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Emery v. Johnson
139 F.3d 191
5th Cir.
1998
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*1 court for further remand to the district will opinion

proceedings consistent with this court to reinstate her state

direct the district claim, over which the district

law contract jurisdiction pursu- to exercise

court declined 1367(c). parties will to 28 The

ant U.S.C. appeal. their own on this

bear costs EMERY, Petitioner-Appellant,

Jeff

Gary Director, JOHNSON, L. Texas De-

partment Justice, of Criminal Institu- Division, Respondent-Appellee.

tional

No. 96-20826. Appeals,

United States Court of

Fifth Circuit.

Sept. 1997. Rehearing April

On Petition for *2 Moran,

Thomas Donald Teicher Leora *3 Kahn, Houston, TX, McKinney, & Schneider Petitioner-Appellant. for Martinez, Meredith Anne Assistant Attor- General, Austin, TX, ney Respondent- Appellee. KING, BENAVIDES,

Before SMITH Judges. Circuit SMITH, Judge: E. JERRY Circuit Emery, -pauper- proceeding Jeff in forma is, appeals for writ denial his corpus. Concluding of habeas that several of by procedural his claims are barred default merit, and that others are without .the stay affirm and vacate the of execution. I.

A. day Muhlinghaus One LaShan re- apartment her turned to and undressed. her, Emery, an accom- Unbeknownst plished apartment burglar, had entered her using pass key. Muhlinghaus a stolen When apartment, Emery hid in her entered the roommate’s closet.

Muhlinghaus went into her roommate’s to return a dress she had borrowed. bedroom Muhlinghaus, stabbing attacked her dead, twenty-five times. After she was Em- ery body. sexual intercourse with her police any The not find evidence that did anything. stole to the house where he returned (“Debo- wife, lived with his Deborah rah”). showering disposing of his After clothes, Emery drove blood-stained knife and with Deborah to to the scene crime police investigation. Emery con- observe the later to fessed his actions to his wife and brother, Smith, Marie James his foster Michaeloff. burglary objecting to the intro- every his wife at least

Emery assáulted his wife. slapped that he usually hit her with duction evidence Although he day. other bar, trial court conducted an The state habeas fists, occasionally used a metal he nicknacks, evidentiary hearing various find- He also and issued lighters. ashtrays, The of Criminal ings At of fact.1 Texas Court on the bathtub. pound her head child, Appeals on the once, was a tod- denied hit her who least August Finally, July merits dler, room. across proceedings. Five began divorce Deborah 1995, Emery a second In November filed later, reported crimes she months petition, raising several new state habeas police. to the issues, challenges including general to Tex- penalty new claims of

as’s death scheme and B. on counsel’s hav- ineffective assistance based *4 testify hav- ing not to convinced capital murder convicted of Emery was part objected particular to a burglary, see commission of during the Tex. petition pend- jury charge. While that (Vernon 19.03(a)(2) 1994), § Ann. Pen.Code Emery, habeas ing, filed the instant federal in 1986. The to death was sentenced petition. Appeals reversed of Criminal Texas Court transcript the trial portions of because the rule that state follows Texas, Emery v. 800 stolen. See been may prisoner seek habeas relief state (en banc). (Tex.Crim.App.1990) S.W.2d 530 court, Consequently, not both. federal but Texas courts refuse to consider a habeas the obtained a retried The state petition pending. petition while a federal is conviction, whereupon jury sen second Green, 914, parte See Ex 548 S.W.2d appeal, in 1991. On him to death tenced 1996, (Tex.Crim.App.1977). February In alia, unsuccessfully argued, inter prin Appeals of invoked this Court Criminal penalty phase at the jury instructions ciple and dismissed second state because did not allow inadequate were 1996, petition. August In habeas federal mitigating all relevant jury to consider court relief on all his district denied Texas, Emery v. 881 S.W.2d evidence. See granted probable but a certificate of claims 702, (Tex.Crim.App.1994), cert. de 711-12 (“CPC”) appeal. Emery v. cause See 1257, nied, 513 U.S. (S.D.Tex.1 Johnson, F.Supp. (1995). L.Ed.2d 996).2 C. II. 1995, Emery In his first state habeas filed A. alia, right that his

