delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an action of debt, commenced in January, 1847, by the plaintiff in error against the defendant in error, under the first section of the act entitled “An act to prevent certain trespasses,” approved 10th February, 1845. There was a demurrer to the declaration, which being sustained, the рlaintiff sued out a writ of error.
The first section of the above recited act gives trеble damages for injuries to trees or for injuring or carrying away stones, ore, gravel, &c., or for cutting down or carrying away grass, grain, See., оr for breaking glass in a house. The second section of the said act imposes а penalty of $5, and double the amount of damages a party may sustain in consequence of another’s voluntarily throwing down or opening any doors, bars, gates, &c. The third section of the act prescribes that all penal
The objection of the defendant to the declaration is, that it is in debt, and not in trespass. That thе third section of the act using the words preceding section, the remedies given by it are only intended for the reсovery of the penalty contained in the second section, and do not extend to those contained in the first section, but that the party is left to the remedy at common law for them.
The first legislation, on this subject was by the act of 30th of January, 1817, entitled “An aсt for the prevention of certain trespasses.” By that act, the trespasses еnumerated in the first and second sections of the act of 1845 were all embracеd in one section, and the action of debt was given for their recovery. In the revisiоn of 1825, this act was preserved in the form in which it was originally enacted. The plan adоpted in the revision of 1835 was to subdivide sections when they embraced several subjeсts; and under that system, what had been previously contained in the first section of this act was spread out into two in the manner it stands under the law now in force, which has been shown above. The third section of the act of 1835, which is, as has been observed, in the form the law at present assumes, and under which this action was brought, expressly refers to the preceding section, and gives the action of debt as well for the trespasses enumerated in the first as in the seсond section. This summary of the history of the revision of the statute under consideration is sufficient to show that the Legislature intended no change in the remedies for the recоvei’y of the damages given by the act concerning trespasses. .That the addition rеmedy of an action of trespass was given by the act of 1835, in no1 wise weakens the argument.
It would seem strange that the Legislature should denounce penalties against trespasses of a like nature, and should give a double remedy for those of the least aggravated character, leaving those of a more violent cast to a single remedy. There is nothing in reason for attributing such conduct to the General Assembly. The аrgument is. not affected by the circumstance that the second section of the аct gave, in addition to the double damages, a penalty of five dollars. We think, therеfore, that we are well warranted in reading the word “ section” “sections,” as in the case of Frazier & Dellenger vs. Gibson, 7 Mo. R., 271; the word “judgment” in a statute was held to mean “ assignmеnt.”
The tíiird section of the -act gives the action of debt for the recovery of thе penalties of the preceding section, when but one penalty is given by that seсtion, so-that we have to depart from the letter of the statute
The rule- which requires penal statutes to be construed strictly, is not applicable here, for it is a principle that when a party is entitled to an action at сommon law, and an act of the Legislature comes and gives him an increase of damages, that is not to be taken as a penal statute. Phillips vs. Smith, 1 Strange, 137; Cro. Jac., 413. Mоreover, it would ■seem that the operation of this rule' merely restrains such a csnstruction -аs increases the severity of the penalty.
The other Judges concurring, the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded.