112 Ky. 376 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1901
Lead Opinion
'Opinion oe the court by
Reversing.
In this suit to settle the estate of Mrs. B. J. Tuck, deceased, it was alleged in the petition that the personal estate wias insufficient to pay her indebtedness, and that It would be necessary “to sell some part or all of the realty” ■owned by the decedent at her death. She owned about 900 .acres of land in Christian county, and left, as her' heirs at law, she having died intestate, two adults and one infant child, and an infant grandchild. The petition further alleged that it would be to the interest of all the heirs to sell all the land. Answers filed by the adult heirs reasserted such alleged benefit. Before tbe amount of the indebtedness bad been ascertained, and without an allegation as to its sum, the court decreed a sale of all the land owned by the decedent at her death.’ In the judgment of sale it was provided that so much of the purchase money as was going to the infants should not be1 collected, but was to remain a lien upon the land. The land was ■sold by the commissioner in two parcels, both to appellant
The proceedings were under section 489 of the Civil. Code of Practice, which provides for the sale of an infant’s, estate in real property: First, for the payment of a debt or liability of its ancestor for which he may be legally charged upon, brought against him pursuant to section 428, which is the section of the Civil Code of Practice providing for the settlement of estates -of deceased persons;, second for the payment of a debt or liability of -an infant in an action brought against him by his creditor; third, for maintenance and education of the ward in an action by his guardian; fourth, in an action for the maintenance of a lunatic and his family; fifth, in an action against an infant by his guardian for a sale of the estate- and reinvestment in other property. It is manifest that, this action was brought under the first subsection named;
Vowles’ Heirs v. Buckman, 6 Dana, 466; Henning v. Harrison, 13 Bush, 720; Walker v. Smyser’s Ex’rs, 80 Ky., 620; (4 R. 662) Meddis v. Bull’s Admr, 13 R. 767 (18 S. W., 6.) Much concern has been manifested, in which some members of the court to some extent share, lest an adherence to the more stringent rule in behalf of the infant’s interest should relax that other important tenet of the courts that treats as valid, till reversed or vacated in a direct proceeding for that purpose, every judgment of a court of general jurisdiction. We can not be fairly misunderstood as in any wise relaxing the latter rule. On the contrary, in its 'general application, we adhere to it. Nor do we depart from it in this instance, as an exception new to the law. Courts of general jurisdiction frequently have conferred upon them special powers by the Legislature. Of such! the question has arisen in many jurisdictions, are the exercise of such special powers governed by the same general rule applicable to those matters within the general jurisdiction of the courts? From an overwhelming array of authorities, with- but few States opposing the doctrine, with two adopting a modified rule, Freeman thus tersely states the conclusion at which the courts have arrived: “The jurisdiction exercised by courts of record is, in many cases, dependent upon special statutes conferring an authority in derogation of the common law, and specifying the manner in which such authority shall be employed. The decided preponderance of adjudged eases-upr
Our first notable decision involving this question is Vowles’ Heirs v. Buckman, 6 Dana, 466. That was an action of ejectment in which it was proved, on the part of the plaintiffs, that their ancestor, Yowles, claimed under several deeds, one of which emanated through a record of the Nelson circuit court purporting to contain a history of
A history of the statute law of this State on this subject may not be out of place in this point in the investigation. The act of March, 1791, provides that descended estates, held jointly by an infant or other person under disability and another, when the dividend of each isha.ll not exceed the value of ¿30 in the opinion of any court mentioned in the act, it should" be lawful for the high court of chancery, etc., to decree a sale. Morehead & B., Ky. St., 290. The next act was the one approved February 3, 1813 (5 Litt. Ky. Laws, 57; Morehead & B., Ky. St., 806), the pre
True, in the revision the words at the beginning of section 2 of chapter 86 of the Revised Statutes, viz.: “Before a court shall have jurisdiction to decree a sale of infants’ lands,” are omitted. These words prefaced the provisions concerning the appointment and report of the commissioners, the taking of proof showing the propriety of the sale, and the execution of the bond provided in subsection 3, set out above. It is argued that the omission from the revision of the clause quoted from section 2 of chapter 86 of the words just stated shows a legislative purpose to relax the stringency of requirements concerning such proceedings. It must be assumed, though, that the Legislature had in mind, in framing the revision, such construction as this court had previbusly placed upon the statutes re-embodied in section 489,. Civil Code Prac., etc.