petition, arguing, inter analysis of the claims that testify on his own behalf had been denied Our peti in his state habeas ineffective as- raised second and that his counsel rendered proce complicated by tion is the doctrine of by opening the door to the admission sistance may A history dural default. federal court not con- of his confession to Deborah and Texas, petitions require § post-conviction U.S.C. 2253 to a "certifi- 1. In habeas amended 28 all Appeals. appealability” are the Court of Criminal decided a final order in a cate of before 11.07, 2(a) § art proceeding appealed. Crim. habeas can be Because Tex.Code Proc. Ann. (amended 1995) (current (Vernon Supp.1994) petition Emery filed his habeas well 11.07, § Ann. art at version Crim. AEDPA, Tex.Code Proc. before the effective date of the this new (Vernon Supp.1997)). aWhen him, requirement apply grant and the does not fact, requires questions the resolution jurisdiction of a CPC is sufficient to vest in this that rendered the conviction state trial court Texas, 236 n. 1 court. See Shute v. performs fact-finding See id. function. Cir.1997) (on (5th rehearing). Similarly, the 2(c). § whether to issue the The decision writ new standards of review contained in 104 of Appeals. still with the Court of Criminal remains AEDPA, 1218-19, apply 110 Stat. at do not Johnson, petition. v. 116 F.3d See Green 2. Section 102 of the Antiterrorism and Effective (5th Cir.1997). 1119-20 ("AEDPA”) Penalty Death Pub.L. Act (1996), 104-132, No. 110 Stat. 1217-18 context, 'if we review the district court’s deter constitutional claim prisoner’s sider a state findings novo and its rejection of that minations law de their courts based the state Whitley, for clear error. See Dison v. facts independent state adequate and claim on an (5th Cir.1994). 185, 186 844, 20 F.3d Maxey, 98 F.3d Martin ground. See Cir.1996). (5th always easy, It is not 11.071 Because article is new stat however, a state court determine whether uninterpreted by state largely ute that relief is based on denying collateral decision eases, whether we should we instead consider or, instead, grounds on the procedural affirm on the basis of the abuse-of-the-writ interpretation law. The of federal court’s any judgment doctrine. affirm a We supplied us with a useful Supreme Court has ground supported the record. See Man apply procedural rule: We will not default Nelson, 1202, 1204n. garoo v. state court to consider unless the last default Cir.1989).4 , “clearly expressly” particular claim A is an abuse second independent adequate state on an relied prisoner urgés grounds if of the writ Thompson, ground. Coleman not, been, were raised in his could have but 2546, 2557, 722, 735, 111 115 L.Ed.2d Collins, petition. See Russell v. first habeas (1991). (5th Cir.1991) curiam). (per however, apply, This default rule does not doctrine, courts Such a federal which state rem- petitioner “if the failed to exhaust *5 justice by recognize, encourages efficient re petitioner to and the court which edies quiring prisoner present a to all claims for present his claims required would be Zant, McCleskey relief at once. See v. 499 requirement the exhaustion order to meet 493, 1454,. 1469-70, 467, 111 113 U.S. S.Ct. procedurally the claims would now find (1991). 517 The Texas courts have L.Ed.2d 1,n. 111 at 2557 n. barred.” Id. at 735 S.Ct. twenty recognized this doctrine for over ease, procedural “there is 1. In such Carr, See, parte years. e.g., Ex 511 S.W.2d for of federal habeas re- purposes default 523, (Tex.Crim.App.1974). 525-26 court gardless of the decision the last state qualify can petitioner actually presented his An abuse of the writ to which the Mottram, v. procedural bar. See Murch claims.” Id. 41, 45-46, 71, 73-74, 409 93 S.Ct. 34 U.S. curiam). (1972) proce A (per L.Ed.2d 194 B. however, it adequate, is not unless dural bar “strictly regularly” or to the “vast applied 1. Scott, majority Amos v. claims.” similar federal district court reasoned The (5th denied, Cir.), 333, cert. 516 61 F.3d 339 Emery’s procedurally claims were 1005, 557, 116 S.Ct. 133 L.Ed.2d because, if them he tried to exhaust barred (1995). Historically, Texas courts have failed manner, barred proper in a would be in a apply the abuse-of-the-writ-doctrine 5(a) 11.071, § Proo. Ann. art. Tex.Code Crim. manner, and, therefore, regular we or strict (Vernon Supp.1997), prohibits which the fil Scott, it. Lowe v. have refused to honor See untimely appli subsequent or habeas Cir.1995). (5th 873, 48 F.3d cations, absent cause or actual innocence.3 (Tex. 1994, Davis, changed in when the Texas This parte Ex 947 S.W.2d (en banc) Appeals announced the (upholding the con Court of Criminal Crim.App.1996) 11.071). abuse-of-the-writ-doc- adoption In a of a strict stitutionality of article cases, procedural v. capital rule. See Trest applies but of a state’s 3. Article 11.071 different 11.07, (Vernon (5th Proc Ann. art. Whitley, & n. 2 F.3d 1007-09 Crim. Tex.Code non-capital adopts Supp.1997), Cain, rule for same Cir.1996), granted nom. Trest v. cert. sub felony convictions. -U.S. -, 137 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1997). rely Although court did not the district plead procedural does not default in 4. If the state finding doctrine in on the abuse-of-the-writ court, the district it is waived. See United States default, urged ground procedural the state Marcello, (5th Cir.1989). v. appeal before the district court. both on exception recognized to this We have a limited implicitly waives the default rule when one state 668, 687, Washington, exception v. 466 U.S. only by an for Strickland trine, tempered (1984). 2052, 2064, Barber, 80 L.Ed.2d 879 S.W.2d parte Ex cause. See (en banc) (plu (Tex.Crim.App.1994) n. 1 compare .perfor counsel’s We represents an ade Barber rality opinion). objective to an standard of reason mance purposes of federal bar for quate procedural ableness, presumption strong mindful Scott, Fear ance review. See adequacy. inadequate will not find We Cir.1995). (5th 633, 642 because, merely with the ben representation any post-Bar&er Emery has not cited hindsight, disagree with counsel’s efit of writ, and our re allowing an abusive case Maggio, strategic choices. See Garland Therefore, we are has revealed none. (on search (5th Cir.1983) to follow Fearance and hold bound prejudice, Em rehearing). To establish for Emery’s violation of Texas’s abuse-of-the- that counsel’s errors ery must demonstrate independent constitutes writ-doctrine fundamentally unfair verdict “render procedural to our consideration adequate bar Johnson, 110 F.3d Carter v. unreliable.” of his barred claims.5 (5th Cir.1997).6 Specifically, he probability’ that must “show a ‘reasonable jury otherwise harbored a would have concerning guilt.” Id. doubt reasonable pro petitioner

