107 Mich. 528 | Mich. | 1895
Lead Opinion
At the spring election in 1891, an amendment to the Constitution increasing the salary of the attorney general was submitted to the electors. The -vote was canvassed, and the amendment was declared to be carried. Similar action was had relative to another amendment submitted in 1893. Salaries were paid at the increased rate, until a recanvass, in obedience to the order of this court, resulted in the determination and declaration that the respective amendments had been defeated. Relator alleges that meantime, believing said amendments to have been legally adopted, he, in good
“Whereas, certain moneys were from time to time paid as salaries, under and by virtue of act eighty-seven of the public acts of one thousand eight hundred and ninety-one, and acts one hundred twenty-seven and one hundred twenty-eight of the public acts of one thousand eight hundred ninety-three; and
“Whereas, certain parts of each of said acts have, in effect, been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of this State, and no decision having been made as to the rights of the parties to whom the salaries were paid, and no settlement having been had with the several parties receiving the same: Therefore
“Resolved hy the Senate and House of Representatives, that the board of state auditors be and- are hereby authorized to ascertain the amount paid under and by virtue of either or any of said acts, and -to inquire into the facts and circumstances thereof, and to make such a settlement with the several parties as shall, in the opinion of the board, be just and equitable in each case, and, if any sum or sums shall be found due to this State, said board of state auditors are hereby authorized and required to commence suit therefor, in the name of the people of the State of Michigan.
“This act is ordered to take immediate effect.”
The petition states, further, that the board of state auditors caused a notice to be served upon relator to appear before them, for the purpose of adjusting the claim of the State against him for the excess received by him, over and above his lawful salary, and that he appeared accordingly. This meeting* was adjourned to a subsequent day, when said board, acting under and in accordance with an opinion furnished them, at their request, by the attorney general, determined that they were not
The relator contends that he is entitled to a hearing before the board; that the board is authorized to compromise the matter upon principles of abstract justice and equity; and that, if action is to be brought, it is only
1. That the State has no legal claim against him, for the reason that the payment was voluntary, being made and received under a mistake of law.
2. That he is entitled to a hearing before said board.
3. That the board is required to settle with him upon principles of abstract justice and equity, as contradistinguished from legal and equitable rules.
4. That no action can be brought until a settlement is reached.
We are asked to set the board in motion, unless we shall determine that the State has no valid claim.
The brief of the relator discusses the first proposition in connection with the question whether the legislature has the power to authorize a compromise of such claims as this, inasmuch as it had not the power to authorize the payment in the first instance. Whether the legislature might lawfully provide for the acceptance of a sum less than the amount paid, as a means of adjusting a claim that is doubtful, either because of supposed legal impediments in the way of recovery, or from an inability to enforce the collection, would be one thing, while to authorize a compromise by the board in accordance with its opinions of abstract justice and equity, after payment, is another. The fundamental law forbids the raising of the attorney general’s salary by the legislature. Of this, not only the members, but every citizen of the State, must be supposed to be informed. The facts that the Constitution had been declared amended, and that office had been accepted under that belief, would not have enabled the relator to recover the increased salary had payment been refused, though, in a certain sense, it may be said that in “justice and equity” he had earned it, and should be entitled to it. In such case he would be obliged to suffer the disappointment; and the fact that payment was made does not materially change the situation. He has
Tbe following are some of the logical results of such a construction as is contended for by tbe relator:
(1) Tbe board should not bring action if, in its opinion, tbe State has no legal claim to this money, because paid and received under a mistake of law.
(2) It should not bring action if, in its opinion, tbe State should recognize an abstract equity in tbe relator to keep the money received.
(3) If tbe board should think tbe 'claim of tbe State a legal and just one, it still could not bring action until tbe amount due should be determined by it.
(4) This determination must be reached by agreement with relator, wbicb implies that tbe resolution is futile unless tbe relator shall consent to state an account, wbicb obviously might be made ridiculously low at bis option, or refused altogether, thereby effectively preventing action, or limiting tbe sum to be sued for to an amount admitted by the relator.
We are of tbe opinion that this resolution should not receive such construction. The preamble alludes to the unsettled condition of these matters, and tbe failure of this court to pass upon tbe rights of tbe parties in a former proceeding, and impliedly, at least, indicates that differences exist between tbe State and these officers. Reading this in tbe light of tbe last paragraph of tbe
Our view accords with the opinion of the attorney general that the legislature intended that the board should determine whether or not, in their opinion, the State had a lawful claim against the relator, and, if so, the suit was to be commenced. We think that it was not designed that tjiey should surrender by compromise a part ■of a claim which, in the opinion of the board, was a legal one, and then resort to a suit to determine whether it was a legal one or not, if relator should not choose to
We need not consider the power of the legislature to compromise a claim the payment of which, in the first instance, was clearly a transgression of the State Constitution. It is unnecessary, for the reason that we ought not lightly to infer a willingness to surrender claims of the State, except upon legal grounds. This record does not indicate a danger of loss upon these claims. Indeed, relator’s petition asserts a willingness to pay such sum as shall be found to be legally and equitably due. The resolution, in our opinion, ought not to receive such construction.
Counsel have discussed and intimated a desire for a decision of the question of the validity of the claim of the State. We are asked to compel this board to proceed
There would, then, be but one legitimate conclusion for the board to reach, and as we cannot suppose that this writ is invoked to that end, and the board seems to have already arrived at that result, there is no occasion for our intervention.
The writ will therefore be denied.
Michigan State Bank v. Hastings, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 225; Same v. Hammond, Id. 527; Ambler v. Auditor General, 38 Mich. 746.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). I am inclined to think that the legislature regarded the right of the State to recover the amount paid to relator as open to question, and, with that view, empowered the board of auditors to inquire into the matter, and adjust it.
It is well settled that money paid under a mistake of law cannot be recovered back, and, unless an exception is made in favor of the State, the case comes within the rule on the merits. In State v. Railroad Co., 89 Mich. 481, it was held that the State was not exempt from the doctrine of estoppel; and, if so, I fail to see why, upon principle, the rule referred to is not applicable as to payments made by the State. The doctrine of State v. Railroad Co. may be questionable; but, while it is recognized as law, I cannot concur in the opinion of the majority.