Looking again to the numerous utterances of this court
From the foregoing and other dicta it is by some argued that, where the courts and Legislature have been saying “void,” they meant “voidable” only. It must be noted, though, that the opinion further says that the former opinions of the court holding such proceedings void used that term as the equivalent of voidable. No decision is named in the opinion, and none of those cited in this opinion save Barber’s Adm’rs v. Hopewell, 1 Metc., 262, Wells v. Cowherd’s heirs, 2 Metc., 514, and Wyatt v. Mansfield’s Heirs, 18 B. Mon., 780, were cited on the briefs of counsel. His ov?n strong opinion, in Singleton v. Cogar, supra, delivered in 1838, to the contrary, not to mention the numerous other cases above named, opposing this statement, could not have been in the judge’s mind. Besides, the language used by the General Assembly, at the close of subsection 3 of section 2 of chapter 86, quoted above, was as positive as that used in the opinions of this court. The court, then, seems to have decided that the original sale w<as not shown to be void, because of the silence of the record on certain points. But they were unwilling to rest their opinion on any such conclusions, for they then said: “I'f, as we are inclined to think,' the sale was not void, in any of the senses of that word, that would end this controversy. But, not being perfectly satisfied with that as a judicial conclusion, we will now proceed to notice the two objections made here to the chancellor’s decree of confirmation.” Then the court held that the special acts before mentioned cured any defects in the original sale. The codifiers of the law on the subject of the sale of infants’ lands, therefore, were met with what appeared to be an utterance of this court to the effect that by the use of the
The construction to be placed on these sections of the statute, as affecting sales of infants’ real estate, has not been had since the adoption of the Civil. Code of Practice in its present form. We deem it of importance scarcely less than the correct solution of the main question that the conclusion reached now may be regarded by the profession, and those having occasion to investigate the subject, as decisive of the question. To do so it may be necessary to consider a number of other decisions of this court, in which the principles here involved appear to have been at least collaterally under consideration, but none of which, in our opinion, are in conflict with the conclusion we announce. Robinson v. Redman, 2 Duv., 82, was a proceeding under section 543 of Myer’s Code for the sale of city or town lots “held by, or in 'trust for, co-parceners, joint tenants, or tenants in common, when a division would materially impair the value.” The court distinguished this proceeding from those under chapter 86 of the Revised Statutes, above discussed, and the court held that after a jurisdiction had attached, as was shown to have been done in that case, a failure to,comply with some requirement of practice, such as the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the infants, would not render the judgment void, but merely erroneous. In that case it further appeared that a sale of the lots was necessary in order to pay specific legacies and debts of the testator, and that the court of equity decreeing the sale took jurisdiction of
Two grounds were relied upon in that case as holding the judgment of sale void — First, that' the commissioners appointed by the court had not reported whether the interest of the infant or idiot required the sale to be made; second, that the bond executed was not as required by the statute. The court found that the report of the commissioners was a substantial compliance with the statute, but that, whether it was or not, it was not such an informality as would fender the judgment void; but the court found that the bond had been executed substantially as required by the statute, and was sufficient for everj practical purpose of the law. The court, however, rested its decision finally upon the other and distinct grounds, which, in our opinion, were sufficient. It held that the land had been sold for a full, fair price, that the purchase price had been turned over to the guardian of the infants, and subsequently accounted for by him to them and their husbands upon their arriving at age, and that, therefore, an estoppel was worked upon them, and that it would not be equitable to allow them to reclaim the land, .under the circumstances, without returning the purchase price, allowing for an accounting of rents, interest, improvements, wastes, etc., though the court held, or at least so strongly intimated that we understand it to have so held, that, by making such tender and allowing such an accounting, the judgment would be vacated, even in that collateral proceeding. In Revill’s Heirs v. Claxon’s Heirs, 12 Bush, 558, the principal question was whether the failure to incorporate the names of the infants in the caption of the peti
After all, 'besides the general doctrine constituting the practice of enlightened tribunals in so many other jurisdictions-, and admitting that we were quite free to ignore the judicial -and legislative construction so long applied in this State, why should we adopt a different rule? It is said innocent purchasers at these sales, or innocent purchasers subsequent to the sales, may be injured, may sustain loss, if this rule is adhered to. That can not be, though, except the parties to the proceeding have shown, and the court had suffered, such a palpable departure from their plain statutory duty as would result in loss to the infant unless this rule stands. It, then, is the question, which should .suffer, if either must, — the infant whose utter helplessness makes it impossible for him to know, much less to prevent, the wrongful act, or the adult purchaser, whose ripened judgment and experience and sense of caution, prompted by self interest, all make it his duty, as it is his opportunity, to look and to know, before he parts with his money, whether these plain statutory requirements have been performed? Shall such a negligent one, to save himself from loss, .which could not have been but for such negligence, be permitted to say to the babe robbed of his patrimony, “I am the innocent one?” Or, it may be said, it is the sanctity of the judgments of the courts — their stability — that must be upheld. Are the judgments that were made for property rights of more importance than the property rights for which they were made? It is not sound public policy that would tempt perfidy in dealing with infants’ -estates, or at best condone their neglect by those
