411 F.3d 1107 | 9th Cir. | 2005
Lead Opinion
Elysee Theagene petitions the court for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ final order of removal, arguing that (1) he is a citizen of the United States; (2) the BIA erred in granting á motion to reconsider its own decision that he was eligible for withholding of deportation; (3) the BIA erred in applying an intervening en banc decision to Petitioner’s case on reconsideration; and (4) the BIA incorrectly applied the holding in that intervening decision to Petitioner’s case. In a memorandum disposition filed August 27, 2003, we found that we lacked jurisdiction over the nationality claim because the claim had not been raised during the administrative proceedings. We also held that the remaining claims lacked merit. Theagene filed a petition for rehearing raising substantial questions regarding our jurisdiction to hear his nationality claim. We granted the petition, and, after briefing by both parties, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to review Theagene’s nationality claim. However, because service in the armed forces is not itself sufficient to ground a claim for nationality, and because Theagene’s other claims also lack merit, we deny the petition for review.
I. Background
Theagene is a native of Haiti who was admitted to the United States in April 1974, when he was six years old, as a lawful permanent resident. He never applied for naturalization as a United States citizen, but served in- the United States Navy between 1989 and 1993 and participated in combat operations during the first Gulf War. He was' honorably discharged from the service. Theagene has not returned to Haiti since his arrival in the United States; does not speak French or Creole, and has no relatives in Haiti.
In November 1998, Theagene was convicted of first degree residential burglary in California, in violation of California Penal Code § 459(a), and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of four years. Two years later, the INS initiated proceedings to remove Theagene from the United States. The proceedings were initiated pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which provides for the removal of “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission” into the United States. On November 22, 2000, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found Theagene ■ removable under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as a result of his burglary conviction.
Theagene argues that (1) he is a United States national and therefore not subject to removal; (2) the BIA erred by reversing its decision upon a motion to reconsider; (3) the BIA erred in granting the motion to reconsider because the motion was legally deficient; (4) the BIA erred by failing to offer Petitioner opportunity for rebuttal; (5) the BIA erred by failing to specifically notify Petitioner that it would apply an intervening change in applicable law to his case upon reconsideration; and (6) the decision of the BIA in Matter of JE did not compel. reversal of the BIA’s original decision in Petitioner’s case. In a memorandum disposition filed August 27, 2003, we found that we lacked jurisdiction over the nationality claim because it had not been raised during the administrative proceedings. Theagene v. Ashcroft, Court No. 02-71224 at 2 (Aug. 27, 2003) (unpublished). We then found that the remaining claims lacked merit. Id. at 2-5.
II. Theagene’s Nationality Claim
A.
In our prior memorandum disposition, we relied on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2000)
Moreover, Moussa relies on a decision of our Circuit. See Moussa, 302 F.3d at 825 (citing Hughes v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 752 (9th Cir.2001)). In Hughes, we held that despite the requirement of exhaustion, we retain “jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s claim that he is a United States national or citizen and thus not ‘an alien’ subject to removal.” Hughes, 255 F.3d at 755.
B.
Theagene claims United States nationality based on his service in the United States military during the first Gulf War. We have held that service in the armed forces is not itself sufficient to ground a claim for nationality. See Reyes-Alcaraz v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 937, 938 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that “service in the armed forces of the United States, along with the taking of the standard military oath, does not alter an alien’s status to that of a ‘national’ within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act”). Neither party claims that there are disputed issues of material fact with regard to Theagene’s nationality claim, and we find none in the record. Accordingly, we consider only Theagene’s legal argument. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A). Thus, it would appear that Theagene has no persuasive claim to United States nationality.
III. The BIA’s grant of the motion to reconsider
Theagene argues that the Board erred in granting the government’s motion to reconsider its ruling on Theagene’s Convention Against Torture claim. The government’s motion to reconsider properly stated a'perceived error in law that the Board committed in reversing the immigration judge. As such, the Board acted within its discretion in granting the motion to reconsider. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), 1003.2(b)(1).
IV. Application of an intervening BIA decision to Petitioner’s case
Citing our decision in Gonzalez v. INS, 82 F.3d 903(9th Cir.1996), Theagene argues that the Board violated his right to due process by applying an intervening en banc decision of the Board without providing him with notice and an opportunity to respond. We cannot agree. Gonzalez and Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir.1992), upon which Gonzalez relied, involved the Board’s decision to take administrative notice of facts that bore on whether an alien was deportable. In Gonzalez and Castillo-Villagra, we concluded that the Board’s decision to make legal judgments on the basis of facts of which the Board took administrative notice violated an alien’s right to due process where the Board failed to give the alien an opportunity to respond. Gonzalez, 82 F.3d at 911-12; Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1028-29. However, Theagene cites no authority for the proposition that an alien’s right to due process is similarly violated when the Board applies controlling legal authority to a pending case without informing the alien or providing an opportunity to respond.
