71 Ga. 466 | Ga. | 1883
This case, by consent of parties, was determined by the presiding judge, without a jury, upon the following agreed statement of facts and the questions of law arising thereon:
Plaintiff, in the year 1873, was the owner of a draft due at twenty days, payable to her order, for seven hundred dollars, drawn by Ellis & Laney upon W. A. Oheny. Payments were made upon the paper, considerably reducing the debt.
Plaintiff instituted suit upon this paper, returnable to the October term, 3874, of Bibb superior court, against. Oheny, the acceptor, and Ells & Laney, the drawers. Oheny and Laney were alone served; there was no return of service whatever as to Ells, and he was, in fact, not served ; judgment was rendered by the court, there being no issuable defence filed under oath, against Oheny, as acceptor, and Laney, as drawer, for $332.S0 principal, and $23.30 interest to July the 1st, 1875, and costs. Ells was absent from the state from the 24th day of December, 1873, to the 24th day of December, 1877; this statement as to Elis’s absence was agreed to, subject to objection as to its admissibility in evidence. Oheny went into bankruptcy, and there were no funds of Ells & Laney or of Laney to satisfy the judgment. Ells having returned to Georgia, plaintiff brought suit against him, returnable to April term, 1884, of Bibb superior court, on this paper.
The question submitted was, whether Elis’s liability on the paper existed after the judgment rendered against Oheny and Laney on the previous suit upon the same paper, or whether it was merged in said first judgment. The presiding judge held him liable to this suit, notwithstanding the judgment in the first suit against his co-contractors, and upon this holding, error is assigned.
Judgments so obtained are made to bind, and execution ■may be levied on, the joint copartnership property, and also upon the individual property, real and personal, of the defendants who have been served with process; but they 'shall not bind or be levied on the individual property of • such as were not served.
On the authority of what was said by this court in Howell vs. Shands & Co., 35 Ga., 72, the defendant contends that this former judgment was converted into a debt of record; that its character as a joint undertaking became thereby -fixed; that, as to this joint character, the judgment amounted to an estoppel, and was conclusive between the parties thereto, and that it effected or worked a merger of the original cause of action. The suit in that case was upon a judgment rendered in another ■ state, California; it was brought against all the parties to the judgment, only a portion of whom were served; and the principles above announced were correct and applicable to the facts then before the- court. Not so, however, in our case.- Ells, by the express provisions of the
This statute has been of force for more than sixty years, and this is the first attempt, so far as we are able to ascertain, that has been made to apply the doctrine of merger to joint contractors not served, and to free them from liability on account of that fact.
This is certainly a circumstance of no little weight, in sustaining the conclusion we have reached. In other states which have similar, if not identical, enactments, the point has been raised, but has not been favorably entertained. 6 Otto, ut sup., 4 Comstock (N. Y.), 513; 4 Hun., 188, 500 2 N. Y. Rev. Stat., p. 377; Wait’s N. Y. Code, §136, p. 176; 34 Mo., 276; 5 Ib., 476; 9 N. H., 259; 1 Rich. (S. C.), 480; 12 Ala., 482; 2 Ind., 269; 4 Greene, (Iowa) 212; 22 Iowa, 560; 6 Mass., 18; 3 Metc. (Ky.), 500, 4 Sneed, 229, 231; 6 Yerg., 505.
It is further insisted that the merger will follow, unless the terms of the statute are strictly complied with, and
In view of these cases, and the further fact that the common law rule seems never to have been adopted, even in the absence of such legislation as ours, in many of our sister states, we cannot do otherwise than to order the judgment affirmed.