| S.C. | Jul 26, 1900
Lead Opinion
July 26, 1900. The opinion of the Court was delivered by The record contains the following statement of facts: "On the 21st day of November, 1898, appellant, L.C. Elmore, named above, commenced this action in Magistrate J.M. Hudgens' court in Laurens County against J.T. Elmore, as executor of the last will and testament of George Elmore, deceased, the defendant, respondent, above named, to recover possession of a mule alleged to be of the value of $75. On the trial of the case, Magistrate Hudgens dismissed plaintiff's complaint upon the grounds that the action was prematurely brought and that the plaintiff had not given any undertaking. The plaintiff appealed to the Circuit Court of Common Pleas for Laurens County, alleging error on the part of the magistrate. The appeal was heard at February, 1899, term of Court, by Judge George W. Gage, who reversed the judgment of the magistrate, and remanded the case to the court of J.M. Hudgens, magistrate, or his successor in office, for trial. There was no appeal from Judge Gage's order.
On the 8th day of July, 1899, the case came on for trial, was tried before Judge J.W. Peterson, magistrate, who had succeeded J.H. Hudgens as magistrate at Laurens, S.C. Before the plaintiff closed the testimony and before he concluded the examination of his first witness, Magistrate Peterson granted a nonsuit. The plaintiff again appealed to *291 the Circuit Court of Common Pleas for Laurens County upon various grounds.
The second appeal was heard at October, 1899, term of Court by Judge R.C. Watts, who did not consider plaintiff's grounds of appeal, but dismissed plaintiff's appeal and confirmed the judgment of the magistrate, on the ground that no action of claim and delivery of personal property could be sustained against a party as executor, for an unlawful possession. The plaintiff appeals to this Court, alleging error on the part of Judge Watts.
The practical question raised by the exceptions is whether there was error in the ruling of the Circuit Judge, that "no action of claim and delivery of personal property could be sustained against a party as executor for an unlawful possession." There can be no question as to the manner in which the defendant came into possession of the property, for in his answer he alleges as a fact, which the plaintiff does not deny, that he came into the possession of the mule as the executor of the will of George Elmore, deceased. The A. E. Enc. of Law, vol. VII., 332 (1st ed.), lays down this doctrine: "At common law, no action founded upon a tort committed by the deceased, for which damages only could be recovered as satisfaction, such as trespass, trover, false imprisonment, assault and battery, slander, deceit * * * and the like — where the declaration imported a tort, to person or property, and the plea must be not guilty — lay against his executor or administrator. But if by reason of the tort the estate has derived pecuniary advantage, the representative could be compelled to account to the injured party in another form of action for the benefit so obtained. Thus if goods wrongfully taken away by the deceased remain in specie in the hands of the executor or administrator, the rightful owner might maintain replevin or detinue against such executor or administrator, to recover them back; or trover, laying the conversion to have been by the representative; or if sold, an action for money had and received to recover their value." In 3 Wms. on Ex'ors, sec. 1602, it is said: "In *292
some, however, of the cases above mentioned, a remedy may be had against the executor or administrator in another form: Thus, although at the common law, an action of trover upon a conversion of the testator dies with him, yet if the goods, c., taken away continue still in specie in the hands of the executor or administrator of the wrongdoer, replevin or detinue will lie against such executor or administrator to recover them back; or trover, laying the conversion to have been by the executor; or in case they are sold, an action for money had and received to recover their value." The following cases throw light upon this question: Jenkins v. Bennett,
Since there is no question that the mule came into the possession of the defendant as executor of the testator's will, I think the judgment of this Court should be, that the judgment of the Circuit Court be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial, but as two members of this Court are of the contrary opinion, the judgment of the Circuit Court must stand affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
I am conscious that an example is to be set, but I am ready to assist in setting such example. I cannot conceive that a man who takes my mule, then dies, having named an executor which executor takes possession of my mule as assets of his testator's estate, to be by him administered, and upon my demand for my mule declines to surrender the mule to me and when I sue him to recover my mule, in a magistrate's court, his reply is, "You cannot sue me in claim and delivery," will be protected by law. If the executor surrendered the mule on my demand, without suit, will not he have to *293 account for such surrender to the legatees of his testator? If the executor refuses to surrender, must I stand by and take no steps to recover my mule? If the executor had been the original tort feasor, I admit he could plead that his taking of the mule was personal act, and in no manner connected with his testator's estate. But the testator took mymule, and died with said mule in his possession. His executor succeeds to his testator's possession, in his representative character. When I demand my mule and I am refused possession of him by such executor, on the ground that the mule belonged to the estate of his testator, of course I must sue him as executor. I concur in the opinion of Judge Gary and the judgment of reversal.
