Elsiе A. Dorsey (“claimant”) appeals from the district court decision denying her request to have the Secretary reconsider her social security disability claim pursuant to the new mental impairment and pain regulations promulgated after denial of benefits by the Appeals Cоuncil. Because we agree that the court erred in not requiring the Secretary to reconsider her claim under the new regulations, we reverse and remand.
I.
Claimant filed an application for social security disability benefits on November 3, 1983. In her application, she alleged and later presented evidence of back problems, pain and depression. Her claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. Claimant requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“AU”) and was subsequently awarded benefits on August 23, 1984. The AU found Dorsey to be disabled basеd upon severe degenerative disc disease in her lumbar and cervical spine; musco-ligamentous syndrome in her cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine; tendonitis in her left shoulder; frequent and severe pain; and severe depression.
Thereafter, the Appeals Counсil reversed the AU’s favorable decision and denied benefits on January 4, 1985. A federal complaint seeking review of the Appeals Counсil’s final decision was filed with the district court on May 31, 1985. 1 The Secretary filed a motion to remand for readjudication under the new mental impairment listings promulgated at 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, pursuant to § 5(c) of the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-460. The new regulations had becоme effective on August 28, 1985. The claimant opposed the motion to remand and requested disposition by summary judgment. On May 23, 1986, the magistrate recоmmended that summary judgment be granted in favor of the Secretary. Claimant filed timely objections to the magistrate’s report. However, the district court affirmed the magistrate’s findings and further held that remand for reconsideration was not required under the new regulations. 2 Claimant filed a timely noticе of appeal on the remand issue.
II.
On appeal, Dorsey argues that once the district court found the Secretary’s decision tо be supported by substantial evidence under the old regulations, §§ 5(c)(1) and 3(a)(1) of the Reform Act required a remand for an administrative readjudication of the pain and mental impairment issues under the new regulations. We agree. The plain language of § 5(c)(1) compels the Seсretary to reexamine any case receiving a final administrative determination after October 9, 1984, and before the effective dаte of new regulations promulgated under the Reform Act in which a denial of disability benefits is based on alleged mental impairment. 3 In the *248 present case, the Appeals Council reversed the previously favorable AU’s decision on January 4, 1985, before the effective date of thе new mental impairment regulations. Therefore, this claim falls squarely within the time period covered by § 5(c).
We also reject the Secretary’s suggestion that claimant waived a right to remand by opposing the Secretary’s motion for remand prior to the decision to the district court. In a recent Sixth Circuit case,
Daley v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services,
We find the Sixth Circuit view persuasive. 4 The Court is of the opinion that this interpretation best effectuates the рurpose of the Social Security Act. The Social Security Act is a remedial statute, to be broadly construed and liberally appliеd in favor of beneficiaries. Because the claimant has not been awarded benefits under the old regulations nor had the benefit of аdjudication under the new mental impairment regulations, she is now entitled to a remand under § 5(c).
III.
Claimant also argues that her case should be rеmanded for reevaluation under the revised pain standard at § 3(a)(1) of the 1984 Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). Claimant presented evidence to the AU regarding disabling pain of both an organic and psychogenic nature. Claimant argues that even though the new statutory pain standard was an appаrent codification of existing regulations and policies, the Secretary was not applying its own standards in many cases. We agree. Uрon a careful review of the Appeals Council’s decision, it cannot be determined if the Secretary applied the corrеct standard in evaluating pain. Therefore, upon remand, the Secretary should also reevaluate the claimant’s complaint оf pain in light of the 1984 Reform Act amendments.
Lawler v. Heckler,
IV.
Because we find that the district court erred in failing to remand for consideration of mental impairment and pain under the new regulations, we reverse the decision below and remand the cause to the district court for further remand to the Sеcretary for readjudication according to the new mental impairment regulations at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (1986) and pain disorder pursuant to § 3(a)(1), now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) and implemented by the Secretary in the revised Listing of Impairments.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Notes
. Claimant’s counsel requested and was granted an extension of time to file a civil action in the district court.
. In her objections to the magistrate’s proposed order, claimant requestеd that the district court find that the Appeals Council’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence or in the alternative to remand thе case to the Secretary for further consideration under the new pain and mental impairment regulations.
. Section 5(c) states as follows:
(c)(1) Any initial determination that an individual is not under a disability by reason of a mental impairment and any determination that an individual is not under a disability by reason of a mental impairmеnt in a reconsideration of or hearing on an initial disability determination, made or held under title II or XVI of the Social Security Act after the date of the enactment of this Act and prior to the date on which revised criteria are established *248 by regulation in accordancе with subsection (a), and any determination that an individual is not under a disability by reason of a mental impairment made under or in accordancе with title II or XVI of such Act in a reconsideration of, hearing on, review by the Appeals Council of, or judicial review of a decision rendered in any continuing eligibility review to which subsection (b)(1) applies, shall be redetermined by the Secretary as soon as feasible after the date on which such criteria are so established, applying such revised criteria.
. Previously, we had reached a similar conclusion in an unpublished opinion.
John v. Bowen,