172 Ga. 181 | Ga. | 1931
Thomas Eeagan and his wife, Mary Eeagan, brought suit against Erampton E. Ellis as administrator of the estate of J. J. Neese, deceased, and his heirs at law, to compel specific performance of a parol contract alleged to have been entered into between J. J. Neese in his lifetime with the plaintiffs, whereby, on consideration that the plaintiffs would move into the home of deceased located at 776 Curran Street, Atlanta, Georgia, and take care of him as long as he lived, he promised that he would make his will and leave his house and lot on Curran Street to them as compensation therefor. It is alleged that in pursuance of the agreement the plaintiffs did move into the house; that J. J. Neese occupied one room in the house, and was waited upon during the remainder of his life until his death on December 30, 1928; that the contract was fully carried out and performed on their part by the plaintiffs, but the deceased died without having made a will; that plaintiffs made and paid for valuable improvements on the property in pursuance of the contract; that the deceased lived with' plaintiffs without paying board and without their receiving any compensation for the improvements; and that the administrator was attempting to collect rent from the plaintiffs for the use of the property. The prayers were, that the administrator of J. J. Neese be required to perform the contract made and entered into, that the house and lot be decreed to be the property of plaintiffs, and that the defendants be enjoined from interfering with plaintiffs in their use and occupancy of the property. The answer denied that there was any such agreement as alleged; averred that the plaintiffs were in possession of the property merely as tenants; and asked for judgment for rent. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. A motion for new trial was overruled, and defendants excepted.
In order to entitle one to specific performance of a parol contract to convey land upon a valuable consideration, the contract must be proved so clearly and satisfactorily as to leave no reasonable doubt on the minds of the jury as to what the contract was, and it must appear that it was performed on the part of the plaintiffs, and was not performed on the part of the defendant. Bird v. Trapnell, 149 Ga. 767 (102 S. E. 131); Tidwell v. Garrick, 149
D. P. Stewart testified: “He told me he had come from Philadelphia and wanted a home and did not have any children except two stepchildren, and he wanted a home and had come and was going to give Mr. and Mrs. Reagan his house on Curran Street if they would move there and live with him and give him one room, that he was going to leave them the house and lot on Curran Street. I 'saw Mr. Neese several times after that conversation. I went to see him several times while he was sick before they moved. After they moved I went to see him there. He was living on Curran Street at that time. As to how long he had been living there— they moved there the latter part of June, if I am not mistaken, and he died in December. He was a sickly man. Mr. and Mrs. Reagan waited on him and looked after him around the house. Mrs. Reagan worked a lot of the time.” J. C. Harris testified: “He [Neese] told Mr. and Mrs. Reagan that if they would live on Curran Street with him and give him a room and take care of him the rest of his life, at his death he would will them this property. He asked Mrs. Reagan had she decided what she was going to do. She told him she had. She said, ‘Well, I want you to live up to your contract.’ He said, ‘All right.’ He asked her if she was going to live up to hers, and she asked him would he. He says, ‘Yes,’ that his word was as good as his bond. After that conversation, Mr. Reagan and Mrs. Reagan and Mr. Neese moved on Curran Street. I do not know the exact date that they moved. They are living on Curran Street yet. I do not know the exact date Avhen J. J. Neese died. He died just about a year ago. As to where he was living at the time he died — the last time I saw him he was at Mrs. Reagan at 776 Curran Street.” Mrs. Maggie Branan, C. E. Croft, W. T. Bone, R. L. Whitworth, W. A. Whitfield, and Homer Martin testified to substantially the same conversations with the deceased, with reference to his agreement with
From the foregoing testimony introduced by the plaintiffs we think that it established the parol contract between the deceased and the plaintiffs so clearly and satisfactorily as to leave no reasonable doubt on the minds of the jury as to what the contract was, and that it had been performed on the part of the plaintiffs, and was not performed on the part of the deceased at the time of his death. We are therefore of the opinion that the verdict was supported by the evidence, and that the judge did not err in overruling the general grounds of the motion for a new trial.
Grounds 4, 5, and 6 of the motion except to the failure of the court to charge the jury, as requested, certain principles of law, as follows: (4) “I charge you that before section 4634 of the Code (read section) would apply in the ease, you are to determine, before possession with' valuable improvements would entitle the plaintiffs to recover, the .possession must be absolute and exclusive; that if the deceased, J. J. Neese, still retained dominion over the property or of any part of it, plaintiffs would not be in absolute possession and such possession with improvements would not entitle plaintiffs to recover. I further charge you that on the question of improvements, if any were made, it would be your duty to determine under the evidence whether such improvements are made, if made at all by the plaintiff, were for his immediate convenience or whether made as a lasting, substantial improvement. If made for the present convenience of the plaintiff, then, even if the possession were absolute, such improvements would not entitle the plaintiff to recover.” (5) “Before you would determine, however, such an equitable title passed by reason of the gift so as to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict of specific performance, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt," from the evidence, that there was a gift of a specific tract of land and a delivery of that land as set out in the petition. If the evidence fails to satisfy your minds upon this, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was a gift of a specific tract of land and a delivery of that land.” (6) “Where specific performance is sought for the enforcement of the sale of land, such contract and the terms thereof should be established so clearly, strongly, and satisfactorily as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the agreement.” The refusal of these requests was not error for any reason assigned. The re
The judge did not err in refusing a new trial.
Judgment affirmed.