Opinion
Thе self-represented plaintiff, Roger Emerick, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his action against the defendant, the town of Glastonbury (town). The plaintiff sought to prevent the demolition of the former Slocomb Mill located on town property. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court (1) improperly granted the town’s motiоn to dismiss the plaintiffs action on the ground of mootness, (2) improperly failed to award him punitive damages for the town’s conduct in demolishing the mill while his action was pending, and (3) violated his due process rights by denying his ex parte motion for a temporary injunction to halt the demolition of the mill. The town claims that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring this action. We affirm the judgment of dismissal on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring this action, and, therefore, we do not reach the issues raised by the plaintiff in this appeal.
The following facts, as alleged in the complaint or as disclosed in the record as undisputed, are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff owns property that abuts the formеr Slocomb Mill in Glastonbury. The town purchased the mill property in 2008 and intended to demolish various buildings and structures at the site. On
The court held a hearing on the town’s amended motion to dismiss on May 9, 2011. At that time, counsel for the town presented the court with reasons as to why the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the town’s actions with respect to the mill property. Counsel also stated that the matter was not ripe for adjudication because the process for obtaining the requisite permits for demolition had not been completed. The court then told the plaintiff that although the amended motion to dismiss had been filed by the town, it was the plaintiffs burden to demonstrate that the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the action.
On September 27, 2011, the town filed its fourth motion to dismiss. At that time, no court decisions had been made with respect to the town’s prior motions to dismiss. In this fourth motion, the town claimеd that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs action because (1) the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and (2) events had occurred since the filing of the plaintiffs complaint that rendered the matter moot. The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the town’s fourth motion to dismiss on November 4, 2011.
On Novеmber 21, 2011, the court held a hearing on the September 27, 2011 motion to dismiss. The court began the hearing by referring to all of the pleadings that the parties had filed subsequent to the May 9, 2011 hearing on the town’s April 4, 2011 amended motion to dismiss, and then asked the parties: “It’s just like it’s a moving target and I’d like to know what—exactly what it is that you’re asking me to decide. ” The town’s counsel responded that the ripeness claim was no longer being asserted because the inland wetlands approval and the demolition application process had been completed. Counsel indicated that the town still was pursuing the plaintiffs failure to exhaust administrative remedies
The corut addressed the plaintiff: “So are you satisfied that you filed everything you wished to file on— as to each of these claims? And right now the claims are standing and mootness.” The plaintiff respоnded: “Yes, Your Honor.” After the court indicated that it would take the matter on the papers, the plaintiff inquired: “May I talk?” When the court answered in the affirmative, the plaintiff voiced his frustration over the fact that his previous applications for a temporary injunction had been denied by the court. He stated that his action was intended to рreserve the mill and that the mill already had been demolished. Although the court was aware that much of the procedure for securing the demolition of the mill had been completed, it did not know until that moment that the mill had been tom down.
On November 22,2011, the court rendered ajudgment of dismissal on the ground of mootness. In its notice to the parties, the court stated that the mill had been substantially demolished on October 18, 2011, and that there was no practical relief that the court could afford the plaintiff.
