Lead Opinion
In 2006, Lоuisiana built a new state-of-the-art prison facility to house death-row inmates. The cells in that facility, located in Angola, Louisiana, lack air conditioning. Three inmates sued the Louisiana Department of Corrections (the “State”) and various prison officials in their official capacities,
Although the trial court’s findings of deliberate indifference by prison officials to these particular inmates’ serious heat-related vulnerability suffice to support a constitutional violation, the scope of its injunctive relief exceeds our prior precedent, Gates v. Cook,
BACKGROUND
Angola’s 25,000 square-foot death-row facility
Although death-row inmates spend twenty-three hours a day in their cells, in-cell sinks provide unlimited access to potable water. Inmates also enjoy access to ice. Each housing tier has an ice chest, which the Angola staff maintains. Inmates can only access the chest themselves during the one hour a day they arе allowed to walk the tiers. The rest of the time inmates depend on guards or other inmates for ice.
The three plaintiffs here, Elzie Ball, Nathaniel Code, and James Magee, are longtime residents of Angola’s death-row facility. Magee lives on tier A, while Ball and Code live on tier H. Each suffers from various conditions: all three prisoners have hypertension; Ball has diabetes and is obese; Code is also obese and has hepatitis; and Magee is depressed and has high cholesterol. They take a variety of medications to control their ailments. According to the inmates, the extreme heat, not ameliorated by air conditioning, exacerbates their ailments, causing dizziness, headaches, and cramps.
Each inmate filed administrative complaints explaining that the heat was exacerbating his conditions and requesting air conditioning. The Defendants denied their requests. Internal appeals of the rulings were unsuccessful. Consequently, in June 2013, the inmates sued the Louisiana Department of Corrections and prison officials asserting claims under the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment and violations of the ADA and RA. As relief, the prisoners sought an injunction requiring the state to keep the heat index at or below 88° F.
A month later, the district court appointed United States Risk Management (“USRM”) to monitor the temperature at the facility. During the monitoring period, July 15 to August 5, the temperature on tiers A and H ranged from 78.26° to 92.66° F.
After the data collection period, the district court held a three-day bench trial. Experts testified about the Plaintiffs’ medical conditions, the conditions on death row, the design and construction of the facility, and the effectiveness of current practices and procedures. The judge personally toured the facility to observe the conditions first-hand. Several months later, the district court issued a 100-page ruling that concluded the conditions on death row are cruel and unusual because
DISCUSSION
The parties present four issues. The Defendants assert that the district court made several erroneous evidentiary rulings, wrongly found a constitutional violation, and issued an overbroad injunction contrary to the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3626, and Gates v. Cook,
I. Evidence
The State’s evidentiary objections are easily resolved. It contends that the heat index, on which the district court based its ruling, is inherently unreliable and inappropriate in prison settings. It also contends that the court should not have taken judicial notice of other facts without providing the State an opportunity to respond. The objections are meritless.
We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Battle ex rel. Battle v. Mem’l Hosp. at Gulfport,
The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of or relying on the heat index. The thrust of the State’s argument is that because heat index is a derived number, courts cannot use it as a basis for ruling. Although the State’s expert meteorologist, Jay Grymes, testified that the heat index is “not a real number,” the rest of his testimony bolsters the use of the heat index. For example, Grymes testified that the heat index is a “guideline number” and that he “provide[s] heat index as a guide to [his] viewers to make better decisions.” Dr. Susi Vassallo, the Plaintiffs’ expert, testified that peer reviewed scientific articles measure the correlation between heat index and morbidity and mortality. This court also has relied on the heat index before. See Gates,
The State’s complaint about the court’s taking judicial notice of publicly available evidence is similarly weak. The court cited an article from the National Weather Service's website called Heat: A Major Killer and referred to temperature readings from the Baton Rouge Regional Airport.
Because the district court did not warn the State that it would be taking judicial notice of these materials, the State complains it was “deprived of the opportunity to request an opportunity to be heard regarding the data.” Rule 201, however, expressly contemplates courts’ taking judicial notice without prior warning. See Fed.R.Evid. 201(e) (“If the court takes ju
II. Eighth Amendment
Turning to the Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims, the Constitution “ ‘does not mandate comfortable prisons,’ but neither does it permit inhumane ones.” Farmer v. Brennan,
The predicate findings of a substantial risk of serious harm and officials’ deliberate indifference to the risk are factual findings reviewed for clear error. Gates,
For various reasons, the State asserts that the Plaintiffs are not at substantial risk of serious harm and its officials were not deliberately indifferent to this risk. Further, the State contends that, because it provides the remedies this court mandated in Gates, there can be no Eighth Amendment violation as a matter of law.
