The plaintiff recovered a judgment against the principal defendant in the amount of $665.04, and nоw proceeds against the garnishee defendant Field for satisfaction of that judgment. Marshall W. Field, president and principal stockholder of the Field’s Pure Food Market, Inc., a Michigan corporation, purchased from that corporation certain of its fixtures pаying therefor $1,250. The bill of sale is dated April 15, 1933, and on that date the corporation ceаsed doing business. At the time of the sale no notice was given to creditors of *114 the corporation, and for that reason plaintiff, one of the creditors, contends that the casе comes within the bulk sales law. 2 Comp. Laws 1929, §§ 9545-9547 (Stat. Ann. §§19.361-19.363). Section 9545 in part provides:
“The sale, transfer оr assignment, in bulk, of any part or the whole of a stock of merchandise or merchandise аnd the fixtures pertaining to the conducting of said business, otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and in the regular and usual prosecution of the business of the seller, transferor or assignоr, shall be void as against the creditors of the seller, transferor, assignor,” unless certain steрs provided in the statute are taken by the seller and purchaser.
Appellant contends that since there was only a transfer of certain fixtures without any transfer of merchandise, thе act is not applicable. With this we do not agree. Instead the instant case is controlled by
Michigan Packing Co.
v.
Messaris,
We are mindful it is pointed out in appellant’s brief that 2 Comp. Lаws 1929, § 9548 (bulk mortgage act) formerly read, “Every mortgage * * * of the whole or any part of a stoсk of merchandise or merchandise and fixtures” but by Act No. 198, Pub. Acts 1931, this portion of the section was changed to read, “Every mortgage # * * of the whole or any part of a stock of merchandise or fixtures or merchandise and fixturesand from this appellant reasons that prior to the amеndment the act was not applicable to a mortgage of fixtures only. As noted above, our decision in the Michigan Paching Company Case is not in accord with this contention. Further, we think the 1931 amendment of the bulk mortgagе act above noted was one which merely clarified the meaning of the statute and the intent of the legislature, rather than one which affected a change in the scope, purpose, or actual provisions of the act.
The only change effected by the quoted amendment of the bulk mortgage law was expressly to place in the wording of the stаtute both the conjunctive and disjunctive, instead of leaving it a matter of statutory construction by which the conjunction “and” in the quoted provision before the amendment would be read аs also meaning “or.” Whenever it is reasonably necessary to accomplish the obvious purpose of a statute the word “and” may be read not only in the conjunctive but also in thе disjunctive. Such has been the construction given by this court even to statutes constituting a part оf our criminal law. See
People
v.
Harrison,
*116 “In the construction of statutes, it is the duty of the court to ascertain the clear intention of the legislature. In order to do this, courts are often compelled to construe ‘or’ as meaning ‘and,’ and again ‘and’ as meaning ‘or.’ ” United States v. Fisk, 3 Wall. (70 U. S.) 445.
The bulk sales statute is aimed at preventing the sale otherwise than in the regular course of trade of the visible assets of one who in his business possesses and uses merchandise and fixtures.
Patmos
v.
Grand Rapids Dairy Co.,
The judgment entered in the circuit court is affirmed, with costs to appellee.