Dissenting Opinion
Being unable to concur in the conclusion reached by Mr. Justice Gary in the opinion which he has prepared in this case, I propose to state the grounds of my dissent. The appeal turns upon the single question whether the Circuit Judge erred in holding that an action of claim and delivery of personal property brought against the defendant as executor of the will of the testator, George Elmore, under the allegations that he, as such executor, is in the lawful possession of such property, cannot be maintained, but that such action should have been brought against the defendant individually and not as executor. This is an important question, far-reaching in its results, and it is claimed has never heretofore been distinctly decided in this State. It is not a mere question of pleading, or of the proper parties to an action, but its decision vitally affects the interests of those who may be interested in the estates of decedents. For if this case is allowed to proceed in its present form, and the plaintiff shall succeed in establishing his right to the possession of the mule sued for, or damages in lieu thereof, then it is clear that the liability will be fastened upon the estate of the testator, not by reason of any act of his own, for it is distinctly declared that "no wrong is imputed to defendant's testator," but solely because *294
of a tort committed by the defendant, who has been appointed executor of the testator's will. So that it seems to me that the practical inquiry is, whether one who has been intrusted by a decedent with the execution of his will can by any action or omission of his own, fasten a legal liability upon the estate of his testator, in the absence of any provision in the will investing him with authority so to do, and it is not pretended that there is any such provision in the will in this case. The doctrine is well settled that neither an executor (in the absence of authority in the will so to do), nor an administrator can, by contract, either express or implied, impose any new debt upon the estate of the testator, or intestate, as the case may be. McBeth v. Smith, 2 Treadway Con. Rep., 676; reported, also, in 3 Brev., 511; Nehbe v. Price, 2 N. McC., 328; where Mr. Justice Huger, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said that the point had been repeatedly decided. O'Neall v. Abney, 2 Bail., 317; Wilson v.Huggins, 11 Rich., 410; Cook v. Cook,
Now, if an executor or administrator has no power to fasten upon the estate, which he represents, any liability by contract, either express or implied, even though such contract may be entered into for the benefit of the estate, how much stronger is the reason for holding that an executor has no power to fix upon the estate placed in his charge any liability for any tort that he may commit, and hence that no action based upon a tort committed by him can be maintained against him as executor, for that would be imposing uponthe estate a liability for his own wrongful act. This view is supported by authority. See II. Enc. of Law, at page 942 of 2d edit., where it is said: "Executors and administrators can create no liability against the estates represented by them by any tortious or wrongful act. Their torts are their individual acts, for which the only remedy of the person injured is against them individually, and the rule is the same whether the injury results from intentional wrong or negligence." On the next page of the same volume, under the subdivision 17, treating of the liability of an executor or administrator for taking property of third persons, I find the following language: "If an executor or administrator, as such, receives money or takes possession of property to which the estate has no right, he is liable to an action by the real owner for its recovery. The authorities are uniform in holding this, and they generally hold that he incurs personal liability; but there is some diversity as to whether his liability is only personal, or whether he also becomes liable in his representative capacity. The English Courts, adhering to the principle that an executor or administrator has no power to create any new liability on the estate, hold that he becomes liable in his individual *296
capacity alone, though the money or property is applied to the purposes of the estate, and some of the decisions in the United States are to the same effect." (Citing cases from the States of Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Virginia.) The writer of the article in the Encyclopoedia then proceeds to say: "But other authorities have adopted a more equitable rule, and hold that if an executor or administrator has applied to the use of the estate money or proceeds of property belonging to third persons, he is liable in his representative capacity, and that the person injured may elect whether he will hold the executor or administrator liable personally or in his representative capacity." The cases of Ford v. Caldwell, 3 Hill, 248, and Huff v. Watkins,
It seems to me, that it would not only be analogous but illogical to hold that, while an administrator or executor cannot be sued in his representative capacity on a contract made by him and not by his intestate or testator, as the case may be, whereby a new debt or liability may be fastened upon the estate which he represents, yet he may be sued in his representative capacity for a tort committed by him, with which his testator or intestate had nothing whatever to do, and is in no way responsible for; and thus a new liability may be fixed upon the estate which he represents. Such a doctrine would not only be anomalous and illogical, but would tend to prejudice, perhaps to destroy, the interests of those beneficially interested — oftentimes minors — in the estates of decedents. In the present case, no wrong whatever is imputed to defendant's testator, and, on the contrary, appellant in his argument distinctly repudiates any intention to make such an imputation. The action is based upon a tort committed by the defendant since the death of his testator, in wrongfully withholding the possession of the chattel sued for from the alleged rightful owner, and for that he can only be held liable in his individual and not in his representative capacity. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which no wrong could be imputed to the testator in taking and retaining the possession of the chattel in dispute, and yet the person who may unlawfully withhold the possession of such chattel from the rightful owner would be guilty of a wrong in so doing. For example, if the testator was entitled to a life interest only in the chattel, with remainder over to the plaintiff, there could be no possible wrong on the part of the testator in taking and retaining possession of such chattel during his lifetime. But if, after his death, any person, be he executor or administrator or a third person, should unlawfully withhold the *299 possession of the chattel from the person entitled in remainder to it, then the wrong done is that of such person, for which he would be liable in his individual and not in his representative capacity. If it should be said that it would be a hard case upon the executor, if he should be held individually responsible in a case like the one supposed, the answer is obvious. The Court of Equity would, in a proper case and upon a proper showing that the executor had acted in good faith, allow him credit for whatever he had been required to pay in an honest effort to protect the interests of the estate committed to his charge. It is every day practice to allow the executor, upon his accounting, credit for amounts paid out by him for counsel fees and other proper expenses incurred by him in the management of the estate, upon contracts for which he is responsible in his individual and not in his representative capacity, whenever the Court is satisfied that such obligations have been incurred in good faith for the benefit of the estate.
I think there was no error upon the part of the Circuit Court in holding that this action could not be maintained against the defendant in his representative capacity, but that the action should have been brought against the defendant individually. This view being conclusive of the case, there was no error in holding that it was not necessary to pass upon appellant's exceptions.
MR. JUSTICE JONES concurs in the dissenting opinion of CHIEF JUSTICE McIVER.