The Board’s decision to apply legal principles from intervening case law is of a different character than the Board’s decision to draw legal conclusions from facts introduced through administrative notice. In the latter, the violation of due process stemmed from depriving the alien of notice and an opportunity to respond to the Board’s legal conclusion through the introduction of other facts. See Gonzalez, 82 F.3d at 911-12. Yet, Theagene does not explain why the application of intervening law without notice, offends due process,
V Application of Matter of J-E to Petitioner’s case
Finally, Theagene argues that the Board’s en banc decision in Matter of J-E did not require the Board to deny his petition on his Convention Against Torture claim. We review de novo the Board’s determinations as to purely legal ■ questions. Molino-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1093(9th Cir.2002). The Board’s initial October 30, 2001, decision, which granted Theagene asylum on the Convention Against Torture claim, rested on legal premises that the Board repudiated in Matter of J-E. See Matter of J-E, 23 I & nd. at 299-304. Theagene conceded in his administrative proceedings that he had no evidence that his family had ever been persecuted or that he had personally been a victim of persecution in Haiti. As his claim under the Convention Against Torture was based on reports of prison conditions and detention, just-as in Matter of JE, the Board’s application of Matter of JE was legally sound. Theagene fails to distinguish Matter of J-E on appeal.
Insofar as Theagene challenges the BIA’s holding in Matter of J-E, we are required to defer to the Board’s reasonable interpretation of immigration laws. Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1187 (9th Cir.2001). The Board’s decision in Matter of J-E is not unreasonable, so we defer to the Board’s interpretation.
VI. Conclusion
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), we have jurisdiction to entertain Theagene’s claim of United' States nationality, despite the fact that the claim was not made before the Board of Immigration Appeals. Nevertheless, we find that Theagene’s former service in the United States military is not itself sufficient to prove nationality. Theagene’s other claims also lack merit. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.
DENIED.
. Theagene subsequently requested asylum and withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("Convention Against Torture"). In reconsidering his initial finding of removability, the IJ concluded that Theag-ene was not eligible for asylum, had not demonstrated that it is more likely than not that
.On October 30, 2001, the BIA decided that Theagene was eligible for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture, On November 29, 2001, however, the INS filed a motion for en banc reconsideration, asserting that Theagene had not established that he would more likely than not be subjected to torture in Haiti, and that any harm that may befall him in Haiti .would not constitute “torture” as defined by 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). In reviewing the motion to reconsider, the BIA noted that there had been an intervening change in the law regarding the removal of alien felons to Haiti. In Matter of J-E- 23 I & N Dec. 291 (BIA 2002), the BIA held that neither indefinite detention nor inhuman prison conditions in Haiti constitutes torture. Relying on Matter of J-E-, the BIA concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish that Theagene would more likely than not be subjected to torture in Haiti.
. Tide 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) provides: "A court may review a final order of removal only if the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies....”
. We do not mean to imply that the question of nationality may not be addressed at the administrative level. Inasmuch as the immigration judge and the Board have no subject matter jurisdiction over United States nationals, those officials will have to investigate the issue if it is raised. It remains, however, that
. The later case of Taniguchi v. Schultz, 303 F.3d 950 (9th Cir.2002), does not counsel differently. That case does not consider the effects of the terms "petitioner” and "alien” in § 1252(b)(5) and § 1252(d)(1) respectively because the petitioner in Taniguchi failed to appeal the order of removal that had been entered against her. Taniguchi, 303 F.3d at 955.
Citing Rivera v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1129, 1138 (9th Cir.2005), the dissent argues that Tanigu-chi stands.for the proposition that failure to exhaust remedies at the administrative level will result in denial of a "frivolous” citizenship claim made under § 1252(b)(5). The petitioner in Taniguchi did not bring a claim under § 1252(b)(5). Rather, the petitioner sought habeas relief, which was denied because of her failure to exhaust remedies by not bringing her citizenship claim under § 1252(b)(5). Taniguchi, 303 F.3d at 956. In discussing the case, Rivera states that Tanigu-chi could properly have brought her "patently frivolous” claim to citizenship under § 1252(b)(5), and thus, could have preserved her habeas claim. Rivera, 394 F.3d at 1138. Although it was noted in Rivera that Tanigu-chi did not raise her citizenship claim before the IJ, the opinion is nonetheless clear that she could have, and should have, brought a claim under § 1252(b)(5). Id. Accordingly, regardless of how "frivolous” the dissent may believe petitioner’s claim to be, Rivera holds that it could properly be raised under § 1252(b)(5) despite petitioner’s failure to raise the claim at the administrative level. Minasyan v. Gonzales, the second case cited by the dissent, relies on Rivera to hold that failure to raise a claim of citizenship will not defeat jurisdiction under § 1252(b)(5) even where the petitioner has actually been deported. Minasyan v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir.2005). The case briefly mentions Taniguchi in a footnote, stating that in Taniguchi, "we' declined to consider a patently frivolous claim to citizenship.” Minasyan, 401 F.3d at 1075 n. 9. But as Rivera and
. We note our discomfort with a rule of law that results in the deportation of an honorably discharged former member of the United States armed forces who has lived in the United States since he was a child. It is, however, the role of Congress, and not the Courts, to alter this rule.