A overcome by showing preju cause and default cedural Johnson, Tucker v. B.

dice for that default. See 1997) (on July 97-20101 Cir. No. Emery argues that rehearing). anticipate passage of article

his failure to claim con- first ineffectiveness 11.071 constitutes cause for his failure questioning counsel’s Deborah cerns his plead grounds all his for relief his first confession, waiving marital thus *6 petition. 504(1), privilege, Evid. and see Tex.R.Crim. the confession. allowing the admission of Emery filed his first state explora- Explaining requires claim some this year July over one after Barber was background. tion of its factual decided, ignorance of his so he cannot claim during duty plead grounds to all his for relief law, Texas the marital Under review. his first for collateral commu privilege extends to confidential Therefore, cause for his he has shown no nications, Sterling v. not observed acts. See the writ doc- violation of Texas’s abuse of Texas, (Tex.App.— 814 S.W.2d 261-62 trine. refd) curiam). (per writ Debo Austin Emery to the rah testified that returned III. shortly after the murder with a blood house underpants knife stained and blood-stained A. arms, “had on his smeared on his and blood hands, shirt, Emery arms and his on his and his raises several ineffective-assis- pants, some on his work boot.” She tance-of-counsel claims. To establish ineffec- and assistance, Emery that her to the site of must both testified drove tive demonstrate investigation and the murder to watch the performance deficient his counsel and deficiency. Emery James Smith that he had prejudice resulting that that told from effective, pending Emery certify when the act became 5. to to the Court of cases filed motion questions concerning Appeals they certain precedent Criminal remain to the extent that " application interpretation of article and that with Lindh 's conclusion ‘do[] conflict rely 11.071. Because our decision does apply chapter do not retro 153 amendments " article, deny that motion as moot. Tucker, (quot actively.’ 280 n. Green, 2). at 1120 See Lindh n. Johnson, Although Murphy 6. F.3d 10 - -, Murphy, S.Ct. 1997) Cir. our er and Carter were influenced (1997). L.Ed.2d 481 applicability roneous of the AEDPAto view of performance law does not constitute deficient and instructed Smith killed a man unless it is that'it Debbie. so unreasonable rebuts the request from to verification strong presumption perfor that counsel’s testimony Impeaching this' was vital range mance “falls the wide within reason .of Emery’s identity. mistaken John defense of professional Washington, able assistance.” counsel, that an Quinn, feared effective his 689, 104 466 U.S. at at 2065. open would the door to cross-examination Quinn’s judgment that effective cross- Emery’s testimony confes- Deborah’s about examination of Deborah would been time, have Furthermore, Emery at that still sion. impossible opening the door to the without testify. Quinn feared that Em- intended to admission of was the confession reasonable. ery that make statements would waive would Similarly, explained infra, in more detail privilege and allow admission of the Quinn’s testify would belief that confession. open the confession door to that also was successful, mistaken-identity To be reasonable. judgments, These reasonable theory high defense to obtain a required the erroneous, if,ultimately satisfy even the stan- degree credibility jury. Conse- dard effective assistance counsel. strategic priorities quently, one of counsel’s straightforward. Ac- was be honest and 3. introduce, cordingly, Quinn wanted any event, Emery In has not demonstrated of, impact any incriminating lessen the evi- trial, prejudice. At both Smith Michae- prosecution might present. dence that

