26 Wash. 631 | Wash. | 1901
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Plaintiffs, appellants, in their complaint substantially allege that they were qualified' owners of fish license Ho. 146; that on the 20th of 'March, 1899, they entered upon and gave notice of the'location of a pound net or fish trap in the- waters of the Gulf of Georgia, in Whatcom county, off the west shore óf Point Roberts, and near the international boundary line between the United States and Canada; that for the purpose of indicating said location they placed thereon a “shov'edown” ■and buoys, and posted the license number thereon, and •drove piles thereon; that on the same day, after notice
“Any person or corporation, after first having obtained a license as provided for in this act, shall indicate locations for traps or pound nets made under such license, by driving at least three substantial piles thereon, which must extend not less than ten feet above the surface of the water at high tide, one of said piles to be driven at each end of the location claimed, and upon said terminal piles there must be posted the license number.”
The findings of fact are, in substance, as follows: That the plaintiffs and defendants were qualified owners of annual pound .net fishing licenses, duly issued by the state fish commissioner; that in October, 1898, defendant Lord discovered the location in controversy, and made soundings thereon to ascertain the depth of water; that the plaintiff Milligan, a day or two prior to the 20th of March, 1899, made soundings thereon; that both Lord and Milligan, in going upon the location in controversy, and making the soundings, did so for the purpose of ascertaining the fitness of the location for a pound net fish trap; that on the 20th of March, 1899, the plaintiffs went upon the location, and placed what is commonly known in the locality as a “shovedown,” to wit, an end
“That the plaintiffs Elwood and Milligan used all efforts that men of reasonable care, prudence, and diligence would have used to obtain a pile driver for the purpose of driving substantial piles in a substantial manner upon said location, and were unable to obtain such pile driver prior to the 3d day of May, 1899;” •
and the seventeenth finding is:
“That the location of the defendants upon the grounds above described in all things conformed to the requirements of the statute, and that the action of the plaintiffs constituted an infringement upon the rights of the defendants, and interfered with the enjoyment of their property so acquired by valid location upon the fishing grounds above referred to; that the location of the plaintiffs is within 2,400 feet laterally and 600 feet endwise of the location of the defendants, and is within the distance prohibited by law.’’
- Plaintiffs requested an additional finding that the plaintiff Milligan discovered the location in controversy, and that plaintiffs had, prior to the 20th of March, arranged for the use of a piledriver to drive the location piles upon the location, but were prevented from so doing by the acts of the defendants. This offered finding is clearly supported by the testimony. There is some
It is apparent that the conclusion of the learned superior court is based upon a strict construction of the statutory requirements to indicate the location of a fish trap. Such conclusion necessarily excludes the consideration of any rights accruing from actual notice of location. Trom a careful examination of all the findings of facts it seems that the seventeenth finding, excepted to by appellants, is inconsistent with the specific facts found in Ho. 6 and Ho. 9. The facts specified in finding Ho. 6 show that defendants did not, on the 20th of March, 1899, —their first attempt to locate, — put in piles conforming to the statutory requirements; and finding Ho. 9 shows that on the 26th of April following, when defendants again indicated notice of location, while they more nearly conformed to the requirements of the statutory notice, still the compliance was not exact. They spliced their piles to make them high enough to reach ten feet above high tide of the gulf. It is true plaintiffs did not comply in form with the statutory requirements on the 20th of March, when they endeavored to give notice of location. Their efforts on the 25th of April following were further in the direction of substantial compliance; but not until the 3d of May, 1899, did either of the parties make an
“The legislature had the power to license fishing, and to give exclusive control for a reasonable distance of the water after the construction of a net or other fixed appliance for fishing, and for the limited period of one year.”
In Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U. S. 527 (5 Sup. Ct. 560), it seems the discoverer of a mining claim had driven a stake at the point of discovery. The trial court instructed the jury that the notice posted on the stake was deficient, and under it the locator could not claim any more than the place in which the stake was planted. The supreme
“There is no doubt but the discoverer of a mineral vein should have a reasonable time after ■ the discovery of his vein in which to complete his location embracing the same.”
In Omar v. Soper, 11 Colo. 380 (18 Pac. 443, 7 Am. St. Pep. 246), the court observed: : ¡
“To hold that the miner, as soon as he discovers a lode, must immediately stake the territory which he is entitled to claim thereon, in order to protect it from the invasion and claims, of other persons learning of his find, would be an unreasonable, if not an impossible, requirement.”
In Murley v. Ennis, 2 Colo. 300, it is said:
“Prom the moment of commencing the labor of development with the bona fide purpose tó complete it; and so appropriate the mine, the party has a possession in fact, and for the time being a right to retain that possession.”
See, also Patterson v. Hitchcock, 3 Colo. 533, where it is mentioned that “what is to be regarded as a reason
The decree is reversed, and the cause remanded to the superior court, with directions to enter a decree adjudging the right to the location in controversy to the plaintiffs, and enjoining any interference by defendants with the rights to the fishing trap constructed and operated by the plaintiffs.
Dunbar, Fullerton, Anders and Mount, JJ., concur.