Concurrence in Part
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the result. I agree with all but part 11(A) of the opinion because I disagree with that important section on jurisdiction.
As in many asylum cases, the outcome here is a sad one. A man who served honorably in our armed forces during wartime, and whose only connection with Haiti is that he was born there, will be sent back, with no apparent way to earn a living and no ability even to speak the language. But as the majority concludes, there is nothing we can do about that.
The majority’s jurisdictional argument, however, is mistaken. Administrative pro
We are now reviewing the BIA’s decision, and the statute limits us to a review of the record and the decisions made on the points raised before the BIA. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), a subsection of the judicial review statute, says that we may review a removal order only if “the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.”
The majority opinion disregards this waiver, and the majority’s decision to reach the waived claim conflicts with our decision in Taniguchi v. Schultz.
Only if .Theagene had raised his claim to citizenship before the IJ and the BIA would 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5), the statutory section upon which the majority relies, be material. That section is part of the “Judicial Review” statute that applies to petitions to the courts of appeals, and our review is limited to points raised and the record made below.
But, as the majority concedes, our jurisdiction under § 1252(b)(5) cannot be exclusive. The IJ and the BIA must be capable of determining whether they have jurisdiction, which requires determining whether the person appearing before them actually is an alien. That is why the IJ asked Theagene what his nationality was, and whether he was a United States citizen. Subsection 1252(b)(5), which gives us jurisdiction to determine citizenship, is part of § 1252 which governs “Judicial Review,” so § 1252(b)(5) is plainly part of the system for reviewing a decision that the BIA has already made, rather than a means of detouring around the BIA. When § 1252(b)(5) says that “[t]he petitioner may have such nationality claim decided only as provided in this paragraph,” the word “only” cannot mean “the courts of appeals are the only place citizenship can be determined.” Such an interpretation would make it impossible for the administrative agency to determine whether it had jurisdiction in contested cases. The word “only” must mean “this is the only way that the court of appeals can adjudicate alienage or citizenship if the point arises on review.”
In Moussa v. INS,
It makes no sense to establish an administrative process for handling the huge vol-. ume of immigration cases, but then, after a person has conceded that he is an alien and lost on the merits in the immigration court, permit him to start all over again by saying “I am not an alien, but a citizen,” in the court of appeals. Allowing a person to try out an asylum claim by asserting that he is not a citizen, and then try to avoid an adverse asylum determination by asserting that he is a citizen, invites abuses that the overburdened system of adjudicating immigration cases cannot bear.
. See Reyes-Alcaraz v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 937, 938-40 (9th Cir.2004); Perdomo-Padilla v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 964, 966-72 (9th Cir.2003).
. See Cal.Penal Code § 459(a).
. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C); see also United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir.2004) (noting that a burglary offense for which a term of at least one-year imprisonment was imposed is an "aggravated felony”).
. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); see Bairon v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir.2004).
. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A).
. See Barron, 358 F.3d at 677-78; Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir.2003).
. Taniguchi v. Schultz, 303 F.3d 950 (9th Cir.2002).
. Hughes v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 752 (9th Cir.2001).
. Taniguchi, 303 F.3d at 955.
. See Minasyan v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir.2005); Rivera v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1129, 1138, 1140 (9th Cir.2005).
. See Perdomo-Padilla, 333 F.3d at 972; see also Reyes-Alcaraz, 363 F.3d at 938-40.
. See Minasyan, 401 F.3d at 1075 & n. 9 (noting that Taniguchi would bar jurisdiction over a frivolous claim of citizenship); Rivera, 394 F.3d at 1138 (same).
. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4).
. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(5)(A)-(B).
. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(C).
. Moussa v. INS, 302 F.3d 823 (8th Cir.2002).
. See id. at 824; see also Minasyan, 401 F.3d at 1074-75 (reviewing a non-frivolous claim of citizenship where the petitioner had argued that he was a citizen throughout his administrative proceedings); Rivera, 394 F.3d at 1136-39 (same).
. See Moussa, 302 F.3d at 825.
