154 Iowa 96 | Iowa | 1912
The plaintiff is a resident of Wayne county, Iowa, and the defendant, J. II. Davenport, is a resident of Missouri. The Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company is a corporation operating a line of railroad through' Wayne county, Iowa, and through the
The concrete question thus presented for our determination is whether the railway company is liable in this action as the garnishee of J. IT. Davenport, notwithstanding the fact that Davenport had obtained a judgment against it in Missouri before it was garnished herein, and that said judgment still exists. We are of the opinion that this question must be answered adversely to the plaintiff’s contention.
It is true we have held that debts are subject to garnishment regardless of the residence of the debtor. Mooney v. Railway Co., 60 Iowa, 346.
And that a judgment debtor may be garnished for a
It is also true that in some jurisdictions it is held that a judgment debtor may be garnished upon a judgment recovered against him by the principal defendant in a court of the same state other than the one in which the garnishment proceedings are pending, and the plaintiff relies on Heaton v. Lee, 143 Iowa, 21, as so holding in this state. In that case it was expressly said that we did not determine the question now before us for the reason that we held the garnishee' estopped by its conduct in the court of garnishment, and that was determinative of the case. In that case judgment had been rendered for the principal defendant against the garnishee in the district court, while the garnishment proceedings were in a justice court of the same county. Conceding, however, for the purposes of this case, and for such purpose alone, that the garnishee would have been liable under the facts presented in the Heaton case, regardless of its conduct, it does not follow that the garnishee in this case is liable. There the judgment of the justice was subject to review in the very court that rendered the judgment against the garnishee in favor of the principal defendant, and, it having jurisdiction over both judgments and over the entire matter, the garnishee could be fully protected from double payment, if it was without fault, while in this case the courts of this state have no jurisdiction over the judgment rendered against tjie garnishee in Missouri, and can furnish the garnishee no protection against its enforcement. The Missouri court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter, and rendered a judgment against the garnishee long before it was garnished in this suit, and it would be reasonable for it to insist upon the enforcement of its judgment. The garnishment statute of this state was not designed to subject the garnishee to the liability of twice paying his
But if the debt be attached after judgment, what protection has the garnishee against the judgment or the claim of the attaching creditor ? His property is liable to immediate seizure and sale under the execution upon the judgment, while, at the same time, he is made liable for the amount of the judgment to the attaching creditor. If it be said that the court will exercise its controlling power to prevent such injustice, the answer is that, even when the judgment is in one of the courts of this state, the levy and sale may be made at a time when the court can not exercise its controlling power. And when the judgment is recovered in another state, we have no ground for assuming that the court will stay the execution of its process on account of an attachment issued here. I know of no rule of law, no consideration of policy or courtesy, which would or ought to induce any court of Pennsylvania to suspend its process and to withhold from one of its own citizens the recovery of a debt adjudged to be due, because after the recovery of the judgment the debt has been attached under the process of this state. When the attachment is levied before the commencement of the suit against the garnishee, then a different principle applies, and the legal process of another state will be respected. Upon a question of conflict of jurisdiction, it is clear that the
And on the question of conflict of jurisdiction we said, in Willard v. Sturm, 96 Iowa, 555: “The court of this state first obtained jurisdiction, and must retain it to the end. If there has been any error, it sfeems to us it occurred in the Kansas court.”
In 14 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, it is said: “Though there are decisions to the contrary, the better doctrine in the jurisdictions in which judgments are held liable to garnishment is that the garnishment proceeding must be brought in the jurisdiction in which the judgment sought to be reached was rendered, and by weight of authority it is also held that the garnishment proceeding must be brought in the same court in which such judgment was rendered.”
In 20 Cyc. 1009, it is said: “In a majority of jurisdictions, a debt evidenced by a final judgment may be reached by garnishment or trustee process by a judgment creditor of plaintiff in the -first action. In some jurisdictions, by construction of statute, it is held that a debtor can not be chargeable in garnishment or trustee proceedings for a debt due on a judgment rendered before the service of the process upon him, and on which he is liable to an execution. The better rule seems to be that a judgment
It is true that many of the cases cited above announce the broader rule that a debt reduced to judgment may not be attached; hut the reasons given for such rule apply with still greater force to the case at bar, for here the debt of the garnishee is in the form of a'valid judgment in another state. Appellant cites Pennsylvania cases which support his contention; but no others. We think the judgment right, and it is affirmed.