EMBASSY HEALTHCARE, d.b.а. CARLISLE MANOR HEALTHCARE, APPELLEE, v. BELL, APPELLANT.
Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-4912
Supreme Court of Ohio
December 12, 2018
2018-Ohio-4912
FRENCH, J.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Embassy Healthcare v. Bell, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-4912.] NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. (No. 2017-1031—Submitted July 18, 2018—Decided December 12, 2018.) APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Warren County, No. CA2016-08-072, 2017-Ohio-1499.
FRENCH, J.
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we consider whether a creditor‘s failure to present its claim for unpaid expenses to a decedent‘s estate within the six-month statute of limitations in
{¶ 2} We conclude that a creditor must present its claim for unpaid necessaries to the decedent‘s estate under
The Necessaries Doctrine and the Relevant Statutes
{¶ 3} This appeal requires us to examine the interplay between
{¶ 4} We begin with
{¶ 6} Early versions of
{¶ 7}
(A) Each married person must support the person‘s self and spouse out of the person‘s property or by the person‘s labor. If a married person is unable to do so, the spouse of the married person must assist in the support so far as the spouse is able. * * *
* * *
(C) If a married person neglects to support the person‘s spouse in accordance with this section, any other person, in good faith, may supply the spouse with necessaries for the support of the spouse and recover the reasonable value of the necessaries supplied from the married person who neglected to support the spouse unless the spouse abandons that person without cause.
{¶ 8} Also at issue here is
Facts And Procedural History
{¶ 9} Embassy operates the nursing facility in which Robert stayed at some point in 2014 before his death. On January 9, 2014, Robert entered into an admission agreement with Embassy under which the facility agreed to provide him with certain goods and services. The agreement states that Robert, as the resident, “is responsible for payment in full of all amounts due and owing to the Facility.” Cora signed the agreement as the “Responsible Party,” which according to the agreement means that she “is liable for services rendered to the Resident by the Facility to the extent of the Resident‘s income, assets or resources to which the Responsible Party has legal access.” The agreement further states, “Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to require that a Responsible Party is in any way personally liable for payment for services rendered by the Facility to the Resident.”
{¶ 10} On November 25, 2014—six months and three days after Robert‘s death—Embassy sent a notice to Cora that it was seeking payment from Robert‘s estate for an outstanding balance of $1,678. Embassy mailed the notice to “The Estate of Robert Bell, c/o Cora Bell, Fiduciary,” and directed the correspondence to the “Personal Representative of the Estate.” The body of the letter stated:
You are not personally liable for the account. We are seeking payment from the assets of the decedent‘s estate. You are
not required to use your own assets or assets you owned jointly with the decedent to pay this debt.
{¶ 11} As of November 22, 2014, or six months after Robert‘s death, no estate had been opened for Robert, and Embassy did not seek to have an estate administrator appointed for the purpose of presenting a claim for unpaid services to Robert‘s estate.
{¶ 12} On June 29, 2015, Embassy filed a complaint in Franklin Municipal Court in Warren County, Ohio, naming Cora as the defendant and seeking payment from Cora for Robert‘s unpaid expenses under
{¶ 13} Cora moved for summary judgment, arguing that Embassy could not prove one of the elements of its claim under
{¶ 14} The trial court overruled Embassy‘s objections to the magistrate‘s decision and granted summary judgment in favor of Cora, but for a different reason. The court concluded that Robert‘s debt to Embassy became a debt of his estate by operation of law and that Cora was not jointly and severally liable for her husband‘s obligation. Embassy was therefore required to seek payment from the estate under
{¶ 15} A divided panel of the Twelfth District reversed, holding that
{¶ 16} We accepted Cora‘s discretionary appeal, 151 Ohio St.3d 1502, 2018-Ohio-365, 90 N.E.3d 945, which presents two propositions of law:
(1) The plain language of
R.C. 2117.06(C) mandates a claim underR.C. 3103.03 for necessaries supplied to a decedent must be presented to the estate and failure to do so bars the claim against both the estate and the spouse.(2) By dеfinition, a creditor who fails to timely present its claim to the decedent‘s estate cannot prove, as a matter of law, the decedent is unable to pay the claim such that a claim cannot be brought against the spouse.
Analysis
{¶ 17} The Twelfth District concluded that Embassy could pursue its claim for Robert‘s unpaid nursing-facility expenses against Cora individually under
R.C. 3103.03 imposes primary liability on each married person for his or her own debts
{¶ 18} We begin with the plain language of
{¶ 19} The first sentence of
{¶ 20} Our conclusion is consistent with previous decisions in which we construed a former version of
{¶ 21} We then concluded that the decedent‘s wife was liable under
{¶ 22} Prior to Kinkaid, we concluded that G.C. Section 7997, the predecessor to
{¶ 23} Courts in other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions regarding the doctrine of necessaries. See Hickory Creek at Connersville v. Estate of Combs, 992 N.E.2d 209, 210, 212 (Ind.Ct.App.2013) (the doctrine of necessaries holds “each spouse * * * primarily liable for his or her independent debts“). A creditor must first seek satisfaction from the income and property of the debtor spouse, “[a]nd only if those resources are insufficient may a creditor seek satisfaction from the non-contracting spouse.” Id. at 213, citing Bartrom v. Adjustment Bur., Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1, 8 (Ind.1993). See also Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Baum‘s Estate, 84 N.J. 137, 141, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980) (“a judgment creditor must first seek satisfaction from the income and other property of the spouse who incurred the debt“); Cheshire Med. Ctr. v. Holbrook, 140 N.H. 187, 190, 663 A.2d 1344 (1995) (provider of necessaries must first seek payment from the spouse who received goods or services before pursuing collection from the other spouse).