Based mainly on Dr. Vassallo’s testimony, the district court found that the heat puts these plaintiffs 'at substantial risk of serious harm. According to Dr. Vassallo, the cardiovascular system is critical for maintaining normal body temperature. Dr. Vassallo testified that both hypertension and diabetes can adversely affect this critical system. “The heart has to bе able to pump very hard to meet the demands of heat.” Hypertension generally can decrease “the ability of the blood vessels to open and close.” As a result, those vessels are “not as compliant as they should be,” “they can’t open like they should and have to in response to heat,” and blood therefore cannot circulate to cool the body. Therefore, people with hypertension generally can have a hard time controlling their body temperature. The same is true for people with diabetes. Cardiovascular disease, which can result from diabetes, can harden the arteries and blood vessels, thus inhibiting circulation. As a result, diabetics can lose ability to circulatе blood properly and thus the ability to maintain normal body temperature.
The treatments for hypertension can further inhibit these prisoners’ ability to regulate body temperature. Specifically, beta blockers, which help control blood pressure, can compound the effects hypertension has on the cardiovascular system. Beta blockers prevent blood vessels from dilating properly while at the same time “decreasing] the heart’s ability to pump as hard and to meet the requirements of heat or exercise.” Likewise, diuretics decrease the total amount of water and salt in the body, resulting in less fluid around which the heart can contract. According to Dr. Vassallo, without sufficient fluid to contract, the hеart is unable to meet the increased demands heat places on the cardiovascular system. Therefore, even if prisoners receive proper care for their ailments, they may be at increased risk of heat stroke. This evidence of the Plaintiffs’ heightened vulnerability to high temperatures, combined with the USRM temperature data showing the high temperatures on tiers A and H, led the court to find that the Plaintiffs are at substantial risk of serious harm.
The State argues that the totality of the record evidence refutes Dr. Vassallo’s opinion. Specifically, the district court discounted the State’s arguments that no death-row prisoner has ever suffered a heat-related incident; these prisoners’ medical records show no signs of heat-related illness; the prisoners’ poor dietary choices and failure to exercise caused their health problems; and the prisoners’ suffer high blood pressure all year, not just in the summer months. Thus, the State contends, the prisoners do not suffer an unreasonable risk of serious heat-related injury at all.
These facts fail to show that the district court clearly erred. First, that no one at Angola, including these plaintiffs, has ever had a heat-related incident and that these prisoner’s medical records do not show signs of heat-related illness are insufficient. To prove unconstitutional prison conditions, inmates need not show that death or serious injury has already occurred. See Helling,
Second, because the Plaintiffs forego exercise and overeat junk food, the State asserts that their ailments and any accompanying risk are their own creation. Prison canteen records confirm these inmates’ consumption of unhealthy foods with high sugar and salt content. Although this may be true, the evidence is at best conjectural about the connection between these plaintiffs’ conditions and their lifestyle. We are constrained to agree with the district court’s finding that, canteen food comprises only part of the prisoners’ diets, and their medical conditions arise from a combination of factors, many of which are outside their control. Thus, the district court did not clearly err when, in the face of conflicting evidence, it found that these prisoners are at substantial risk of serious harm.
Finally, that the prisoners suffer year-round high blood pressure is simply irrelevant to the district court’s substantial-risk finding. The prisoners’ complaint is that their high blоod pressure places them at an abnormally high risk of heat stroke during Louisiana’s extended hot season. The lower risk in other months does not offset their vulnerability during the summer any more than an allergy to insect bites ceases to exist when the bugs are dormant in winter.
The second element for Eighth Amendment liability requires “prison officials] [to] have a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’ ” Farmer,
The district court relied on a variety of evidence showing that the State knew of and disregarded a substantial risk to the Plaintiffs. Medical personnel routinely monitor prisoners and administer medication daily. Correctional officers “closely monitor” the temperature on death row, recording the temperature every two hours. Defendant Norwood, moreover, testified that the prison maintains a list of, and monitors more closely, inmates particularly susceptible to heat-related illness. None of the Plaintiffs was on the list, although Norwood personally reviewed the ARPs for each prisoner, inspected each prisoner’s medical records, interviewed both Ball and Code, and admits Magee should have been on the list. Defendant Cain admitted that he was always thinking about “how to overcome the heat” and that he considered adding extra fans and ice on the tiers. Most strikingly, after this suit was filed, and during the court-ordered monitoring period the Defendants surreptitiously installed awnings and began soaking some of the tiers’ exterior walls with
Yet the State complains that the deliberate indifference finding is fundamentally flawed because the district court relied solely on the prisoners’ administrative remedy requests, which are required under the PLRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). If that is sufficient to prove deliberate indifference, the State continues, then there is no need for a court to separately analyze the deliberate indifference prong. As a statutory necessity, see Gonzalez v. Seal,
We agree with the Defendants’ premise — a request for administrative relief cannot alоne prove deliberate indifference. A request for administrative relief is at best only circumstantial evidence that a prison official is aware of facts from which he can deduce a risk of harm; it is not even particularly strong evidence of that. Because grievances are essentially pleadings, not evidence, they must have independent verification before they become probative. Separating the few meritorious complaints from the mountain of frivolous complaints is as difficult work for prison officials as for federal courts. A legitimate complaint can go unrecognized by even the most diligent official. As a result, a prison administrator who has received an administrative remedy request is nоt necessarily made aware, without faetual corroboration, that there is a substantial risk of serious harm.
