184 Ga. 179 | Ga. | 1937
Lead Opinion
Under the decision of this court in City of Atlanta v. First Methodist Church, 83 Ga. 448 (10 S. E. 231), an interlocutory judgment granting or refusing an injunction, when the same depends entirely upon a question of law, is, upon its affirmance by the Supreme Court, a final adjudication of such question. Ingram v. Trustees of Mercer University, 102 Ga. 226 (29 S. E. 273), and cit.; Georgia Ry. &c. Co. v. Decatur, 153 Ga. 329 (111 S. E. 911); City of Atlanta v. Smith, 165 Ga. 146 (140 S. E. 369).
When this case was here before (Elyea Inc. v. Cenker, 182 Ga. 287, 185 S. E. 253), the law of the case upon the present appeal was fixed, at least in so far as applicable to the parties in the cause. Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Third National Bank, 125 Ga. 489 (54 S. E. 621); Southern Bell Telephone &c. Co. v. Glawson, 140 Ga. 507 (79 S. E. 136); Georgia Ry. &c. Co. v. Decatur, supra; Towers v. City Land Co., 159 Ga. 486 (125 S. E. 837).
Judgment affirmed.
Rehearing
ON SECOND MOTION EOR REHEARING.
It is insisted in a second motion for rehearing that excessive levy was not an issue in the case under the evidence, because there was no evidence to show that the property levied on was capable of being so subdivided that a part thereof less than the whole could have been levied on and sold for an amount sufficient to satisfy the tax execution; and that this court erroneously held that the evidence showed that the property levied upon was capable of being subdivided. In this case the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant in fi. fa., and found that the levy of the tax execution was excessive, because the property was capable of being subdivided. In the ruling complained of this court was merely holding that the verdict was authorized by the evidence. One witness testified that the rear portion of the lot levied on, 23 by 30 feet, was separate from the store building, that it was worth approximately $150, and that it was accessible through an alleyway. The defendant in fi. fa. testified that the rear portion of the lot was not essential to the store, was not used by the store, and was not needed for that purpose; that this portion of the property could be used for a parking lot; that he had intended to so use it; that running along a portion of the