What sufficient reason could be urged upon us to justify our allowing the infant’s title to be passed for a different purpose, or in a different manner, than the lawmaking body of the State has seen fit to provide? We can conceive of none. We therefore hold that, when the proceedings show that the statutory ground or necessity for selling the infant’s lands do not exist, or where the bond required by the Civil Code of Practice (section 493), has not been executed, the judgment and sale are void. The infant loses no rights under them, and the purchaser takes none. Lest confusion may arise in some minds as to the extent of this ruling, we also reaffirm what was said'in Gill v. Givin’s Adm’r, supra,' viz.: “It may be proper to add, in reply to a suggestion of counsel, that, in our opinion, it does not necessarily follow from what we have said that an order for the sale of so much of the real estate descended or devised to an infant as might be necessary to pay a certain sum adjudged to be due the decedent’s creditors woulcl be void if erroneous as to the sum adjudged to be due.” (Page 199.) We may also add, where the lot or land sought to be sold is indivisible without impairment1 of its value, the Code furnishes ample and exclusive provision for proceedings to sell it as an entirety. Where the lot is indivisible, and some part of it is necessary to pay1 the ancestor’s debts, as said in Gill v. Givin’s Adm’r (page 198),
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting opinion of
This case involves the construction of the provision of section 429 of the Code of Practice, that, in actions to settle decedents’ estates, when the personalty is insufficient for the payment of the debts, “the court may order the real property descended or devised to the heirs or devisees, who may be parties to the action, or so much thereof as shall be necessary, to be sold for the payment of the residue of such debts.” The question is, upon what basis is it to be determined liow much land it is necessary to sell for the payment of the debts? When the land is divisible, and enough of it maj'- be sold to .pay the debts without impairing the' value of the part sold or that remaining, ■ the court shall order a sale of so much land as will pay the debts. But, if the property is indivisible, as in the case of a town lot occupied by a valuable building, then the whole must be sold, although bringing much more than the amount of the debt. The power of the chancellor to sell more land than required to pay the debts would not stop here; because it is his duty to protect, not to sacrifice, the interest of the heirs at law; and, where the property is divisible, but when much more valuable when sold together than if separated, he would have the power to sell. the whole rather than inflict a loss on the heirs, although
In making a sale under this section, where, for illustration, the debts are $5,000, and the land is worth $10,000, and two-thirds of it may be sold for $5,000, .the chancellor is not required to order a sale of two-thirds when the other third will only be worth- $2,500. The word “necessary” is not to be strictly construed, but liberally, with a view to promote the purposes of the section. Its object was to provide for the' payment of the decedent’s debt without unnecessary sacrifice of the interests of the heirs, and for this reason' the power to settle the estate was vested in the chancellor exercising his usual equity jurisdiction, as in .the settlement of other trusts. In this case it was averred that the debts were considerable, that a sale of a part of the land was necessary, and that it would be to the interest of the heirs for all the land to be sold. Each of the adult heirs filed an answer, in which they admitted this to be true, and joined in the prayer of fhe petition for a sale of all the land. The statutory guardian of one of the infant defendants filed a similar answer. The guardian ad litem for the other infant, who had no statutory guardian, filed a report, stating that he had examinéd the record, had n.o defense to make, and knew no reason why the prayer of the
None of the other cases cited arose in suits to settle decedents’ estates, and all of them were decided before the adoption of the present’Civil Code of Practice, which was clearly intended to modify the rigor of the former rule. It is a noteworthy fact that since,the decision of Thornton v. McGrath, in February, 1864, no sale of infants’ land has been adjudged void. In Walker v. Smyser’s Ex’rs, 80 Ky., 620 (4 R. 662) an earnest effort was made to get the court to adjudge the sale void; but the court upheld the sale, under the general power of the court of chancery to execute a trust. In Robinson v. Redman, 63 Ky., 82, it was held, following Thornton v. McGrath, that the provisions of tble statute are merely directory to the court, and their nonob
In Henning v. Harrison, 13 Bush, 723, the doctrine of these cases- was adhered to, and it was said: “It is only when the required bond is not given that the judgment is void.” The same conclusion was announced in Kendall v. Briggs, 81 Ky., 123. (4 R. 854). In Spencer v. Milliken, 4 Ky. Law Rep., 856; Bronston v. Davidson, Id., 56; Johnson v. McDyer (11 R. 29) 9 S. W., 778; McNew v. Martin (22 R. 1175) 60 S. W., 412, —the above decisions were recognized. The rule laid down in the latter decisions has evidently been acted upon and acquiesced in by the Legislature in the adoption of the present statute, and, even if this was regarded a sale of infants’ land under these statutes, the sale would be voidable, and not void, however erroneous the judgment may have been. It has been the settled policy of this State to uphold judicial sales. Many titles have been made and large amounts of money have been invested on the faith of the decisions above referred to. It seems to be unwise and unwarranted for this court to depart from them after they have been recognized as the law of. the State for