Embassy Healthcare v. Bell (Slip Opinion)Embassy Healthcare v. Bell (Slip Opinion)
Lead Opinion
{¶ 2} We conclude that a creditor must present its claim for unpaid necessaries to the decedent's estate under
The Necessaries Doctrine and the Relevant Statutes
{¶ 3} This appeal requires us to examine the interplay between
{¶ 4} We begin with
{¶ 5} Ohio has abolished coverture. See Damm v. Elyria Lodge No. 465, Benevolent Protective Order of Elks ,
{¶ 6} Early versions of
{¶ 7}
(A) Each married person must support the person's self and spouse out of the person's property or by the person's labor. If a married person is unable to do so, the spouse of the married person must assist in the support so far as the spouse is able. * * *
* * *
(C) If a married person neglects to support the person's spouse in accordance with this section, any other person, in good faith, may supply the spouse with necessaries for the support of the spouse and recover the reasonable value of the necessaries supplied from the married person who neglected to support the spouse unless the spouse abandons that person without cause.
{¶ 8} Also at issue here is
Facts And Procedural History
{¶ 9} Embassy operates the nursing facility in which Robert stayed at some point in 2014 before his death. On January 9, 2014, Robert entered into an admission agreement with Embassy under which the facility agreed to provide him with certain goods and services. The agreement states that Robert, as the resident, "is responsible for payment in full of all amounts due and owing to the Facility." Cora signed the agreement as the "Responsible Party," which according to the agreement means that she "is liable for services rendered to the Resident by the Facility to the extent of the Resident's income, assets or resources to which the Responsible Party has legal access." The agreement further states, "Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to require that a Responsible
{¶ 10} On November 25, 2014-six months and three days after Robert's death-Embassy sent a notice to Cora that it was seeking payment from Robert's estate for an outstanding balance of $1,678. Embassy mailed the notice to "The Estate of: Robert Bell, c/o Cora Bell, Fiduciary," and directed the correspondence to the "Personal Representative of the Estate." The body of the letter stated:
You are not personally liable for the account. We are seeking payment from the assets of the decedent's estate. You are not required to use your own assets or assets you owned jointly with the decedent to pay this debt.
{¶ 11} As of November 22, 2014, or six months after Robert's death, no estate had been opened for Robert, and Embassy did not seek to have an estate administrator appointed for the purpose of presenting a claim for unpaid services to Robert's estate.
{¶ 12} On June 29, 2015, Embassy filed a complaint in Franklin Municipal Court in Warren County, Ohio, naming Cora as the defendant and seeking payment from Cora for Robert's unpaid expenses under
{¶ 13} Cora moved for summary judgment, arguing that Embassy could not prove one of the elements of its claim under
{¶ 14} The trial court overruled Embassy's objections to the magistrate's decision and granted summary judgment in favor оf Cora, but for a different reason. The court concluded that Robert's debt to Embassy became a debt of his estate by operation of law and that Cora was not jointly and severally liable for her husband's obligation. Embassy was therefore required to seek payment from the estate under
{¶ 15} A divided panel of the Twelfth District reversed, holding that
{¶ 16} We accepted Cora's discretionary appeal,
(1) The plain language ofR.C. 2117.06(C) mandates a claim underR.C. 3103.03 for necessaries supplied tо a decedent must be presented to the estate and failure to do so bars the claim against both the estate and the spouse.
(2) By definition, a creditor who fails to timely present its claim to the decedent's estate cannot prove, as a matter of law, the decedent is unable to pay the claim such that a claim cannot be brought against the spouse.
