FORD ELSAESSER, in his capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith v. RIVERSIDE FARMS, INC., an Idaho corporation
Docket No. 48701
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Boise, April 2022 Term. Opinion filed: July 6, 2022
MOELLER, Justice.
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Ada County. Michael Reardon, District Judge.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Law Office of Vernon K. Smith, PC, Boise, for Appellant.
Givens Pursley, LLP, Boise, for Respondent.
This appeal stems from an action in which the personal representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith (the “Personal Representative“) sought to eject Riverside Farms, Inc., (“Riverside“) from its real property, referred to by the parties as the “Chinden Property,” after the term of Riverside‘s lease expired. Riverside argued that the Personal Representative lacked standing to bring the ejectment action because it is not the true owner of the land. The Personal Representative was earlier granted ownership of the “Chinden Property” pursuant to a Rule 70(b) judgment issued during the probate proceedings following Victoria‘s death. Riverside argues that the Rule 70(b) judgment was barred by res judicata because a prior action, which concerned removal of trees along an easement on the property, had already confirmed that the Personal Representative was not the true owner of the Chinden Property.
The district court determined that ejectment of Riverside was proper because the dismissal of the prior case did not preclude the Rule 70(b) judgment issued in the probate case. Riverside filed a motion asking the district court to reconsider its decision, but the district court declined to do so. Riverside appeals to this Court, arguing that the denial of its motion to reconsider was in error and renewing its argument that the personal representative lacked standing to seek removal of Riverside from the property because the Rule 70(b) judgment was barred by res judicata.
I. FACTS AND BACKGROUND
This matter has a long and convoluted backstory spanning multiple cases and appeals. The principal actors in this saga are Ford Elsaesser, the personal representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith,1 and Vernon K. Smith (“Vernon“), a son of Victoria and the attorney for Riverside Farms, Inc. Relevant to this appeal are the following cases: Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d 6 (2018) (Ada County Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352) (the “Probate Case“), and Smith v. Smith (Ada County Case No. CV-OC-2015-2348). The factual background of these cases is summarized below only to the extent such facts are needed to provide context here.
Victoria H. Smith acquired real property during her lifetime, including a parcel known as the “Chinden Property.” In 1990, Victoria prepared a holographic will leaving everything to her son, Vernon. She also executed a durable power of attorney, making Vernon her attorney-in-fact. Vernon later formed a limited liability company, VHS Properties, LLC (“VHS“), and transferred all of Victoria‘s personal and real property to VHS.
Several months after Victoria‘s death in September 2013, Vernon‘s brother, Joseph, filed a petition in the Probate Case for formal adjudication of Victoria‘s intestacy, claiming the will was invalid as a product of undue influence by Vernon. While the Probate Case was pending, Joseph and his wife Sharon also filed a separate action against Vernon (Smith v. Smith). Victoria had previously given Joseph a portion of the Chinden Property. Years prior, Joseph had planted juniper trees along an access way the family had used. Eventually, Joseph acquired an easement to use that access way. Joseph refused to trim the trees when Vernon requested that he do so. Joseph claimed Vernon was planning to remove the juniper trees and sought a temporary restraining order to enjoin Vernon from removing them. The complaint stated that Vernon‘s ownership (through VHS) was being challenged by Joseph in the Probate Case. Vernon counterclaimed, arguing that the case should be dismissed because Joseph and his wife did not have standing to bring this case because the trees were not located on Joseph‘s property, but on property which belonged to VHS. The district court issued a notice of intent to dismiss for failure to prosecute. On January 19, 2017, the district court dismissed Joseph‘s claims with prejudice.
In March 2017, the magistrate court in the Probate Case concluded that Victoria‘s will was invalid because it was a product of Vernon‘s undue influence. Accordingly, it ruled that Victoria died intestate. The Personal Representative was appointed and filed a motion for relief under
On February 22, 2019, the Personal Representative and Riverside entered into a lease whereby Riverside was allowed to lease the Chinden Property for a term “ending on March 31, 2020, together with any extensions as provided herein unless terminated earlier as provided herein.” The Personal Representative notified Riverside multiple times in the weeks leading up to March 31 that it would not be renewing the lease. On March 23, 2020, Riverside responded with a letter stating
Over a year after this Court‘s decision in the Probate Case, on April 30, 2020, Vernon filed a motion in the Probate Case to correct the Rule 70(b) judgment. Vernon stated that the Personal Representative had begun a series of ejectment actions to remove those in possession of the real properties, including an action to eject Riverside which was farming the Chinden Property.2 Vernon claimed the Rule 70(b) judgment was improper, and that he is a two-thirds owner of the real properties as Victoria‘s intestate heir.3 Specifically, Vernon argued that the judgment in Smith, which dismissed Joseph‘s claims with prejudice prior to the issuing of the 70(b) judgment in the Probate Case, precluded the magistrate court in the Probate Case from issuing the Rule 70(b) judgment. Vernon argued that the Smith judgment had “the effect of a final determination as a matter of law that the Chinden Property is vested in VHS Properties.” The magistrate court held that the Smith judgment did “not operate as res judicata, claim preclusion or issue preclusion in this probate.”
