, that there is no reasonable explanation of the facts proven' except upon the hypothesis that the accused committed the crime charged, then every ‘ reasonable
2. Witnesses were called by the prosecution, who testified to having heard the defendant Emery, during the winter before the homicide, remark that if he met Peter Houston in the woods, and they both had guns, he would see that Peter did not get the first shot. When Emery was put on the stand in his own behalf, he admitted that he might have made such a remark, and was then asked what was the occasion of his making it. This question was objected to, and the objection sustained, and exception taken. The following colloquy then took place: “ Ques. Why do you say you may have said that ? (Objected to as before. Overruled.) The Court: You need not tell anything you heard previous to that, if you did hear anything. Ans. Because I might have said it. Q. If you are limited to not giving the conversation, you cannot give it in any other way 1 A. No, sir.” It is very apparent that the court, by these rulings, excluded everything else that was said by either Emery or others at the time of the making of the threatening remark, as well as excluded every thing that had come to Emery's knowledge which prompted him to make it. That the balance of the conversation was admissible there can be no doubt. Wheré the plaintiff introduces evidence of a remark made by the defendant, the defendant may unquestionably on his own be
There are numerous other assignments of error made on the part of the plaintiffs in error. We have carefully examined them, and do not find them to be well taken. We shall now briefly notice some of the more important of these contentions.
(1) There was a plea in abatement made by the defendant Lord to the effect that he had had no preliminary examination. This plea was based on the grounds — first, that the complaining witness was not sworn on the examination; second, that all of the witnesses for the state were not sworn; third, that the defendants were deprived of the testimony of a material and. important witness named James Jacobs, upon such examination, by the acts and direction of the district attorney of Wood county. This plea seems to have been
(2) At the close of the testimony on the part of the state, and before the introduction of the evidence for the defense, the defendants’ counsel claimed the right to review the testimony on the part of the state for the purpose of showing that it did not warrant a conviction. Upon objection, the court ruled that, in opening the defense, he could only comment on the testimony already in so far as it might be necessary to show the relevancy of the testimony which he expected to introduce. This was plainly right, and is in accordance with the established practice within this state. It is no infringement on the constitutional privilege of being heard by counsel. It is simply a rule which manifestly is conducive to the orderly and logical mode of conducting a trial, by which the arguments upon the merits are all to be made after the testimony is in and -all the facts are before the
(3) The state was allowed to introduce certain parts of
(4) The state was allowed to prove a conversation between Emery and the sheriff on the day of Emery’s arrest, in which the sheriff said to Emery, “ I am satisfied in my own mind that your gun did the shooting,” to which Emery replied, “ It looks so, don’t it? ” It is objected that this evidence was inadmissible, as its effeot was to introduce the opinion of the sheriff as to whose gun did the shooting. We do not regard the objection as tenable. The answer of Emery partook of the nature of an admission, hence was proper evidence against him; but it could only be understood in connection with the sheriff’s remark to which it was a reply.
We do not deem it necessary to notice any other points made.
By the Court.— Judgment is reversed as to each plaintiff in error, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for a new trial. The warden of the state prison will deliver the plaintiffs in error to .the sheriff of Wood county, who will hold them in custody until discharged therefrom by due process of law.