Although the State’s premise is correct, its conclusion that the district court’s deliberate indifference finding is erroneous does not follow. The district court did not base its finding solely on the prisoners’ administrative requests, but on the totality of the record evidence. There is more than enough, particularly in light of the State’s attempt to cool down the cells with awnings and misting without telling the court, to prove subjective awareness of a substantial risk of serious harm. Therefore, the district court’s deliberate indifference finding is not clearly erroneous.
Even if it cannot overcome the district court’s factual findings, the State argues that this court’s decision in Gates v. Cook precludes liability. Gates upheld an injunction requiring Mississippi to equip each cell with fans, provide inmates with additional access to ice water, and allow daily showers when the heat index in the cells exceeded
The district court, however, demonstrated that Gates is distinguishable. Where Gates approved fans for each cell, each fan in Angola’s death row serves two cells. Ball v. LeBlanc,
Based on its findings of fact, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that housing these prisoners in very hot cells without sufficient access to heat-relief measures, while knowing that each suffers from conditions that render him extremely vulnerable to serious heat-related injury, violates the Eighth Amendment.
III. Disability Claims
The inmates assert that the State’s failure to alleviate the heat violates their rights to a reasonable аccommodation for their “disabilities” under the ADA and RA.
We review the district court’s conclusions of law de novo, and its factual findings for clear error. Lightbourn v. Cnty. Of El Paso, Tex.,
Under both the ADA and RA,
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,*597 concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.
Id. § 12102(2)(A). Second, a major life activity includes “the operation of a major bodily function.” Id. § 12102(2)(B). Such functions include, but are not limited to:
the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.
Id. The prisoners can prove themselves disabled if their ailments substantially limit either a major life activity or the operation of a major bodily function.
The prisoners point out that the district court considered whether they are disabled only under the first definition of major life activities; it did not consider whether their impairments affect a major bodily function. We agree. The district court quoted only the first definition of a disability, but it overlooked that “a major life activity also includes the operation of a major bodily function.” Id. § 12102(2)(B). The district court also partially relied on Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams,
Although this error may have affected the district court’s determination, the question remains whether any evidence supports the prisoners’ disability claims. The prisoners argue that “thermoregulation” is a major life activity, there is ample evidence in the record showing their thermoregulatory functions are impaired, and therefore they are disabled.
Assuming arguendo that therm-oregulation is a major life activity,
That the record is devoid of such evidence is unsurprising. Over the course of the three-day trial, there is hardly any mention of the prisoners’ disability claims. Thе overwhelming majority of the testimony related to the future risk of heatstroke, not the prisoners’ present inability to maintain regular body temperature. As a result, the medical testimony focused generally on the risks to individuals with the same ailments as these prisoners, not on any limitations the prisoners presently experience. The prisoners’ counsel, moreover, never asked the three medical experts whether the prisoners’ thermoregu-latory systems are actually impaired, probably because evidence in the record precludes any such assertion. This lapse is
IV. The Injunction
To remedy the Eighth Amendment violation, the district court ordered Louisiana to “develop a plan to reduce and maintain the heat index in the Angola death row tiers at or below 88 degrees Fahrenheit.” Ball,
This court reviews permanent injunctions for abuse of discretion. Symetra Life Ins. Co. v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd.,
The court did not abuse its discretion by deciding to issue an injunction. The State’s first argument is that an injunction is improper because conditions to which these prisoners were subjected do not violate the Eighth Amendment. This contention fails in light of our sustaining the district court’s Eighth Amendment analysis. Moreover, in Gates as in other cases, courts have upheld injunctions in Eighth Amendment cases alleging unreasonably risky exposure to extreme temperatures. See Graves v. Arpaio,
The scope of the injunction is another matter. The PLRA greatly limits a court’s ability to fashion injunctive relief. Before a district court can award such relief, it must find that “such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further .than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive' means necessary to correct the violation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). The court must also “give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.”' Id. If, after making the neces
The district court’s injunction violates the PLRA in two ways. First, the district court ordered a type of relief — air conditioning — that is unnecessary to correct the Eighth Amendment violation. Under the PLRA, plaintiffs are not entitled to the most effective available remedy; they are entitled to a remedy that eliminates the constitutional injury. See Westefer v. Neal,
The district court also erred because it awarded relief facility-wide, instead of limiting such relief to Ball, Code, and Magee. The district court apparently understood that it could not order facility-wide relief. At the start of trial, the district court said:
This is not, contrary to widespread belief, an effort to require the state to install air-conditioning for all of the tiers that house all death row inmates. I think the application for injunctive relief made clear that it’s only these three inmates that are of issue. And so, of course, the evidence in this case will pertain to any facts that are relevant as to these three.... plaintiffs and these three plaintiffs only. This is not a class action lawsuit. This is not, again, an effort to seek relief for anyone other than these three inmates.