On April 23, 2020, the Personal Representative filed his complaint in district court seeking the ejection of Riverside and restitution of the premises and requesting attorney fees. Riverside answered the complaint, alleging that the Personal Representative did not have standing to bring the ejectment action because the Personal Representative is not the owner of the Chinden Property. Riverside asserted Vernon is a two-thirds owner and Joseph is a one-third owner because they are Victoria‘s heirs. On September 9, 2020, the Personal Representative filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings in which he asked the district court to conclude that the Personal Representative owned the Chinden Property (and, therefore, had the authority to eject Riverside) and that any such judgment be made final under
On October 15, 2020, a hearing took place on the motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. The district court found Riverside‘s argument “specious,” stating, “Riverside Farms was not a party to [Smith], the claim in that case was seeking declaratory relief regarding the trimming of some trees which you answered and counterclaimed. . . . There was no property interest put in issue by way of your counterclaim. . . .” The district court held that VHS is not the owner of the Chinden Property. Riverside moved to reconsider, asking the district court to reconsider its analysis concerning application of the Rule 70(b) judgment, which the district court denied. On November 18, 2020, the district court entered its Decision and Order on Motion for Partial Judgment on the
On December 4, 2020, Riverside moved to reconsider the court‘s decision and Order entered November 18, 2020, and filed a motion to amend the judgment entered November 20, 2020, under
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“[T]he standard of review applicable to lower courts’ rulings on motions for summary judgment also applies to motions for judgment on the pleadings.” Trimble v. Engelking, 130 Idaho 300, 939 P.2d 1379 (1997); see
When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being reconsidered. In other words, if the original order was a matter within the trial court‘s discretion, then so is the decision to grant or deny the motion for reconsideration. . . . [W]hen reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for reconsideration following the grant of summary judgment, this Court must determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to defeat the summary judgment.
Id.
We have long recognized that “[a]
III. ANALYSIS
This case originated as an ejectment action in which the Personal Representative sought to remove Riverside from the Chinden Property. To succeed in an ejectment action, the plaintiff must prove “(1) ownership of the property, (2) possession by the defendant, and (3) refusal to surrender possession by the defendant.” Elsaesser v. Gibson, 168 Idaho 585, 591, 484 P.3d 866, 872 (2021). The only disputed element is whether the Personal Representative owns the Chinden Property. Riverside argues the Rule 70(b) judgment, which granted the Personal Representative ownership of the Chinden Property, is invalid. Thus, it contends that the Personal Representative lacks standing to bring the ejectment suit. On appeal, Riverside argues that (1) the dismissal of the case in Smith precluded the Rule 70(b) judgment issued in the Probate Case; (2) the district court erred by denying Riverside‘s motion for reconsideration; and (3) Riverside is entitled
A. The Personal Representative has standing to bring a suit for ejectment because the dismissal of Joseph‘s claims in Smith v. Smith did not preclude the Rule 70(b) judgment in the Probate Case.
Riverside argues that the Personal Representative lacked standing to bring an ejectment action. It asserts that the dismissal of Joseph‘s claims with prejudice in Smith effectively adjudicated the issue of ownership of the disputed properties in the Probate Case. Thus, Riverside maintains that since the order and judgment in Smith confirmed VHS‘s ownership of these properties, the Rule 70(b) judgment in the Probate Case, issued after the judgment in Smith, was barred by res judicata.
“Whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion bars re-litigation between the same parties of a prior litigation is a question of law upon which this Court exercises free review.” Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 122, 157 P.3d 613, 616 (2007). ”Res judicata is an affirmative defense and the party asserting it must prove all of the essential elements by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. “The doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel).” Id. at 123, 157 P.3d at 617. “Separate tests are used to determine whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies.” Id.
1. Claim preclusion does not apply.
“Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action.” Berkshire Invs., LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81, 278 P.3d 943, 951 (2012) (quoting Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp., 147 Idaho 186, 190–91, 207 P.3d 162, 166–67 (2009) (internal quotations omitted)). There are three elements to a claim preclusion defense:
Under this doctrine, a claim is also precluded if it could have been brought in the previous action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (1) the original action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the same parties as the original transaction, and (3) the present claim arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the original action.