loff testified that confessed to Emery originally them. Although told Smith man, that he had he later stabbed identified Quinn argues incorrect (cid:127) Muhlinghaus picture. in a Michaeloff' re- belief-(1) testify would counted confession that was far more de- (2) that an cross-examination would effective reported by tailed and accurate than that open the to the admission of door Deborah. confession. It is difficult determine short, testimony In Deborah’s in the Quinn whether was correct latter be- duplicative testimony given confession was lief. The reveals that the most effec- record by Smith Michaeloff. cannot portion tive of the cross-examination was demonstrate that a third source the same Quinn’s analysis and detailed careful confession, change have sufficed among Deborah’s various inconsistencies prejudice result of his The lack of trial.8 police. statements to the Whether the Texas *7 denying Emery ground an alternative Rules Criminal Evidence7 would have re- on relief this claim. quired of Deborah’s entire the admission statement, report Emery’s including her

confession, C. open question. is an Emery’s this ineffectiveness

We need not resolve issue of state second claim Quinn questioned is akin to first. Debo evidentiary law. The Sixth Amendment does committing guarantee right Emery’s practice rah about not criminal defendants the pass key opening the to representation. burglaries, to v. door error-free Skillern (5th Cir.1983). Estelle, testimony Emery’s McGrady’s Mitchell about 851 alone, stealing quarters Emery ar Standing judg and televisions. counsel’s erroneous that, ment, gues opening the door to the any, requirements by if Ofstate admis- ("When by party, writing given or in evidence one whole on 7. See Evid. 106 Tex.R.Crim. may inquired by subject part or thereof be into recorded statement is introduced same party other... party, time an adverse' at that any any part writing introduce other or other (5th Lynaugh, ought to be 8. Cf. Romero v. recorded which fairness F.2d statement Cir.1989) it.”); (holding prisoner contemporaneously that a failed to estab- considered Tex. act, ("When part prejudice an lish the admission of cumulative Evid. declara- from R.Crim. tion, evidence). conversation, writing or recorded statement act, Collins, of an extraneous mance. this evidence See Clark F.3d sion of (5th Cir.1994). ineffective assistance. Quinn rendered Regarding Quinn’s request failure to a lim- affidavit, Emery’s he intend- According to iting not this evidence be history testify about his criminal as instruction ed to general propensity, considered for criminal that, theory was pass key His burglar. argued has not even that the lack of burglar, he not have experienced en- that instruction the trial fundamen- rendered home, as it Muhlinghaus’s contained tered tally unfair or unreliable. We conclude that stealing. At the time that nothing worth prejudiced by was not this failure. testified, Emery still intended Deborah take stand. IV. above, Quinn’s strategy trial

