Elmer L. JOHNSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Paul PRAST, Respondent-Appellee. Harold SMITH, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ramon L. GRAY, Respondent-Appellee.
Nos. 76-1550, 76-1582.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Nov. 4, 1976 and Jan. 7, 1977. Decided Jan. 26, 1977.
Supplement to Opinion March 9, 1977. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied April 5, 1977.
548 F.2d 699
Charlene R. Bohl, Post-Conviction Defense Project, Madison, Wis., for petitioner-appellant in No. 76-1582.
Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen., John M. Schmolesky, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, Wis., for respondents-appellees.
Before CUMMINGS and TONE, Circuit Judges, and CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge.*
TONE, Circuit Judge.
These habeas-corpus actions challenge state sentences as having been impоsed without consideration of presentence custody resulting from defendants’ financial inability to make bail. In Faye v. Gray, 541 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1976), this court held that the equal-protection clause of the
Johnson, petitioner in No. 76-1550, escaped from the Wisconsin Correction Camp System in December 1974 while serving twо concurrent three-year sentences. On March 7, 1975, he was arrested on another charge in Salem, Oregon. Shortly thereafter, a Wisconsin detainer was filed, and on March 27, 1975, petitioner, having waived extradition, was returned to the Dane County Jail in Wisconsin to await trial on an escape charge. On April 14, he pleaded guilty to that charge and was sentenced to the statutory minimum of one year, to run consecutively to his earlier sentence. The maximum sentence that could have been imposed was five years.
The transcript of the hearing on April 14 contains no mention of the 39-day period petitioner spent in custody between his arrest in Oregon and the sentencing on the escape charge in Wisconsin. Subsequently, however, in an order denying petitioner‘s motion for post-conviction review under
In April 1976 petitioner filed this federal habeas-corpus action asserting that his right to equal protection had been violated by the alleged failure of the sentencing judge to credit the presentence jail timе.3 In reviewing the petition, the District Court apparently adopted the view of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Hall v. State, 66 Wis.2d 630, 633-634, 225 N.W.2d 493, 495 (1975), that consideration of presentence jail time is a matter, not of constitutional right, but of the sentencing court‘s discretion. Accordingly, the court held that, in light of the circumstances outlined above, petitioner had “failed to meet his burden of showing that there was an abuse of discretion . . . that would present a constitutional question actionable on habeas corpus” and denied the petition.4
Smith, petitioner in No. 76-1582, received indeterminate sentences totaling twelve years upon conviction under a Wisconsin indictment chаrging offenses for which the total maximum imprisonment was twenty-seven years and six months. When sentenced he had already been in custody 134 days because of financial inability to make bail. The record of the sentencing, which occurred in 1973, prior to the Byrd decision, does not show whether the judge gave consideration to the presentence custody in fixing the sentence.
In ruling on Smith‘s federal habeas-corpus petition, the District Court noted that the total of presentence custody and sentences imposed did not exceed the statutory maximum, held that there was therefore a presumption of crediting, and dismissed the petition.
“the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any substantive offense be the same for all defendants irrespective of their economic status.”
As the Faye opinion pointed out, this principle has been applied to require crediting whenever the sentence imposed, plus the presentence custody, exceeds the statutory maximum,5 and, by some courts, even when the combined time is within the statutory maximum.6 Courts adopting the latter position have reasoned that in either situation, whether the length of the sentence is attributable to the maximum set by the legislature or to a judicial sentencing order, the result is that an indigent is confined longer than a non-indigent receiving the same sentence. See, e. g., King v. Wyrick, 516 F.2d 321, 323 (8th Cir. 1975); Note, Sentence Crediting for the State Criminal Defendant—A Constitutional Requirement, 34 Ohio St.L.J. 586 (1973). This view, implicitly adopted by this court in Faye, is now explicitly adopted.
In reaching this conclusion, we have considered the Supreme Court‘s decision in McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973), holding that a state that gives good-time credit for a prison sentence need not give such credit for presentence incarceration in a county jail. The Court concluded that, because a purpose of the legislative classification, albeit not the “overriding” one, was to foster the prison rehabilitation program, it was rational and justifiable to exclude time spent in jails, which had no rehabilitation programs. Id. at 274-277. No comparable basis has been suggested for distinguishing between presentence time and prisоn time in the cases before us.
Accordingly, extrapolating from Williams v. Illinois and Faye v. Gray, the equal-protection clause requires consideration by the sentencing judge of presentence custody resulting from inability to post bond. By this we mean that the judge must view that custody as punishment imposed for the offense and determine how much additional custody is appropriate in light оf the time already served.
