37 N.J. Eq. 157 | New York Court of Chancery | 1883
This is a motion to dissolve an injunction. The question it raises is, whether this court shall take jurisdiction of the questions at issue between the parties, or let them be determined at law. The complainant, after the defendants had sued him a.t law, filed his bill in this court, asking to have the defendants restrained, and the account between himself and the defendants settled here, on the single ground that the accounts were so complex that they could not be examined and tried at Nisi Prius with any certainty that an accurate result would be reached. An injunction was granted. The defendants have answered, and now move a dissolution of the injunction.
The case made by the bill discloses no equitable element which would give this court exclusive jurisdiction. The case is one where concurrent jurisdiction exists, and either tribunal may properly take jurisdiction of it. When that is the case, and a common law court has already jurisdiction, when the aid of this court is sought, it is not the practice of this court to withdraw
Judged by this rule, I think there is great reason to doubt whether the case made by this bill is sufficient to justify the interference of this court. The complainant says the accounts are so complicated that they cannot be stated and settled at law; but this is not enough. The court ■ cannot accept his opinion; it must have facts. It is a fundamental rule of equity pleading, to be observed in all cases, that a bill must state facts sufficient to show a case within the jurisdiction of the court; if it fails to do so, no relief can be given. In a case in which a change of jurisdiction is sought on the ground of intricacy or complexity, the accounts must be laid before the court, or their nature, character and extent so far disclosed that the court may see and judge for itself whether a proper case for the exercise of its jurisdiction exists or not. The bill in this case simply disputes certain items with which the defendants have charged the complainant in the bill of particulars annexed to their declaration,
But the answer presents a condition of facts which, I think, renders it entirely clear that the injunction should be retained, and that this court should take jurisdiction of the matters in dispute between the parties. Indeed, in view of the facts exhibited by the answer, it is obvious full and complete justice-can be done nowhere else. In deciding whether an injunction shall be dissolved or not, the court must consider the whole case not simply the case shown by the bill, but the case as it is shown by the whole record. And even in a case where the answer so completely denies the equity of the bill, that if there was nothing else before the court but the bill and answer, the court would be required to order a dissolution, yet if the complainant has-taken his evidence, though the defendant has not yet had time to take his, and it appears that the complainant’s evidence so far supports the equity of the bill that, on a fair consideration of the whole case, the injunction ought not to be dissolved, the-court will not dissolve it. Christie v. Griffing, 9 C. E. Gr. 76.
The main dispute between the parties is whether a sum of about $4,000, paid by the defendants to the complainant, was passed over under such circumstances as entitle the defendants to charge the complainant with it in the accounting. They say the complainant obtained it by fraud; that he induced them, by
The defendants further insist that if the injunction is retained, the complainant should be required either to give security for what may be found to be due, or to allow judgment to be entered, execution 'to be issued and a levy taken, the judgment and levy to stand as security for what may be found to be due. Facts might exist which would entitle the defendants to the protection they ask, but they have no right to it merely because the complainant has asked to have the jurisdiction of the suit changed. To entitle themselves t'o such protection they must show that they need it, or they must show such a case of danger as to render indemnity a reasonable precaution. They do allege they are in danger, but they put in their allegation in this extremely indefinite form:
“ They say that the complainant is himself heavily in debt, and that, as they are informed and believe, most of his lands are heavily mortgaged, and they really fear that if the recovery of judgment against him shall be deferred for any considerable time, they will be in danger of losing their debt.”
An allegation stated in this form presents no ground for extending the protection asked. The answer is verified simply by an affidavit in the common form, the defendants merely affirming that the matters and things set forth in the answer, so far as they relate to their own acts, are true, and so far as they relate to the acts of others, they believe them to be true. A verification in this form affirms nothing except that the defendants are troubled