19 P. 6 | Ariz. | 1888
This was a suit in equity to quiet title. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is the owner in fee of all the land described in the complaint, but does not allege that he is in possession; nor does it aver that he is entitled to possession, or ash that possession be awarded him. The land is described as a Mexican land grant, called the “Rancho San Jóse de Sonoita,” and situated in the Sonoita valley, county of Pima, territory of Arizona, and that it was granted by the Mexican authorities to one Leon Herreras on the 15th day of May, 1825. The complaint further describes the land according to the calls of a survey made by the government of Spain on the 26th and 27th of June, 1821. Then, after averring that the claim of the defendants, and each of them, is without any right whatsoever, the complaint closes with the following prayer for relief: “(1) That the said defendants, and each of them, be required to set forth the nature of his claim, and that all adverse claims of the defendants, and each of them, may be determined by a decree of this court; (2) that by said decree it be declared and adjudged that the defendants have no estate or interest whatever in or to said land and premises, or in or to any part thereof, and that the title of plaintiff is good and valid; (3) that the defendants, and each of them, be forever enjoined and debarred from asserting any claim whatever in or to said land and premises, or to any part thereof, adverse to plaintiff; and for such other and further relief as to this honorable court shall seem meet and agreeable to equity, and for his costs of suit.” The principal defendants demurred to this complaint, alleging as grounds of demurrer “ (1) that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action; (2) that there is a defect of parties defendant, in that it is not alleged that defendants claim a joint interest in the premises referred to in the complaint, or any part thereof; (3) that said complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” On the latter cause of demurrer the court sustained the pleading; and the plaintiff electing to stand on his complaint, and refusing to amend the same, the court dismissed the action. Prom this
To state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action such as will authorize the intervention of a cotírt of chancery, within the rules of chancery pleading, should not the plaintiff out of possession further state facts sufficient to show to the chancellor that the right or estate to be protected is equitable in its nature, or that the remedies at law are inadequate, where the right or estate is legal? Or at least such facts as will authorize such a deduction to be made, and thus authorize and justify chancery interposition? Is it not patent on the face of this bill that, if its allegations are true, the plaintiff has an indubitable legal estate? Prom aught that appears to the contrary is it not equally apparent that plaintiff has a full, adequate, and complete remedy at law by the action of ejectment ? There is no question that the statute of 1881 authorized him to bring the proper suit, whether in or out of possession, though the repeal of that law went into effect about a' month after this suit was filed; but, if out of possession, to obtain equitable relief, ought he not, by the aver
The learned counsel for the appellant has called the especial attention of this court to the case of Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495,—a, suit founded on the Nebraska statute of 1873, a statute similar to the Arizona statute of 1881. Counsel claim that the pleadings in that case were in no material respect different from the pleadings in the present case. But we think different. In that ease plaintiff claimed title by virtue of a tax sale,—an appropriate head of equitable cognizance. Prior to the sale defendant had been the owner. There the plaintiff in his bill of complaint, not only alleged that he was the owner of the premises in fee, but he also alleged that he was entitled to the possession thereof, and set forth the origin of his title, particularly specifying the deeds by which it was obtained, etc., and that the claim of defendant so affected plaintiff’s title as to render a sale or other disposition of the property impossible; in other words, that defendant’s claim was a cloud upon plaintiff’s title. But there is this additional marked difference: Judge Field, in delivering the opinion of the court, assigns as the conclusive reason and justification for the intervention of equity the fact that the lands in dispute were unoccupied, wild, and uncultivated, and that, therefore, an action in ejectment would not lie, because there was no occupant; thus clearly intimating that ejeetment would
In the case at bar wé think there was no error in the ruling of the court below, and therefore its judgment is affirmed.