As mentioned credibility by to maintain not required him A. anything to hide. Fur- appearing to have Emery alleges that he was de thermore, Quinn reasonably believed that it right testify nied the at trial. A criminal strategy damaging vet informa- better right testify defendant has a constitutional himself, allowing prose- tion rather than Arkansas, on his own behalf. See Rock v. province, it. It is not our cution to introduce 2704, 2707-10, 49-53, 483 U.S. review, second-guess counsel’s (1987). right 97 L.Ed.2d 37 This can be strategic choices. defendant, only by waived Finally, Emery argues Quinn Teague, counsel. See United States v. (11th Cir.1992) (en banc). requesting limiting was ineffective for A right knowing for this evidence. We must re waiver of this must be instruction Blum, ject argument, voluntary. as the state trial court See United States v. Cir.1995), denied, granted have stated that it would not such a F.3d cert. instruction, limiting because the defense in S.Ct. 133 L.Ed.2d 767 (1996). Although Emery ar troduced the evidence. gues interpretation that this is an incorrect testify did not at his first law, province “it is not the of a there, trial. Because was convicted he

federal habeas court to reexamine state-court everything was convinced that he should do questions.” determinations on state-law Es differently. begin in the second trial At the McGuire, 62, 67-68, 502 U.S. telle trial, ning of the he informed his counsel that (1991). 475, 479-80, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 testify. he wished to Quinn testimony discussed his D. during several times the trial. told

Emery’s third ineffectiveness claim Quinn radically different versions of what Quinn’s object failure to concerns when the happened night of the murder. For ex- prosecution questioned McGrady about Em ample, point, Quinn at one he told that he ery’s easily slapping Deborah. This claim is using a black male stabbed screwdriver dismissed. car, why to break into and that was *8 he was covered with blood. explained,

As we have a successful defense later, required impeaching testimony. Emery Quinn Deborah’s Somewhat informed Part of the cross-examination on that he in Muhlinghaus centered had met a bar and delay reporting Emery’s eventually Deborah’s had an crime. affair with her. He stated delay by prevent expos- Deborah stated that the was caused that he her killed to her from Emery. Consequently, her fear of Emery’s ing adultery Quinn the to his When wife. slapping jury Deborah was admissible to unlikely show the informed him that the was to Objection story, Emery of her fear. suggested reasonableness to its believe that re- futile, turning admission would been and failure parking have to the “screwdriver the lot to conversations, assert objection story.” a cannot be 'with these meritless Faced grounds finding perfor- Quinn reasonably Emery for a of deficient believed thát in- this, perform of and the defense duties. There also perjury. Because commit tended to is evidence in the record if Em- considerable that to leave the courtroom he threatened Emery strong-willed very unlikely and was ery testifying. on insisted by to allow to controlled his decisions be addition, Quinn Emery that In believed pressure persons. other from cross-examination, up well to would not stand him, support that jury would not believe Because we find sufficient in the that the record, by defense theo- testimony negate his the we are bound the state court’s would Quinn’s findings. Considering factual that ry identity. Emery co-counsel of mistaken right testify the of to agreed his assessment of wisdom understood his and that with Quinn’s to the not him testifying but did not threaten leave actions did coerce into not so, doing Emery’s right testify to was not courtroom. violated. Emery would have testi- night before The

fied, managed finally his counsel convince V. day, trial the next him to do so. At not colloquy Quinn lengthy in a engaged argu makes half-hearted explaining him that he the Emery, ment, Penry Lynaugh, based on 492 U.S. right testify regardless counsel’s advice. 302, 2934, (1989), L.Ed.2d on the that he Emery stated record under- scheme, sentencing applied the that as voluntarily he was rights his that stood instructions, through jury unconsti was testify. declining to prevented jury tutional it from because considering evidence the abuse he suffered B. as child. Instructional error of sort to a does not amount violation constitutional made a factual The state habeas court likelihood “unless there is a reasonable that rights his finding that understood jury applied challenged instruction in Quinn’s threats not coerce that did way prevents the consideration of procedural testifying. into de- not Absent constitutionally mitigating relevant evi proceeding, fect in the state habeas the state Scott, 486, Lackey v. dence.” presumed findings factual are to be court’s (5th Cir.1994) Texas, (quoting Johnson v. fairly supported correct unless are “not 2668-69, 2254(d)(8) record.” 28 U.S.C.A. (1993)) (internal (West 1994). quotation L.Ed.2d 290 Although makes the omitted). Furthermore, mitigat marks is bold the record devoid statement ‘uniquely evidence “must demonstrate testifying his evidence that decision permanent handicap[ with which “threat,” ] severe Quinn’s note not based on we through no fault defendant was burdened supported finding that this factual ” Johnson, his own.’ Turner by Quinn’s affidavit but own Cir.1997) (quoting Graham v. statements under oath.9 (5th Cir.1992) Collins, a great Our review of record reveals (en banc), aff'd, 506 U.S. 113 S:Ct. that' his deal of evidence understood (1993)). L.Ed.2d right testify and to do that his decision not Quinn’s faults persuasion so Whatever have was based existed penalty In death scheme that Texas maintained coercion. addition to statements Emery, prior to Quinn Quinn’s note that see Tex.Code Crim. Peoc. Ann 37.071(b) (Vernon Supp.1991) testimony art. & during Emery’s absence (amended 1991) (current harm, Quinn’s him at Tex.Code caused little co- version have (Vernon 37.071(b)-(e) art. in the courtroom Crim. PROC. Ann. counsel intended remain *9 say Emery argues he had been coerced. also the habeas court's not Of 9. that state course, finding disregarded Emery’s argument because factual should be its assumes conclu- sponsored by found, ignores perjury If, coun- ''[i]t Quinn the trial sion. as the state habeas court Emery Quinn suggests that at trial.” sub- sel Quinn Emery testifying, did not coerce into did perjury by Emery anyone asking whether orned commit) (and Emery perjury. did not suborn testifying, knowing him into that had coerced Supp.1997)),10 Accordingly, AFFIRMED, trial court had the benefit judgment the the is correctly stay Penry of modified its instruc- and the of execution is VACATED. Supreme with the comport tion .to Court’s Specifically, decision. the court instructed ON PETITION FOR REHEARING jury:

