133 Ga. 209 | Ga. | 1909
If Eeeves acted as the agent of the defendants in making the contract with the plaintiff, whether his principals were known to the plaintiff at the- time or not, in seeking to enforce the contract made by him or rights arising thereunder, the defendants would be bound by all the terms of his agreement. If that agreement was as contended by the plaintiff, the defendants had no lien upon the horse, as they were bound to pay all the expenses incurred in connection with keeping it and entering it at races. The defendants by their pleadings allege that they received the horse under the contract made by Eeeves with the plaintiff; and therefore they are not in a position of setting up a livery-stableman’s lien on account of a horse received for its keeping from a third person, regardless of the true ownership. As to this feature of the case it must depend on what was the contract, not upon what rights the defendants might have on account of earing for the horse independently of such a contract with the owner. Livery-stable keepers have a lien on the stock placed in their caie for keeping. Civil Code, §2810. At common law a livery-stable keeper had no lien unless by contract therefor. Jackson v. Holland, 31 Ga. 339. His lien in this State is statutory. Different definitions have been given of a livery-stable keeper. In 19 Am. & E. Enc. L. (2d ed.) 430, it is said: “A livery-stable is a building where horses or vehicles are kept or let for hire. A livery-stable keeper is of course the keeper of such a stable.” Other definitions are: “One whose business it is to keep horses for hire, or to let, or to keep, feed, or board horses for others.” Abbott’s L. D.; Anderson’s L. D.; Black’s L. D. “One who takes horses to bait and board; and he usually keeps horses to let.” Groves v. Kilgore, 72 Me. 489. And a livery-stable has been said to be “A place where horses are groomed, fed, and hired; where vehicles are let.” Williams v. Garignes, 30 La. Ann. 1094. The Standard Dictionary defines a livery-stable to be “A stable where horses are kept at livery and for hire, and vehicles are let.”
The presiding judge charged: “On the other hand, if you believe the contract was made as contended by defendants, that is, made by Elliott with Eeeves as agent for Hodgson & Jackson, and the terms were stipulated as insisted upon by the defendants, and he had expressly agreed to bear all expenses, as well as feeding the horse, and agreed to give them a lien upon it, then it would be your duty to find out what the evidence shows that to be, and return a verdict in their favor against the plaintiff for whatever it amounts to;” and also: “If you believe in this case, however, that Elliott did not make that express contract that he should pay for the feeding of the horse and bear all these expenses and give a lien for the entire thing, but that he did agree to pay for, and that he should have a lien therefor, for feeding and keeping the horse and training him while here and elsewhere, and taking care of him and attending to him here and elsewhere, and that they have not been paid, then the court instructs you that if the defendants themselves have borne all the expense of feeding him here and elsewhere, that the defendants would be entitled to a verdict against the plaintiff.” There was no evidence of any agreement on the part of the plaintiff that the defendants should have a lien for any particular services, nor was any lien by contract set up in the pleadings. If they had a lien, it was not by contract, but such as the statute gave them. As there was a conflict in the evidence as to what was the contract, and as the defendants were claiming a lien as created by statute because of an alleged contract for the keeping of the horse, this reference to a lien by contract, several times repeated, was not adjusted to the evidence, and was calculated to mislead the jury, and perhaps cause them to think that a contract to do certain things in regard to a horse included a contract to create a lien upon it for those services, whether they were such as the statute in this State would create a lien for or not. It is true that the judge wrote off a part of the recovery, and left standing only what he considered well authorized by the evidence; a^d also that he charged that un
Taken alone, some of the charges on which error was assigned were subject to criticism in using such expressions in regard to the defendants as, “in their line of business as livery-stable keepers,” and, “they would have a lien as livery-stable keepers for all these items, if you find that- to be the contract.” Expressions of this character standing alone might have been understood by the jury as meaning that the presiding judge recognized the defendants as livery-stable keepers, and dealt with them as such, whereas whether they were or not was a question for the jury. Although qualified by other portions of the charge, it would have been better not to have so charged as to authorize such impressions on the mind of the jury. But this will probably not occur on another trial.
Judgment reversed.