{¶ 24} As alleged in Embassy‘s complaint, its claim for payment arises from its admission agreement with Robert. And that agreement bound Robert as the payor: “Resident is responsible for payment in full of all amounts due and owing to the Facility.” Although Cora signed the agreement as “Responsible Party,” the agreement expressly states that the responsible party is not “in any way personally liable for payment for services rendered by the Facility to the Resident.”
{¶ 25}
The presentment requirements in R.C. 2117.06 apply to Embassy‘s claim
{¶ 26} Having concluded that Robert retained primary liability for his unpaid debt with Embassy, we now consider the statutory mechanism that Embassy must use to collect on that debt. In order to prevail on a necessaries claim, Embassy concedes, it must show that Robert, as the debtor spouse, was unable to pay for the necessaries that Embassy provided to him. Embassy argues, however, that it can make that showing in an action under
{¶ 27} Embassy‘s argument, however, contradicts the plain language of
{¶ 28}
{¶ 29} As we stated earlier, Embassy‘s claim arose from its contract with Robert. Upon his death, Robert‘s contractual obligations became the obligations of his estate. See Osborne v. Osborne, 114 Ohio App.3d 412, 414, 683 N.E.2d 365 (2d Dist.1996) (“Obligations incurrеd by a deceased during his or her lifetime become debts of his or her estate after death by operation of law“). Accord D‘Amore v. Mathews, 193 Ohio App.3d 575, 2011-Ohio-2853, 952 N.E.2d 1212, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.). As a creditor with a contractual claim against Robert, Embassy should have presented its claim to Robert‘s estate in accordance with
{¶ 30} In fact, Embassy‘s November 25, 2014 correspondence acknowledged that Robert‘s estate, and not Cora, was liable for Robert‘s unpaid expenses. Embassy mailed the correspondence to “The Estate of Robert Bell” in care of Cora as the presumed fiduciary and addressed the salutation to the “Personal Representative of the Estate.” In the body of the letter, Embassy stated that it was “seeking payment from the assets of the decedent‘s estate” and that Cora “[was] not personally liable for the account.”
{¶ 31} Unfortunately for Embassy, the six-month deadline to present its claim to Robert‘s estate expired three days earlier, on November 22, 2014. By that date no estate had been opеned for Robert, and Embassy could have but did not seek appointment of an estate administrator. “[I]t is incumbent” upon a creditor with a claim against an estate to procure the appointment of an administrator under
{¶ 32} The dissent contends that
{¶ 33} The dissent also suggests various scenarios that involve creditors other than those seeking payment for providing necessaries, and it argues that our holding will affect creditors in those situations. Our holding, however, addresses only the statutory language and factual situation before us in this appeal. Here, we have a necessaries creditor with a contractual claim against a decedent—a claim that became the obligation of the estate uрon the decedent‘s death. Our holding goes no further than to address these circumstances.
Conclusion
{¶ 34} We conclude that Embassy was required to present its claim for unpaid necessaries to the decedent‘s estate under
Judgment reversed.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and O‘DONNELL, KENNEDY, and DEGENARO, JJ., concur.
FISCHER, J., dissents.
DEWINE, J., dissents, with an opinion.
DEWINE, J., dissenting.
{¶ 35} The majority today reimagines Ohio‘s necessaries statute,
{¶ 36} Almost lost in the majority opinion is that resolution of this case simply requires the construсtion of two lines of statutory text. The necessaries statute provides that if a married person who is able to do so fails to support her spouse, “any other person * * * may supply the spouse with necessaries * * * and recover the reasonable value of the necessaries supplied from the married person who neglected to support the spouse.”
{¶ 37} It is true that before recovering payment from Cora, Embassy must show that Robert himself was unable to pay.
{¶ 38} Instead of looking to the plain language, the majority grafts
{¶ 39} According to the majority‘s new rule, when an estate has not been opened, a creditor who wishes to pursue a necessaries claim must undertake the burden of having an estate opened under
{¶ 40} The majority gets to its new rule through a novel construction of
“creditors having claims against an estate,” not just to creditors who actually seek payment from an estate. * * * A creditor with an enforceable claim against a decedent cannot opt out of the requirements of
R.C. 2117.06 . That person is a “creditor” with a “claim” that must be presented timely to the estate.
Majority opinion at ¶ 32, quoting
{¶ 41} In reaching this result, the majority reads the phrase “[a]ll creditors having claims against an estate” out of context.
{¶ 42} The majority‘s misreading of the statutory scheme is put into sharp focus when one considers the implications for cases that go beyond necessaries. Imagine a tort action in which a decedent and another person are jointly and severally liable for injuries to a plaintiff. Under the majority‘s rendering of
{¶ 44} This is the all more reason why we ought to stick to what the statutes in question actually say. Under a plain reading of its terms,
Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L.P.A., Daniel A. Friedlander, and Jeffrey Sobeck; Tucker Ellis, L.L.P., and Susan M. Audey, for appellee.
Miriam H. Sheline, for appellant.
Cathlene Beck and Scott E. Torguson, urging reversal for amicus curiaе the Legal Aid Society of Columbus.
Rebecca Steinhauser and Heather Hall, urging reversal for amicus curiae Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Inc.
Katherine B. Hollingsworth and Thomas Mlakar, urging reversal for amicus curiae the Legal Aid Society of Cleveland.
Andrew D. Neuhauser and Michael F. Harrington, urging reversal for amicus curiae Southeastern Ohio Legal Services.
John M. Petit, urging reversal for amicus curiae Community Legal Aid Services.