James Anthony Elliott appeals his conviction for trafficking in cocaine, two additional counts of violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act and obstruction of an officer. The state’s evidence, construed in favor of the trial court’s findings on appellant’s motion to suppress and at his jury trial
(Allenbrand v. State,
On appeal, Elliott complains of an illegal stop, search and seizure; the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdicts; and the inadequacy of assistance of trial counsel for having failed to get a specific ruling on appellant’s motion to suppress even though the court, in denying a motion for new trial, stated that it did so “having read the transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress”; and the trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial made on grounds that the state’s testimony contradicting his attorney’s opening statement forced appellant to testify. Held:
1. The trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress — including the denial of a motion for new trial with the trial court having heard the arguments of the defense and the state on the motion to suppress and “having read the transcript of the hearing on the Motion to Suppress” — where there is a conflict in the evidence will be upheld as long as there is evidence to support the trial court’s order.
State v. Medders,
The trial court’s denial of the motion for new trial, viewed in favor of that ruling, establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant abandoned the car which was clearly identified as having immediately been driven by him, and he thus abandoned any interest in it and the property in it and appellant had no protected interest in the abandoned car. Thus, the search and seizure were proper.
Burgeson v. State,
The events surrounding the roadblock, which he claims was pretextual, are irrelevant and do not affect the propriety of the search and seizure made from an abandoned car after its driver crashed into a police car and led police on a high speed chase.
Appellant’s argument that the search of the car and seizure of property in the car were illegal because the roadblock was pretextual and was manned by narcotics officers and dog handlers, amounts to an assertion that he had the right to flee a police stop upon his uni *857 lateral determination that the stop was pretextual and that he had the right to commit criminal acts to evade capture by police. We reject this argument completely. Even if the roadblock had been improper, appellant had no right to flee a police stop and to lead police on a high speed chase after ramming a police car.
Notwithstanding the fleeing acts by appellant and regardless whether the roadblock was improper, the controlling fact here is that police searched an abandoned car which was identified as the car appellant had been driving immediately before he abandoned it. It contained a large quantity of cocaine, marijuana and drug-sellers’ paraphernalia, and property appellant admitted was his.
2. Furthermore, the roadblock stop was proper. Georgia courts have long since established, as proper, police roadblocks set up for the purpose of checking the legality of the operation of vehicles “without the necessity of any particularized suspicion of wrongdoing.”
Kan v. State,
3. We have examined the evidence and find it overwhelmingly sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty of the crimes charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia,
4. (a) Appellant claims trial counsel was ineffective for having failed to get a specific ruling on his motion to suppress. The order denying the motion for new trial states: “Having heard the argument of the defense attorney and attorney for the State and having read the transcript of the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, the Court hereby denies the [d]efendant[’s]. . . Motion for New Trial.” This is a specific ruling on the motion to suppress.
(b) The alleged ineffectiveness occurred after the trial court ruled on appellant’s motion for new trial; thus the issue is raised here for the first time. Generally, when this issue is raised for the first time on appeal, the case is remanded to the trial court for hearing on the issue.
Kennedy v. State,
(c) New defense counsel was retained after the trial. New counsel did not assert ineffectiveness of trial counsel in his motion for new trial, i.e., at the earliest practicable opportunity. Under
Owens v. State,
We have held that where this issue is raised for the first time on appeal, it
must
be remanded to the trial court
for
an evidentiary hearing on the claim.
Turner v. State,
Generally the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel refers to counsel’s performance
at trial. Strickland v. Washington,
In this case, new appellate counsel filed a motion for new trial which did not include a claim for ineffectiveness of trial counsel. Moreover the only claim of ineffectiveness is that trial counsel failed to do what new appellate counsel could easily have done in his motion for new trial, to wit, get a “specific” ruling on appellant’s motion to suppress. Therefore, a remand for hearing on this singular issue is barred by the rulings in Bailey, Owens, and Johnson, supra.
(d) Further, in the interest of judicial economy, we note that the singular issue of trial counsel’s failure to obtain a specific ruling on the record denying appellant’s motion to suppress is a legal one, and we can answer it. This claim does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, and was in fact irrelevant to the outcome of the case-, a specific ruling would have gained appellant nothing inasmuch as the search and seizure were entirely proper and legal and the denial of his motion to suppress was correct. Finally, we have found the court did make a specific ruling on the motion to suppress by denying the motion for new trial upon stating it had heard arguments of counsel on the issue and had read the transcript of the motion to suppress hearing.
5. The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion for mistrial, made on grounds that the state forced appellant to testify, by using state’s witnesses to contradict statements made in trial counsel’s opening argument. The motion is specious, as the circumstances were created by appellant.
In his opening argument appellant’s trial counsel surprised the State by asserting for the first time that he was not the driver of the car but had been “carjacked.” This surprise evidence forced the State to call witnesses to testify that appellant made no such claim when he came to police headquarters to turn himself in and to retrieve his personal items.
Having created this evidentiary ambush, appellant created a necessity for the State to refute it, and he also created any compulsion he says he felt to respond to the State’s refutation. The entire circumstance which he claims to be error was induced by appellant; self-induced error is close to premeditated error.
Huff v. State,
We further find any possible error in the denial of appellant’s motion for mistrial was harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence against appellant in the case. Hamilton v. State, supra; Johnson v. State, supra; In the Interest ofD. T C., supra; Kirkland v. State, supra.
Judgment affirmed.