In Gеorgia a married woman who is living apart from her husband can maintain an action for dаmages against a third person for the alienation of her husband’s affections.
Sessions v. Parker,
Appellant argues that "Under Georgia Law, in order to bring an action based upon alienation of affections, the person bringing the action is restricted to the husband.” This contention is based upon the language of Code § 105-1203 reading: "Adultery or criminal conversation with a wife shall give a right of action to the husband.” While it is true this statute specified such cause of action as being in the male spouse, this results from the influence оf Blackstone’s Commentaries first printed in 1765 which stated that at common law when a man and woman married they became *297 one and he was the one. Thus, this exact language including thе common law phrase of "criminal conversation” was placed as Sectiоn 2950 in Georgia’s first codification 1 and continued without change in our subsequent codes. In todаy’s world, when women are no longer relegated to an inferior legal position and fervent feminists 2 have prevailed upon newspapers and magazines to use the modеrn designation of "Ms.” rather than "Mrs.” or "Miss,” it is obvious this anachronism presently codified as § 105-1203 cannоt deny the wife an equal right to sue for tortious interference with the marital relationship. In fact, our appellate courts have not needed the prod of the Women’s Libеration movement because all of the cases cited in the first division of this opinion were instances in which the wife was acknowledged to possess that same legal right prior to the current egalitarian effort epitomized in the proposed Twenty-seventh Fеderal Constitutional Amendment: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied by the United States or by any state on account of sex.”
As was said in
Wright v. Lester,
The other enumeration of error complains of the trial judge having overruled a defense motion for more definite statement under Paragraph (e) of Code Ann. § 81A-112. Seeking specificity as to various allegations, appellant cites decisions dealing with special demurrers prior to the Civil Practice Act of 1966 in which the courts required details to be pleaded in cases of this type bеcause of their nature. In his article on our Civil Practice Act by its principal architеct, E. Freeman Leverett, appearing in 3 Ga. State Bar Jour. 295, 299, said: "Paragraphs (e) and (f) [of § 81A-112] contain the only vestige of the much abused special demurrer long known to Geоrgia practice. The test of a special demurrer and a motion for more dеfinite statement is vastly different, however. A special demurrer lies to make the plaintiff set out the facts more fully so as to enable the defendant to prepare his defense. Georgia Procedure and Practice § 9-5. A motion for more dеfinite statement, however, lies only when the pleading is so indefinite that the defendant is unable to frame an answer thereto, and only with respect to a pleading to which another responsive pleading must be filed. 2 Moore, Federal Practice, par. 12.18 (1), at 2303.”
Thе applicable principle is succinctly stated in the horn-book series book by Charles Alan Wright entitled "Law of Federal Courts” (2d Ed. 1970) in Section 66, p. 277: "Another disfavored motion is the motiоn for a more definite statement. . . If the pleading is sufficiently definite that the opponent can reply to it, the motion for more definite statement should be denied and any pаrticulars that the opponent needs to prepare for trial obtained by depositions, interrogatories, and similar discovery procedures.” The trial judge correсtly followed this rule in overruling the motion seeking particulars.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Called "The Code of 1863,” it was aсtually adopted in 1860. Clark, "The History of the First Georgia Code,” 7 Ga. Bar Assn. Reports 144 (1890).
Some extremists "are protesting that in poker, for example, two kings should not beat two queens,” says Time magazine at page 8 of its issue of August 21, 1972.