Plaintiff filed this premise liability action against defendant, alleging that she was injured as a result of defendant’s negligence. A jury returned a verdict of no cause of action, and the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff now appeals, and we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In October 1994, plaintiff went to the Livonia-West Holiday Inn to attend a miniature show. She says that she fell and injured her hand after she tripped on an uneven portion of sidewalk on the hotel premises. Plaintiff sued on a negligence theory. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury returned a verdict of no cause of action.
i
Plaintiff’s first issue involves the impeachment exception to the bar in MRE 407 on evidence of subsequent remedial measures. Plaintiff claims that the trial court should have allowed her to impeach defendant’s witness with evidence that defendant renovated the hotel’s sidewalks after plaintiff’s fall. We disagree, because the sidewalk renovation was not actually a subsequent remedial measure and would have been irrelevant as impeachment.
Because Kevin McAndrew, the chief engineer of the Livonia-West Hоliday Inn, was unavailable to testify at *188 trial, plaintiff read excerpts from his deposition into the record. After plaintiff completed the reading, defendant read into the record another part of the deposition in which McAndrew was asked whether “the area that yоu were discussing in particular [i.e., where plaintiff fell] has not had any repair work done either before or after the time we’re talking about, October of ‘94.” McAndrew responded “No.” Plaintiff later tried to introduce as impeachment the deposition testimony of Steve Cаrter, the hotel manager, who testified that there had been work on the sidewalks in 1995 and 1996. The trial court excluded this evidence because plaintiff failed to object to McAn-drew’s testimony. Plaintiff claims this decision was in error.
A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidenсe is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Szymanski v
Brown,
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is nоt admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of рrecautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
The purpose of MRE 407 is to encourage, or at least not to discourage, people from taking steps in furtherance of added safety.
Palmiter v Monroe Co Bd of Road Comm’rs,
Plaintiff argues that Carter’s testimony should have been pеrmitted under the impeachment exception of MRE 407. It is well established that evidence of a subsequent remedial measure is admissible as impeachment when the opposing party has denied making a repair.
Id.,
690;
Cody v Marcel Electric Co,
Here, the trial court concluded that plaintiff was required to object to McAndrew’s testimony as a prerequisite to introduce evidence to impeach that testimony. We have not found any authority to support this ruling, nor do we see any ground plaintiff would hаve had for objecting. The rule prohibits introduc *190 tion of evidence that a repair was made after an accident; it does not bar evidence that no repair was made. Accordingly, we do not believe that objection to this portion of the deposition was a prerequisite to the introduction of impeachment evidence.
However, we will not reverse the decision of a trial court if it reached the right result, albeit for the wrong reason.
Yerkovich v AAA,
n
Plaintiff contends that the cumulative effect of alleged trial errors denied her a fair trial. We disagree.
First, plaintiff argues that her right to a fair trial was violated by the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence of repairs to the sidewalk after рlaintiff’s fall. However, as already discussed, the evidence was properly excluded.
Second, plaintiff asserts that she was prejudiced by defense counsel's reference to the “two-inch rule” during his closing argument. Defense counsel commented that “in the old days a gеneration ago,” the court would find negligence if the sidewalk elevation was two inches or greater and not find negligence if the elevation was less. He explained that the rule was thrown out in favor of allowing jurors to decide the question of negligence based on thе particular circumstances.
When reviewing claims of improper conduct by a party’s lawyer, this Court must first determine whether the lawyer’s action was error and, if so, whether the error requires reversal.
Hunt v Freeman,
The “two-inch rule” refers to the now-defunct doctrine that a municipality cannot be held liable for negligence because of a discontinuity of two inches or less in a sidewalk.
Rule v Bay City,
in
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to give SJI2d 6.01 with respect to defendant’s failure to produce its manаgement service contract with the owner of the hotel. We review claims of instructional error for an abuse of discretion.
Joerger v Gordon Food Service, Inc,
SJI2d 6.01 states that where a party fails to produce evidence under its control, and gives no reasonable excuse for the failure to produce the evidence, a jury may infer that the evidence would have been adverse to that party. SJI2d 6.01 should be given only where (1) the evidence was under the control of the party who failed to produce it and could have been produced by that party, (2) no rеasonable excuse for the failure to produce the evidence has been given, and (3) the evidence would have been material, not merely cumulative, and not equally available to the opposite party. See Note on Use of SJI2d 6.01.
Here, the management contract was not material to a determination of defendant’s negligence. Because plaintiff was visiting the hotel in response to a public invitation to a show, she was a “public invitee” and entitled to the duty of care an invitor owes to invitees.
Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship,
rv
Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court should have granted her motion for a new trial because the jury’s verdict of no cаuse of action was against the great weight of the evidence. We disagree.
When a party claims that a jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, we may overturn that verdict “only when it was manifestly against the clear weight of the evidence.”
Watkins v Manchester,
To prove negligence, plaintiff was required to prove (1) that defendant owed a duty to рlaintiff, (2) that defendant breached that duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages.
Schultz v Consumers Power Co,
443 Mich
*195
445, 449;
Plaintiff testified that she fell because her toe hit а raised portion of the sidewalk. Plaintiff presented the testimony of Duane Van Camp and Nancy Van Camp that there was a 1- to PMnch height difference between two concrete sections of the sidewalk at the site of plaintiffs fall. In addition, the jury viewed photographs of the sidewalk admitted into evidence by plaintiff. Defendant did not dispute that the sidewalk was uneven and presented no evidence that the height variation was not 1 to IV2 inches. However, defendant presented McAndrew’s testimony that he inspected the sidewalks on a weekly basis and had not noticed a dangerous condition at the site of plaintiffs fall at any time before her fall. Furthermore, Carter testified that he did not believe the uneven sidewalk was a hazard and noted that there was no indication in defendant’s records that anyone else had ever fallen on the sidewalk.
Whether the uneven sidewalk presented an unreasonable danger was a factual question for the jury to decide. The jury’s verdict was supported by competent testimony of defendant’s employees that they knew of the height variatiоn and did not believe it to *196 be a hazard and that there were no reports of anyone else ever having fallen on the sidewalk. Furthermore, the jury viewed photographs of the sidewalk. On the basis of this evidence, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on the ground that the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.
The jury’s verdict is affirmed.
Notes
For example, in Little, supra, 613-614, testimony that a witness saw rock salt on an entranceway two hours after the plaintiff had fallen on the *191 entranceway was permitted to impeach defense witness testimony that no salt had been applied to the entranceway where the plaintiff had fallen.