203 S.W.2d 18 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1947
Affirming. *226
The 1946 session of the General Assembly enacted KRS
On July 5, 1946, appellant, Buron R. Elrod, filed his petition in Franklin Circuit Court, suing as a tax-payer and seeking a declaratory judgment defining the rights and duties of the Governor, the appointed members of the Board, and the Commissioner of Finance, and asking that the portion of KRS
Robert L. MacDonald, as the class representative of disabled veterans in Kentucky, filed an intervening petition alleging that he was deprived, along with other members of his class, of such needed services, due to the failure of the defendant, Clarence Miller, Commissioner of Finance, to make the payments necessary to the functioning of the Board. He further stated that he wished to be served by a Board controlled by the American Legion, Department of Kentucky, and prayed that KRS
Judgment was entered in the Franklin Circuit Court declaring KRS
The appellant, Clarence Miller, Commissioner of Finance, states in his brief that he has no desire to enter into the debate as to the constitutionality of the law in question. He states that the question of constitutionality of the Act has been raised and that if and when the conclusion is reached that the Act is constitutional, and the Governor's appointees are the duly chosen officials provided for by the Act, then he will have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that he should issue the warrants against the Treasurer to reimburse these appointed members for their actual and necessary traveling expenses and lodging incurred in the proper performance of their duties. It will be noted that the intervenor, Robert L. MacDonald, joins with the defendants, *228
the appointed members of the Board, in maintaining that the Act is constitutional, and that the appellant, Buron Elrod, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars, have joined in attacking the provisions of KRS
Appellants further attack the provisions of the Act as unconstitutional because the naming of the American Legion as a nominating agency is a grant of an exclusive and separate public privilege to that organization which contravenes section 3 of the Kentucky Constitution. We find in this second attack a much more serious and bothersome question. Appellants insist that the choice of the American Legion as an organization to represent veterans is an unreasonable and arbitrary abuse of legislative discretion. They insist that the classification used in determining the nominating agency is violative of section 3 in that it grants a special privilege not enjoyed by members of the same class similarly situated. It has been written by text-writers, and held in numerous opinions of courts, that while classification is an inherent power of legislation it must not be arbitrary nor unreasonable. It has its limitations under the Constitution and judicial construction thereunder. So, where legislation makes an improper discrimination by conferring particular privileges upon a class arbitrarily selected, and there can be no reasonable or substantial ground justifying the inclusion of one and the exclusion of the other, it is called class legislation. However, it may be said that a legislative body has wide discretion, and by way of repetition, it may be said an Act will not be held invalid unless the classification is clearly unreasonable and arbitrary. It is not enough to say that the law will work a hardship. That is true of many laws. But the crucial test is the extent to which the law operates and the manner in which it applies, or the objectives sought to be attained by it. It has been held that in order to justify an interference it must appear that the interest of those generally sought to be affected by the Act, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires such interference. What classification is reasonable rests in the discretion of the legislative body in the first instance, and in the second it is in the province of the courts to adjudicate when it should be classed as arbitrary or unreasonable. In Williams *230
v. Nall, etc.,
This Act was not passed for the benefit of the Board, nor for the benefit of the American Legion, or the Veterans of Foreign Wars as such, but primarily for the purpose of preparing, presenting, and prosecuting the claims of disabled ex-servicemen and women, and their dependents with the U.S. Veterans Administration, and other Federal agencies, and further "to make certain that no disabled veteran or his dependents are neglected." It must, therefore, be kept in mind that the objectives of the Act are caring for the interests of the disabled veteran, or his dependents. The American Legion is simply an agency selected to carry out the purpose of the General. Assembly, and the fact that the duty of making nominations for members of the Board was placed on the American Legion does not qualify the members of that organization to any special benefit or privilege under the law. It is true that under the provisions for membership of the three organizations, the American Legion, Disabled American Veterans, and Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, the eligibility is not the same. The American Legion is not all-inclusive. Neither are the other two organizations. But it may be noted that the greater per cent of, or possibly a large majority of the Disabled American Veterans and the Veterans of Foreign Wars may also be members of the American Legion, but the converse cannot be said of members of the American Legion. Since the objectives of the American Legion are in harmony with the objectives of the agency created under the Act, and since the American Legion was sufficiently inclusive to contain members of these other major veterans organizations, a fact evidenced in that one of the members selected above is a member of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Legislature obviously believed this organization could and would most effectually carry out the *231
purposes of the Act. This selection has a reasonable basis in facts. See Markendorf v. Friedman,
In the Indiana case of Bullock v. Billheimer,
The judgment is affirmed.