Id. “When the three elements are established, claim preclusion bars ‘every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit.‘” Monitor Fin., L.C. v. Wildlife Ridge Estates., LLC, 164 Idaho 555, 561, 433 P.3d 183, 188 (2019) (quoting Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 437, 849 P.2d 107, 110 (1993)) (emphasis in original).
Claim preclusion “does not require resolution on the precise point or question in the present suit that was resolved in the first one.” Carter v. Gateway Parks, LLC, 168 Idaho 428, 439, 483 P.3d 971, 982 (2020). Rather, it looks to the transaction underlying the prior action:
Claim preclusion bars adjudication not only on the matters offered and received to defeat the claim, but also as to “every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit.” In other words, when a valid, final judgment is rendered in a proceeding, it “extinguishes all claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose.”
Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 126, 157 P.3d at 620 (quoting Magic Valley Radiology, 123 Idaho at 437, 849 P.2d at 110). To determine what constitutes a transaction, the court looks to “such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage.” Magic Valley Radiology, 123 Idaho at 437, 849 P.2d at 110. Claim preclusion “may apply even when there is not a substantial overlap between the theories advanced in support of a claim, or in the evidence relating to those theories.” Id. (quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 259, 668 P.2d 130, 135 (1983)).
8. Defendant currently holds title to Decedent‘s property as the sole member of VHS Properties, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company.
9. Defendant‘s claim to ownership of such property has been challenged by Plaintiffs in Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352 in the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County [the Probate Case], by allegations of breach of fiduciary duty of Defendant to the Decedent in conveying her property into his name, and undue influence in the creation of a holographic will alleged by Defendant to grant him sole title to Decedent‘s property.
These paragraphs clearly reference the Probate Case, which was still pending at that time. However, the amended complaint did not ask the court in Smith to decide the issue of ownership of the Chinden Property because that issue was being determined in the Probate Case. Both Joseph and Vernon acknowledged that ownership was being resolved in the Probate Case.
Additionally, Riverside argues that its answer and counterclaim escalated the Smith case to include the issue of the ownership of the disputed properties. However, neither the parties nor the court in Smith even attempted to adjudicate ownership of the disputed properties. Therefore, nothing decided in Smith could have any preclusive effect on the issue of ownership of the land.
In sum, while ownership of the Chinden Properties was at issue in the Probate Case, tree removal along an easement was the issue in Smith. Therefore, it cannot be said that “the present claim ar[ose] out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the original action.” Berkshire Invs., 153 Idaho at 81, 278 P.3d at 951. Accordingly, we need not consider the other two elements of claim preclusion. We hold that claim preclusion does not apply and next look to issue preclusion.
2. Issue preclusion does not apply.
“Issue preclusion protects litigants from having to relitigate an identical issue in a subsequent action.” Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618. The test for issue preclusion (also known as collateral estoppel) contains five elements and bars relitigation of an adjudicated issue when:
(1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation.
Id.
The issue decided in the prior litigation must be identical to the issue presented in the present action. Berkshire Invs., 153 Idaho at 81, 278 P.3d at 951 (quoting Stoddard, 147 Idaho at 190–91, 207 P.3d at 166–67). As explained under our analysis of claim preclusion, the same issue was not addressed in Smith as was presented in the Probate Case. Smith addressed whether Joseph could prevent Vernon from removing trees located on the Chinden Property, while the Probate Case determined who owned the disputed properties. Because the issues in Smith and the Probate Case did not concern the same issue, we need not consider the other elements of issue preclusion and hold that issue preclusion does not apply.
3. The Personal Representative has standing.
We conclude that the Personal Representative was properly allowed to proceed with its action to eject Riverside from the “Chinden
B. The district court did not err in denying Riverside‘s Motion for Reconsideration.
On December 4, 2020, Riverside moved to reconsider the district court‘s decision and order entered November 18, 2020. It also moved to amend the judgment entered November 20, 2020, under
Although the denial of the motion for reconsideration is subject to an abuse of discretion standard, Fragnella, 153 Idaho at 276, 281 P.3d at 113, Riverside did not address any of the Lunneborg factors or make any other cogent argument as to how the district court abused its discretion in its opening brief. See Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018). Therefore, because we will not presume error, we affirm the district court.
C. The Personal Representative is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
Riverside argues that it is “entitled to an award of costs, with the issue of attorney fees reserved for the District Court to determine upon remand.” The Personal Representative seeks attorney fees on appeal pursuant to
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we hold that Personal Representative had standing to bring the suit for ejectment. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court. The Personal Representative is awarded attorney fees pursuant to
Chief Justice BEVAN, Justices BRODY, STEGNER and ZAHN CONCUR.