the April Issues, Special answers the [Y]our punishment the to be which determine as- PER CURIAM: court, the the should sessed defendant rehearing, Emery On urges us your finding of be reflective the to reconsider our determination that the culpability personal of the defendant moral claims that he in present did not his first in this case. application habeas are proeedurally state by Texas’s barred common-law abuse-of-the- you questions When about deliberate the support writ In of Issues, doctrine. Special contention posed you in are the that the pro- common-law doctrine does hot any mitigating sup- consider circumstances eedurally claims, bar federal of these review ported by presented evidence in the both case, offers a single published phases Ex mitigating of the trial. A circum- Fierro, Parte (Tex.Crim.App.1996), S.W.2d 370 any aspect stance be of the defen- — denied, U.S. -, rt. character, record, 117 S. Ct. background, dant’s ce (1997), 138 L.Ed.2d 1019 in crime, which the you of circumstances the which (TCCA) Appeals Texas Court of Criminal inappro- believe makes sentence of death the addressed merits of a successive priate habeas you in this case. If that find there application, unpublished and a circumstances, number any mitigating you are decisions the TCCA in which he weight must how much contends decide de- that court petition addressed you give serve them an- effect when er’s on though claims even determine, merits special you swer the issues. If presented claims were for the first evidence, in time in a that a consideration life sentence, sentence, application.* successive habeas We conclude rather than a death that these cases do not undermine our personal deter appropriate response to the that defendant, mination Texas’s culpability you moral abuse-of- are common-law the-writ doctrine ground constitutes Special instructed to answer the Issue un- adequate to bar federal der review the consideration “No”. claims present did not his first state This jury instruction allowed the to consider petition. any circumstance, appropriate mitigating in- abuse, cluding history of required child We note as an initial matter that jury not to sentence if to death contends in his for rehearing appropriate that, life sentence light of his evaluating adequacy of a state culpability. moral adequate- procedural rule, The instruction point proper “the in time for ly addressed the Court’s concerns Tex- determining procedural whether a rule was penalty as’s death giving jury scheme firmly regularly established and' followed is ability any appropriate to consider miti- procedural ‘the time of purported [the] de ” gating Calderon, circumstance. (quoting fault.’ Fields v. 1996); Gibbs, 23,624-02 penalty Texas its procedures (Tex. modified death Ex Parte Writ No. Penry's comply teachings. 1995); Burdine, Crim.App. July Ex Parte Tex.Code Writ (Vernon 16,725-06 Supp.1997). Ann. art 37.071 1995); Apr. Crim. (Tex.Crim.App. No. Ex Proc. Although Goodwin, 25,290-02 (Tex.Crim. the relevant amendment became effec- Parte Writ No. 1, 1991, September tive charge pun- 27, 1995); Mata, and the App. Jan. Ex Parte Writ No. 26, 1991, given ishment was 8,937-02 November 1995); (Tex.Crim.App. Jan. Ex applied only amendment 17,898-03 to offenses (Tex.Crim. committed Marquez, Parte Writ No. before the date effective of the act. See Act 1995). cases, App. Jan. In all of these 16, 1991, R.S., 838, 5, Leg., June 72d ch. Appeals Court of summarily Criminal de (Vernon). Tex. Sess. Serv. Law nied relief. We deciding assume without * Banks, following summary cites the disposition Ex Parte cases: such constituted a resolu 13,568-03 Writ (Tex.Crim.App. No. Jan. solely tion of cases on the merits.