Analysis
{¶ 17} The Twelfth District concluded that Embassy could pursue its claim for Robert's unpaid nursing-faсility expenses against Cora individually under
{¶ 18} We begin with the plain language of
{¶ 19} The first sentence of
{¶ 20} Our conclusion is consistent with previous decisions in which we construed a former version of
{¶ 22} Prior to Kinkaid , we concluded that G.C. Section 7997, the predecessor to
{¶ 23} Courts in other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions regarding the doctrine of necessaries. See Hickory Creek at Connersville v. Estate of Combs ,
{¶ 24} As alleged in Embassy's complaint, its claim for payment arises from its admission agreement with Robert. And that agreement bound Robert as the payor: "Resident is responsible for payment in full of all amounts due and owing to the Facility." Although Cora signed the agreement as "Responsible Party," the
{¶ 25}
The presentment requirements in
{¶ 26} Having concluded that Robert retained primary liability for his unpaid debt with Embassy, we now consider the statutory mechanism that Embassy must use to collect on that debt. In order to prevail on a necessaries claim, Embassy concedes, it must show that Robert, as the debtor spouse, was unable to pay for the necessaries that Embassy provided to him. Embassy argues, however, that it can make that showing in an action under
{¶ 27} Embassy's argument, however, contradicts the plain language of
{¶ 28}
{¶ 29} As we stated earlier, Embassy's claim arose from its contract with Robert. Upon his death, Robert's contraсtual obligations became the obligations of his estate. See Osborne v. Osborne ,
{¶ 30} In fact, Embassy's November 25, 2014 correspondence acknowledged that Robert's estate, and not Cora, was liable for Robert's unpaid expenses. Embassy mailed the correspondence to "The Estate of: Robert Bell" in care of Cora as the presumed fiduciary and addressed the salutation to the "Personal Representative of the Estate." In the body of the letter, Embassy stated that it was "seeking payment from the assets of the decedent's estate" and that Cora "[was] not personally liable for the account."
{¶ 31} Unfortunately for Embassy, the six-month deadline to prеsent its claim to Robert's estate expired three days earlier, on November 22, 2014. By that date, no estate had been opened for Robert, and Embassy could have but did not seek appointment of an estate administrator. "[I]t is incumbent" upon a creditor with a claim against an estate to procure the appointment of an administrator under
{¶ 32} The dissent contends that
{¶ 33} The dissent also suggests various scenarios that involve creditors other than those seeking payment for providing necessaries, and it argues that our holding will affect creditors in those situations. Our holding, however, addresses only the statutory language and faсtual situation before us in this appeal. Here, we have a necessaries creditor with a contractual claim against a decedent-a claim that became the obligation of the estate upon the decedent's death. Our holding goes no further than to address these circumstances.
{¶ 34} We conclude that Embassy was required to present its claim for unpaid necessaries to the decedent's estate under
Judgment reversed.
O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.
Fischer, J., dissents.
DeWine, J., dissents, with an opinion.
Dissenting Opinion
{¶ 35} The majority today reimagines Ohio's necessaries statute,
{¶ 36} Almost lost in the majority opinion is that resolution of this case simply requires the construction of two lines of statutory text. The necessaries statute provides that if a married person who is able to do so fails to support her spouse, "any other person * * * may supply the spouse with necessaries * * * and recover the reasonable value of the necessaries supplied from the married person who neglected to support the spouse."
{¶ 37} It is true that before recovering payment from Cora, Embassy must show that Robert himself was unable to pay.
{¶ 39} According to the majority's new rule, when an estate has not been opened, a creditor who wishes to pursue a necessaries claim must undertake the burden of having an estate opened under
{¶ 40} The majority gets to its new rule through a novel construction of
"creditors having claims against an estate," not just to creditors who actually seek payment from an estate. * * * A creditor with an enforceable claim against a decedent cannot opt out of the requirements ofR.C. 2117.06. That person is a "creditor" with a "claim" that must be presented timely to the estate.
Majority opinion at ¶ 32, quoting
{¶ 41} In reaching this result, the majority reads the phrase "[a]ll creditors having claims against an estate" out of context.
{¶ 42} The majority's misreading of the statutory scheme is put intо sharp focus when one considers the implications for cases that go beyond necessaries. Imagine a tort action in which a decedent and another person are jointly and severally liable for injuries to a plaintiff. Under the majority's rendering of
{¶ 43} If the majority really means what it says-that the requirements of
{¶ 44} This is all the more reason why we ought to stick to what the statutes in question actually say. Under a plain reading of its terms,