There remains to be decided the question the Faye court did not need to reach, viz., whether, in the absence of a showing by the prisoner that the presentence custody was not given the consideration the Constitution requires, a federal court in a habeas-corpus action will presume that it was considered. The answer to this question would seem to lie in the nature of the right asserted. Before Williams v. Illinois, supra, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that, where a statutory scheme required the crediting of an indigent‘s presentence jail time, it would conclusively presume that such credit had been given by the sentencing court “[w]herever it is possible, as a matter оf mechanical calculation, that [it] could have been given.” Stapf v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 100, 367 F.2d 326, 330 (1966). Accord, Holt v. United States, 422 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1970). Since Williams the Fifth Circuit has adopted a similar presumption, see Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625, 627 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975), in a habeas-corpus action brought by a state prisoner. This is, of course, another way of saying the credit need not be given at all in such a case. The basis for the Fifth Circuit‘s position is its view that
“there is no absolute constitutional right to pre-sentencе detention credit,” Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231, 1237 (5th Cir. 1976); and, thus, in the absence of a state statute granting credit or the imposition of a maximum sentence, the granting of such credit is within the discretion of the sentencing judge, id. at 1235.
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit, however, this court‘s view in Faye, which we have reaffirmed, was that the indigent‘s right to consideration of presentence detentiоn is constitutionally based even if the total detention is below the statutory maximum.7 With that as a premise, the court in Faye questioned the invocation of a presumption to deny a constitutionally based right, but did not reach that issue, because it found that, if a presumption existed, it was “thoroughly rebutted” by the record. The Eighth Circuit‘s reasoning in King v. Wyrick, supra, 415 F.2d at 322, was the same. Now that the issue is squarely bеfore us, we hold that there is no presumption, either conclusive or rebuttable. Unless the state proves in the habeas-corpus action that the judge, in fixing the sentence, gave consideration in the sense stated above to the time served before sentencing, the prisoner will be entitled to credit. An opposite result would derogate from the importance of the equal-protection right to have presentence jail time considered at the time of sentencing or, in the absence of such consideration, to have that time credited. Were we to presume consideration, and therefore deny credit, thаt right would become illusory in many cases. Cf. Steele v. North Carolina, 348 F.Supp. 1023, 1024 (W.D.N.C.1972), aff‘d in part and remanded, 475 F.2d 1401 (4th Cir. 1973), and Padgett v. United States, 387 F.2d 649 (4th Cir. 1967).
Applying this standard to the cases at bar, we reverse the District Court judgments. In neither case does the record of the sentencing hearing contain any reference to presentence custody. The sentencing judge‘s statements in Johnson, at the subsequent state post-conviction prоceeding, that he was aware of the Byrd decision and that he “strongly suspect[ed]” he had considered the presentence custody, do not establish that Johnson was accorded his right to equal protection. Because, as we must therefore assume, Johnson‘s sentence was fixed without reference to prеsentence custody, he was entitled to credit for as much of that custody as resulted from his financial inability to make bail. Cf. Stapf v. United States, supra, 367 F.2d at 330. To “consider” the presentence custody in the state post-conviction proceeding, but leave the sentence unchanged, as the sentencing judge did here, was tantamount to increasing thе sentence in violation of Johnson‘s equal-protection rights. On remand in Johnson, a writ will be issued ordering the release of petitioner upon completion of the one-year sentence, less the presentence time during which he was eligible for bail, as determined by the District Court. In Smith, unless the state can establish by the sentencing judge‘s testimony that, despite the silence of the sentencing record on the point, he gave the required consideration to presentence custody, Smith is entitled to credit for that custody. We remand Smith to give the state an opportunity to make such proof, if it sees fit to attempt to do so.
Our ruling need not result in a flood of post-conviction proceedings in either state or federal courts in Wisconsin. The state can grant administrative relief in cases in which it ascertains either that appropriate consideration was not given or that it cannot be determined whether consideration was given. Those relatively few cаses that cannot be resolved administratively will of course have to be processed by the courts.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
SUPPLEMENT TO OPINION
TONE, Circuit Judge.
On the day the above opinion was issued, the Office of the Wisconsin Attorney Gen-
CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge (concurring in part, and dissenting, in part).
I agree that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to receive credit against his sentence for that period of pretrial incarceration which resulted from his inability to post bond. But I also consider it bоth constitutional and desirable to rebuttably presume that such credit was given by the trial judge at the time of sentencing, and to impose upon petitioner the burden of proof to the contrary. See, Faye v. Gray, 541 F.2d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 1976); Campbell, dissenting).
In my view, the record in No. 76-1550 rebuts any such presumption, and accordingly I concur in the result reached by the majority with respеct to that appeal. The record in No. 76-1582, on the other hand, does not reveal whether, in sentencing the petitioner, the trial court gave credit for time served in confinement prior to trial. Accordingly, I would presume that credit was given and would find that petitioner has not satisfied his burden of proof to the contrary—i.e. the burden to present evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption. I therefore respectfully dissent from the result reached by the majority in No. 76-1582.
* The Honorable William J. Campbell, Senior District Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation.
Notes
The court added that the effect of this ruling was to make mandatory what had previously been permissive. 65 Wis.2d at 425, 222 N.W.2d at 702.“We further hold that, in imposing any sentenсe, the court must, in exercising its discretion, take into consideration, in determining the length of sentence to be imposed, the time the defendant spent in preconviction custody . . . even though the time spent in custody, when added to the sentence, would be less than the maximum.”