201 (9th Cir.1997) (internal quotation regularity trine with strictness and 757, sufficient — ground. an state We adequate it denied, U.S. -, render omitted), cert. marks - — accept are this conclusion. See bound (1998)). 1826, L.Ed.2d 118 S.Ct. , (5th v. Narvaiz Johnson the burden of note bears also that We Cir.1998) (“It is more than well-established apply not the doctrine proving that Texas did that, circuit, panel may over this one not regularity and dur- sufficient strictness with decision, wrong, prior right rule the or of period. v. time See Stokes ing the relevant panel in the absence of en banc reconsidera (5th Cir.1997), Anderson, F.3d superseding Supreme tion or of decision the — denied, -, cert. (internal quotation Court.” marks brack (1998); Maxey, v. 140 L.Ed.2d 147 Martin omitted)). ets Cir.1996). (5th Assuming ar- F.3d law is that view of the cor- guendo applica filed his first state habeas conclude, rect, 5, 1995, set for the reasons forth July tion on and the TCCA denied below, August In his for strictly regularly ap- relief on that Texas be rehearing, cites no eases decided plied its common-law abuse-of-the-writ doc- tween that court Fear the date this decided Emery’s procedural de- trine at the time of ance date he his first and the that filed fault, is, the time that he failed to that at the ad application habeas in which TCCA all of the claims for which seeks include application. dresses the merits of an abusive appli- his first habeas federal review in state He case — Ex Parte cites one such cation. Gibbs, 23,624-02 (Tex.Crim.App. No. Writ 1995) (5th Scott, July 15, between the date we In Fearance v. —decided the decided Fearance date that Cir.1995), panel acknowledged of this court appli TCCA relief on his first denied that, ap had not past, in the Texas courts that, if up cation. Even we assume until common-law doc plied the abuse-of-the-writ date that the TCCA relief on his first denied regularity trine with sufficient strictness and petition, Emery could have amended ground adequate an to render the doctrine application present so as for the claims barring review of a later federal habeas review, thereby which he now seeks federal (citing at 642 constitutional claim. See id. default, avoiding procedural Emery has Scott, F.3d Lowe Cir. apply that failed its demonstrated Texas 1995)). that, However, panel held as of doctrine with common-law abuse-of-the-writ Barber, in Ex the TCCA’s Parte decision regularity to render sufficient strictness (Tex.Crim.App.1994), com S.W.2d ground it an state the time adequate ap mon-law abuse-of-the-writ doctrine have held Emery’s procedural default. We regularity sufficient strictness and plied with grace by that a state “an occasional act adequate to render the doctrine a state excusing disregarding court or Fearance, 56 at 642. Fear ground. F.3d rule procedural rule not render does that, proposition for the at ance thus stands Scott, Amos inadequate.” period respect to the time between least (5th Cir.1995).** such, Emery’s presen As February 23, the date that TCCA single tation of a case decided between Barber, 18, 1995, the until June date decided TCCA the date the date of Fearance and Fearance, ap application that court decided on his first habeas denied relief inadequacy of Texas’s plied its doe- cannot establish the common-law abuse-of-the-writ ** Additionally, merely ... opinion or similar to his trine] to claims identical because Gibbs summarily one-page denying claim[s], consists order is an we are that the rule convinced relief, case in- it is unclear whether that even respect ground," adequate at least with state-law volved claims similar to the ones period Emery urges tous to the time to which [Emery] has seeks to have us review. "Because evaluating regularity look the strictness strictly [did] not demonstrated the TCCA Amos, application. 61 F.3d at 340-41. rule's regularly apply doc- [abuse-of-the-writ *11 common-law abuse-of-the-writ doctrine dur- adequate independent ground. Ac- cordingly, we DENY Emery’s petition period time contends is rehearing.

germane to the determination of whether federal review of his claims is barred

Case Details

Case Name: Emery v. Johnson
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date Published: Apr 15, 1998
Citation: 139 F.3d 191
Docket Number: 19-40566
Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.
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