It is unclear why the district court changed its mind when it fashioned the injunction. The PLRÁ limits relief to the particular plaintiffs before the court. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). This is not a class action; Ball, Code, and Magee are the only plaintiffs before the court. As a result, any relief must apply only to them, if possible. Brown v. Plata,
Nevertheless, the district court ordered relief to all 85 death-row inmates because “the Defendants may move any death row inmate to a different tier and/or cell at any time.” Ball,
Because the district court’s injunction provides an unnecessary type of reliéf and applies beyond these three Plaintiffs, it violates the PLRA. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion.
Finally, we note the substantial disparity. between the relief ordered in Gates and the scope of the injunction in this case. The Gates court did not mandate a maximum heat index applicable in the Mississippi prison. It required particular heat measures, including fans, ice water, ice, and showers, “if the heat index reaches 90 degrees or above.” Gates,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s resolution of the Eighth Amendment and disability claims, but VACATE and REMAND the district court’s injunction for reconsideration under the principles stated here.
Notes
.The officials include James M. LeBlanc, Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections; Nathan Burl Cain, Warden of the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola; and Angela Norwood, Assistant Warden in charge of death row. We refer to all appellants collectively as "the State” because suit against officials in their official capacity only is essentially against the State of Louisiana.
. Our issuance of this ruling renders moot the Plaintiffs' request that we lift the stay pending appeal.
. The death row unit is one of several buildings collectively known as the "Louisiana State Penitentiary" or "Angola.” Only the death-row facility is implicated here, however.
. Inmates can distribute ice to other inmates during the one hour they are allowed to walk the tiers. If, however, those inmates spend their free hour in recreation or showering, then the other inmates may not receive ice.
. USRM monitored the temperature on all the tiers. But because the Plaintiffs only reside on tiers A and H, and because this is not a class-action, only readings from those tiers are relevant to this appeal.
. We emphasize, however, that the finding of substantial risk regarding a heat-related injury is tied to thе individual health conditions of these inmates.
. Even then, obtaining ice is no guarantee. The record suggests that the ice machine occasionally breaks down leaving the tier ice chests empty.
. On appeal, the prisoners also assert a disparate-impact claim. But the prisoners' complaint does not allege a disparate-impact claim and, as far as we can tell, this appeal is the first time the prisoners have asserted such a claim. "It is a bedrock principle of appellate review that claims raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered.” Stewart Glass & Mirror, Inc. v. U.S. Auto Glass Disc. Ctr., Inc.,
. To succeed on a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the disability and its consequential limitations were known by the covered entity; and (3) the entity failed to make reasonable accommodations. Neely v. PSEG Tex., Ltd. P'ship,
.The RA incorporates the ADA definition of disability by reference. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B). Accordingly, if the prisoners are disabled, they are disabled under both statutes.
. The prisoners urge this court to hold that thermoregulation is a major bodily function (and thus a major life activity) because the ADA’s list is non-exhaustive. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B). Before the passage of the ADAAA, this court left undecided whether "the regulation of body temperature constitutes a major life activity under the ADA.” EEOC v. Agro Distribution, LLC,
. Ball also argues that he is disabled because diabetes impairs his endocrine system and his sight. Although this might be true, that Ball’s endocrine system and sight are impaired does not entitle him to relief from the heat. Only if Ball’s diabetes limits his ability to thermoregulate, can Ball get the only relief he requested — an order requiring Louisiana to keep the prison at or below 88 degrees. As for that claim — that Ball’s diabetes impairs thermoregulation — there is no evidence in the record.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I agree with almost all of the opinion, but I would affirm the injunction which in principal only orders the heat index in the Angola death row tiers to be maintained below 88 degrees.