Eman-Henshaw v. Park Plaza HospitalEman-Henshaw v. Park Plaza Hospital
Park Plaza Hospital appeals the denial of its motion to compel arbitration of Francis F. Eman-Henshaw‘s Title VII claims. We REVERSE and REMAND.
I.
In 1993, Eman-Henshaw, who was employed at Park Plaza, signed an agreement to arbitrate “any and all events that arise out of employment ....” This agreement is contained in the acknowledgment
In April 1995, Eman-Henshaw filed this action against Park Plaza, claiming that, in violation of Title VII, he was denied a promotion in August 1993 because of sex and national origin discrimination. (All three applicants were black, Park Plaza employees; one was a woman; and Eman-Henshaw was the only Nigerian. The woman received the promotion.) Park Plaza moved to compel arbitration pursuant to § 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),
II.
Park Plaza appeals pursuant to
A.
Eman-Henshaw contends that the district court had discretion to deny the motion because § 4 applies only when the party seeking arbitration files an original judicial proceeding to compel arbitration, not where, as here, the party files a motion in a pending action. But, he cites no authority for that interpretation, and makes no attempt to distinguish cases in which § 4 has been invoked through a motion filed by the defendant in a
B.
The FAA applies to contracts “evidencing a transaction involving commerce“.
Eman-Henshaw maintains that the FAA is inapplicable because the record contains no evidence of interstate commerce involvement. To the contrary, it contains evidence that Park Plaza engages in interstate business activities such as receiving goods and services from out-of-state vendors, treating out-of-state patients, and receiving payment from out-of-state insurance carriers for services rendered. Eman-Henshaw‘s employment as a food service worker at the hospital facilitates its interstate commerce activities. Accordingly, the FAA applies.
C.
D.
Eman-Henshaw maintains that Park Plaza waived its right to enforce the arbitration agreement, or is estopped to assert that right, because it refused to arbitrate his grievance. “Waiver will be found when the party seeking arbitration substantially invokes the judicial process to the detriment or prejudice of the other party.” Walker v. J. C. Bradford & Co., 938 F.2d 575, 577 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But, “[w]aiver of arbitration is not a favored finding, and there is a presumption against it.” Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656, 661 (5th Cir. 1995) (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). “A party asserting waiver
The employee handbook provides that employees who are dissatisfied with the internal resolution of their grievances may use arbitration as the final step in the complaint process and may “request Alternative Dispute Resolution in writing“. Because Eman-Henshaw does not claim that he ever requested arbitration of his grievance, Park Plaza could not have refused to arbitrate it. Accordingly, Eman-Henshaw has not met his “heavy burden” of showing that Park Plaza waived its right to arbitration.
E.
Finally, Eman-Henshaw maintains that the agreement to arbitrate is not enforceable because the consideration for his promises failed when Park Plaza declined to arbitrate his grievance. Again, we disagree. In exchange for agreeing to submit all employment-related disputes to arbitration, Eman-Henshaw received consideration in the form of continued salary and employment.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the order denying the motion to compel arbitration is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Park Plaza‘s motion to supplement the record is DENIED.