Emery v. Hapgood
73 Mass. 55
| Mass. | 1856
Bigelow, J.

The want of jurisdiction in the magistrate to try and determine the complaint originally made by the defendant against the plaintiff, and the invalidity of the commitment of the plaintiff for contempt, are fully settled in Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray, 120. In that case, the proceedings before the magistrate were similar to those in the case at bar.

The only question therefore arising in this case is, whether, upon the facts proved, the defendant is liable as a trespasser. In deciding this question, it is unnecessary to determine upon the regularity of the form of the warrant of commitment. This is not an action against an officer for serving the warrant, or against a person acting by or under his authority or sanction. If it were, it would be essential to consider whether the war*58rant was bad on its face, and disclosed the want of jurisdiction in the magistrate who issued it. For reasons founded on public policy, and in order to secure a prompt and effective service of legal process, the law protects its officers, and those acting under them, in the performance of their duties, if there is no defect or want of jurisdiction apparent on the face of the writ or warrant under which they act. The officer is not bound to look beyond his warrant. He is not to exercise his judgment touching the validity of the process in point of law ; but if it is in due form, and is issued by a court or magistrate apparently having jurisdiction of the case or subject matter, he is to obey its command. In such case, he may justify under it, although in fact it may have been issued without authority, and therefore be wholly void.

But such is not the rule applicable to strangers or third persons, who are not required, in the exercise of a public duty, to assume the responsibility of executing legal process. If they interfere of their own motion, without authority or command 'from the officers of the law, to cause a writ or warrant to be enforced, they act at their peril; and if the process, though regular on. its face and apparently good, was unauthorized, or was issued by a tribunal having no jurisdiction, or acting beyond the scope of its power, they are liable for the consequences arising from the enforcement of unlawful process. It is upon this ground, that a party is held responsible, at whose suit execution is made, when the officer serving it incurs no liability. The rule is, that if a stranger voluntarily takes upon himself to direct or aid in the service of a bad warrant, or interposes and sets the officer to do execution, he must take care to find a record that will support the process, or he cannot set up and maintain a justification. Barker v. Braham, 3 Wils. 376. Parsons v. Loyd, 3 Wils. 341. Bryant v. Clutton, 1 M. & W. 408. West v. Smallwood, 3 M. & W. 418. Codrington v. Lloyd, 8 Ad. & El. 449. Carratt v. Morley, 1 Ad. & El. N. R. 18. Green v. Elgee, 5 Ad. & El. N. R. 114.

In the present case, the defendant was a volunteer in urging the officer to serve a void warrant upon the plaintiff; and, under *59the instructions given to the jury, it is found by their verdict that the plaintiff would not have been committed to jail but for his interference and instigation. He was, in a legal sense, a stranger to the warrant. It was not his duty, or within his province, to cause it to be enforced. After having made and signed the original complaint, and testified in its support before the magistrate, his duty and responsibility were at an end. Barker v. Stetson, ante, 53. He cannot therefore shelter himself under the authority of the officer, and claim immunity on the ground that the warrant was regular, and disclosed no want of jurisdiction in the magistrate. But it being apparent by the record that the warrant was illegally issued and void, the defendant is responsible for the trespass which he caused to be committed upon the plaintiff. Judgment on the verdict.