OPINION
The latest “chapter” in this litigation started on November 2, 1993, when David L. Alley, Sr., and David L. Alley, Jr. (“the Alleys”), filed a motion in the trial court pursuant to Tenn.R.Civ.P. 60.02 seeking to set aside an adverse judgment (“the earlier judgment”) entered below on June 11,1990. This is the second time this litigation has found its way to the appellate courts of this state. The earlier appeal reached all the way to the Suprеme Court. It was concluded there when our highest court filed its opinion 1 on November 16, 1992, affirming in part and reversing in part the decision of the Court of Appeals which had modified the earliеr judgment of the trial court. This matter was “at rest” until the judicial process was again called into action by the Alleys’ Rule 60.02 assault on the earlier judgment.
In the instant proceeding, the trial court denied the Alleys’ motion, finding that it was not timely filed and further finding that the affidavits supporting the motion “are conclusory and aver insufficient facts to set aside” the earlier judgment. The Alleys appeal, arguing that the affidavits filed in support of their motion demonstrate that the original plaintiff, J. Waymon Ellison (“Ellison”), was guilty of fraud in securing the earlier judgment. The Alleys also argue that the Chancellor should have stepped aside in response to their motion to recuse. Finding no error in the judgment appealed from, we affirm.
The facts which led to the earlier judgment are sеt forth in the Supreme Court’s reported opinion.
It is apparent that the defendants [the Alleys] manipulatеd both the Myers and Ellison transactions in such a manner as to willfully, and wrongfully, conceal their true role and their intention to reap a $180,000 ill-gained profit from the sale of the property.
Thе Alleys contend in their motion that Ellison and witnesses who testified for him committed perjury at the original hearing.
*417 They argue that the affidavit of Sytha Port-erfield, Ellison’s former 2 wife, and the affidavit of a сertified public accountant who counseled with the Myers’ family regarding the transaction support their allegation of fraud. They conclude by stating that the
Defendants would assert that thе affidavits attached hereto clearly demonstrate that the Plaintiff and members of the Myers family engaged in a scheme to perpetrate a fraud on the Court and to induce thе Court to find liability against the Defendants in this cause. Pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court should set aside the judgment, conduct such other hearings as it deems necessary in order to properly resolve this dispute, and dismiss the Complaint as was filed against the Defendants in this cause.
The Alleys’ motion comes too late. All Rule 60.02 motions must “be made within a reasonable time.” Tenn.R.Civ.P. 60.02; however, if the motion seeks relief from a judgment based on fraud, there is an outer limit on the time allowed for filing the motion. If fraud is the basis of the motion, it must be filed “not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.” Tenn.R.Civ.P. 60.02. The earlier judgment, from which the Alleys seek relief, was entered June 11, 1990. Their motion was filed on November 2, 1993, over 40 months after the entry of that judgment. 3 The Alleys’ motion which is expressly based upon the alleged fraud of Ellison and others, and nothing more, was not timely filed.
The Alleys acknowledge the one-year limitation on the filing of a Rule 60.02 motion based on fraud; but they assert “that since the motion is based on allegations that the Plaintiff and Plaintiffs witnesses practiced a fraud upon the Court in thеir testimony about their knowledge of the fact that Defendants had an option on the property, that the one (1) year limitation for the filing of such a motion does not apply.” Contrary to the requirements of Tenn.RApp.P. 27(a)(7), the Alleys’ brief cites no authority for this assertion. Furthermore, we are not aware of any such authority. The proposition cited by the Alleys is not the law in this jurisdiction.
In addition to being time-barred, the Alleys’ motion and supporting affidavits are, as found by the Chancellor, insufficient to warrant relief from the earlier judgment. The affidavits are filled with conсlusory statements and hearsay-based assertions
4
.
*418
Furthermore, the meager admissible facts
5
which are set forth in the affidavits are not sufficient to establish fraud.
See Leeson v. Chernau,
A Rule 60.02 motion addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial court. The sсope of our review is whether the trial court abused its discretion.
Toney v. Mueller Co.,
The Alleys by their second issue argue that the Chancellor should have recused himself from hearing their Rule 60.02 motion because, after the original hearing, David L. Alley, Sr., filed a complaint against the Chancellor with the Court of the Judiciary 6 based on what Mr. Alley, Sr.’s affidavit refers to as “multiple and significant errors in determining the facts of this ease, and applying Tennessee law to those facts.” The recusal motion argues that disqualification is warranted because the Chancellor “would likely be biased against the Defendant due to” the filing of the complaint with the Court of the Judiciary.
There is no ordеr in the record before us addressing the motion for recusal. There is no indication in the record that the motion was called to the Chancellor’s attention. A trial court will not be placed in error for failing or refusing to rule on a motion unless the record clearly reflects that it was asked to do so and thereafter, without just cause, refused to act.
Cary v. Arrowsmith, 777
S.W.2d 8, 20 (Tenn.App.1989). Assuming, fоr the purpose of argument, that the trial court orally denied the motion for recusal or denied it in an order which is not in the record before us, we find no error in this action. The motion аnd affidavit — with their “would likely be biased against” the Alleys language — are not sufficient to make out a case for recusal. “The determination of whether to recuse oneself rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge.”
7
State v. Galloway,
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for the collection of costs and such other action as mаy be appropriate. The costs of this appeal are taxed against the appellants and their surety.
Notes
.
Ellison v. Alley,
. They were divorced in February, 1990.
. While not raised by the parties, we recognize that this case wаs pending on appeal during the year following entry of the earlier judgment, and that this fact means that the "trial court [had] no jurisdiction to consider a Rule 60.02 motion during the pendency of [thе] appeal.”
Spence v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
.For example, Ms. Porterfield’s affidavit contains the following statements:
I was told and overheard conversations that leave no doubt that Mr. Ellison and Cora Myers conspired to lie and strip Mr. Alley of any money that he made on the sale of the option on Mr. Ellison’s farm. Prior to the meeting with Mrs. Myers, Mr. Ellison was very happy about the sale of his farm and he was satisfied that he had received a fair price. He knew that Mr. Alley had an optiоn and was not working as his agent. He was glad he didn’t have to auction his farm to get rid of it. He understood the option and its terms and only became unhappy about the sale after being stirred up by the Myers. Mr. Ellison would never have filed a lawsuit if the Myers had left him alone. They convinced him that he could get some money from a lawsuit that would not cost him anything and that they would help him all they сould in a lawsuit.
. Neither affidavit asserts that Ellison was aware that the Myers family was paying $380,000 for his farm, and that the Alleys were receiving $180,000 of that sum.
. Mr. Alley, Sr.'s affidavit points out that the complaint was dismissed by the Court of the Judiciary.
. In &e instant case, the Chancellor’s discretion would address itself to the Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly Canon 3C. There is absolutely nothing in the record before us to suggest that Chancellor Williams violated that Canon in refusing to disqualify himself.