Opinion by
This is аn action in assumpsit for damages for breach of an express warranty. The trial Judge who heard the case without a jury, found a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $3096.85. All of the defendant’s exceptions were dismissed by the Court en banc, and judgment Was entered on the verdict. From this order and judgment the defendant appeals.
The basic question is whether defendant’s printed catalogue setting forth the capacity of its bоiler was an express warranty and if so, whether such warranty was clearly excluded under the franchise agreement previously made between plaintiff and defendant.
On December 20, 1945, defendant, who is a manufacturer of a patented oil burning device, entered into a franchise agreement with plaintiff who is a dealer or distributor. The agreement provided as follows:
Sec. 8. “The Manufacturer shall repаir or replace, without charge, any parts manufactured or supplied by it which may prove defective from poor materiаl or workmanship; within one year from date of installation, provided. the Distributor . . . immediately forwards.such alleged defective parts prеpaid to the Man *348 ufacturer, accompanied by tbe Manufacturer’s returned parts form . . . The foregoing guarantee constitutes thе only guarantee or warranty given or assumed by the Manufacturer, and it is agreed that there are no implied warranties.”
Subsequently the defendant in the regular course of distribution published and disseminated its circular or catalogue in which it offered to the trade a SteamPak Generator' SPL 50-5 with a further statement that it had a specified heating capacity of 7300 EDR steam per hour. Plaintiff purchased this boiler relying uрon the manufacturer’s statement of its capacity. This reliance upon the manufacturer’s statements of capacity was in аccord with the general practice in the trade because the manufacturer of such an article possesses virtually exclusive knowledge of the quality and capacity of its product and the buyer little or none. The Judge, sitting as a jury, further found as a fact that the bоiler did'not have the heating capacity described, and his findings, as well as the verdict, were sustained by the Court en banc.
The unqualified statement of capacity made in writing by defendant (the manufacturer) constituted an express warranty under Sec. 12 of The Sales Act (Act of May 19, 1915, P. L. 543, 69 PS 121) whiсh provides: “Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods . . .”
Defendant contends that plaintiff is precluded from recovery for breach of warranty because Paragraph 8 of the Distributor’s Agreement provides as herein-above noted,, “the foregoing guarantee [as to repairs ■and replacements for. poor material' or workmanship] constitutes the only guarantee- оi* warranty given or -assumed by .the' Manufacturer U.: As we said in
*349
Boyd v. Smith,
The lower court in an able opinion dismissed defendant’s contention on two grounds, one of which was that the interpretation of the franchise agreement sought by it would violate public policy. For reаsons hereinafter appearing we need not decide this question, although we cannot refrain from pointing out that if a manufacturer could escape all liability for future warranties by an agreement excluding them it would ofttimes be injurious if not disastrous to the business world and would open wide the door to fraudulent misrepresentations. We decide this case on the ground that the protective or exclusion clause in question relates only to prior or contemporaneous or present express warranties. Such an exclusion prоvision, while valid as hereinabove set forth, must be strictly construed, and so construed, we have no doubt that it was not intended to apply and did not apply to future express warranties which the manufacturer might make to the distributor or to others purchasing its product in reliance thеreon. Moreover, if a contract is ambiguous, a reasonable construction is always to be preferred to ah unreasonable one. •
- ■ The Parol Evidence Rule which prohibits the admission of oral evidence to vary- or contradict a written contract dоes- not .apply to-.or prohibit, a subsequent
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modification by parol; it applies only to prior or contemporaneous statements or agreements which induced the written agreement in question.
Grubb v. Rockey,
Defendant also contends that plaintiff failed to show (a) that it resold the boiler under the warranty of its capacity and (b) that the plaintiff’s loss which resulted from the cancellation of its contract with the purchaser because of a violation of express warranty was the natural and probable result of manufacturer’s breach of warranty. In
Wolstenholme v. Randall,
Considering the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff —as we are bound to do after a verdict in his favor:
Lanni v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company,
Judgment affirmed.