“A motion to dismiss [for lack of standing] . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court. ... A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction. . . . [0]ur review of the trial court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting grant of the motion to dismiss [is] de novo.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) West Hartford v. Murtha Cullina, LLP,
“[A] party must have standing to assert a claim in order for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. . . . Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capаcity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) R. F. Daddario & Sons, Inc. v. Shelansky,
“Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to еnsure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and
We begin with well settled principles rеgarding standing and its aggrievement component. “Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement exist, classical and statutory. . . . Classical aggrievement requires a two part showing. First, aparty must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the [controversy], as opposed to a general intеrest that all members of the community share. . . . Second, the party must also show that the [alleged conduct] has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Andross v. West Hartford,
“The plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised.” Fink v. Golenbock,
We now review the plaintiffs complaint to determine whether he has alleged facts that, if proven, would constitute aggrievement as a matter of law. See id. Construction of pleadings is a question of law. Kovacs Construction Corp. v. Water Pollution & Control Authority,
The plaintiffs status as an abutting landowner dоes not automatically confer standing in this action. Although abutting landowners are statutorily aggrieved in zoning cases, this is not an administrative appeal
In his appellate reply brief, and during oral argument before this court, the plaintiff argued that he has taxpayer and voter standing. He does not allege in his complaint that he is a registered voter in Glastonbury or that he was qualified to vote at any proposed referendum; see Windham Taxpayers Assn. v. Board of Selectmen,
That allegation, without more, however, is insufficient for purposes of alleging taxрayer standing to bring the present action. “The plaintiff’s status as a taxpayer does not automatically give [him] standing to challenge alleged improprieties in the conduct of the defendant town. . . . The plaintiff must also allege and demonstrate that the allegedly improper municipal conduct cause[d him] to suffer some pecuniаry or other great injury. ... It is not enough for the plaintiff to show
Because the record in this case is sufficient for us to determine that the plaintiff lacked standing, it is unnecessary for us to remand the matter to the trial court. The complaint clearly does nоt allege facts that, if proven, would constitute aggrievement as a matter of law. See Jolly, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
The judgment is affirmed.
Notes
The affidavit of the town manager submitted with the motion averred that the demolition could not occur without the issuance of appropriate permits.
The court addressed the plaintiff as follows: “You understand, Mr. Emer-ick, that you do—even though it’s the [town’s] motion, when it comes to subject matter jurisdiction, that is, thepower of the court to act in apartieular matter, that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof with respect to jurisdiction. So in this case, the challenge has to do with whether or not you have legal standing and—as well as some other claims.”
“The Court: They knocked it down? It’s knocked down already?”
The court reasoned: “Since the primary relief sought was injunctive, accompanied by a request for declaratory relief and a writ of mandamus, the objeсt of which was to preserve the mill until a public referendum could be held, the demolition of the mill has rendered the plaintiffs complaint herein moot.”
The classical aggrievement test is not limited to zoning or other administrative appeals. Andross v. West Hartford, supra,
Parаgraph ten of the plaintiff’s complaint alleges violations of various historic and environmental statutes. Although allegations that the town’s conduct was reasonably likely to have the effect of unreasonably polluting, impairing or destroying the public trust in the air, water or other natural resources could have been considered for рurposes of alleging aggrievement, the plaintiff has expressly stated that “the mill is gone and he is not appealing these statutes. [The plaintiff referenced General Statutes §§ 22a-9, 22a-16, 22a-19a and 29-401]. On other matters raised in this appeal, the plaintiff has standing.” Accordingly, we do not review the facts alleged in paragraph ten to determinе whether they are sufficient for purposes of alleging statutory aggrievement.
“[T]he rationale for disallowing taxpayer suits, absent special circumstances, has been explained by one court as follows: This rule is based on the sound policy ground that without a special injury standing requirement, the courts would in all likelihood be faced with a great number of frivolous lawsuits filed by disgruntled taxpayers who, along with much of the taxpaying public these days, are not entirely pleased with certain of the taxing and spending decisions of their elective representatives. It is felt that absent some showing of special injury as thus defined, the taxpayer’s remedy should be at the polls and not in the courts. Moreover, it has long been recognized that in a representative democracy the public’s representatives in government should ordinarily be relied on to institute the appropriate legal proceedings to prevent the unlawful exercise of the state or county’s taxing and spending power. . . . Dept. of Revenue v. Markham,
It is dispositive that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege voter or taxpayer standing in his complaint. For that reason alone, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs аction. We also note, however, that the plaintiff presented no evidence before the trial court to demonstrate such standing, although he was given the opportunity to do so at the May 9, 2011 and November 21, 2011 hearings. A plaintiff must allege and prove that he has the requisite standing in order for the trial court to have subject matter jurisdiction over his claims. See Jolly, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra,
This court and our Suрreme Court have affirmed a trial court’s judgment of dismissal on the ground of standing rather than the ground relied on by the trial court. In Connecticut Business & Industry Assn., Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care,