ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
We deny the petition for rehearing. We conclude that our decision does not conflict with
United States v. Houser,
We need not, however, solve that problem in this petition. Houser deals with criminal appeals and Pratt with civil appeals. Rules 4(a) and 4(b) differ on their face, each prescribing a different procedure for obtaining an extension. Rule 4(a) explicitly requires that the request for extension of time be by motion, while Rule 4(b) permits the request “with or without motion and notice.” In addition, the time limits in Rule 4(b) are more accelerated than those of Rule 4(a).
With these apparent differences, it should come as no surprise that our review of discretion exercised by the district court would also be different. Thus, it has been held that the amount of deference accorded to the district court’s ruling on excusable neglect is greater in criminal appeals under Rule 4(b) than in civil appeals under Rule 4(a).
United States v. Ferrer,
Because the discretion allowed the district court is less in civil than in criminal appeals, see id., our review of the order granting an extension of time to file a notice of appeal in Pratt was less deferential. Houser, which deals with review of discretion in a criminal context, does not bar our ruling.
The full court has been advised of the suggestion for rehearing en banc, and no judge of the court has requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc. Fed. R.App.P. 35(b).
The petition for rehearing is denied, and the suggestion for rehearing en banc is rejected.
