89 Ala. 477 | Ala. | 1889
Section 20 of the charter of the city of Birmingham, after conferring power on the Mayor and Aldermen to assess, levy and collect taxes on all property in the city for each year, not exceeding one half of one per centum on the value thereof, and providing that the assessments are to be made by the clerk of the city, from the State and county assessment books as assessed for State taxes the preceding year, further provides: “That if there was any property in the city on the first day of January of the then current year, which was not in the city on the first day of January of the preceding year; or, if there were improvements on the first day of January of the then current year erected on property, materially enhancing the value of such property, which said improvements had not been erected on the first
The record raised the question, whether the provision of the charter conferring such authority infringes section seven of Article XI of the Constitution, which declares: “No city, town, or other municipal corporation, other than provided for in this article, shall levy or collect a larger rate of taxation, in any one year, on the property thereof, than one half of one per centum of the value of such property, as assessed for State taxation during the preceding year.” The provision otherwise relates to the power to levy an additional rate for the payment of debts existing at the time of the ratification of the Constitution.
In the absence of constitutional restrictions, the General Assembly could confer on municipal corporations the power of taxation for municipal purposes, as to rate, assessment and subjects, which it possesses for State purposes. The inhibition against the power of municipal corporations to levy a greater rate of taxation than prescribed in the Constitution, operates a limitation on the power of the legislature to delegate authority for that purpose. In interpreting limitations upon legislative power in State constitutions, the nature and objects of the particular limitations should be kept in view, and the causes in which they originated considered in the light of history and former constitutions; and such force and operation given to the language employed, consistent with its legitimate meaning, as may fairly remedy existing and apprehended evils, and accomplish the desired ends. The framers of the Constitution were cognizant that no governmental power is more liable to abuse than the taxing power,
It is contended that the constitutional inhibition is against a higher rate of taxation,, and was not intended to restrict the power of .the municipality to assess taxes on property only which has been assessed for State taxation. This construction ignores the relation which the rate sustains to the valuation, and their inseparable connection. As all taxes, levied on property in this State, are required to be assessed in exact proportion to its value, an assessment or appraisement is an essential preliminary to the apportionment. Without an assessment made in the mode required by law, and by the proper officers, the tax is without support. This is the principle underlying the limitation upon the taxing power of municipal corporations. Experience having shown the insufficiency of a limitation upon the mere rate, which could be easily avoided by increasing the value, preserving at the same time the nominal rate, and that a mandate to the General Assembly “to restrict their power of taxation, assessment and contracting of debt,” did not promote the ends proposed, it became apparent that the interests and protection of the citizen called for a restraint better guarded and more imperatively protective. The plan devised was to limit the rate to a specified per cent, of the value as assessed for State taxation.
The controlling principle is the adoption for cities, towns, and other municipal corporations, of the assessment of value made by the officers of the State, as the basis of the per centum to be levied, and the measure of the tax-payer’s liability, thereby preventing different assessments, varying as to values, for the State and for the political sub-divisions, mere agencies for the administration of local government, and furnishing a rule by which whether the limited per centum had been exceeded could be ascertained by a mere arithmetical calculation. As we have said, a constitution, the revision of a former constitution, should be interpreted in the light of its predecessor. . The corresponding provision in the Constitution of 1868 is found in section 36 of Article IY, which declared: “The General Assembly shall not have power to authorize any municipal corporation ... to levy a tax on real and personal property to a greater extent than two per centum of the assessed value of such property.”
In Mayor & Aldermen of Birmingham v. Klein, ante, p. 460, speaking of this limitation, it is said arguendo: “Not only is the levy by any city to be made ‘on the property thereof,’ i.e., the whole taxable property thereof, but it must be made on such property as assessed for State taxation during the preceding year.” Though rules of statutory construction may be of limited application in the construe
It is argued, that this construction exempts all property wbicb may have escaped State taxation during tbe preceding year, and all property wbicb may come into existence after the completion of the State assessment. As to property wbicb may escape State assessment, tbe municipal officers, on its discovery, have but to report tbe same to the assessor or collector, whose duty it then becomes to assess it; and as to property subsequently coming into existence, if it exists on tbe first day of January of tbe current year, its value will be assessed for State taxation during such year, and tbe municipality can levy a tax on such property in tbe succeeding year; the only sequence being to postpone tbe levy of tbe tax for one year. Tbe power conferred on tbe municipal authorities by the charter of tbe city of Birmingham, where tbe value of real estate, as assessed for State taxation during tbe preceding year, has been materially enhanced on tbe first day of January of tbe current year by improvements erected thereon, which bad not been erected on the first day of January of tbe preceding year, to assess such improvements at a fair valuation, and add such valuation to tbe value as assessed for State taxation, authorizes tbe municipal authorities to levy on such real estate a greater rate than one-balf of one per centum of tbe value as assessed for State taxation during tbe preceding year, and violates the letter
We have carefully considered the question raised, because of its importance, and that it is brought for the first time before the court, and have arrived at the conclusion announced with some reluctance. But, with the policy or expediency of the constitutional provision we have no judicial concern; our duty is to interpret it as ordained by the people. We are forced to hold that the proviso to section 20 of the charter of the city above quoted, is unconstitutional.
Judgment reversed, and judgment here rendered in favor of plaintiff, for $4,838.18.
Reversed and rendered.