Dеfendant State Farm appeals as of right from a declaratory judgment dated October 22, 1976, issued by the Jackson County Circuit Court. That judgment found that plaintiffs stepson, Craig Hull, was covered under the uninsured motorist coverage provided in a policy of insurance issued by State Farm to plaintiff Ellis. The State Farm policy was issued on plaintiffs automobile. On August 7, 1973, Craig Hull was fatally injured in a collision with an uninsured motоrist. At the time of the accident, Craig Hull was operating a motorcycle which he owned and for which he had purchased liability insurance. However, he had expressly rejected uninsured motorist coverage under that policy.
Clauses in both the liability and uninsured mоtorist sections of the policy issued by State Farm to plaintiff Ellis excluded coverage of the motorcycle. Assuming that Craig Hull was not protected from the acts of uninsured motorists under the terms of the uninsured motorist clause in the policy issued by State Farm, the Seсretary of State *191 argues that the exclusionary clause is void as against public policy and that under the law at the time of thе accident, the policy must be read to include such coverage.
MCLA 500.3010; MSA 24.13010, in effect at the time the policy was issued and the time the accident occurred, read in part:
"No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy insuring against loss * * * shall be dеlivered or issued for delivery * * * unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto * * * for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles * * * unless the named insured rejects such covеrage in writing as provided herein. (Emphasis supplied.)”
In
Boettner v State Farm Mutual Insurance Co,
The liability coverage of the State Farm policy defines the "insured” as including "if residents of the same household, the relatives of the first person named in the declarations, or оf his spouse”. At the time of the fatal accident Craig Hull was a *192 household resident relative of the named insured or his spouse. Therefore, the policy’s own definitional terms conferred insured status on Craig Hull at the time of the accident by virtue of his being a household resident relative. Since Craig Hull was a person insured under the liability section of the policy, MCLA 500.3010; MSA 24.13010 necessarily requires uninsured motorist coverage for him under the policy. Such coverage must therefore be read into the State Farm policy. See MCLA 500.3012; MSA 24.13012.
State Farm contends that the decision of this Court in
Nunley v
Turner,
"It is hard to see how Farmers could possibly be held liable to рlaintiff. Such a rule of law, if extended, would mean that an insurer to whom a premium had been paid on one car would be liable fоr uninsured motorist coverage on any number of motor vehicles bought by an insured subsequent to the original purchase of uninsured motorist сoverage without purchasing such additional coverage.”
While this is a forceful and logically appealing argument, we сannot ignore the holdings in the Supreme Court decisions in this area that the statute is mandatory, that it requires coverage that is personal to the insured rather than limited to injuries which occur in the insured vehicle, and that the purpose of the statute was to reduce claims on the motor vehicle accident claims fund.
State Farm contends that
'Nunley, Rice [infra],
and
Priestly [infra],
establish that public policy, as expressed in the statute, voids exclusionаry lan
*193
guage of uninsured motorist coverage only in instances where the plaintiff would be covered under the liability sections of thе policy”. We believe this argument ignores the result in
Boettner, supra.
A similar argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in
Pappas v Central National Insurance Group of Omaha,
The opinion reads in part:
"Proof of the facts Central demands triggers the insurer’s liability, but we do not believe it has any effect on a passenger’s status as an insured under the terms of the policy.”
The Court also states in that opinion:
"That the plaintiff in Blakeslee was a named insured responsible for paying prеmiums whereas Pappas was not does not undermine the authority of that case. The critical fact in Blakeslee was that statutorily required coverage was being limited.
_ " * * * The legislative policy expressed in the statute is not affected by circumstances peculiar to the situation of a particular plaintiff.”
We are not unmindful of the fact that
Nunley v Turnеr, supra, Rice v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange,
In the instant case and its two companion cases,
Bradley v Mid-Century Insurance Co,
Since the insurance policy issued by Stаte Farm conferred insured status on Craig Hull by virtue of his being a household resident relative, and not by virtue of his operating any particulаr given vehicle, he had insured status at the time of the accident, whether or not State Farm was liable under the liability coveragе of the policy, and therefore was necessarily covered by the uninsured motorist section of the policy. Under the statute such coverage could not be limited by self-devised exclusionary clauses written into the policy by State Farm.
We agree with the well-written and well-reasoned opinion of the circuit court wherein Judge Britten pointed out:
"The question becomes whether the public policy behind the statute is for the protection of vehicles or persons.
* * *
"The uninsured motorist coverage required by the *195 statute provides that no policy shаll issue without coverage for 'the protection of persons insured thereunder’. The coverage appears to be personal in nature and would logically remain with the insured regardless of the circumstances when he became involved with the uninsured motorist.”
Affirmed. No costs.